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                    INVISIBLE WOUNDS: 
    A GENEALOGY OF EMOTIONAL ABUSE AND 
                   OTHER PSYCHIC HARMS 
 
 
 
               INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER  
 
 
This dissertation is about how the concept of harm, damage or wound is applied 
as a metaphor to a site often called the self or the soul. This is the social space of 
the individual subject, which is, paradoxically, placed by our language and 
culture in a person’s interior – a place where we are all said to be vulnerable and 
endangered by a potentially hostile environment. The thesis consists of a series 
of studies which are designed to show how the concept of harm to an inner life 
emerges from different discursive contexts, and how it does so in distinctly 
variable versions: psychological, emotional, neurological or social, in more or 
less stable hybrid forms. Using primary sources which are mostly documentary, 
supported by some interviews, the studies range from a look at the psychiatric 
history of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and at the story of its rewriting 
in English tort law; the recent reprised popularity of attachment theory and its 
marriage to neurology and a look at the career of the concept of the emotional 
abuse of children as a social problem category in the legal/administrative 
processes of Child Protection. These are introduced by a first chapter which 
concentrates on the metaphoric content of invisible wounds or psychic trauma 
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and the way it produces particular forms of the self. The studies which follow 
this are clustered around the literature and practices of the psychiatric, 
psychological, psycho-analytic, social work and legal professions, in order to 
show how the work of these professionals makes the concept of a psychic injury 
visible, discussible, treatable, administrable and justiciable. Through their 
efforts, it is argued, the concept moves from being a metaphor, hooked onto the 
palpable reality of a physical wound, to acquire a ‘facticity’ of its own; it 
becomes a reality through its achieved status as a social problem category and an 
ever present risk to self and self regulation at the turn of the 21st century.  
 
 
I. JOURNEY INTO THE INTERIOR 
 
Starting Out 
 
The roundabout ways in which I approached this subject and its title were, 
indeed, something of a journey. When I started this project in 1999, I was well 
acquainted with severe psychological problems, and their variable descriptions 
and treatment modalities, having worked for some years, over the 1980s, as a 
single-handed social worker, family therapist and professional systems 
consultant in a psychiatric unit for adolescents, in a large National Health 
Service teaching hospital. But, in the early 1990s, I changed jobs to work as a 
Research Officer on an ESRC funded study, Social Workers Attitudes to Risk in 
Child Protection and I was keen to ground my thesis in the knowledge I had 
gained here. I wanted particularly to look in detail at the risk assessment process 
for Local Authority Child Protection case conferences and the way social 
workers and assessors of paedophiles accomplished the task of applying the 
rigid, technical categories of risk management to the indeterminate, turbulent 
and morally ambiguous world of their clients. From there, I became increasingly 
interested in what I thought was, at the turn of the new century, the smallest 
category of child abuse, the one least applied to children in the Child Protection 
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registration process,1 certainly the one least talked or written about: emotional 
abuse – a vague puzzling idea and one which would take most work and 
ingenuity to dress up in the calculus of risk. What was it that was ‘at risk’ and 
what would count as evidence in the administrative and legal processing of cases 
where this cruelty was suspected? 
 
My curiosity about this concept and its application was enhanced by two events. 
The first occurred when I began to investigate the meagre literature in this area 
and discovered that there was a copy of the first US book on the subject by John 
Garbarino and colleagues (Garbarino et al, 1986a) in the University Science 
Library – where else? I found it there wedged between two other books. On the 
left was a large medical tome on the physical abuse of children, a photographic 
compendium of injuries on small, fragile bodies, images which were powerful 
and quite pornographic in their raw, red detail; on the right was one of the first 
volumes published on the sexual abuse of children, which consisted in chapters 
of compelling oral testimony by adult survivors, transcribed into the written 
word. I was struck by the force and the directness of their visual and oral 
communication and by the contrasting invisibility and silence of the problem I 
was interested in. The ‘injury’ caused by this abuse could not be seen and nor 
could the inchoate experience of a small child, who had known no other life, be 
put into words. How could the intermittently cruel behaviour of parents be 
observed without continual access to the private world of the family? To be 
made public and visible, this was an injury which would need a subtle form of 
policing and the mediation of a certain sort of professional knowledge. It 
required some convincing theory or stockpile of lay wisdom, which could relate, 
by inference, observable behavioural signs to an invisible mental state and some 
causal parental actions or poor familial relationship. It was hardly surprising that 
the emotional abuse of children had never become the subject of a political and 
media campaign in the US and the UK, in the way that child physical abuse, in 
                                                 
1 In fact, according to the Department of Health (DOH) figures for registrations of child abuse by 
category in 1999, not published until 2000, the figure for emotional abuse just overtook the 
numbers registered for sexual abuse.  
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the form of baby battery and child sexual abuse, had done in the 1960s and the 
1970s-80s respectively. It lay in a hidden territory, which, as in Foucault’s 
version of the psychoanalytic confessional, could only be known or explored 
through the arcane knowledge of experts. 
 
And who were these experts? This question triggered the second event: a 
memory, this time, of a session of an International Society for the Prevention of 
Child Abuse and Neglect (ISPCAN) European Congress in Oslo in 1995, where 
a social work academic from Northern Ireland gave a paper on the urgent 
necessity of finding a definition that would distinguish between the emotional 
and the psychological abuse of children. I was surprised by a paper on this little-
discussed form of child abuse, surprised that what was problematised here was 
the classification of this particular form of deviancy, rather than the behaviour it 
purported to describe. I was even more struck by the vigorous way in which 
some of the leading players in the Child Protection field entered into the 
consequent discussion of taxonomy. I later realised that, at that point, the paper’s 
author had published the only UK monograph on the subject, but that these other 
experts were about to enter the field. Compared to other social problem 
categories, the terrain of emotional abuse was as yet unoccupied and I was 
witnessing my colleagues laying claim to a new strip or two. 
 
It may seem cynical to go from an initial interest in a social problem category 
straight to the politics of its inception, promotion and public recognition, rather 
than to the causes, manifestations and consequences of the problem itself – the 
distress and difficulty located in the child and family. But I had trained in and 
practiced a therapy which, whilst it acknowledged and worked with distress in 
all its forms, intervened with clients at a cognitive rather than an emotional 
level. It was primarily interested in how the client construed the problem, in the 
belief that any such construction, be it lay, psychiatric, psychological or social, 
could be superseded by an infinite number of re-descriptions. It was the 
helpfulness of this framing to the client, rather than its approximation to any 
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objective state of the world, which was of ultimate importance. With such a 
relativist approach to my work (with all its much criticised drawbacks in terms 
of lack of a moral marker), I was also sensitive to the constant negotiation and 
renegotiation of the nature of child and family problems in the eclectic, multi-
professional field of child welfare. Here, child psychiatrists, psychologists and 
psycho-analysts rubbed shoulders with teachers, social workers and lawyers. 
They met in clinics, courts and case conferences, where difficulties for children 
and their families were constantly being rewritten in the light of different 
professional rationalities and organisational imperatives – most especially those 
entailed by scarce resources. 
 
I was aware, of course, that these professional rewritings were not infinite. Apart 
from the limitations imposed by institutional structure, professional rationalities 
depended on a limited set of knowledges, which crossed institutional and 
professional boundaries and were found in multi-professional training manuals, 
journals, literature on sale at conferences and publishers’ lists. The items of this 
repertoire were often mixed up with each other even in the language and 
practices of one individual, let alone in those of one profession or institution. On 
the whole, day to day practice and decision making in this area seemed like a 
thoroughly commonsense affair, in which particular pieces of technical talk were 
adopted for rhetorical purposes – to prove a point or assert a professional 
identity. Nevertheless, several broad discourses could be identified in everyday 
professional practices in the area of emotional abuse and in the academic and 
professional literature. These partial models explaining the behaviour of children 
and families, were sometimes purely behavioural, but more often invoked 
theories of an interior life – medical (psychiatric, psychological and 
neurological) theories of the psychic reaction of human beings to sudden loss or 
shock, often called trauma, socio-medical (psychological and biological) 
theories of the emotional and behavioural reaction of children to poor, disturbed 
or dangerous mother-child relationships, socio-legal theories, more feminist, 
hybrid, rights-based narratives about the depredations of patriarchy and the 
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psychic reactions of victims to abuse of power in all its forms, psycho-social and 
biological theories of child development – all of them set in a rich legacy of two 
centuries of discourse about danger to children from the aberrations of adults, 
both individually and collectively. 
 
It was clear that if I wanted to make problematic the status of the emotional 
abuse of children as an administrative and legal category in the world of Child 
Protection, I could do it in two different ways: first by looking at the inter-
professional politics of its emergence and growth in considerable institutional 
detail, which might indicate a sort of social history of this problem category in 
the form of a classic social constructionist thesis and, second, looking more at 
the genealogy of the concept, marriage, divorce and death in the particular 
knowledge streams that gave birth to the concept. I did not think these two were 
mutually exclusive in theory, but it became clear that, in terms of time and the 
direction of research effort, it would be hard to manage them both. In that sense, 
I had a choice about where to concentrate my gaze. And, simply, I think, 
because I was already familiar with the administrative and legal world of child 
protection, it was the genealogies, the related world of the ‘psy’2 professionals, 
with their more esoteric knowledge, which aroused my curiosity. I wanted to 
think more specifically about the psychological or emotional harm said to be 
done by this version of abuse and how particular psychiatric, psychological and 
legal versions of psychic harm contributed to the way it was construed and 
treated. 
 
At this point, a literature search on emotional abuse in general threw up two self-
help books. The first was called Invisible Wounds, by Kay Douglas, a writer and 
therapist from the US. This was a book for women who felt subjugated and hurt 
by men, written by one who had shared their pain (Douglas, 1996). I was taken 
by this metaphor and began to find other examples of its use located in the 
                                                 
2 This is a shorthand for the professions purveying knowledge of individual behaviour and its 
explanations, psychiatry and different forms of psychology and social work. It was first used by 
Michel Foucault and other French poststructuralists.  
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discourses I was already interested in. Apart from the instance of the broken, 
bleeding heart in literary or religious iconography (not always invisible), the 
obvious one was psychic trauma. The word ‘trauma’ is Greek for a wound or a 
piercing of the body’s skin. Its first use, as recorded in the Oxford English 
Dictionary, was in the mid-17th century. In the second half of the 19th century, 
its use was extended to include a form of ‘nervous’ injury by British 
neurologists working on the effects of railway accidents. Freud himself first used 
trauma as a metaphor for psychological harm in his work on hysteria (Breuer et 
al, 1955 [1893-1895]; Freud, 1966 [1892-94]) as did William James, who, 
almost contemporaneously in 1894, described certain reminiscences of shock as 
‘psychic traumata, thorns in the spirit, so to speak’.3 Now it is part of a 
flourishing vernacular about shock and psychic hurt and has emerged in the 
medical world as the diagnostic category of post traumatic stress disorder. There 
is the notion of traumatic attachments in the mother/child relationship and that of 
spiritual wounds inflicted in racism or hate speech, bullying or harassment, or 
collective wounds to groups and even nations, an example of which occurs in the 
discourse of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions.4 This language of the 
wound was also accompanied by its causes and consequences, as in wounding 
words, psychic pain, mental anguish, damage, sickness, healing and scarring, 
and its location, as with deep wounds, spiritual lesions, hurting inside and, of 
course, the notion of vulnerability and so impending danger. I began to think 
about the power of the physical metaphor of the wound and the work that it does 
in discourse. How might it help to make the incorrigible private experience of 
psychic harm into a social problem which was discussable, theorisable and even 
legally actionable? At the same time, I was curious as to how the dualistic 
philosophy of the law, in which the mind inhabits its body as a possession, could 
ever accommodate to the idea of harm to an inner life.5 
 
  
                                                 
3 In Psychological Review 1:199. 
4 See Chapter 1. 
5 This is considered in Chapter 3. 
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Metaphor and Interiority 
 
At first, it seemed clear that the metaphor of invisible wounds primarily locates 
the injury in some kind of mental or emotional space inside an individual. This 
was underlined by the metaphor of the second self-help book I had found, called 
Inward Bound: Exploring the Geography of Your Emotions, by Sam Keen, a 
clinical psychologist, which was reminiscent of John Sutherland’s earlier 
biography of the distinguished psychoanalyst Ronald Fairbairn, Fairbairn’s 
Journey into the Interior (Sutherland, 1989). If I embarked on a study of 
invisible wounds, how was I going to deal with the whole topic, even 
assumption, of human interiority, ‘the world passed within’, as Charles Taylor 
put it in Sources of the Self  (Taylor, 1989)? I was in no danger of making my 
own journey into the vast and intractable terrain of the interior world of the self 
or the soul (a space which, though it is continually explored and rewritten, is still 
as mysterious as the dark continent of Africa was to Western explorers in the 
19th century). For all I knew it was the Kingdom of Prester John, a land of myth 
and legend. I was not going to ‘go native’. I was (and remain) agnostic about the 
real nature and location of this interior, seeing the accounts of those who claim 
to have been there as dependent on the culture and practices of the explorers, 
themselves, and their colonising homeland. For example, Foucault saw this 
tricky, even hostile land, with deep, impenetrable subterranean caves, as created 
and elaborated in the context of the psycho-analytic confessional, where the 
arcane techniques of experts helped the inhabitants to imagine and map their 
world, making it the subject of systematic ‘scientific’ knowledge and therefore 
power and regulation. In the more recent psychological paradigms of cognitive 
or cognitive behavioural therapy, the natives are the informants, giving first-
hand accounts of the lie of their flatter and less savage landscape – expert, 
privileged observers of their own mental behaviour. In both cases, the maps and 
charts are all produced within the linguistic and therefore social processes by 
which subjectivities and their worlds are made up. Any pre-cultural psychic 
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interior cannot, by definition, be seen or spoken of. It may be a no-place, though 
not, according to Freud and Klein, a utopia! 
 
Moreover, not only can it only be broached within a cultural domain, it would, 
as the last paragraph testifies, be hard to imagine without metaphor. This is a 
complicated claim which is based on the fact that many of the abstract 
theoretical constructs which are used to explain human behaviour within a 
psychological paradigm started life as everyday concepts, and often as 
metaphors, from which the figurative content has been gradually lost, as they 
have become abstract, reified, technical categories; they are inferred from certain 
sets of observable behaviour, which they are then used to explain. Like the 
language of the emotions (Griffiths, 1997), metaphors of a psychic interior, 
concepts like depression, stress and, of course, trauma – a psychic wound – and 
emotional abuse as harm, seem to lack an obvious referent, although they have 
meaning, embedded in language’s figurative history and current social use. 
Aristotle, the arch-realist, wrote that ‘metaphor consists in giving the thing a 
name that belongs to something else.’6 In a realist world, it is the nature or 
existence of this thing which is problematic. 
 
So any discussion, examination or elaboration of the nature of a psychic interior 
plunges us further into a figurative world; any consideration of the work that the 
metaphor of the psychic wound does in discourse to make this interior place 
public, treatable, administrable, immediately involves more metaphors. Most 
especially, it involves a spatial trope, based on a dichotomy between interior and 
exterior sites, public and private domains, and on movement between the two; a 
narrative about ‘bringing forth’ from incorrigible self-knowledge to vocal 
expression or visibility in the social domain. These two registers of knowledge 
of another, according to Susan Sontag, are the basis of the two modes in which 
metaphor functions – the ‘expressive and the scientific’ (Sontag, 1991: 91). If 
                                                 
6 Aristotle The Poetics 8. Chapter 21, 1457b1 - 30. translated by Ingram Bywater, quoted in 
Garrett, J. (2007), Aristotle on Metaphor, http://www.wku.edu/~jan.garrett/401s07/arismeta.htm 
[accessed, 22 February, 2008]. 
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this dissertation were just about the work of metaphor as something which 
locates, names and ‘brings forth’ a ‘private place’ into the social world, it would 
simply be part of the process it was writing about. 
 
But I have already declared agnosticism about this inner world – a belief that it 
is ontologically subjective, a creation of the social domain. So I had to be clear 
that while metaphor may be said to reveal or make discussable a private place, it 
also facilitates its creation as a new form of life. The language and practices of 
the invisible wound can not only be described as revealing a particular form of 
subjectivity; in the revealing, they also make it. Susan Sontag writes in her 
introduction to Aids and its Metaphors that ‘saying a thing is something-it-is-not 
is a mental operation as old as philosophy and poetry and the spawning ground 
of most kinds of understanding’ (Sontag, 1991: 91). We could add that saying, in 
metaphor, that a thing is something-it-is, creating facticity, seems to be a 
similarly ancient mental occupation. We are all expert users of this linguistic 
convention, just as we are all expert users of language in general.  
 
But what is significant in Sontag’s formulation is that it catches the negative 
basis of metaphor. For example, in the case of a spiritual or psychological 
wound, we do not really think that when someone declares or shows extreme 
distress that their soul or their psyche is pierced or opened up painfully by a 
forceful object or weapon. But our language and ways of thinking about this 
process are almost totally taken from the body and its hurts.7 So, to describe 
distress, our words for bodily hurts must be qualified by the adjective ‘mental’, 
‘psychological’ etc. And to start with, at least, such qualifiers have a certain 
disqualifying connotation. For example, the qualifier, ‘invisible’, for a wound, 
suggests that the wound is not a gross bodily lesion after all; that is, not a 
                                                 
7 Apart from the word distress (from the Latin districtus: divided in mind) words like pain, hurt, 
harm, injury or damage all primarily refer to the physical; they are either connected to the neural 
system or, in law, to the body as property and, only very remotely, to a person’s rights. 
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wound. As the critic John Lanchester pointed out,8 ‘all metaphors have, to some 
extent, an anti-realistic effect’ and Gilbert Ryle went further when he reminded 
an Oxford seminar that ‘making a mental note’ was precisely not to make a note 
at all (Eagleton, 2001: 163)! The suggestion is that with time and habitual use, 
these qualifiers lose their disqualifying power; they are taken for granted and 
become part of a phrase with a unified meaning, not dependent on its supposed 
metaphorical referent; they can be dropped, and a powerful, often implicit, 
theoretical context used to provide their intention. This process is traced in 
Chapter 4 on the history of the concept of emotional abuse as a problem 
category, where these historical stages in the development of a metaphor are 
identifiable.  
 
So, over time, the figurative content of a metaphor seems partly lost. In the 
current use of the word ‘trauma’ in the psy sciences, for example, there is little 
qualification. But when Freud first used the wound as metaphor at the beginning 
of the 1890s in his notes on an edition of lectures by Charcot (Freud, 1966 
[1892-94]), he talks of the ‘traumatic hysteria’ and ‘psychical trauma’ He makes 
it clear that he is talking about the psychic consequences of a material event, a 
trauma. ‘Hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences’ (Breuer et al, 1955 [1893-
1895]: 7) and whether the event is an accident involving physical injury or one 
which merely causes intense fright, anxiety or shame, is immaterial. The word 
trauma is subtly expanded by Freud from an identifiable event, which might 
perhaps be or cause a physical wound, to include its psychic sequelae (Freud, 
1966 [1892-94]: 137). So, in the concept of psychic trauma, the physical 
references seem to fade – or do they? Is it just that they are present at a 
subliminal or habitual level, directing our thoughts and ideas about the inner life, 
and their practices, in certain ways rather than others? 
 
                                                 
8 In a Guardian newspaper tribute to Muriel Spark. 
http://www.newagebd.com/2006/may/12/liti.html [accessed 22 February, 2008]. 
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Edward Manier (Manier, 1980) has described how, in the development of 
scientific programmes of work, a series of tropes – figurative representations – 
are used. These are then gradually replaced by literal, unequivocal, technical 
expressions. Imaginative correlatives of the language used fade and words come 
to have a unitary, scientific or technical meaning. The full ontological 
significance of a theory, he says, can only be recaptured through attention to its 
dialectical relation with its cultural context. It appears, however, that, in the case 
of the metaphor of the wound, this process of theorisation is far more 
complicated and the technical expression is far less detached from its cultural 
context than Manier suggests above. This is for two basic reasons. The first is 
simply the ideological nature of psychology itself, in which so many categories 
are, like those for the emotions, grounded in the vernacular (Griffiths, 1997: 2-
5). Besides this, the fact that the human mind and emotions are both the subject 
as well as the object of its observations confers a highly ambiguous ‘scientific’ 
status on the psychological sciences, as noted in Chapter 1. What appears to be 
objective is sustained by tacit knowledge from introspection or the testimony of 
subjects within a linguistic and, therefore, social domain which is saturated with 
figurative understandings.  
 
The second reason is that the same processes of figurative loss, abstraction and 
reification, to which Manier refers, in scientific theorisation, also constantly 
occur in popular usage, for which science itself, far from providing merely 
abstract ideas, provides a new and fertile source of metaphor.9 When Freud first 
envisaged traumatic harm to the psychic system, he still used the language of 
19th century physiology - the cell or the neuron (Freud, 1966 [1895]). However, 
he later shifted this physical schema to provide a more figurative account of 
                                                 
9 Caroline Steedman notes that tracing the dissemination of discourse from dominant cultural 
forms, official and often scientific texts, through a sort of trans-social diaspora is the most 
difficult task for the historian of ideas. Steedman, C. (1995) Strange Dislocations: Childhood 
and the Idea of Human Interiority, 1780-1930. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. It 
would presumably be as difficult the other way around, tracing the exact pathways by which 
demotic and figurative concepts become embodied in theoretical and often reified categories. 
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psychological or psycho-dynamic concepts (Freud, 1950 [1920]: 3-64).10 Over a 
period of time, these bodily influences have been, at least partially, shed, so that 
the notion of trauma as purely damage or hurt to a psychic interior – ‘the 
feelings’ – has acquired a legitimacy of its own as a theoretical construct in the 
psy disciplines, in the manner Manier describes. But it has also found its way 
into self-help literature and back into popular ‘psychologised’ discourse. Thus in 
the expressive, figurative language of literature and the everyday, the more 
recent ‘technical’ concept of ‘trauma’ joins and elaborates the metaphor of 
‘wounded feelings’; it suggests that a private event might be likened to one 
which has some legitimate public status, one which has a name which is lodged 
among an array of official diagnostic categories, necessitating medical attention, 
if not legal compensation. 
 
Metaphor is clearly not a simple linguistic device; all language functions in 
complex ways, and the metaphor of the invisible wound is no exception. First, it 
covers a large domain of meaning; second, this domain is constantly enlarging 
through time and spreading over different social contexts in a sort of 
‘metaphoric flow’ between bodies of thought (Figlio, 1976: 26), as it migrates 
between expressive and scientific language and back again; and third, it works to 
create new meanings for the concepts it refers to in ways that may have social 
and political significance. All of these points are enlarged in Chapter 1. 
 
Techniques of the Interior 
 
Although I was addressing figurative accounts of a wound to some inner site, I 
had to remain clear that I was not just looking at a linguistic phenomenon, an 
exercise in syntax and semantics; and although it was tempting to do a sort of 
cultural ‘reading’, I decided to confine this to one chapter only – Chapter 1 – 
and, even there, I do not attempt to engage with the millions of accounts of 
human suffering, present in world literature since the Myth of Gilgamesh, the 
                                                 
10 See Chapter 1. 
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oldest written story (Godwin, 2002: 18-22). What I wanted to concentrate on 
was the notion of psychic harm as opposed to suffering – suffering-induced (and 
inducing) change for the worse; damage to the wholeness and integrity of the 
soul; a departure from the normal. For this implies in its study and formulation 
not just experience or observation or literary expression; it entails its very 
creation by a range of helpful and expert others: it is shaped by a self-confirming 
understanding both driven and limited by skills in intervention and healing – in a 
word, by technique . 
 
Although the exploration of this inner world is presented in the narratives of 
those who claim to have been there, these expeditions, as in the great 15th and 
16th century ‘Age of Exploration’, could not have been envisaged without 
contemporary technological advance in navigation, boat building, weapons and 
the rest – ‘ways and means’ (Latour, 1988 [84]: 47) – a thoroughly 
technological, interventive understanding of being. As in the new forms of 
micro-biology, the method of study is no more the hermeneutic gaze of subject 
on object (Heidegger, 1977; Rheinberger, 2000). These were not just voyages of 
discovery, but, also, of colonisation and control. So accounts of psychic hurt had 
to be seen, not just in terms of what was related, but of who the explorers were; 
who were their friends and professional colleagues; who had funded their 
expeditions and for what purpose; what were they trying to prove; whose 
account were they trying to disqualify and why; what other expeditions were 
they trying to pre-empt? Besides this, and most important, what maps did they 
emerge with to locate and describe what they had seen and by what practices and 
accomplishments did they try to make this interior territory a part of the known 
world – not some exotic other, but literally mundane, a place where the same 
social customs and rules would be as applicable as everywhere else? How did 
they make this place the subject of regulation? 
 
In fact, I did not have to wait long to discover one such technique. This was a 
piece of evidence, a picture, with all the truth and immediacy of a travel 
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photograph, taken in the interior and brought back for our inspection. There it 
was on the page of a Sunday Newspaper, a large grey, grainy image of a human 
brain with its two hemispheres of slightly uneven size.11 Above it was the 
headline:  
 
HARSH WORDS CAN DEFORM CHILDREN’S BRAINS FOR 
LIFE 
 
And, below it was the caption:  
 
An abused child’s brain is uneven – the larger hemisphere rules the 
rest. 
 
Neuro-imaging: a snapshot of harm to this internal territory; a piece of 
compelling evidence of the dangers to human development of a discouraging 
and hurtful social environment. This was not the picture or the place I had 
expected. Was the invisible wound located in a psychic or a biological space, or 
were these indistinguishable? On which side of the rift valley between body and 
soul had the conflicting accounts of the explorers placed it; where had they 
located the raging sea of the passions or the still mere of motives (Danziger, 
1997)? And if the invisible wound was sited in the body, was it, with all the 
techniques of modern medicine, invisible; or was it, in fact, a visible wound, 
sited at a microbiological level – not a metaphor at all?  
 
Obviously, this was just one technique of discovery and one version of the inner 
world amongst a plurality of techniques and accounts, their form arising 
contingently in different social situations, with different professional imperatives 
and different local conditions. With this in mind, I decided that the best way of 
resolving my different leanings and using the work I had already done was to 
make a series of studies of different social and organisational contexts in which 
                                                 
11 Burke, J. The Observer, 31 December 2000: 4. 
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instances of the invisible wound are created and made visible by the writings 
and practices of academics and professionals (in the broad sense of the word). I 
had in mind:  
 
1. the development of the concept of trauma in the history of PTSD in 
psychiatry and tort law – the ‘pure’ case of the wound, since it does not 
necessarily involve crime by another or even always arise in an 
interpersonal context;  
2. the career of the concept of the emotional abuse of children as an official 
problem category in government guidance to Local Authorities on their 
statutory duties in Child Protection, and  
3. an account of this wounding relationship in modern developments in 
attachment theory within the psychoanalytic, neurological and child 
welfare communities.  
 
These studies would be prefaced by a chapter, introducing the metaphor of 
invisible wounds and its appearance in psychiatric, psychoanalytic and 
therapeutic literature across a wide spectrum of sites, and attempting to trace the 
particular form of subjectivity that this metaphor serves to create. 
 
The following case studies could only expose small pieces of the social surface 
to view, localised snapshots of a potentially vast social problem area; in which 
discourses merge and part across time and social space and where there are no 
clear discontinuities. It was obvious that these were not going to throw up any 
major generalisations or grand narratives – except perhaps that there can be none 
– but an emphasis on the contingency and local nature of different assemblages 
of techniques and practices. Nevertheless, certain key themes seemed clear from 
the beginning and from these I distilled three key questions that I wanted to 
explore: first, how this concept of invisible wounds, in its varying 
manifestations, has grown and changed from a metaphor hooked onto the 
palpable reality of a physical wound to something which has a reality of its own; 
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second, to what extent is it made real by its location in the interior of the body 
rather than in an emotional interior, in a biological rather than a psychological 
space, and third, by what route has the threat to this interior space been elevated 
to a major social risk at the end of the 20th century. 
 
 
II. INVISIBLE WOUNDS: THE SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
 
That psychic harm is seen as a major social risk is indubitable.12 Obviously, such 
a claim involves appeal to social changes and particular discursive shifts over 
the last half century, which have none of the clarity of the sort of institutional 
changes that can be pinned down statistically. But the former do manifest 
themselves in the language and preoccupations of the media, academic and 
professional literature and, more important, official government documents and 
guidelines for specialists, which effectively regulate both language and practice 
in the professions of the wound. In these, psychological harm, as a social 
problem category, seems to sit at the centre of a Venn diagram, a unique site, 
where several different major social preoccupations or projects overlap. There 
are, no doubt, many that could be named, but those that seem to stand out can be 
listed thus:  
   
1. the increasing use of the language of psychology and individualisation in 
accounts of social and even political problems (Nolan, 1998);  
2. a broad and complex risk discourse (Douglas, 1992; Luhmann, 1993);  
3. the growth of identity politics with its claims to harm, injury or the 
uneven distribution of risk (Brown, 1995; Clarke, 2004);  
                                                 
12 As I write, the UK is just recovering from extensive flooding. The spokesperson for the 
Institute for Environmental Management and Assessment (the government regulatory agency), 
while roundly rebutting accusations that flood defenses were inadequate, identified the 
psychological distress of the victims as the area which had not been sufficiently studied or 
prepared for. 
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4. our perennial concerns about childhood, child safety, welfare and 
development (Hendrick, 2003);  
5. the socio-political project of producing the flexible, self-motivating, self-
appraising, self-governing individual (Rose, 1999) and  
6. somewhat paradoxically, the increased disciplinary role of the state 
(Brown, 1995).  
 
Risk of Psychic Harm 
 
The infliction of an invisible wound on another covers an enormous number of 
cruel and sometimes criminal acts by individuals, sometimes collective, as well 
as events of unprecedented power and psychological consequences for those 
involved which are not due to the destructive intention of an individual or group 
but to negligence or chance. These can all be construed in the technical language 
of risk as environmental hazards which threaten us all.13 Although some of these 
events are extremely infrequent, they carry highly aversive outcomes, which 
have, until recently, been largely thought of in their physical form; when we 
insure against accidents or ill health, we are usually thinking of the physical 
kind.14 But threats to our psyche are gaining more credibility as legitimation of 
our claims to rights and needs (Douglas, 1992). 
 
It is a commonplace of a particular strand of realist sociological writing that the 
Western world at the end of 20th century was and is a ‘risk society’ (Bauman, 
1994; Beck, 1992; Beck et al, 1994). Reflexive modernity is accompanied by a 
sense of the essential contingency of self, science and society; the technological 
project of controlling and exploiting nature is subject to the stochastic nature of 
the world; uncertainty accompanies every human decision, in which, ‘for 
something gained, something is always lost’ ((Luhmann, 1993). The cosmic 
                                                 
13 For an analysis and critique of this approach, see Douglas, M. (1986) Risk Acceptability 
According to the Social Sciences. London: Routledge. 
14 Medical Insurance both in the USA and the UK will cover treatment for clinically diagnosed 
psychiatric illness. 
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bottle is half empty rather than half full. And this is said to be accompanied by a 
breakdown of trust in the willingness and ability of government and big business 
to respect individual rights; the traditional knowledge of academics and 
professionals no longer has authority and trust moves to self-help groups and the 
law – a system which, because it is based on notions of human intentionality, is 
not ultimately equipped to deal with the problems of risk as an actuarial 
phenomenon (Luhmann, 1993). 
 
In this context, psychic harm can be said to loom on the horizon as an 
environmental hazard as real as any spouting volcano – an outcome of natural 
and technological disasters which are now socially accepted as distressing, 
debilitating and legally actionable (see Chapter 3). In these particular cases, the 
medium of the harm is fear for the physical safety of self and those emotionally 
close. The list of such disasters in the last twenty years is evocative: 
Hillsborough, the Torrey Canyon, the Zeebrugge ferry disaster, Bhopal, the 
Paddington train crash; with Lockerbie, Nine/Eleven and Seven/Seven adding 
the factor of intentional human agency and a new form of risk called ‘terror’. 
Since a team from the Tavistock Clinic (Garland, 1998) first decided to set up 
shop at the scene of the Zeebrugge ferry disaster, it has become automatic for 
UK local authorities to set up counseling services for shocked and bereaved 
victims and distressed rescue workers.15 Powerful and debilitating psychological 
consequences of fear and horror in participants, witnesses or relatives are what is 
expected and part of the tally when the economic and social costs of such events 
are estimated.  
 
                                                 
15 See R. J. Ursano, C. S. F., A E. Norwood (2003) Terrorism and Disaster: Individual and 
Community Mental Health Interventions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The 
effectiveness of such therapeutic debriefing has not gone unquestioned. See Rose, S., Bisson, J. 
& Wessely, S. (2003) A Systematic Review of Single-Session Psychological Interventions 
("Debriefing") Following Trauma Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 72(4), 176-184. 
 30 
By the same token, psychological harm is an expected outcome and cost of the 
horrors of war, for both the military and civilians involved.16 Though its 
presence, in the form of shell shock, was much written about in World War I, 
such harm for the professionals was only finally legitimated by the 
compensation paid by the US government to Vietnam veterans in the late 1970s, 
and by the writing into DSMIII17 of the new diagnostic category of post 
traumatic stress disorder in 1980.18 In the UK media, it was a feature of the 
aftermath of the Falklands War and it is notable that part of the discourse of the 
British press in even contemplating the recent invasion of Iraq was the prospect 
of psychological as well as physical injuries to our soldiers. The US studies on 
returning soldiers produce a figure of 1 in 6, rising to 1 in 3 veterans suffering 
depression or PTSD.19 It is simply part of modern warfare, though a soul count 
is not yet used in its memorialisation, in the way that a body count of the dead 
and injured still serves (Scarry, 1985). In the case of civilians the psychological 
risks of warfare, ethnic cleansing, genocide and mass rape are incontrovertible 
and documented in a vast international academic and institutional literature, 
from UN publications onwards.20  
 
Psychic harm is also part of another environmental danger, listed by the 
technicians of risk as ‘crime’, 21 a problem involving the effects of human 
agency. Under this heading are forms of communication in threatening 
relationships: the crime of psychic assault, a sub-category of grievous bodily 
harm, which induces fear for physical safety in the victims (Horder, 1998 ), as 
                                                 
16 A new book estimating the economic cost of the Iraq war (Stiglitz, J. & Bilmes, L. (2008) 
The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict. Harmondsworth: Allen 
Lane.) includes the cost of care and loss of manpower to the economy from PTSD, as a 
diagnosed medical condition, attributed to returning troops. 
17 The profession-wide diagnostic rubric of the American Psychiatric Association (1980) 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. (3d edn). Washington, D. C.: American 
Psychiatric Association. 
18 See Chapter 2. 
19 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/11/13/terror/main3498789.shtml [Accessed 20th 
January 2009]. 
20 See Chapter 1. 
21 For an example of such lists see Slovic, P. (1987) Perception of Risk. Science, Washington, 
236, 280-285. 
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do the crimes of harassment and stalking (Best, 2008). Other forms of verbal 
communication, which are not generally criminalised, are said to produce 
different negative emotions in addition to fear, such as shame, humiliation and 
self loathing (Nussbaum, 2004). Whilst public defamation and libel, one-off 
events, are judged in civil law for compensation on the basis of consequent loss 
of goods like reputation and earnings, these emotions induced by cruel words 
over a long period are said to produce a slow death of the spirit or ‘soul murder’ 
(Shengold, 1979). Emotional abuse, hate speech, psychological torture, racism, 
bullying, harassment at work and other acts are seen as abuses of power, which 
may be justiciable under some interpretations.22 Current social panics in the UK 
concentrate on the ‘culture of bullying’ of young army recruits at Deepcut and 
Catterick army barracks, the sexual humiliation of Iraqi prisonsers at Abu Graib, 
the degradation of internees at Guantanamo and the rest. Sexual assault, 
degrading treatment of the elderly and vulnerable, and physical and verbal 
aggression in close family relationships, marital and parental, are also said to 
have such an effect on mental states (Kennedy, 1993) and, for example, a 
diagnosis of Battered Wives’ Syndrome has been used as mitigation in some 
cases of women accused of spouse murder.23 
 
The threat of psychic, or any harm to children is thought of as a social problem 
of particularly high valency, since for the last two centuries, at least, the child 
has had such a symbolic importance in our culture. After WWII and the shock 
generated by the poor physical and educational state of the child evacuees who 
poured out of London, children and families became a prime object of social 
policy (Rose, 1999). With the start of the Welfare State, childhood, as a social 
                                                 
22 The Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill passed by the British parliament in 2008, contains 
provision for longer sentencing for crimes of violence or incitement, aggravated by 'hate', i.e. 
motivations of hostility on the grounds of race, gender, sexual orientation or abilities. 
Harassment on these grounds appears in Employment Law, in tribunal cases in which aggravated 
damages are awarded for 'injury to feelings', as well as 'injury to health', cost of care, loss of 
earnings and the rest.  
23 See the case of Sally Thornton, whose 1990 conviction for murdering her husband was 
converted to that of manslaughter in 1996 because of responsibility 'diminished by abnormality 
of mind' (Will Bennett in The Independent, 31st May, 1996). [accessed 25th Jan, 2009]. 
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ideal, became elevated to a protected space, watched over by Mother – a 
nostalgic place of primal innocence and happiness, despite the contemporary 
theories of Freud and Klein. Images of children at risk are constantly used to 
enhance political movements and campaigns, from community panics about 
paedophiles through law-and-order issues and the crisis of the disintegrating 
family, to matters of global ecology, in which ‘children yet unborn’ and 
‘generations to come’ are overwhelming objects of concern. Formally, UK Local 
Authorities have been running a child protection system of increasing cost, 
sophistication and organisation since 1970; the right to protection was written 
into the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (signed by the UK in 1991)24 
and, recently, the government has created a Minister for Children to safeguard 
their especial interests. Meanwhile, child emotional abuse, that is abuse that does 
not touch the body, became an official registration category in this system in 
1980.25 In the administrative processing of abuse, it was initially low on the 
hierarchy of ‘dangerousness’ implicit in the figures but seems to be rising fast 
(see Chapters 4 and 5) as a major risk to children and their psychological and 
emotional development, though it is now coded in another language.  
 
For, here, as elsewhere, ‘risk’ is being reframed. The official parlance of the 
Department for Children, Schools and Families (DfES) has for some time 
avoided the use of the word ‘risk’. Children at risk of abuse were administered 
under a system called ‘Child Protection’ and now children are no longer just 
‘protected’ but ‘safeguarded’. This, it seems, is thought to have more positive 
and more universal connotations26 and is twinned, in Government speak, with 
the reframing of issues of risk in general as those of ‘security’ – a positive 
                                                 
24 See http://www.everychildmatters.gov.uk/strategy/uncrc/ [accessed 10th Dec 2008]. 
25 DHSS (1980) Child Abuse: Central Register Systems. LASSL (80) 4 London: HMSO. 
26 Part of the 'safeguarding procedures' is presented as the statutory programme of assessment for 
need (rather than risk ) and applies to every child that crosses Social Services' threshold and 
every child about whom any involved professional has any concern for her well being or 
development. This is prevention, at least at a secondary level, if not at a primary one, and a case 
of what is called 'net widening' in the Criminological literature. Cohen, S. (1985) Visions of 
Social Control. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
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programme for making safe in the face of threats.27 It is not only the positive 
emphasis that is subtly different. For example, whilst in the UK ‘security’ is still 
very much concerned with ‘protection’ (protecting borders against unwanted 
threats such as immigration and protecting the population against terrorism and 
crime), in the world of international relations the concept of security has 
migrated away from the realist one of sovereign nation states, like individuals, 
manning their own boundaries to become amalgamated with the discourses of 
human rights and human development forming the concept of ‘human security’, 
which is a universal, individual and communal aspiration across borders, 
concerned with the ‘downside risks’ caused by famine and war (often internal ) 
to these same rights and development (Ogata et al, 2003).28 This discourse 
therefore includes an insistence on positive as well as negative freedoms, the 
rights of individuals to have their basic needs met and to develop on some 
optimal path of wellbeing. It is the downside risks to this optimal development 
which have to be guarded against, not just by protection from threats and 
curative action in response to calamity but by the empowerment of people.29 
Psychological health is one such need and a therapeutic process, by definition, is 
one which penetrates the boundaries of individuals as well as states. Thus its 
relationship to empowerment, which invokes the concept of negative as well as 
positive rights, is somewhat problematic.30  
 
The Consequences of Psychic Harm 
 
A general reading of the psy academic, professional and social policy literature 
and the UK media suggests that these consequences are dire for individuals and 
society as a whole. For adults, what seems to be threatened by a psychic injury, 
is varying levels of reactive mental illness, depression, PTSD, dissociative 
                                                 
27 For example, 'energy security' involves a nation making sure of its supplies of oil, gas etc.  
28 The UN Advisory Committee on Human Security was established in the UN Secretariat in 
2004. 
29 See Ogata, S. & Sen, A. (2003) Human Security Now. New York: United Nations 
Commission on Human Security.  
30 See Chapter 1. 
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disorder, obsessive compulsive or eating problems, suicidal or other disturbed 
behaviour (often called maladaptive), signs of unhappiness, restlessness, 
inability to concentrate, unwillingness to socialise, unprompted aggression, 
substance abuse, delinquency and the rest, all of which may last for varying 
periods of time. There is no doubt that psychic harm enlarges the pool of mental 
health problems, which one in four of the UK population is said to have 
experienced (The Royal College of Psychiatry, 2008), especially in the worrying 
guise of environmental ‘stress’, which is apparently ‘the number one complaint 
of British workers’ (Observer, 31 October, 2004) – ‘a stress epidemic’, Richard 
Excell of the TUC calls it. (Financial Times, 1 March, 2004) 
 
The negative consequences here are seen as twofold and represent a bifurcation 
in the way that psychological problems are construed and controlled in this 
country. Stress sufferers either enter the formal medical sector, consuming costly 
care and treatment, with escalating use of mood and personality enhancing 
drugs, like SSRIs,31 which are an ever-increasing drain on NHS resources. They 
may present problems of social control, because of compensatory substance 
abuse which frequently accompanies long term psychological problems, 
sometimes supported by delinquency, and problems of depletion of the work 
force. This is less an issue of loss of skills, but more, according to this 
government, that of the numbers on Incapacity Benefit,32 in turn, partly a matter 
of cost and partly because a lack of employment is seen to loop back into poor 
mental health, as well as more traditional satanic activities.33  
 
The alternative is that stress sufferers make their way into the burgeoning 
alternative medical sector, through self-help books or groups, private counseling 
or therapy. According to Frank Furedi, the UK has become a ‘therapy culture’, 
and this, he thinks, presents us with a meta-problem. The profound discursive 
                                                 
31 Selective Seratonin Re-Uptake Inhibitors. Tradenames: Prozac, Seroxat etc.  
32 This is the thinking behind the Layard Report. http://cep.lse.ac.uk/research/mentalhealth/ 
[accessed 15th January 2009]. 
33 http://www.workingforhealth.gov.uk/Carol-Blacks-Review/ [Accessed 15th Jan, 2009]. 
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shift, manifest in the huge growth in the therapy sector, does not just track our 
psychic vulnerability to the dangers of our physical and social environment, it 
creates it. We react to events in ways in which we have learnt are culturally 
appropriate; we know how victims ought to behave; our lack of emotional 
resiliency is self fulfilling (Furedi, 2004). 
 
Our psychic vulnerability is also said to pass from generation to generation, one 
of the results and one of the causes of a crisis in the family and the care and 
control it is seen to provide. The negative effects of parental mental ill health 
and marital conflict on children’s health and welfare is a commonplace of our 
family narrative. In general, we hear, the diagnosis of depression among children 
is rising rapidly, as, not surprisingly, is their consumption of drugs like SSRIs 
and Ritalin for hyperactivity (Horwitz et al, 2007; Wong et al, 2004). 
Meanwhile, the Health and Lifestyle sections of the Sunday newspapers have 
taken up the publication of neurological research suggesting that emotional 
deprivation affects the development of children’s brains (Burke, 2000). Neuro-
imaging provides powerful visual material for new ‘narratives of endangerment’, 
designed, like the government’s pro-familial policies, to keep parents on the 
job.34  
 
Consequently, we are told, this sadness and behavioural disturbance in children 
has significant social outcomes, affecting our collective welfare in complicated 
ways. Apart from its immediate effects on levels of delinquency and poor 
educational attainment, it signals poor adult adjustment. If we cannot raise 
mentally healthy adults, we cannot enjoy the high levels of economic wealth we 
currently experience. According to the hedonic calculus of some economists (Di 
Tella et al, 2003; Layard, 2008) we are just not happy enough, too depressed to 
appreciate what we have got (James, 2007). 
 
                                                 
34 See Chapter 7 for a discussion. 
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In the longer run, mental ill health may affect our very powers of wealth 
creation. Unlike World War II paternalism, which rested on a concern for the 
collective psychological health of the nation, current policy pursues the 
collective wealth of the nation. Our governmental blueprint for the future is a 
vision of private individuals and corporations functioning in a global economy, 
mediated by the state through facilitating partnerships, and by the family and 
civil society in similar roles (Giddens, 1998). For these individuals (and 
institutions) to function, people have to be healthy in body and mind. Above all, 
since paternalism has gone, the contribution of state and family to their welfare 
is education, teaching and training in order to produce a flexible response to 
changing work role expectations; participation depends on transferable social 
and technical skills. These, in turn, rest on the ability of the individual to process 
information, and to manage the self and the emotions at all times. Training for 
this begins early. The Personal, Social Health and Economic Education section 
of the National Curriculum, (2000) provides a perfect template for the 
production of such a paragon of reflexivity and control, who, for example, has 
learnt how to mourn the loss of parents in family breakdown by Key Stage 
Three.35 
 
Finally, all this happiness and wealth is still at risk, because even a population of 
flexible, self-motivating, self-controlled individuals may be adversely affected 
by the major calamities that the modern world has in store for them, accidental 
disasters, civil wars, violent bereavement and the rest. Psychic harm may be too 
much even for these models of psychological health and normality, unless they 
have the ability to bounce back from trauma, to carry on in the face of 
overwhelming odds in the form of shock and grief or devastating social 
circumstances and to survive mentally, where ordinary people would succumb to 
stress. Probabilistically, of course such extraordinary people were a statistical 
phenomenon, the tail of a bell curve, picked up in early epidemiological studies 
                                                 
35 http://curriculum.qca.org.uk/ [Accessed, 14th January 2009]. 
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of child developmental psychopathology.36 But we now learn from 
epidemiological studies that such ‘resilient’ people exist, a minority of the 
population, for instance at the level of 40% in a study of New Yorkers exposed 
to the events of 9/11 (Ahern et al, 2004; Behrens et al, 2007; cited in Young, 
forthcoming). Furthermore, such ‘trait resiliency’ can be measured (Connor et 
al, 2003) and learned through psychological interventions,37 or induced through 
regimes of medication, which promote an optimistic frame of mind (Davidson et 
al, 2005). But most surely and lastingly it can, literally, be incorporated in the 
individual by the right developmental experiences38 (Young, forthcoming). 
 
In a way, the story is obvious. Stress and risk, those two great reifications of the 
late 20th century, lurk somewhere in the ether waiting to get us when we are 
down on our luck, joined now by ‘terror’ as the hazard for the new century. And 
their social threat is maximised when the danger is to children, repositories as 
they are of our uncertain future and icons of human vulnerability to harm and its 
unjust distribution. Their proper growth and development is crucial to the social 
production of the self governing individual of the neo-liberal state and, further, 
to a subject who is resilient to shocks both to the individual and to the social 
system (Young, forthcoming). This process of development is, paradoxically, so 
important that it cannot be left to individuals. The child and the family, above all 
else, become sites where the disciplinary role of the state can be said to have 
increased (Brown, 1995), along with the ceaseless occupation of the 
confessional in the treatment of the psychologically sick in both the alternative 
and the statutory health markets. For behind all our preoccupation with trauma 
and treatment is the fantasy of resilience, the inner capacity of an individual to 
rise above adversity – not impervious to suffering shock and emotional pain but 
not long-term harmed or altered by it either. On the contrary, ‘Resilientman’ 
grows stronger in crisis and difficulty; he bursts the clothing of the normal and 
                                                 
36 See, for example, Rutter, M. (1985) Resilience in the Face of Adversity: Protective Factors 
and Resistance to Psychiatric Disorder. British Journal of Psychiatry, 147, 598-611. 
37 See the American Psychological Association’s Road to Resilience program, devised in 
response to the events of 9/11 (Young, forthcoming).  
38 See Chapters 6 and 7. 
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the everyday like some psychic superhero who, whatever befalls, by the end of 
the episode, has achieved resolution ‘and moved on’. 
 
 
III. PSYCHIC HARM: THE SOCIOLOGICAL PROBLEM 
 
Metaphysics 
 
In Part 1 of this chapter, I have committed myself unequivocally to a study of 
the social processes whereby a social problem category is made and, in this case, 
how it is made visible, how it becomes the object of professional knowledge and 
techniques, talk, text and social practices. I have suggested that this involves me 
in some sort of a social constructionist theorisation of psychic harm, combined 
with a more Foucauldian history of the present, elaborated below.  
 
The social constructionist approach is an old and sometime honourable position 
in sociology, developed in the seventies by Malcolm Spector and John Kitsuse 
(Sarbin et al, 1994; Spector et al, 1977) and, later, Joel Best, (Best, 1989) as the 
theory of constructing social problems. But its roots lay further back in the work 
of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (Berger et al, 1966); in the micro-
sociology of Erving Goffmann and the symbolic inter actionists (Goffmann, 
1961; Goffmann, 1963; Goffmann, 1974) and in Howard Becker’s work on the 
sociology of deviance (Becker, 1963). This work was given a new twist by a 
wave of more recent studies done under a more relativist, post-structuralist 
philosophy, many of which are reviewed in the first two chapters of Ian 
Hacking’s book, The Social Construction of What (Hacking, 1999). Of these, the 
most relevant to this study would be Rom Harre’s The Social Construction of the 
Emotions (Harre, 1986), Kurt Danziger’s Naming the Mind (Danziger, 1997) 
and Allan Young’s The Harmony of Illusions (Young 1995), as well as 
Hacking’s own essays, in the same book, on child abuse and schizophrenia, 
together with his earlier work on multiple personality syndrome (Hacking, 
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1995b). Lastly, this approach is given a more political turn by Nikolas Rose, 
using Foucault’s theorisation of power/knowledge, the genealogies of discourse 
and the notion of governmentality (Foucault, 1979b; Foucault, 1982) in order to 
write the history of the psychological production of the modern soul (Rose, 
1989).  
 
I have also clearly stated a leaning to a broadly post-structuralist philosophy, a 
position which is still often conflated with social constructionism – another 
vague term, much used in the United States to denote the nominalist as opposed 
to the realist side in the ‘science wars’ which have riven the US academy 
(Hacking, 1999). So I have left an engagement with the so-called real world to 
grapple with the world of communication or text. I use appropriate words like 
‘narrative’ and ‘script’. I express a robust agnosticism about the existence and 
whereabouts of this territory called the self. I am therefore more interested in the 
political purposes of those who purport to describe it, than in the truth or falsity 
of their descriptions and I want to know the institutional origins of the regime on 
which they base their claims to objectivity and fact. I distance myself from their 
knowledge; it becomes an ‘other’, an object of observation. And this is true both 
for the knowledge of other disciplines like psychology, psychiatry or 
psychoanalysis and also for other sociological theories, like realism, marxism or 
feminism, which construct and critique particular versions of subjectivity and 
the harm it may sustain. They seem to be relegated, all alike, to bit parts in the 
discursive drama which is played out in this social space… and I am the 
audience. 
 
I confess to feeling, at times, a sort of giddy exhilaration at this absurd 
omnipotence. Most of the time my position is uncomfortable, both morally and, 
also, epistemologically, as the social constructionist stance for a researcher is, on 
the face of it, fraught with paradox. One aspect of this logical pickle was picked 
up by Steven Woolgar and Dorothy Pawluch in their well known critique of 
social constructionism called ‘Ontological Gerrymandering: The Anatomy of 
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Social Problems Explanations’. This accuses social constructionist studies of ‘a 
selective relativism with respect to the phenomena it seeks to explain’ (Woolgar 
et al, 1985: 214). These studies, the authors claim, foreground the definitional 
processes in social problem formation, whilst ‘backgrounding’ or merely 
imputing the identification of a constant (real) set of conditions or behaviours, 
which the variable and contingent social problem category purports to define 
but, usually, inflates or distorts in some other way. Also, it is argued, in this 
contradictory stance, they assert the empirical validity of their description of 
these socially constructed phenomena. This ‘selective relativism’, these ‘lapses 
into realism,’ (Woolgar et al, 1985: 224) they suggest, are gerrymandering,39 
doing boundary work, which sustains ‘the differential susceptibility of 
phenomena to ontological uncertainty’ (Woolgar et al, 1985: 216). Thus they are 
the social accomplishment of sociology departments, which all have to manage 
the contradictions inherent in presenting objective accounts of social 
phenomena.  
 
There seem to me to be four potential solutions to this problem for anyone 
attempting a social constructionist study, though I am not sure that any are 
entirely convincing. The first, of course, is just to live with paradox and be 
proud of one’s gerrymandering accomplishments. The second is to opt for 
radical relativism. This is the strategy of Stephen Pfohl, author of ‘The 
‘Discovery’ of Child Abuse,’ which was selected by Woolgar et al. for criticism 
(Pfohl, 1977). He replies to Woolgar from a position so provisional that it seems 
to deconstruct around him as he writes. He pleads the contingency of both the 
‘real’ conditions and their social descriptions. His purported lapses into realism 
are (in fact ?), he claims, just ‘instances of metaphoric condensation’ (Pfohl, 
1985: 230). The third, Ian Hackings’s alternative solution, outlined in his book, 
The Social Construction of What, is very different. Set in the reasonable, 
                                                 
39 Gerrymandering was an electoral practice in which the boundaries of constituencies were 
moved to alter the demographic characteristics of its voters, which would then favour the party 
in power. This was rife in the 19th  century, but accusations of such moves were not unknown in 
the 20th. 
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commonsense language of the Philosophy Department, his project is to clarify 
the claims of social constructionists and possibly to reconcile the claims of 
nominalism and realism in this area, though this second is undeclared (Hacking, 
1999). He approaches the problem, initially, by looking at social consructionism 
as an activity rather than a theory of knowledge. For, as one reviewer of Hacking 
observes, it is only when it is seen as a metaphysic that social constructionism 
‘goes astray’ and ‘degenerates into an impossible form of idealism’.40  
 
Hacking goes on to examine what sort of a political activity social 
constructionism is, identifying a hierarchy of claims for the categories described 
as constructed, from neutral claims for their contingency or lack of inevitability 
(a historical or ironic approach) through ‘reformist’, ‘rebellious’ and 
‘revolutionary’ versions. These run from merely ‘unmasking’ to claims that such 
social constructions are undesirable and ought to be abolished (Hacking, 1999: 
Ch 1). 
 
This dichotomy between doing and being social constructionist is the first of a 
series of useful distinctions that Hacking makes. The second is a careful marking 
of difference between what Nelson Goodman called ‘kinds’, names for a class of 
things (for example, a social problem category might be a ‘social kind’) and the 
concrete instances of this general kind (for example, certain forms of 
interpersonal behaviour which are named by this social category). These kinds, 
these names of instances, he claims, exist only under a description; they are 
subject to historical contingency; their existence in the social world is not 
inevitable but an outcome of social circumstances – as indeed is the world in 
which they exist (Goodman, 1979; cited in Hacking, 1999: 44,45 and 128-131). 
This brings us to the third and vital distinction, which Hacking attributes to the 
linguistic philosopher John Searle (Hacking, 1997; Searle, 1995). These 
linguistic forms (the social problem category in general and a name for a 
                                                 
40 Paul Boghossian. http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/1153/socialconstruction.pdf :11 
[accessed 22nd February, 2008]. 
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concrete example) are, for the reasons just given, ontologically subjective. Since 
they exist in the world, in the public domain, up for discussion and, in the case 
of ideas, they are observable within the social matrix of their use in public 
rhetoric, claims making and associated practices, they are also epistemologically 
objective. In this respect, they are rather like Foucault’s archaeological layers of 
discourse, where meaning is dependent on the observable internal structure of 
their rules, rather than anything hermeneutically endowed. Thus, they, as 
linguistic categories, can be studied and objectively described (Foucault, 1972).  
 
On one level, this neat argument based on marking the difference between 
ontology and epistemology appears to have solved the contradictions managed 
by ontological gerrymandering, without abandoning the question of 
metaphysics. Indeed, one of my problems with it is that Hacking’s shelter from 
paradox is in a realist world. Besides this, it seems almost too good to be true. 
He adds a rider about the contingent changes to a social problem category 
‘looping back’ to influence the behaviour of those so categorised – ‘human 
kinds’ emerging and transformed simultaneously with the language that 
describes them (Rose, 1999: xix). (He calls this process ‘making up people’, 
which is hardly a new idea and basically indistinguishable from the old concept 
of ‘labeling’ in the sociological study of deviance.) Moreover, he says nothing 
about the social work done, when such a category changes, (or even when it 
does not) in deciding on how to recognise its concrete instances – that is, in 
applying the category. There is nothing on the looping back effects on the 
worlds and on the practices of the people who make these observations, and thus 
on researchers themselves. It is as if the linguistic categories were the beginning 
and the end of the social process (Hacking, 1995a).  
 
Nevertheless, Hacking’s work does provide a place from which to build some 
coherent account of what any particular social constructionist account is doing. 
A refuge in radical relativism would not be nearly so challenging, if all one 
could claim to be doing was ‘a reading’. In Hacking’s hierarchy of social 
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constructionist claims, this dissertation on the invisible wound would be low on 
the radical count (though perhaps it might attain the status of irony!). An 
argument for the lack of inevitability or of the contingency of its various social 
forms is certainly being made, although even this seems hardly necessary. For 
instance, it is a commonplace in the Child Protection literature that child abuse is 
‘socially constructed’, mostly described as dependent on contemporary values. 
However these ‘values’, seem to transmogrify over time as effortlessly as 
language does in Hacking’s accounts. As stated earlier, this thesis it is more 
about the effort - about how this set of problem categories has been socially 
produced. If this can be shown, then the question of whether they have been will 
take care of itself.  
 
This brings us to the fourth solution, which is to forget about metaphysics and 
go for a position of irrealism – an indifference to the nominalist versus realist 
debate and even to metaphysics at all.41 This involves an assertion that, while 
selective relativism might be unacceptable, it is a legitimate exercise in 
academic enquiry to examine only one aspect of a complex problem, holding the 
other variables constant. Agnosticism about the existence and location of the 
territory known as ‘inner life’ and its wounds is not denial. I am simply not 
interested in exploring the question of its ontological status; what interests me is 
the ‘exploration industry’ itself, its claims to discovery and its creation of new 
versions of the territory called the self.  
 
This solution suggests that I should avoid the term social constructionism, with 
its metaphysical implications and concentrate on a version of Foucauldian 
genealogies, or a history of the present. And, if social constructionism involves 
tracking the forging of a problem category in the crucible of competing 
professional claims and practices, then it is just a small step to the way that 
Foucault thinks about the emergence of discourses out of the power struggles of 
                                                 
41 'Irrealism' or an indifference to metaphysics is Goodman’s term, which, Hacking points out is 
also a metaphysical position. In Hacking, I. (1999) The Social Construction of What? 
Cambridge, mass: Harvard University Press. pp 60 and 61. 
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people wielding professional rationalities. Genealogy, his name for this history 
of discourse, is a word which he took from Nietzsche, who saw ideas as arising 
from everyday and extremely low level squabbles (Foucault, 1977). Foucault 
himself was more concerned with knowledge encapsulated in the more formal 
theories and practices of what he called ‘the unsafe sciences’ – the human and 
social sciences (Foucault, 1973). Perhaps the difference between the two 
approaches lies somewhat in the linguistic unit to be studied – the social and 
political career of a problem category, a unit of knowledge, a name, with 
contextual origins and implications, as opposed to ‘discourse’, a more extensive 
set of formal, autonomous rules which created the possibility of claims to 
knowledge and truth and in which knowledge, techniques and social practices 
and assemblages were fused (Foucault, 1970).  
 
Not that Foucault’s approach to history does not present some methodological 
problems of its own. Foucault, it would seem, was never really free of 
metaphysics, in the sense that, as noted above, his theorisations always had to 
avoid hermeneutics and the meaning-giving observer (Dreyfus et al, 1982). So, 
for Foucault, the archeologist, discourses were synchronic, discrete, 
discontinuous and objectively recognizable sets of rules, because their meaning 
was created by the rules themselves. They were in no way dependent on the 
meaning given them by an interpreting subject. With the introduction of the 
genealogical metaphor into his later work, discourses became diachronic, looser, 
more mobile phenomena, still discontinuous, emerging into a social space and 
submerging again, criss-crossing the social surface in a series of marriages and 
divorces, fusions and fissions, which make an ordinary family tree look like a 
very orderly affair (Dreyfus et al, 1982). It was in genealogical method that 
Foucault famously married knowledge and power in their complex 
interdependent relationship (Foucault, 1979a; Foucault, 1980b). And, of course, 
in his studies of power in the social world, he re-encountered the problem of the 
interpretive observer, also a subject of power/ knowledge (Dreyfus et al, 1982).  
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His answer to this problem of interpretation was to write a very concrete and 
pragmatic form of history, totally divorced from appeal to subterranean forces 
and metaphysical explanations. This he called ‘genealogy’. The surface of 
human activity is looked at from high up, from which point a map of all the 
empirical connections between persons, texts and apparatuses would be 
apparent. These connections were not interpreted by the observer but rather 
traced into the past, as one would trace the ancestry of a present living individual 
on a family tree. This genealogy was not like the old history of ideas which was, 
paradoxically, dehistoricised (in which concepts and theories drew their meaning 
from their own self-contained trajectory, developing according to some internal 
rationality). Moreover, in contrast to current history, where events and ideas 
draw their significance from their place within the social context of their time, 
these events were significant only for what they did or allowed to happen next, 
rather than for any meaning attributed to them by the genealogist. This method 
Foucault also called ‘a history of the present’, in which was mapped a chain of 
happenings which lead to a current state – inexorably, it would appear, with the 
hindsight of the present, but in fact, of course, a random and chancy business – 
as with evolution.  
 
In the main body of his work, Foucault’s ‘histories of the present’ trace the 
emergence of particular technologies of disciplinary and regulatory power. In his 
late work, however, he begins to relate particular discursive transformations to 
the current forms of government in advanced liberal states (Foucault, 1982; 
Foucault, 1985), work which is later taken up by others (Barry et al, 1996). And 
this suggests another possible methodological difficulty, one residing in his 
theorization of power. His version of knowledge/power, which, for me makes 
his writing so compelling, becomes more elusive as his work progresses – so 
infinitely diffuse that it merges into ‘life itself’ – and so may lose any analytical 
usefulness (Foucault, 1985). On the other hand, if the concept is pinned down, as 
it is by Donzelot, for example (Donzelot, 1979), to the social praxis of certain 
institutions and a certain form of state, accounts of the genealogies of dominant 
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discourses can resemble functionalist explanations, with their more realist 
concepts of power.  
 
The last methodological problem in my list is this: I suspect that, according to 
Foucault’s transgressive thinking, the whole notion of a ‘Foucauldian 
Methodology’ is a contradiction in terms. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) suggest 
that Foucault’s approach to history writing is largely rhetorical and that others 
should not try or hope to reproduce the pyrotechnics of his astonishing, playful 
and persuasive style. Finally though, as he would wish, this is not a problem but 
a liberation. 
 
So I approach my series of studies with a set of generic ‘Foucauldian’ concepts 
and questions. First, my approach will be genealogical, as described above, 
mapping the ancestors of present forms of invisible wounds – what allowed 
them to come into being, necessary but not sufficient conditions for their 
existence. In this ‘history of the present’, I will be asking: what are the social 
conditions under which each form of the invisible wound discussed here was 
made visible – that is to say, knowable, discussable, treatable, administrable and 
justiciable; what were the different regimes of truth which prevailed; what were 
the discursive conditions under which truths, facts and explanations, theories of 
the wound, came to be formulated and accepted; what were the different 
individual and institutional power relations and hierarchies of authority and 
prestige, technological conditions and practical affordances; what was the 
political context in which such knowledge emerged?  
  
Second, what is to be studied here is the emergence of these wound categories at 
the level of discourse, not in everyday speech or social interaction but within the 
broad context of scientific, professional, policy and legal texts42 and the 
practices they enshrine. A discourse is defined here as a relatively well ordered, 
                                                 
42 This context is stretched a little in Chapters 1 and 7 to include the writing on internet sites of 
less official groups and organisations. 
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though not necessarily internally consistent, system of knowledge. It consists of 
ideas, beliefs, attitudes and practices, linked by certain styles of thought, key 
concepts and techniques, which construct both their subjects and the truths about 
the worlds of which they speak and write. It is an open system, draws on 
multiple sources and is constantly changing over time. 
 
Third, it is assumed here that discourses are not just sets of knowleges but, in 
their construction of subjects and their worlds, they, also, carry with them 
relations of power. Ways of thinking are linked to ways of acting; human 
agency, even down to individual action, is shaped and constrained by formally 
defined capacities and legitimations at the discursive level, though these, in their 
turn, are changed over time by social action and interaction from which new 
discourses emerge. It is this emergence which this thesis addresses as an 
exercise in what Foucault called ‘historical ontology’, charting the birth and 
growth of some of the categories of the wound: PTSD, nervous shock in tort 
law, emotional abuse and attachment disorders, particular forms of knowledge, 
which have become fundamental to our ways of knowing ourselves. As such, 
they are also, as Hacking has observed, involved inexorably in world-making, in 
our ways of being and in our forms of power. But this ‘looping back’ of socially 
constructed categories into the making-up of people and their forms of 
government is the part of a recursive system which I have largely to assume, 
rather than examine in any detail, simply because there is a limit to what I can 
do here. The exception is Chapter 1, where I look at the work done by the 
metaphor of ‘invisible wounds’ in the creation of a particular form of 
subjectivity. In the other chapters, I do not look at what forms of government or 
Foucauldian forms of power these categories of the wound allow. I am 
concerned only with the political conditions of their emergence. Of course, these 
two relationships of power/knowledge are inseparable in practice, but I have 
found it essential to separate them conceptually in the interests of a manageable 
thesis. 
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Reading Literary Sources 
 
I am also limited in my power to map all the ‘social conditions’ of these 
excursions into the interior, the particular political, cultural and technical 
contexts in which knowledge emerges. As stated above I am concentrating my 
gaze largely on social problem formation in various discursive and therefore 
non-concrete locations, for which my sources are largely literary.43  
 
Of course, within these limits, I provide a contextual account based on broader 
texts as secondary sources, and some social commentary, using both secondary 
and primary sources, largely internet generated. In the chapter on the legal 
construction of psychological harm in tort law, my primary source is the dicta of 
the Law Lords as published in the Law Reports over a period of a century, but 
legal text books and Law Commission reports provide background, as does the 
academic literature on the history of PTSD. Institutional and organisational 
background and history is most detailed in my study of the emotional abuse of 
children, as I was familiar with the work and issues of Child Protection and used 
both conferences and orientating conversations with some well known and 
influential figures in the field – interviews as a source of historical material 
rather than text for analysis. But, when studying the academic literature on 
attachment theory and intervention, I also looked at peripheral literature and 
attachment-based organisations on the internet; studied official policy-based 
publications and attended a number of training days and conferences, to discover 
who attends such events and what the salient practice issues are that subscribers 
raise and hope will be addressed (See Appendix). 
 
Apart from this, my primary data is also textual. It consists of academic and 
professional literature, as well as alternative, internet sources. And it is this 
                                                 
43 After much negotiation, I gave up any attempt at ethnographic studies of particular, concrete, 
local sites of activity – a particular social services department for instance – and concentrated on 
a purely textual study.  
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literature itself which comprises the individual social sites in which the 
emergence of these categories of the wound is traced. So my approach to these 
academic and professional writings is a little different from that commonly 
understood to be used in a ‘literature based dissertation’. Conventionally, to say 
that the academic and professional literature in the small sections of the vast 
field of psychological literature that I am studying is my primary source for all 
the chapters, as well as my secondary one, does not convey anything much 
except that I am interested in the content of this writing, not just to collect the 
information imparted but to attempt some sort of textual or sub-textual critique 
or discourse analysis. My approach comes nearest to the latter but I am also 
interested in what the writers are doing, as well as what they are saying – even at 
a subtextual level, and in their revealed relationships with each other. For me, a 
database print-out for a particular field of study, organised say around particular 
key words, reveals a fascinating picture of a particular site of productive activity. 
Although it is virtual, it is as much a space for the making of knowledge as any 
factory for frozen food or clinic for pathology, a site which is as full of conflict 
and ambition, fashion and trend as any other social enterprise, with enough low 
level squabbles to satisfy even Nietzsche. This activity is likewise structured, 
guided and constrained by the technologies of research, communications and 
publishing, the availability of funding streams and the organisational form of the 
academy. These, in turn, are influenced by government’s attitude to particular 
scientific endeavours as a public good, the size and structure of tertiary 
education and professional training and the quasi market conditions which 
prevail, creating the need for institutions and individuals to produce value for 
money in the form of publications. 
 
Search any social science or medical data base for topics in psychiatry, 
psychology and social work over the second half of the 20th century and a 
stunning growth in the number of books and articles will be found, especially in 
the last two decades, What looks like a dazzling research effort in the fields of 
PTSD, child abuse and developmental psychology, for example, suggests, on a 
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conventional positivist reading, an impressive increase in our knowledge of the 
many facets of human psychology and psychopathology. Such a reading 
concentrates on the informational content of the literature, given the research 
methods and findings, which is, ideally, reproducible by anyone with access to 
the same research sample and so independent of who did the research and in 
what social context. However in the psy field of research – a soft science by any 
accepted criteria – research is seldom reproduced, for good technical reasons, 
and particular slants or interests in the work tend to be author or institution 
specific. And a glance at the authors and publishers of these works over time 
gives another, more sociological reading.  
 
Databases not only provide abstracts or whole articles, but also information on 
authors and collaborators, on their institutions, on their acknowledgements of 
help and reading of their work and often on their sources of soft money. Any of 
these can be followed up by visiting the author’s departmental websites, which 
usually provide detailed curricula vitae, charting professional, publication, 
funding and research supervision histories. So databases scrutinised over time 
show career pathways through PhDs and resultant articles, the joining of a 
research partnership, the establishment of a research centre, the breaking off of 
one partner to establish another such centre and the promotion of specialist 
topics through personal tributes, conference and official, professional, 
government and pressure-group publications. The output of key research figures 
continually expands as they reproduce their articles and themselves in a process 
of fusion and fission. We see also a multiplication of different diagnoses and 
pathological conditions. This multiplication is not just correlated with 
proliferating environmental risks, amongst which psychological harm and abuse 
itself increase through the fragmentation of the concepts and their colonisation 
by metaphor; it is also correlated with the growing number of knowledge 
workers in the field and promoted by particular academic entrepreneurs. 
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Much of what I present here, except for Chapter 1, involves this sort of 
sociological reading of the academic and professional literature.44 As well as a 
favourable epistemic and technological (discursive) context, this assumes that 
the promotion of different forms of psychic harm as social problem categories 
involves human activity and striving. This is not exactly based on the old 
sociological idea of a ‘moral entrepreneur’ .45 The word ‘moral’ seems 
superfluous here, despite the location of these concepts within the field of the 
caring and helping professions. Given the incentive structure in the academy for 
the production of publications, the word entrepreneur is sufficient, though, as in 
rational choice theory, the rewards of the system are not necessarily monetary. 
Nor am I suggesting this latter theory provides a sufficient explanation for the 
development of new forms of knowledge. Though parsimonious, this would be 
simplistic and somewhat circular. For the methodological reasons I have cited, I 
prefer to see the development of new knowledges at the impersonal level of 
discursive change, but power/knowledge is diffuse and produced and reproduced 
at the micro/individual level. Given that particular forms of knowledge 
production are the organising principle of academic life and ‘original 
contributions to the literature’ the telos of academic activity, there will 
inevitably be creative and combative individuals in the field of human science, 
who will exploit new practices, new technologies, and possibly each other, to 
produce key contributions to the making of new forms of life. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
At the beginning of this section on Methodology I hinted at some ethical 
confusion, a lack of certainty about whether my position was either 
overwhelmingly arrogant or, in contrast, pathetically humble, constrained by a 
                                                 
44Since many professional/clinical posts are now attached to universities, this distinction is 
fuzzy, though the difference in principle between laboratory/epidemiological research and 
clinical research remains.  
45 Becker, H. (1963) Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. New York: Free Press. 
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realist metaphysic into feeling that, if I cannot make claims to truth, then I really 
have nothing useful to say. My doubts were exacerbated by the cold reception I 
was frequently given, when I tried to explain my research approach to 
questioners who were keen to sympathise with the emotional strain that such 
work must cause me or to connect it to their own psychological state and 
memories of childhood. For, as it became clear that I was not a potential 
technician of human suffering, I seemed to lose all claim to feel compassion – 
let alone to expertise or to truth. I tried to answer this scepticism by declaring, 
‘truthfully’, that, of course, I feel the utmost sympathy for the subjective reality 
of individual suffering, be it psychological or physical, but that just was not the 
point of my research… But what, then, is the point? 
 
The question was answered for me when I found this justification for the 
genealogical method in the introduction by Nikolas Rose to the second edition of 
his book, Governing the Soul. 
 
The aim of such genealogies is a kind of destabilisation or de-fatalisation of 
our present. In describing its contingency, in therefore opening up the 
possibility that things have been different, could have been different, they 
try to make it easier to assess that present, in order to make judgments about 
how to act upon it. If the history of our present is more accidental than we 
may like to believe, the future of our present is also more open than it 
sometimes appears (Rose, 1999: xii). 
 
This made sense of putting compassion and truth in brackets and getting on with 
it. It is a thoroughly political justification of research; research as intervention. 
Although I may have many reservations about what Rose calls the ‘ceaseless 
confession and solicitude’ of therapy (Rose, 1999: xxv), I was taken back to the 
work I did fifteen years ago. In the way I questioned my clients, it was precisely 
this ‘de-fatalisation’ of the present that I was trying to achieve.  
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                             CHAPTER I: 
                     INVISIBLE WOUNDS 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
                   
INVISIBLE WOUNDS: A self help guide for women in destructive 
relationships by Kay Douglas (1994).  
 
                A foreword by Stephanie Dowrick 
 
Kay Douglas has written an extraordinary book about a terrifyingly 
‘ordinary’ phenomenon: emotional abuse of women by men. 
 
This is so ordinary, in fact, that even those living with emotional abuse often 
tend to confuse it with and excuse it as normal behaviour. If you don’t have 
broken ribs or bruises; if you are not being raped, do you have any right to 
complain, or any need to act to save your own life? 
 
This painful confusion about what a woman is entitled to expect for herself 
and from her male partner comes through most powerfully in these pages…. 
Invisible Wounds shows that denigration, belittlement, contempt, censorship 
and blaming are not and never can be valid expressions of love. 
 
Yet many women … may hesitate for many years before saving themselves 
from an emotionally abusive relationship. And sometimes it may be even 
harder for women to act, when there are no obvious bruises, when it is 
wounding words and punitive silences that are the weapons of attack…. Kay 
Douglas … knows how hard it can be for even the most enlightened woman 
to face up to the reality that is in front of her eyes, that may be snoring in her 
bed, when she wishes with all her heart that things may be different…. 
 
Living with emotional abuse means [existing] within a cramped life, a fear 
driven life, an unloved, unappreciated and uncherished life…. Freedom and 
individuality are gradually eroded…. [She] is gradually stripped of her rights 
and identity … her self esteem [attacked]…. 
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Invisible Wounds is the strong wise companion every woman needs who 
doubts her right to a life free of emotional abuse and the shame and self 
blame that so often accompany it…. Kay Douglas understands suffering. 
But her own life, and the rich insights she has gathered for this book, show 
that she also understands love, courage and freedom. For those are the 
emotions that can reconnect us with ourselves, and will heal even the 
deepest of our wounds (Douglas, 1996: 15-18). 
 
 
 
This foreword to a book also fronts this chapter and this thesis because it 
captures perfectly the discourse of invisible wounds, as they lie open in a matrix 
of confusion and contradiction.  
 
They are of course ‘ordinary’. It is completely taken for granted that the terms 
emotional abuse and invisible wounds will be understood by the reading public, 
though ten years earlier this might not have been the case; by the 1990s, when 
this book was published, they are just part of the moral vocabulary of a 
generation whose emotional lives are primed by daytime television.  
 
But the distancing italics go round the word ‘ordinary’, as they well might, 
because we are given the impression that this phenomenon is statistically, 
descriptively the norm but not normative, not prescriptive, not what should 
happen in a healthy or well-ordered world. 
 
Male abusive behaviour is ontologically and epistemologically objective, like 
the snorer, a thing in the world which women should recognise when they see it, 
if only they have the courage to adopt the right mental set – which means, of 
course, that it is also a subjective matter of observer perspective! 
 
The nature and status of the harm done is equally ambiguous. Psychological 
harm is conjured up in the form of deep injuries; the metaphor of the human 
body at war predominates, in the notion of wounds, of conflict, attack and 
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defence. This harm is potentially severe, dangerous. Women should act to ‘save 
their lives’. This is not their physical lived lives, however, rather some ideal of 
what a good healthy life should be, a future possibility. The harm is not the 
major, one-off, debilitating wounds of a battle, rather the cumulative results of 
skirmishes and attrition, which affect the growth or development of the self to its 
full potential; it damages or causes psychological harm by cutting people off 
from what might have been. And to stunt the growth of a soul is tantamount to 
its murder.  
 
The abusive relationship is described in a mix of quasi-legal rights talk and the 
language of the psy sciences. The abuse contravenes women’s rights and 
entitlements; it constricts autonomy; it disempowers. On the women’s side, on 
the other hand, there is an indication of a disorderly subconscious, repression 
and denial. The self, who is the object of this abuse, is a split self and one who 
has become a little disconnected from reality – there is just a hint at multiple 
personality and dissociative disorder, or at least the sort of condition which 
demands therapy. But then, she is also a whole self, a narrated self, a self in 
history, one who can recognise what relational events are doing to her, and, 
though vulnerable, take action. This is a self who can know and manage herself. 
On the one hand she needs help and on the other hand she does not. 
 
A perfect compromise is offered. The reader is a human subject, not the object 
of medical observation. She has a voice and will find it with the help of this 
book, whose writer’s knowledge is not a form of objectifying expertise but is 
authenticated by her own hurtful experience and that of others who tell their 
story – a community of suffering selves, who, through inter-subjective 
communication, can feel their own and each other’s pain. By using the book, the 
reader joins a group of victims, who have suddenly seen what has been staring 
them in the face, have together found their voice and have become survivors. 
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Making the Wounded Self 
 
This passage is a fine example of the powerful vernacular of invisible wounds – 
the language in which claims to injury and psychological harm are often made. 
On the other hand, this vernacular rests firmly on the efforts of knowledge 
workers in the academic and professional fields of psychology, psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis, who have fashioned a more technical, ‘scientific’ set of 
categories. The emotive figure of speech, used, as above, to gain readers, invoke 
sympathy and express a sense of injury, is also a metaphor, which over the 
course of the 20th century seems to lose some of its figurative content and 
transform, in part, into the technical, medical discourse of trauma and the 
diagnostic category of PTSD. So these two languages, the vernacular and the 
scientific, run along side by side, often merging; they not only reinforce each 
other but are the conditions of each other’s being. So a particular, somewhat 
conflicted view of the inner life emerges, when the self or the soul is looked at 
through the prism of psychic harm or wounding. And this is what is taken up in 
this chapter.  
 
The technical version of trauma, on its own, is complicated enough, as it 
presents itself in two forms. First, the medical version, PTSD, is defined as a 
severe disturbance of the mind caused by a uniquely shocking or horrifying 
event or set of events – unpredictable aversive environmental changes that the 
medical profession decided sometime in the 1970s to call ‘traumatic stress’ – 
literally, events that wound and events through which the history of an 
individual is completely disrupted and rewritten. (Chapter 2 looks further at this 
diagnosis and Chapter 3 at its legal version.) Second, however, the concept of 
invisible wounds is not limited to sudden and violent one-off events, this 
‘unpredictable environmental change’ mentioned above, as Freud’s original 
‘summative’ version of trauma demonstrates.46 There are other claims to 
                                                 
46 Breuer, J. & Freud, S. (1955 [1893-1895]) Studies on Hysteria. Standard Edition of The 
Complete Works of Sigmund Freud 2. 
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psychological harm, as in our foreword. Here the wounding events are insidious 
and cumulative, proceeding over a lifetime to change and transform the growth 
trajectory of an individual and creating, it is said, a deformed life and a 
dislocation from an optimal developmental pathway. (Chapters 4 and 5 look at 
the career of the concept of emotional abuse, which is said to produce such 
developmental alteration and Chapters 6 and 7 look at the growth of attachment 
theory, which is both a theory of developmental psychopathology and, also, a 
theory of developmental normality, security and possible resilience to 
environmental stress or wounding.)  
 
What is more, even in the technical version, the ‘ordinariness’ of invisible 
wounds, mentioned in the foreword, is confusing. It was Canguilhem who 
pointed out that, within the life sciences, the understanding of normality, 
ordinary ways of life at all levels of complexity, depended on the study of 
abnormality of living form or function, both physical and psychological, that is 
pathology and developmental deformity (Canguilhem, 1991; Foucault, 1980a). 
In the case of trauma, we are talking about something different, however: an 
understanding of the self arrived at not through a study of its diseases, but 
through the idea of a severe hurt to the soul or psyche, so severe, in fact, as to 
result in prolonged psychic distress and disorder. Though the effects of the 
wound are as if the mind itself is diseased, this is, nevertheless, a disorder which, 
over time, has come to be seen neither as a symptom of an organic condition nor 
a ‘constitutional weakness’, neither caused by an illness nor by the predisposing 
factors which are stochastic features of the landscape in modern, statistical 
medicine, but by events quite outside the individual that could wound just 
anybody and from which we are all at risk. This, of course, creates a paradox 
(one which the Appeal Court Judges struggle with in Chapter 3). Since the 
effects of trauma are psychologically debilitating, attracting medical diagnosis 
and drug or counseling therapy, the individual sufferer can be said to have a 
psychiatric condition, but one, on the other hand, which can be said to be normal 
– a sort of normal pathology.  
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This contradiction seems to be held in place by two major discursive shifts 
towards the end of the 20th century. The first is the story of the vulnerability of 
all bounded individuals toward risk or danger in their physical and social 
environment (Beck, 1994) or what has alternatively been called ‘the victim 
culture’. Far from meeting danger with social solidarity (so the story goes) the 
growing individualism of the late 20th century makes for a breakdown of trust in 
big business and all branches of state governance to protect our interests, as well 
as the failure of the traditional sources of support under paternalism – 
professionals, parents and the like. The individual falls back on solitary 
assertion, complaint and litigation or rights-based political pressure groups. 
Whilst the discourse concentrates on the physical effects of technological 
disasters and the breakdown of law and order, there are increasing claims of 
psychological harm from fear and horror, as well as from cumulative lack of 
care and respect – danger not to the body but to the soul. The danger is of 
wounding and scarring, the stunting of cognitive and emotional development, 
the leaching out of self esteem and, lastly, of that dreadful affliction, 
disempowerment – the vitiation of the project of self management and regulation 
in a neo-liberal state. Stress and risk are a dreadful threat to which we are all 
alike exposed. 
 
And who are these selves who are so vulnerable, so readily hurt? The answer is 
the second part of the story which is a narrative about the self in ‘late modernity’ 
and its relationship to its social environment. The influential work by Philip 
Reiff on ‘The Triumph of the Therapeutic’ in Western Thought (Reiff, 1967) has 
been followed by a raft of books describing the development of Therapeutic 
Culture (Furedi, 2004) and The Therapeutic State (Nolan, 1998) and exemplified 
by a current attempt by some psychoanalysts to extend therapeutic thinking into 
the political domain (Kraemer et al, 1996; Samuels, 2002, for example). Nolan 
suggests that the self produced by this therapeutic turn no longer exists within 
the old authoritative moral orders and transcends even the psychoanalytic self, as 
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the latter struggles to adapt to the demands of ever present social imperatives. 
This latest self is the product of more humanistic therapies; it exists in a milieu 
in which it alone is the ‘touchstone of cultural judgement’ (Bell, 1978: 117); the 
self and its experience alone is authentic and central to its moral universe: any 
moral schema that exists for self regulation is ultimately self-referential. So 
Nolan finds in his study of political discourse in the USA that the language 
constantly invokes the goal of individual emotional development, rather than the 
individual moral growth that used to be seen as the means and end of adaptation 
to external social mores. As he puts it: ‘where once the self was to be 
surrendered, denied, sacrificed and died to, now the self is to be esteemed, 
actualised, affirmed and unfettered’ (Nolan, 1998: 3). It might be observed that 
anyone whose mental welfare requires all that must be a little liable to 
disappointment! 
 
So what sort of entity is this vulnerable and demanding self? Nolan, it seems, 
tends to conflate this morally unfettered, free-floating and reflexive self with the 
fragmented, decentred self of post modernity, cognitively aware of its own 
contingency and social construction and reproducing itself by its own operations 
(Nolan, 1998). But the political language of the therapeutic self posits the soul as 
a source of emotional control and self regulation, one of the products of 
normative development, as an individual who is at the centre of its social world, 
who interacts with it and may be encouraged or harmed by it, but not in some 
continuous process of social reproduction. This is not a self recreated anew in 
every social encounter (Gergen et al, 1989), but a self held together, integrated, 
by memory and its sense of its own history. In short, it relies for its meaning on 
a more realist version of personal identity: the authentic, whole, centred 
individual of humanism.  
 
And the metaphor of the ‘invisible wound’, in one way, assumes such a self. The 
concept of psychic harm or thwarted emotional development posits a vulnerable, 
woundable individual, thus one who is fixed, continuous, there to receive a 
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causal blow. However, as already noted, this self bifurcates into two, depending 
on the nature of the harm: first, one whose self narrative or observable behaviour 
may be altered by a powerful traumatic event47 and, second, one for whom the 
harm is ontogenetic because more subtle and continuously cumulative over 
time.48 To complicate matters, this already split self splits again around the 
distinction between observed behaviour and self narrative – the visual versus the 
oral register. The subject of observation is carried by the largely medical 
metaphor, organised around the concept of trauma, abuse and attachment 
disorganisation, as dealt with in the following six chapters. These invoke a linear 
and positivist psychiatric/psychological model of personal functioning and, in 
fact, a conventional doctor/expert–patient relationship. But the subject of 
narrative is the owner of voice, whose identity develops in some dialogical 
relationship with her social world, who can claim her rights and for whom 
therapy is an inter-subjective conversation of empowerment.  
 
It has already been suggested that there is something paradoxical about the very 
notion of therapy (which invokes professional or quasi professional expertise) in 
self actualisation, as there is something strange about the notion of 
empowerment of one person by another.49 Moreover, this self actualising 
version is often conflated with the medical one, indeed depends on it for 
legitimation of claims to harm, as in the foreword to the book by Kay Douglas 
and in many other uses of the wound metaphor discussed in this chapter. And 
both are so overlaid by figurative expression and alternative paradigms that 
‘wound culture’ (Das, 2003: 297) seems to abound in ontological confusion.  
 
Besides this, there are other puzzles. For, even in a constrained psychological 
model of individual interaction with a social environment, it is not clear where 
the self is located – in the neurological system or in some parallel inner world 
                                                 
47 Like the sufferers from PTSD or Nervous Shock detailed in Chapter 2.  
48 As in the foreword to the book by Kay Douglas, or in developmental versions such as 
Attachment Theory, discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
49 For example, injunctions to 'be independent', 'think for yourself' etc. are 'double binds'. See 
Gregory Bateson’s (1972) Steps to an Ecology of Mind.University of Chicago Press.  
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that might be called consciousness… or in unconsciousness, or in both.50 At 
what level is the wound ‘invisible’? This raises deeper questions about metaphor 
itself and the metaphysic in which it sits, described in the Introductory Chapter.  
 
These confusions and complications are touched on in this chapter and they also 
run right through the dissertation, as it addresses the question of how the 
metaphor of the invisible wound serves to fix the fragmented, protean, self-
reproducing or socially constructed soul of post-modernity or post-structuralism 
into particular forms. This is not just a matter of language, but also of practice. 
The metaphor is part of a discourse in which language and practices, in 
particular those of psy professionals, are inseparable. Later chapters look at the 
practices of the invisible wound as they evolve in the context of professional 
journals and other texts. This first chapter is, however, about language and thus 
more literary, less sociological in content. It traces the implications of the 
metaphor for particular narrated forms of the self with all their contradictions. It 
does not attempt to sort out or rationalise the discourse, merely seeing it as 
reflecting the diversity of social praxis. It picks up examples from a rich varied 
usage which has grown over time, migrated across social context and, itself, 
moves freely between figurative and technical modes of thinking and 
expression, in both the oral and visual registers.  
 
These examples are taken partly from the psychological literature on trauma – 
particularly its history – and the bio-medical version reviewed more extensively 
in Chapter 2, since this underlies and structures the vernacular usage within a 
present anglophone culture which is saturated with ‘trauma talk’. This talk 
generally covers a wide domain, including identity politics, religion and the 
more alternative therapies. Some background research was also done in these 
                                                 
50 This is a contested question of the utmost complexity. See Jerry Fodor (1981) on The 
Mind/Body Problem at http://philosophy.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/Courses/fodorphil1.pdf 
[accessed 17 January 2009]; Steven Rose in Rose, S. (2001b) The Future of the Brain: The 
Promise and the Perils of Tomorrow's Neuroscience. New York: Oxford University Press. And 
John Searle Consciousness: What We Still Don’t Know in the New York Review of Books, 13 
January 2005: 36-9. 
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areas in the process of making sense of the main source of material, which is an 
ordinary Google search for ‘Invisible Wounds’ conducted at the beginning of 
2006. This search provides, even for this more restricted version of 
psychological harm, a stunning array of usages across different social contexts, 
from personal testimony of the psychic costs of chronic physical disease to 
counseling sites and self-help books offering help for emotional or sexual abuse; 
from teen magazines discussing racism and bullying or dating violence to 
religious sites with personal testimony from depressed clergy; or legal or quasi 
legal sites dealing with sexual harassment at work. There are copious references 
to a series of zombie films called ‘The Living Dead’ and, improbably, some 
interesting visual representations, mostly by German artists, on a site called 
fotocommunity.com. By far the most prevalent context for the use of this 
metaphor, however, is discussion of the handling and treatment of military 
personnel, war and ‘peace-keeping’ veterans – from Vietnam to Iraq through the 
holocaust to the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda – and of the indigenous victims 
of these and other conflagrations and mass injustices around the world, of 
oppression by cruel dictatorships, of disappearances, torture, mass rape, ethnic 
cleansing or genocide. And here the metaphor migrates by means of another 
metaphor; the self becomes, by analogy, the psyche, not just of an individual, 
but of a group, a nation, the world even; the bearer of the wound and of scars 
becomes a whole people. Trauma, memory, memorialisation and healing 
become cultural and political phenomena; ‘identity’ is collective (Ignatieff, 
1996).  
 
I do not claim here that such a search throws up a set of data which is 
completely representative of the way this metaphor is used across different 
social contexts, but it does produce examples from a range of sites which do not 
use the language of psychological, legal or administrative expertise and might be 
said to give some glimpse of the diaspora of the concept of trauma, as it has 
become part of what Terry Eagleton calls the ‘custom piety, intuition and 
opinion’ that society observes (Eagleton, 1990: 23). The present chapter looks at 
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the work this metaphor could be said to do in the production of a particular 
hybrid version of the self in relation to his/her physical and social context. This 
is an individual soul with breachable boundaries, like an individual body, 
operating defensively in a potentially hostile environment which may cause 
lesion, shrapnel or foreign bodies lodged in the wound, scarring and long term 
damage. These wounds are administrable by medical experts in healing, and 
their relations, but serve and even legitimate the practices of religious solace, 
political rights claiming, social welfare and international aid.  
 
The Figurative Body 
 
The metaphor of the invisible wound, with its cargo of unreality, emphasises that 
what it refers to is not a wound, at least at a gross physical level. It draws on a 
linguistic and conceptual distinction between the body and some more interior 
site, say the soul. But at the same time, the abstract soul is understood through 
our experience of the frailty, vulnerability and mortality of human flesh. And, as 
if this were not complex enough, it has to be recognised that the body itself is 
not free of figurative loading. The bodily metaphor does not only link the soul to 
obvious physical or corporeal characteristics. The body comes freighted with its 
own set of metaphors which then, through the serendipity of language, the soul 
itself acquires. For example, in all societies, the human body has a starring part 
in the creation of symbolic and social orders (Durkheim et al, 1963). We know it 
so well. It stands proxy for models of cosmic and human organisation (the ‘body 
politic’ of Plato and Aristotle) or any hierarchical system with the head at the 
top. With the development of the life sciences, the body is also the frequent 
bearer of metaphor, its intricate functioning likened, by Descartes, to a machine, 
or to mechanical systems of organs and tubes, nerves and neurons or various 
homeostatic cybernetic systems (Schindler, 1988). Picking up the political 
metaphor in reverse, it can also be seen as ‘an engineered communications 
system, ordered by a fluid and dispersed command-control-intelligence network’ 
(Haraway, 1989: 14).  
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Particularly relevant here is the metaphor of the body as a nation state. 
According to Emily Martin, in her anthropological work on immunology, this 
contains two essential notions; first, the notion of the body as the spatio-
temporal, or the cellular (Schindler, 1988), basis of individual identity which 
implies a rigid and absolute boundary between the body (self) and the external 
world (non-self). Second, ‘the identification of the non-self world as foreign and 
hostile’ (Martin, 1990: 411), which implies the notion of boundaries as 
protective, defences against an invasive and dangerous environment. Martin 
quotes Peter Jaret’s florid description of the way the immune system functions: 
 
Besieged by a vast array of invisible enemies (bacteria etc.), the human body 
enlists a remarkable complex corps of internal body guards to battle the 
invaders (Jaret, 1986: 702); 
                                                     
and Lenart Nilsson: 
 
The organisation of the human immune system is reminiscent of military 
defence, with regard to both weapon technology and strategy (Nilsson, 
1987: 20). 
 
I have already quoted from Sontag’s work, as she describes the use of a military 
metaphor in the way we figure cancer and AIDS. In this discourse, the defence 
of the body extends to the defence of the body politic in its perpetual war against 
encroaching micro-organisms, in the form of disease or mere mortality (Sontag, 
1991). 
 
I will argue here that, through the metaphor of the spiritual wound, the soul, 
itself, acquires this freight of defensive individualism, precluding any notion that 
it is part of some universal animus or some systemic, all-pervasive mind 
(Bateson, 1979) or a construct of the social (Gergen et al, 1989). This bodily 
metaphor places the psyche neatly within each individual body-bag. Also, 
crucially, what it is that lies in the interior of the body is a ‘soul-bag’, with its 
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own defensive boundaries that can be attacked and pierced by powerful forces 
from outside – forces outside the body or outside the soul, until, that is, that 
moment when Freud split the soul into three, so that it could be entirely at war 
within and with itself.51  
 
So, crucially, the metaphor presents us with two distinctions: first, within the 
individual, between the body and the soul and between the individual psyche and 
the potentially hostile outside world. First, it constructs, through the concept of 
invisibility, an interior psychic space, problematically related to a physical 
analogue. But, paradoxically, since it is a bodily metaphor, it somatises the 
spiritual, suggesting the abstract nature of the ‘inner life’ as concrete and 
observable. Second, it individualises the social aspects of the psychological 
within a linear, causal or interactive model. In this way, third, it creates a 
particular form of subjectivity and also functions in a subsidiary way to create, 
by analogy, the possibility of collective identity. Fourth, it medicalises its 
administration and, lastly, through the concept of interiority, creates a rich 
discourse about its bringing forth. These functions will be discussed in turn 
below, though there is much overlap between them. 
 
 
I. THE MIND–BODY BOUNDARY 
 
Body and Soul or How Interior is Inside? 
 
One of the main features of the metaphor of the invisible wound and its variants 
is that the notion of invisibility leaves open a wide set of options for the wound’s 
location. The wound cannot be seen and we are not told where precisely it is 
supposed to be. Only a vague notion of interiority is invoked. The following 
extract from a story in the newsletter of the Network for Family Life Education, 
                                                 
51 See next Section 
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Rutgers University, called ‘Sex, Etc’, is typical of much emotional abuse 
literature. The story is entitled: 
 
Battered on the Inside: Emotional Abuse Inflicts Invisible Wounds. 
 
The heroine, we are assured, had not endured physical violence: 
 
     She had no broken bones, no bruises that anyone could see. 
 
Nevertheless, she ‘was abused. Her wounds were on the inside’. And we are 
assured that the wounds are ‘real’ by inference from the subsequent listing of the 
cruel and ‘abusive’ acts to which she had been subjected, as the narrative 
continues with 
 
The New Jersey teen was a victim of emotional abuse, a form of abuse that 
many don’t regard as real abuse. But it is. 52 
 
So the ontological objectivity of the hurt is established from the reality of the 
hurtful acts and its interior location left tantalisingly unspecified. Nor do 
statements like the following from lawyer, Andrew Vachss, clarify the exact 
whereabouts of inside: 
 
Emotional abuse scars the heart and damages the soul. Like cancer, it does 
its most deadly work internally. And, like cancer, it can metastasise if 
untreated.53  
 
But this notion of invisibility creates some complexity in the use of the 
metaphor, especially in its technical form of trauma. Here the interior wound 
could be located, first, in the depth of the New Jersey Teen’s body, at some 
micro-physiological level, not visible to the naked eye or even the cruder 
techniques of medical detection; second, it could be located in the more arcane 
                                                 
52 http://www.sexetc.org/story/abuse/1983 [accessed 13/01 2006]. 
53 Parade Magazine, 28 August 1994. 
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reaches of the human psyche, at an abstract psychological, emotional or spiritual 
level; third, at both levels – seen either as dual systems that run in parallel and 
reflect each other through mimesis or are connected by some causal mechanism 
(either way round, depending on perspective) or, finally, fourth, in both systems, 
combined in the ‘individual’ in the sort of overarching holistic relationship 
envisaged currently in DSM1V54 and in waves of philosophical and religious 
thought over the centuries.55 
 
In the history of trauma, invisible wounds started off as not a metaphor at all. 
When it was first used by the neurologist, John Erichsen (Erichsen, 1866), to 
describe the invisible lesions in the spine which were the consequence of what 
he called ‘nervous shock’ engendered in railway accidents, this was not a 
figurative use. Nervous shock already meant something to neurologists of his 
generation, because it was the functional equivalent of the phenomenon of 
‘surgical shock’ – a condition, also newly discovered, in which people who 
sustained wounds, even though very slight, might display a disproportionately 
serious set of symptoms, which could be attributable to the shock of the 
accident, rather than the physical injury itself. Nervous shock was a wound in 
the spine, so tiny as to be unobservable within the limit of current techniques, 
but not necessarily in principle. It was caused by the blast of crash and the 
shaking up of the railway carriage etc; there was no suggestion of any 
psychological processes like fear or of memory as a psychological or even 
somatic concept. It was assumed that this was a wound, as yet invisible 
(Erichsen, 1883).  
 
                                                 
54 The DSM IV committee reflected on the title concept, 'mental' disorder (their inverted 
commas), and the unfortunate nature of the implicit distinction that it draws with 'physical' 
disorder, which they ascribed to 'a reductionistic anachronism of mind/body dualism'. American 
Psychiatric Association (1994) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. (4th 
edn). Washington, D. C.: American Psychiatric Association.: 21. 
55 For example, see Butler, J. (1993) Bodies That Matter. London: Routledge. Grosz, E. (1994) 
Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press. And Nedelsky, J. (1995) Meditations on Embodied Autonomy. 2 Graven 
Images, 159. 
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The wound usage slid into metaphor through the work of successive neuro-
surgeons and neurologists. By the 1880s, it was accepted among medical men 
that extreme fear on its own could produce consequences comparable to surgical 
shock (Jordan, 1880), although they never quite solved the puzzle of how ‘fright 
and fright alone’ (Page, 1883: 117) could reproduce the effects of a physical 
blow or injury. Since they saw the equivalence of symptoms empirically, they 
just accepted the proposition that fear is an assault, as it was held to be in the 
common law offence of psychic assault from the eighteenth century onwards. 
Fear, it seemed, could produce the symptoms of bodily harm through patho-
anatomical and physiological pathways (Young, 1995). This is described in 
Chapter 2 on the development of PTSD – part of the strong neurological strand 
in medical thinking about psychiatric disorder, also described in the next 
chapter.  
 
Further, the wound or lesion changed in medical thought over time to become a 
sort of disorder of memory (Young, 1995), not a wound at all, but something 
going wrong with the ordinary homeostatic processes by which a human body 
adapted to changes in its physical and social environment. This was produced by 
the effect of shock on the neuro endocrine system, in which the event was, as it 
were, relived by the body. It was no longer a wound but still a bodily harm; not 
penetrating the skin like a wound, not visible to the naked eye; located at a micro 
level in the body’s interior, but, it is now claimed, accessible to detection 
through scientific observation of a rigorous empirical nature conducted under 
laboratory conditions.  
 
Over the same time period as the invisible wound became located in the body’s 
interior, it was also creating an equivalent emotional or cognitive space. It was a 
short step from the work of these early neurologists with their reliance on 
instinctive fear as an explanation of physical symptoms to Charcot’s insistence 
on the power of an idea to produce strange bodily ‘conversions’ in the state of 
hysteria (Charcot, 1889). In this way, he called on the other strand in medical 
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understanding of disorders of the mind: that of a psychological and, later, after 
Freud, a psychoanalytic dualism. From this perspective, the traumatic disorder 
of memory was located in the compulsive recall and forgetting of words and 
images; that is, in the cognitive and emotional functions of the mind as it related 
to the social history and cultural context of an individual, which gave them their 
meaning.  
 
Freud, himself, in his work with Breuer (Breuer et al, 1955 [1893-1895]), saw 
his patients’ narratives and behaviour as embedded in a very complex, somewhat 
mechanical system of cells and neuronal pathways (Freud, 1966 [1895]). 
Although he never quite abandoned the hope that the psychic self could 
ultimately be explained in this way, he was also the inheritor of the 19th century 
preoccupation with human phylogenetic and ontogenetic inheritance – an 
existence apart from the purely instinctive reactions of the animal kingdom and 
interiorised by a growing sense of history as identity in all its complexity. This 
culminated in his famous and controversial abandonment of the incest theory for 
the Oedipus complex and the split he established, by the time he wrote The 
Interpretation of Dreams, between material (or bodily) reality and what he 
called ‘psychical reality...a particular form of existence not to be confused with 
(the former)’ (Freud, 1953 [1900]: 620). For the later Freud and his 
psychoanalytic inheritors, trauma or invisible wounds are located in a psychical 
interior, detectable only through the skills of therapists in the confessional 
context of the clinic (Foucault, 1980b), who are endowed with a professional 
knowledge which rests solely on metaphor and its theoretical developments. 
 
What developed, historically, were these two locations for the invisible wound, 
the somatic and the psychic, representing the two approaches to mental disorder 
in the history of psychiatry (elaborated in the next chapter) and developing side 
by side.56 The metaphor is more complex still, however. As in current 
                                                 
56 Of course there are other splits and much academic psychology is organised by the study of 
artificial intelligence and the notion that there is no difference between the mind and the brain – 
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modernised psychiatry, where the unifying emphasis has been on diagnosis in 
the Kraepelinian tradition,57 there are still differences of opinion on the 
understanding and treatment of such disorders, so there are differences in the 
approach to psychological harm. It would probably be agreed amongst medical 
personnel that the body and the mind can, at least, be seen as two analogous 
systems (van der Kolk et al, 1985: 318), in which change in one is reflected by 
change in another. Put crudely, this means that a wound might be located in both 
systems, although there would be disagreement about which way round any 
causality might run.  
 
Besides this, as already noted, the medical establishment has formulated a 
version of mind/body holism in DSMIV (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994)58 – the fourth and alternative location for the invisible wound, inside the 
‘individual’ as opposed to the mind or the body or the mind and the body. In this 
approach body and soul are both parts of a recursive system in which their 
interaction is undifferentiated by any causal, or even bi-causal model – a 
combination of ‘thought bodies’ ((Rose, 2001a) and embodied thoughts (Butler, 
1993; Grosz, 1994; Nedelsky, 1995). The problem with this model is that it 
requires a new meta-linguistic to be articulated at all, since its understanding is 
constantly overridden by the dualistic punctuations of our language.  
 
It is argued in Chapter 2 that, in practice, the diverse versions of trauma 
privilege one side of this duality or the other. It also contends that the social 
structure of modern medicine privileges the neurological approach to harm over 
a cognitive/emotional variety. However, in the modern project of clinical 
psychology, the cognitive functions of mind prevail, whilst in psychoanalytic 
therapies these are conjoined with the emotions in an alternative psychic space. 
                                                                                                                                                 
that consciousness is some metaphorical production of the brain itself, which produces the 
illusion that it is different. Whereas others of a different epistemological persuasion might point 
out that it is the mind, as it develops socially, which studies the brain and therefore determines 
what we know about it. A chicken and egg problem, which is not solved and probably not 
soluble. See footnote 48.  
57 See Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
58 Ibid. 
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Which system is privileged for intervention and study depends on the diverse 
beliefs, professional knowledge, organisational constraints and socio-economic 
conditions of a multitude of professional practitioners worldwide, each with 
their own local and idiosyncratic considerations.  
 
Moreover, as already argued in this chapter, the technical use of trauma in a 
context in which its metaphorical status is ambiguous, is still predicated on the 
experience of the human subject, on the expressive language of the vernacular, 
the figurative language of trauma and a broken heart. Though such personal 
testimony might concede the possibility of accompanying neurological change 
(perhaps in the now nearly defunct language of nerves),59 in the websites cited 
by the Google ‘Invisible Wounds’ search it is generally used to describe the 
experience of a psychological harm – the psychological sequelae of a deeply 
unpleasant experience.  
 
A fine example here is the language of the Christian religion which places the 
wound firmly in a spiritual interior. It is the latter, still significant in the 
discourse and running alongside the medical or psychological versions of 
trauma, which offers the most interesting version of this invisibility as a psychic 
location. The talk is that of spiritual suffering and healing and, especially among 
the more proselytising or evangelistic versions, about faith and forgiveness as 
the ‘healer of invisible wounds’. An article under this title in the news letter of 
The Catholic Advocate website (5 November 2003), runs: 
 
There is a healing ministry in the Archdiocese of Newark that doesn’t have 
to do with hospital chaplains or the Anointing of the Sick, per se. Rather it 
involves the spiritual and psychological healing that comes with 
forgiveness.60 
 
                                                 
59 For an account of the status of 'nerves' in the late 19th and early 20th century see Shephard, 
B. (2002) A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press.  
60 http://www.rcan.org/index.cfm [accessed 15th Jan 2006]. 
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This ministry offers help for those suffering from ‘post abortion trauma’, a 
mental condition, whilst on the website of the United Methodist Church an 
article on ‘Clergy Depression’ refers to a ‘wounded healer’.61 On the same 
website, a bookstore advertises three books for the bereaved, under the sales line 
‘Faith As Balm for Grief’s Tragic Scars’. An article on the Santana High School 
shooting by the Associate Pastor at a local Baptist Church, also titled ‘Invisible 
Wounds’, insists that 
 
The healing can’t be rushed. It’s like pulling a scab off. You have the deaths 
and the injuries, and now you have to have the grieving time.62 
 
There is no mistaking the psychic location for the invisible wound in the lurking 
presence of the metaphorical body. 
 
The Abstract and its Incarnation 
 
It has been argued that, despite the complex relationship between body and soul, 
in both the technical and the more figurative versions of trauma and psychic 
harm, different versions of an invisible psychic space are created and elaborated. 
So it would be unsurprising if the work done by this bodily metaphor in making 
this space manifest and thinkable is equally complicated. The metaphor is made 
more complex by the fact that actual physical suffering is associated with the 
spiritual, not just in analogous parallel systems, perhaps in a causal or holistic 
relationship between the soul and the neuro-endocrine system, as described 
above, but as manifest physical illness or lesions are used as expressive, as a sign 
or symbol of their spiritual analogue – the body as a walking metaphor for the 
soul, bringing forth or acting out suffering in a psychic interior, a medium for its 
communication. 
 
                                                 
61 http://www.umph.org/resources/publications/circuit_default.html [accessed 16th Jan 2006]. 
62 http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/metro/santana [accessed 16th Jan 2006]. 
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For example, take again the religious juxtaposition of faith and healing, 
illustrated above. Whilst it is faith that is the healer of invisible wounds, it is also 
the healer of physical wounds. For, clearly, despite the initial quotation’s denial 
of its connection with physical sickness, the juxtaposition of healing with 
forgiveness and faith refers to an older tradition, before healing became the 
purview of the medical profession, and especially to the figure of preacher-as-
healer, which goes further back in time than the ministry of Jesus of Nazareth 
himself. But, in this tradition, what was at stake was not just the healing of the 
body. Such healing events were not only a sign of the miraculous powers of the 
healer and therefore the high levels of his own spirituality, they were also a sign 
that the soul of the sufferer had come into a state of grace. The manifest wound 
or sickness was the sign of an ‘invisible’ mental suffering, an absence of the 
holy spirit. The psychic nature of the wound is emphasised or enhanced by a 
symbolic physical manifestation, its invisibility marked by its juxtaposition with 
the visible. 
 
This is a different ‘mind over matter’ dualism from the tradition of 
psychosomatic suffering which has also existed in medical thinking, somewhat 
controversially, since Charcot’s work on hysterical conversions at the Salpetrière 
(Charcot, 1889; Harris, 1989), although definitions of hysteria by Showalter and 
others are also distinct (Young, 2000). Young’s three way typology is useful 
here. First, in hysteria, symptoms are psychogenic and mimic somatic disorders 
which encode meanings or expressions of a psychological state. Second, 
psychosomatic symptoms are expressions of psychological conflict or stress (as 
in neurasthenia) but have no particular meaning. Crucially, both these 
psychogenic processes are unconscious, whereas the third category of 
mind/body relationship, the use of the body as a form of metaphor, is not. As 
Young explains,  
 
The language of the body is employed self consciously … to define 
symptoms, link them to a preferred aetiology and situate them within a web 
of significance (Young, 2000: 141). 
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An esoteric example of this is the production of stigmata on the human body by 
extreme spiritual devotion and mental identification with the passion of Christ, 
in which it is said that ‘the mind wounds the body’, though the stigmata are 
thought not to behave like real wounds, as they do not smell (except, in one case, 
of roses), become infected or heal.63  
 
The ultimate example of communication through bodily wounds, however, is the 
Christian account of the crucifixion itself and the wounds of Jesus. The Judaeo-
Christian God was an abstract God – a voice, who forbade the making of graven 
images (Scarry, 1985). His first and only substantiation in the Christian story 
was his incarnation in the form of the Messiah, Jesus Christ. He put on human 
flesh in order to suffer and to sacrifice himself for the sins of man. The 
suggestion is that suffering is a bodily phenomenon, which is puzzling, since we 
also know that the disembodied souls of the damned can suffer eternal torment 
in hell. But, if the incarnation is seen as a conscious use of the body as a means 
of communication, then the story of doubting Thomas makes sense of this 
puzzle. It suggests that the incarnation was a way of showing or making 
manifest God’s sacrifice to man as a somewhat concrete thinker. For when 
Thomas put his hands in the wounds of Christ, it was to convince himself of the 
reality of his body and, therefore, of his suffering. The poet, U. A. Fanthorpe, 
calls him ‘Tom, for whom metaphor was anathema’, as she reflects on God’s 
problem of communication with man, in her poem Getting it Across (Fanthorpe, 
1989). As man has remained this concrete thinker, through vast swathes of his 
history, the bodily wounds of Christ move in and out of the realm of metaphor or 
symbolism, especially in the form of his wounded and bleeding heart.  
 
                                                 
63 This example is made more complex by the description of some stigmata as 'visible wounds', 
which come and go from the surface of the body and some as 'invisible…those covered by the 
forces of God for the inner comfort of the sufferer', as the invisible wounds of St Catherine of 
Siena on her hands and feet. (RTE Television: The Afternoon Show). 
http://www.rte.ie/tv/theafternoonshow/1028742.html (accessed 13 Jan 2006). 
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The heart, of course, has many confusing dualities; it is the real, physical, 
emotion-bearing centre of the body and a symbol of sensibility (Godwin, 2002). 
A wound evokes this dual function of heart as both the bodily organ that reacts 
most powerfully to changes in the neuro-endocrine system and also the heart as 
the figurative centre of emotional life. Thus its metaphorical status has always 
been ambiguous. The Elizabethans with their love of paradox played with the 
physical mobility of the figurative transfixed heart (or ‘hart’!).64 In contrast, the 
holistic view of mediaeval medicine and religion, to which the anti-rational 19th 
century Society of the Sacred Heart of Jesus aspired, made no distinction 
between the body and the spirit. Christ’s spiritual and physical suffering were 
one in the bleeding heart. When He revealed his wounded heart to the inspirer of 
the Sacred Heart cult, St Margaret Alacocque, in 1673 or thereabouts, allowing 
her to put her hand inside his body and touch it, it was the real thing (Godwin, 
2002: 100-103). It could be said that it is only the rationalistic, enlightenment or 
psycho-dynamic dualism, persisting into the 21st century and reinforcing the 
intuitive punctuations of our language, which make the concept of a spiritual 
lesion a metaphor and the body a symbol for the soul.  
 
 
II. THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL WORLD 
 
The Boundaries 
 
If the boundary between body and soul required by the metaphor is not always 
clear, the boundary between self and external world that it invokes is 
conceptually simpler, at least on the face of it. The model of psychic harm, 
which underlies the medical version of traumatic stress and PTSD, as well as the 
psycho-analytic, implies something semi-permeable, in the sense that the 
individual exists in and depends on a social world, but is also defensively 
                                                 
64 See 'The Bargain', a poem by Philip Sidney in The Oxford Library of English Poetry. Vol.1, 
ed. John Wain (1990). 
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organised against potential hostility by boundaries which are breachable only by 
a forcible entry made by a weapon. This model also has implications at the level 
of social psychology and its relation to political and social theory. 
 
The exact nature of this boundary is most discussed and elaborated in 
psychoanalytic theory. For Freud it was ‘the mind’s protective shield’ (Freud, 
1950 [1920]: 31), constituted by a sort of ‘fabric’ of the inner world ( Freud, 
1924; cited in Garland, 1998: 10); for W. R. Bion it is the ‘psychic envelope’; 
and for the Object Relations school in general the boundary of the inner world is 
also the ‘container’ (Lopez-Corvo, 2003) of set of histories and beliefs, 
phantasies and associations which are defensively organised, internally around 
‘good objects’ and their projection onto the external world (Garland, 1998). 
 
Freud’s original model of the mind laid out in ‘The Project for a Scientific 
Psychology’, was essentially a neurological system open to external stimuli 
(QE) but programmed to discharge the excitation they produce through motor 
and psychic activity – a homeostatic, negative feedback system with a permeable 
boundary. Self is open to the ‘other’ and dependent on it as a source of force or 
energy, but also organised defensively to preclude more than some equilibrium 
or ‘healthy’ level of excitation. The defensiveness of the system lay not so much 
in its external boundary, presumably the skin of the body, but in the structure 
and function of the individual cells of which it was composed and the way in 
which Q (the stimulus) was exchanged between them in a series of paths of 
conduction between each cell and the contact barriers around them (Freud, 1966 
[1895]). 
 
Having rather abandoned neurological explanations soon after this exposition, 
Freud returned to the cell in 1920 in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, where the 
idea of the ‘protective shield’, surrounding ‘the organ of the mind’ first arose. 
For he used the single cell as a metaphor for the mind, in order to describe how 
this protective layer is formed, as if a transformation of the contact barrier 
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through its bombardment by external stimuli. He refers to ‘a living organism in 
its most simplified form … an undifferentiated vesicle of a substance that is 
susceptible to stimulation’. As a result of ‘the ceaseless impact of external 
stimuli’, a kind of crust is formed around the cell ‘which at last would have been 
so thoroughly baked through by stimulation that it would present the most 
favourable possible conditions for the reception of stimuli and become incapable 
of any further modification’. It is at this point that consciousness arises. The 
shield remains receptive to some level of Q necessary to the functioning of the 
organism, but its primary function remains protective (Freud, 1950 [1920]; cited 
in Steedman, 1995: 89, 90). 
 
Another, more picturesque, example of the boundary of the soul, as shield, is 
cited in the health and wellbeing section of a Sunday newspaper. This is the 
holistic Taoist idea of ‘heart protector energy’, which forms an ‘energetic 
sheath’ surrounding the heart. The sheath is said to support the spirit or 
‘consciousness’ and hold it in the body, there to protect it from ‘painful 
information’.65 
 
The Enemy without... and Within 
 
It is this ‘painful information’ that is the enemy in the outside world, potentially 
hostile or inimical to the wellbeing of the soul. For the early Freud, however, the 
enemy was not so much information, more a sort of physical force which 
produced too much neuronal stimulation of an aversive, unpleasurable kind - too 
much, in the sense that it could not be processed in the normal way. Normally, it 
would be defensively ‘repressed’ and then brought to consciousness by a series 
of re-registrations at the level of consciousness, until the strength of the negative 
emotions attached to it was eventually diffused. If there is too much stimulation, 
and the excitation would become stuck at an unconscious level, a piece of 
                                                 
65 See Barefoot Doctor: Heart of the Matter. Observer Magazine; 25 May, 2003.  
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shrapnel in the wound that prevents healing (Breuer et al, 1956 [1893]; Freud, 
1966 [1895]).66  
 
For the later Freud of the elaborated unconscious, the enemy lay within the 
psyche but was projected onto the outside world in order that the soul’s defenses 
could be mobilised, as if the threat came from its social environment. The move 
from seeing neuroses as the result of external enemies and dangers to seeing 
them as the result of in internal ones concentrated his theory on a divided inner 
life (Freud, 1923). So by the time of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, he had 
shifted his interest from material to psychic reality and had evolved his concept 
of the unconscious as id. Thus he discusses the way in which the protective 
shield provides no such defense against the excitations coming from within the 
vessel itself, which were of much greater intensity than those from the outside. 
In ‘the Project’, endogenous stimuli only arose from the normal cellular activity 
of the body; now they arose from another part of the mind, the unconscious, 
desires and fantasies laid down in early childhood, constantly struggling with the 
ego. But in an attempt to deal with these ‘internal enemies’ the vesicle treated 
them as if they came from outside, so that it might be possible ‘to bring the 
shield….into operation as a means of defence against them’ (Freud, 1950 
[1920]; cited in Steedman, 1995: 89,90). So the inside had to be ejected to 
outside, the self to become other to make use of these defences. Crucially, the 
timeless ahistorical fantasies of the unconscious had to be slotted back into 
history for the ego to wrestle with them. For defence is not just a spatial 
concept;67 there is a notion of time involved in cause and effect, the weapon, the 
assault or event, the wound and its consequences all running in sequence. 
 
It is claimed that since Freud’s move away from the seduction theory, the 
psychoanalytic movement has been divided in its understanding of trauma 
between those who emphasise the enemy without and those who are more 
                                                 
66 For a fuller discussion of this process of repression see Chapter 2 on Traumatic Memory. 
67 Neither is 'repression', which uses a spatial metaphor of hierarchical layers of the psyche 
which become the unconscious id, the ego and the superego. 
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interested in the enemy within (Brett et al, 1993). Certainly, in the medical 
history of post traumatic stress disorder, the first has dominated, thanks to the 
early influence of Abram Kardiner, and the diagnosis of PTSD itself is 
predicated on an identifiable external event (Kardiner, 1941). In this thinking, it 
is the early Freud who is most influential, although his concept of the enemy 
slightly changed over time. Freud’s model, in keeping with the mechanical 
paradigms of his time, was of an organism activated by stimuli as a sort of force 
or energy from the outside world (Freud sometimes calls it a ‘current’). Later, 
Mardi Horowitz (Horowitz, 1976) developed this into a model of an information 
processing organism, as cybernetics became a customary way of conceptualising 
psychological processes, although, far from modern cybernetics, information for 
him was not a neutral phenomenon, since it held an emotional content which 
affected the ability of the organism to process it.68 This work, with its emphasis 
on explaining the symptom clusters contained within the diagnostic description 
of PTSD, has formed the basis for further theorising in behavioural and 
cognitive psychology, described briefly in Chapter 2.  
 
 So the external enemy became exogenous bits of information of a shocking and 
cognitively dissonant nature and the Google search on the metaphor of the 
invisible wound comes up with an array of examples of these. They range from 
the witnessing or experience of terrible accidents, violent and brutal warfare 
torture and rape through to more domestic abuse of a physical, sexual or 
emotional nature. Articles on ‘The Wounds of Spouse Abuse’69 are particularly 
eloquent on the destructive power of words, as ‘drawn swords’ (Psalm 55). And 
a women’s group discusses ‘the many forms that a malicious invisible knight 
might take’ and ‘how to battle that which we cannot see.’70 ‘Shattered Words’ is 
                                                 
68 For Freud, this emotion was 'unpleasure'. Freud, S. (1966 [1895]) Project for a Scientific 
Psychology. In The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. 
Volume 1 (ed J. Strachey), pp. 281-397. London: Hogarth. 
69 www.gospelcom [accessed 16 January 2006]. 
70 www.diana’sgrove.com [accessed 16 January 2006].  
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the title of one article on verbal abuse by Teresa Brouwer, which is followed by 
another called ‘Emotional and Mental Rape,’ by the same author.71  
 
The enemy within meanwhile is seen more as inner conflict which is precipitated 
by exogenous events.72 Later interpretations of internal struggles caused by 
aversive external events from the followers of Melanie Klein and the school of 
Object Relations turn less on the notion of an internal enemy projected to the 
outside and more on the idea of a forcible meeting of the inner and outer worlds, 
causing a massive adaptive failure (Kardiner et al, 1947). 
 
The Breach of the Boundary 
 
The above represents an extension of the meaning of trauma, which, as already 
noted, is, literally, an open injury, caused by cutting, piercing, hitting and similar 
percussive acts. We have also noted Freud’s notions of a breach of the protective 
shield between self and other and his thought that a delusion is like ‘a patch over 
the place where originally a rent had appeared in the ego’s relation to the outside 
world’ ( Freud, 1924; cited in Garland, 1998: 10). Futhermore, this is a language 
taken up by Caroline Garland, head of the Tavistock Trauma Unit, in her edited 
book, Understanding Trauma, with trauma as described as ‘a rent in (the 
mind’s) fabric’ and ‘the catastrophic breach in the protective shield’ (Garland, 
1998: 10 and 18). Whatever the protective boundary is made of, however, a 
fabric, a shield, a crust, or Bion’s ‘envelope’, with trauma it is not just the outer 
defences that are in disarray. The word represents, for the Object Relations 
                                                 
71 www.suite101.com [accessed 16 January 2006]. 
72 For example, Freud’s diagnosis of war neurosis at the end of World War I did not depend on 
any notion of shell shock or neurasthenia.72 War neuroses are a defensive formation, as are all 
neuroses and the defence is necessitated by internal conflict between the fundamental drive to 
self preservation of the id and two warring egos, the soldier’s old peaceful one against the new 
warrior one. So fear is not that of external events but of this new internal enemy, the new warrior 
ego, which threatens survival itself. Thus, structurally, war neuroses resemble psychoneuroses in 
their origins in inner conflict and fear of internal enemies, the first the new ego, the second the 
sexual drives of the libido. He also explained the horrific content of patients’ dreams or indeed 
intrusive memories, by both the idea of 'fixation' on the shocking event and by 'the compulsion 
to repeat', which was to anticipate retrospectively the danger that had precipitated the trauma, 
explaining the continued state of arousal that such patients showed. 
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school, an invasion of the inner world by the outer, which leads to the 
disorganisation and disintegration of the whole personality. Here, for the 
individual, meaning is also of the essence and not just in the struggle with 
cognitive dissonance; cognitive schema are here the whole psychic history of an 
individual and their inner representations of the world, including their deepest 
fears, the ‘objects’ lurking behind the protective shield. Lack of fit does not just 
lead to attempts to rework a terrible memory, but a complete loss of the sense of 
the outer world and of the purpose of life. Garland criticises the mechanistic 
approach of Freud’s description of the way that (traumatic) events breach the 
protective shield: 
 
It describes the breakdown of the smooth running of the machinery of the 
mind, but not the collapse of meaning: the failure of belief in the protection 
afforded by good objects, and from that point onwards the longer term 
consequences for the entire personality…. 
 
She continues:  
 
Once the castastrophic breach in the protective shield has taken place … the 
traumatic influx of stimulation from the present stirs up early phantasies of 
devastation and cruelty, and a paranoid view of relations between objects, 
which then get bound up with the present events in a way that is hard to 
undo (Garland, 1998: 18).  
 
In other words, the result of what she calls ‘a collision between an individual 
and an event’ is an interactive process, as much dependent on the internal world 
of the victim as on the external world in time and history. This is much like 
saying, in the metaphor of a physical wound, that the nature of a lesion is not 
just the work of a powerful, percussive, moving object entering the passive 
interior of a body, but is formed by a complex exchange between object and 
flesh, blood and bones. 
 
Clearly, although a wound to the body represents a breaching of the physical 
defences, an intrusion into private space, an invasion of the interior of the self by 
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an alien object, the piercing of the body’s protective skin is not a simple notion. 
Nor is the piercing of the soul. For, as well as invasion, the metaphor of a wound 
to the body is also accompanied by two other powerful ideas: that of the escape 
through the breach of something that should be contained and that of 
penetration. For an example of escape, we go back to Taoism. The Barefoot 
Doctor writes: 
 
When the energy of your heart protector becomes momentarily ruptured by 
trauma and shock, the heart energy itself is effectively weakened and loses 
control of your consciousness, which moves up out of your body and into 
your brain, where it gets stuck in a claustrophobic loop of self punishing 
thoughts.73 
 
For the spiritual implication of the notion of bodily penetration, we go to 
religious symbolism and the iconography of the heart, where both the physical 
and the spiritual carry a dual implication. For penetration is not just the breach 
of something that was closed; it is also its opening up, the making of a 
connection between the outside and the inside to reveal and also make available 
an interior. In terms of the body, it is significant that a slang word for the female 
genitalia is a ‘gash’ or a ‘wound’, as if the bounded body of the male is 
transformed by the opening of the body bag into something unbounded, 
incomplete, penetrable and passive, that is, paradigmatically female (Naffine, 
1998; Nedelsky, 1990). But this ‘wound’, as a passage from the exterior to the 
inside, also reveals the body’s secrets, like the wounds of Shakespeare’s Caesar, 
which could ‘ope their ruby lips’ to speak the names of his assassins. The labia, 
as the opening to the birth canal, are the means by which women become the 
nurturing, female ‘mother’. Further, the feminist theologian, Caroline Walker 
Bynum, has written on the ‘feminisation’ of Christ’s body in the iconography of 
his wounds and his bleeding heart (Walker Bynum, 1992). In Chapter 3 of her 
book, entitled The Body of Christ in the Later Middle Ages, she describes 
representations in which ‘mother’ church herself is born through the wound in 
his side; the blood from this wound runs down his groin to become like a 
                                                 
73 See Barefoot Doctor: Heart of the Matter. Observer Magazine; 25 May, 2003. 
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menstrual flow and he suckles hungry sinners at his breast. But this mother also 
feeds his children directly with his blood; it is what flows from the wounds in 
his heart and side that, symbolically or not, still feeds his flock at the service of 
Mass or Holy Communion.  
 
If blood is a sign of suffering but also fertility and feeding, the heart pierced by 
Cupid’s arrow bears a homologous duality; the arrow enters the flesh to pierce 
the heart, as the seat of sentiment, to open it up to the sight and the sensibility 
and, also, the cruelty of another, thus to all the pains and pleasures of erotic love. 
We see this curious conflation of anxiety and ecstasy in the Alexandrian poets, 
in Elizabethan love poetry, where pleasure predominates,74 and in the more 
miserable emphasis of Aphra Bhen’s great sonnet of love’s cruelty: 
 
Love in fantastic triumph sate 
Whilst Bleeding hearts around him flowed…. 
 
where the pleasure goes all to her lover, as she inherits the pain (Wain, 1986b). 
 
If this opening up through suffering is a trope in the metaphorical use of bodily 
wounds, it has also become a figurative aspect of spiritual lesions, the gash in 
the soul. The media treatment of the life and death of Princess Diana is saturated 
with a discourse of spiritual wounds, the ‘psychological wounds’ from her 
childhood’,75 ‘the wounds opened up by her passing’,76 and the consequent flow 
                                                 
74 The last verse of Sir Philip Sidney’s poem, The Bargain, says it all: 
 
His hart his wound received from my sight: 
My hart was wounded with his wounded hart, 
For as from me, on him his hurt did light, 
So still me thought in me his hurt did smart: 
 Both equall hurt, in this change sought our blisse: 
 My true love hath my hart and I have his. 
 
Wain, J. (ed) (1986a) The Oxford Library of English Poetry: Volume 1 Spencer to Dryden. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
75 http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,285456,00.html?sPage=fnc/world/diana# [acessed 3 
December 2008]. 
76 http://www.ew.com/ew/article/0,,289454_2,00.html [accessed 3 December 2008]. 
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of emotion to communion with the common man – or more frequently, woman. 
Far from needing to enter into the body of others to feel their pain, as Adam 
Smith suggests (Smith, 1976: 9), it seems necessary, at the turn of this century, 
only to share their hurtful experiences, albeit mediated by the body, to be opened 
up to the great community of victims. After all, Diana called herself the ‘Queen 
of Hearts’. 
 
 
III. THE WOUNDED IDENTITY 
 
So far we have discussed how the metaphor of the invisible wound has created a 
variable narrative about the vulnerability of the individual psyche to a hostile 
world of shocks and cruelty, rather as the individual body is seen in the 
discourse of immunology and invasive disease. As is suggested in the 
introduction to this chapter, this notion of the vulnerable individual, an 
individual susceptible to wounds or trauma, is constitutive of a particular form 
of identity, which also reciprocally creates a particular form of harm. And this is 
discussed here in conjunction with another narrative which takes the form of a 
burgeoning critique of the notion of trauma and traumatic identity, both for 
individuals and, by extension, communities and nations. The critique organises 
itself around the fact that so called traumatogenic situations might more 
helpfully be addressed not at an individual psychological level, but at the level 
of socio-economic, cultural or historical explanations.  
 
‘There’s no such thing as society’ 
 
To start with, and perhaps to state the obvious, the discourse of trauma presents 
a picture of the world peopled by discrete individuals, separated from others by 
permeable but defensive boundaries. They are rather like the atomistic 
individuals of enlightenment philosophy, but different, in the sense that these 
rational beings were not afflicted by the emotions, which this traumatic version 
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of the individual has acquired (Danziger, 1997). Tautologically, the discourse 
explains the inner state of an individual at a psychological and therefore an 
individual level. The social world, society, is a collection of individuals. Hence 
the ease with which the discourse slips from talking of scarred individuals to 
traumatised nations and wounded worlds.  
 
An example of this slippage is, as Richard Wilson argues in his book, The 
Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, the rhetorical creation of a 
community of suffering by the Truth and Reconciliation Committee in the post 
apartheid state, as part of a conscious nation building exercise (Wilson, 2001: 13 
- 16). He quotes Archbishop Tutu’s response to a witness complaining of torture 
in police custody: 
 
Your pain is our pain. We were tortured, we were harassed, we suffered, we 
were oppressed (Wilson, 2001: 111). 
 
Further, he suggests that the TRC was creating a new identity, the ‘national 
victim’:  
 
Individual suffering which is ultimately unique, was brought into a public 
space where it could be collectivised and shared by all and merged into a 
wider narrative of national redemption….  (Wilson, 2001).  
 
The suffering of an individual became symbolic, emblematic, because, also, it 
was part of the suffering of a whole people. Such a collective of individual 
suffering calls up the idea of the outflow of feeling consequent on the 
penetration of the soul’s protective shield in the metaphor of the wound and the 
creation of a ‘sentimental’ community of the traumatised mentioned above. 
Patior ergo sumus. 77 
 
                                                 
77 This is a corruption of a corruption – a version of Descartes’ original 'cogito' by the 
constructivist philosopher, Heinz von Foerster (von Foerster, H. (1991) Through the Eyes of the 
Other. In Research and Reflexivity (ed. F. Steier). London: Sage.. On page 67 he discusses the 
linguistic and therefore essentially social nature of thought. Cogito ergo sumus. 
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Whilst it has been argued that this ascription of a psyche to a group or 
community is improper (Ignatieff, 1996) (and, logically, it is) as a metaphor it is 
not awkward if the difficulties are only those of quantity and addition.78 That is, 
if a community is just a multiplicity of individuals and nothing more – if there is 
no such thing as society.  
 
History is Dead 
 
However, even at the level of the psychological individual, there are problems 
with the metaphor, especially in the relationship of an individual to his own 
history, which the discourse of the wound implies is completely organised by the 
traumatic event. For what defensive individualism omits to address, and what 
the metaphor of the wound precludes (even in the more florid and complex form 
presented by the Object Relations school, in which the individual is a more 
active shaper of her own experience of psychic trauma), is that the world may 
also be the powerful and constant shaper of the individual and her inner life. 
There is a ceaseless interchange which does not start or suddenly stop with 
catastrophe. This is, after all, one event among many, although the individual 
‘system’ may, indeed, be violently ‘perturbed’ (Maturana et al, 1980). The 
metaphor of the wound (at least in its first shocking non-ontogenetic form), on 
the contrary, seems to imply the total transformation of the life trajectory of a 
previously formed individual by an event which, we will discover later, breaches 
the limits of what is ‘expectable’. 
 
First, the metaphor assumes the definitive nature of the individual laid down by 
her own narrated social history (for Freud, before the age of three), a continuous 
entity existing behind some defensively organised, though semi-permeable, 
boundary, through which new information produces a gradual adjustment, which 
we sometimes call development or growth, with all its normative implications. 
                                                 
78 See Kenneth Arrow’s 'Impossibility Theorem' for a discussion of the irrationalities that arise in 
any attempt to add the preferences of individuals. Arrow, K. (1974) The Limits of Organisation. 
New York: Norton. 
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This version of personal history has an element of determinism to it, as 
something contained within normative bounds. For a traumatised individual, the 
wound interrupts the gradual process of change with a discontinuity, a violent 
transformation produced by forces from outside. Isabel Piper Shafir, writing of 
the discourse of trauma prevalent in Chilean society following the end of the 
Pinochet regime, puts it like this: 
 
The fundamental idea is that the history of each one of us was constituting 
us into subjects with a relatively stable and definitive personality, which was 
likely to be maintained. We were subjects that were constituted or were in 
the process of being. Nevertheless, the experience of the dictatorship broke 
the stability, that is it traumatised us (Piper Shafir, 2005: 2). 
 
So here is the idea, not only of discontinuity with the past, but the rupture of a 
sort of preordained future, one that, by implication, was manageable and 
predictable, more or less more-of-the-same, ‘stable’. Trauma, as a discontinuity, 
not only cancels out the past and its narratives, it violates our expectations; 
something deeply unnatural has happened, something that was not ‘meant to be’.  
 
Moreover, this talk of the breaking of stability that Piper Shafir identifies as a 
‘fracture’ leaves a mark or a scar. Subjects of trauma are not the same again. 
Even if they heal, they are scarred. Trauma, she says: 
 
operates as an origin of what we are as a society and of the identity of its 
direct victims … the origin of our major pains (Piper Shafir, 2005: 2). 
 
She calls the discourse of trauma ‘a rhetoric of marks’.  
 
Second, this sense of normativity in an individual history and its dislocation 
from an orderly to a disorderly pathway is reflected in the lack of attention to the 
wider and continuous social context of an individual in the medical model of 
trauma. For, in all the multiplicity of epidemiological and clinical research on 
traumatic stress and its aftermath, the social context of an individual victim, if it 
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figures at all, is seen as either a reflection of disturbed intrapsychic processes, a 
symptom of trauma, or merely presents itself as one ‘factor’ which can influence 
outcome, statistically adding particular ‘resilience’ or ‘vulnerability’ to this 
reified affliction (Summerfield, 2001). 
 
Long Live History! 
 
However, even if more attention is paid to the continuing social history of an 
individual, this still seems to obscure the wider historical issues which 
contextualise traumatic events. This is the point of Piper Shafir’s critique. As she 
points out, even attempts by social psychologists to take a less intra-psychic and 
more interactive perspective still construct the individual as a continuous entity 
in some sort of causal or bicausal (interactive) relationship to the social world at 
the level of behaviour and events – and one event in particular.79 This restricts 
recognition of the role of wider socio-economic and cultural factors – what she 
calls ‘practices of domination’ – in the production of identities (Piper Shafir, 
2005).80  
 
She argues that attempts by Baro (Martin-Baro, 1990; Piper Shafir, 2005) in El 
Salvador, and other theorists in South America, to radically reconceptualise 
trauma as ‘political trauma’, according to a more Marxist interpretation, have 
been defeated by the medical discourse. They still ‘construct notions of the 
individual and society that contribute to the reproduction of the same social 
order that they seek to contest’ (Piper Shafir, 2005: 4-6). Like the notion of 
healing and the Human Rights discourse of reparation in, say, Truth and 
                                                 
79 For an excellent discussion of the limits of the of 'the social' in traditional social psychology, 
as it is comprises the interpersonal, rather than wider political and cultural considerations, see 
Riley, D. (1983) War in the Nursery: Theories of the Child and Mother. London: Virago Press. 
and Burman, E. (2008) Deconstructing Developmental Psychology (2nd Ed.). New York: 
Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group. 
80 This point about the innate conservatism of the therapeutic model in politics, is also made by 
Wendy Brown in her book on identity politics, States of Injury, where she points out that the so-
called 'radical' new political movements, organised around claims to injury, paradoxically 
reinforce the authority of the existing state. 
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Reconciliation Commissions, it calls on the return to a normal or whole past for 
the victim. It requires the wiping out of the effects of violence. But these are the 
effects of a particular piece of history, in this positivist interpretation, a cause 
located in a past which cannot be changed. The discourse of trauma suggests that 
the only thing that can be changed is the wound, through healing, and draws 
attention from what needs to be changed at a structural level, as reflected in 
current social and political practices and relations. Most importantly, the 
metaphor of the wound, in fixing a victim identity on individuals and on 
communities, detracts from their ability to make these major changes, since their 
defined role in the discourse is to ‘work on their healing’ (Piper Shafir, 2005: 
7,8; Summerfield, 1999). 
 
The critique applies both at the level of personal and domestic as well as public 
politics. In the domain of sexual abuse, for example, young girls are supplied 
with literature such as The Courage to Heal and The Courage to Heal 
Workbook, with no mention of socio-economic or cultural issues (Bass et al, 
2002; Davis, 1990).  
 
Working on healing is a complicated business in both the private and the public, 
and the individual and the collective domain, involving as it does a recovery, not 
only from a harm, but also, in many cases, from a wrong – a violation not only 
of some inner psychological space of an individual, but also of some quasi legal 
space called ‘rights’. For example, on the private level, therapy for incestuous 
families in the pioneering treatment centre in Great Ormond Street in the early 
1980s was incorporated into a sort of legal framework, in which the moral roles 
of victim, villain and the rest were laid out and had to be acknowledged and 
adopted by the participants before any reparative scenario could be played out 
(Bentovim, 1986; Bentovim et al, 1984). Since then, the idea of healing through 
justice has infused many Western legal systems with the spreading practice of 
Restorative Justice (Braithwaite, 1996). It is accompanied at the discursive level 
by a widely used formulation of the grief, anger and despair associated with 
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sudden loss through crime or chance, as curable only through the establishment 
of lines of human accountability and blame for causal events, so that the victims 
or their families may ‘have resolution (or closure) and move on’ (Duff, 2006). 
 
This merger of moral/religious, legal and therapeutic models was reproduced at 
the national/collective level by Truth and Reconciliation Committees in South 
Africa and South America, which promulgated a combination of both a healing, 
a legal and a religious/redemptive discourse. Here, it is claimed, the 
concentration on individual trauma, testimony and transgression and the 
construction of the notion of violence and suffering as the result of ‘political 
intolerance’ or ‘racism’ at a personal level avoided a higher level, structural 
critique. This advanced the notion of individual reconciliation and the ANC 
project of nation building on the basis of individual healing. Richard Wilson 
writes:  
 
Accentuating the normative and moral dimensions of conflict and inequality 
was crucial to the TRC’s nation building mission. This meant that 
reconciliation could be more of the religious and redemptive variety, where 
individuals could readily change their attitudes and join the rainbow nation, 
redeeming both. Explaining violence with reference to the social and 
political organization of conflict and inequality was more problematical, as 
this implied a long-term and contentious program of socio-economic 
redistribution and transformation of South African state and societal 
institutions (Wilson, 2001: 93). 
 
 
 
IV. THE PATHOLOGISATION OF IDENTITY 
 
It has been argued that the metaphor of the wound creates a particular form of 
individual identity in a particular relationship to the social world. A critique has 
been described which claims that the discourse of trauma locates social 
problems at the level of the individual, militating against social explanation and 
possible social solutions. But the metaphor of the wound goes further – as does 
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the critique – in that the problem it locates at the individual level is not just a 
moral or socio-legal one, but primarily a socio-medical condition, pathologising 
the individual and requiring specialist knowledge in its recognition and 
treatment, therapy or drugs. Essentially, it cedes power to experts, to their 
cultural assumptions, their techniques and the social structures that maintain 
these – in a phrase, to their regimes of truth. 
 
It hardly needs saying that PTSD, as the product of a highly sophisticated, 
modern, evidence- based psychiatric medicine, needs clinical expertise in its 
diagnosis and treatment. Even the most mechanistic and rigid questionnaires 
such as the much used Diagnostic Interview Schedule ( DIS) designed 
technically to be used to anyone to discover and locate morbidity, have problems 
both of specificity and sensitivity (Robins et al, 1986). These are not solved by 
less reliable semi-structured technologies and only resolved by clinical 
discretion (Spitzer et al, 1992). And yet a different sort of expertise is required, 
when the unconscious where the traumatic memory is lodged is Freud’s 
bubbling cauldron of desire, where time and historical causality have no 
meaning, until it is elicited by dynamic interaction and interpretation in the 
therapy room. Foucault, in his famous History of Sexuality, (1980b) discusses 
the manner in which the terrain of individual sexuality was established by the 
psychoanalytic profession as an area only to be accessed by conscripting the 
priestly techniques of the confessional to psychiatric knowledge and power. 
 
Something of this same argument is produced by critics at the level of 
communities of individuals or nations, where this process is seen as reproduced 
by the pathologising discourse of invisible wounds or psychic trauma. This 
therapeutic turn in the construction of war and hunger, does not just disempower 
the individual and create dependency, so the critique goes. It is the basis for a 
new international security paradigm, which reproduces, in the name of health 
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and helpfulness, all the political and cultural imperialism of the old.81 
International agencies with UN legitimation, international aid programs and 
charitable activities form a different sort of invasion of a sovereign people in the 
name of therapeutic programs for national and individual recovery, rather than 
the rebuilding of economic activity and social infrastructure. Traumatised 
individuals (or peoples) seem to lose negative freedoms and rights to lack of 
interference; they acquire medically defined needs (a right to be treated, even!) 
which appear to be the duty of professional others to meet with a pressing 
urgency (Pupavac, 2004). 
 
Trauma may be experienced at an individual level, but the number of 
traumatised people is legion. Trauma of peoples is portrayed in the discourse of 
international aid agencies as a health crisis of epidemic proportions. Whilst the 
Report on Health Security of the UN Advisory Board on Human Security 
assiduously avoids discussion of mental health issues, a brief look at the material 
from the Google ‘invisible wounds’ search shows that trauma has been elevated 
to a major health problem in Western thinking. And this is not only a matter of 
individual well being; it is also presented as a public health crisis on an 
international scale, which eclipsed hunger in the nineties as the issue most 
flagged up by international aid agencies (Pupavac, 2004).  
 
The on-line material is dominated by two sets of claims. The first is about the 
health needs of soldiers, US veterans of two wars in Iraq and Canadian peace 
keeping veterans of Rwandan genocide. For example, ‘Invisible Casualties’,82 
and ‘These Unseen Wounds Cut Deep’, 83 both cite numbers of Iraq-based US 
soldiers needing psychological counseling as about 20% and rising, quoting 
expectations of the post Vietnam level of over 30% of veterans. They note that 
                                                 
81 See Kapur, R. (2005) Erotic Justice: Law and the New Politics of Postcolonialism. London: 
Glass House Press. In Chapter 4, .The Tragedy of Victimisation Rhetoric: Resurrecting 
the.Native. Subject in International/ Postcolonial Feminist Legal Politics. She makes this point at 
a more theoretical level. 
82 Daily Press.com [accessed 23 Jan 2006]. 
83 environmentalistsagainstwar.com [accessed 23 Jan 2006]. 
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more medical resources are needed in Iraq – for US troops! – and that the VA 
centres in the US will not be able to cope with demand for help. 20% is the 
Canadian figure too for troops returning from Rwanda. A feature in the CBC 
flagship news programme, the National, on PTSD (‘The Unseen Scars’), laments 
the slowness in the Canadian military to address this problem and the reluctance 
of soldiers themselves to seek help.84 The second claim, as made by Dr Richard 
Mollica, Director of the Harvard Program in Refugee Trauma, working in 
Cambodia and Bosnia and quoted in an article by Maria Vega for Inter Press 
Service, is that  
 
One sixth of the people in the world today are psychologically scarred by 
war, ethnic conflicts, natural disasters, social upheavals, torture, terrorism 
and landmines, which kill 15,000 people every year and mutilate many 
thousands more’.85  
 
Vega’s article goes on to cite civil or guerrilla warfare in El Salvador and Peru, 
natural disasters in Haiti and their legacy of ‘depression, fear and anxiety’ 
widespread in the populations. ‘Existing mental health policies are insufficient, 
because these problems have traditionally been ignored in national health care 
plans.’ 86 And there are other articles about the troubled populations of war 
infested zones, about Bosnia,87 about a ‘Mental Health Crisis in Afghanistan’ 
and, in Africa, about Rwanda again and about ‘Sierra Leone’s Invisible 
Scars’, 88 all claiming the desperate need for psycho-social support programs in 
these areas.  
 
                                                 
84 http://www.cbc.ca/national/ [accessed 23 Jan 2005]. 
85 This article was written on the occasion of the International Congress of Ministers for Health 
for Mental Health and Post conflict Recovery held in Rome on 3rd and 4th December 2004, 'for 
all 60 conflict/post conflict societies'. http://ipsnews.net/ [accessed 13 Jan 2006].  
86 This was preceded by a conference in September for only seven strife-torn countries in 
Sarajevo, Bosnia Herzegovina, which Mollica with money from the Fulbright New Century 
Scholars Program, sponsored by the US State Department.  
87 http//www.cies.org/articles/sarajevo.htm [accessed 23 Jan 2006]. 
88 Afghanistan: WHO Special Report, 6 November 2001. Rwanda: Dr Lynne Jones, of the 
International Medical Corps, on BBC News:  http//news.bbc.co.uk/2hi/africa/405279.stm 
[accessed 13 Jan 2006]. 
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With the claims outlined above, goes the obvious implication that scarce 
resources are poured into post-conflict countries for attending to visible wounds 
and for the rebuilding of infrastructure – called by Mollica the ‘blankets, bricks 
and mortar’ approach (in a 2002 internet article on ‘Healing the Wounds of War’ 
for the International Exchange of Scholars). This competed for finance with 
what is implied as the more important task of rebuilding the mental health of 
nations. While Mollica concedes (2006) that this can be most successfully 
undertaken in the context of some return to normalcy (school and work) for the 
afflicted populations, as these assist with psychological recovery (or resilience), 
he also suggests that this recovery is a crucial, necessary condition for the 
development of peaceful and economically prosperous societies (Mollica, 2000; 
Mollica, 2006) – crudely, that war and hunger in the world are some function of 
mental ill health. 
 
This is the next development for claims to individual pathology. Not only do 
these individuals need treating; not only do their numbers constitute a threat to 
health on an international scale, their unresolved trauma and its consequent 
pathology passes on to the next generation in the form of helplessness, anger and 
more major disturbance. Intervention is justified by the paradigm of trauma and 
therapy on conventional security grounds, because psychological injury is seen 
as a trigger for future wars, as this extract from a paper produced by the US-
based Center for the Study of Mind and Human Intervention suggests: 
 
Disasters deliberately caused by other groups lead to massive 
medical/psychological problems. When the affected group cannot mourn its 
losses or reverse its feelings of helplessness and humiliation, it obligates 
subsequent generations to complete these unfinished psychological 
processes. These transgenerationally-transmitted psychological tasks in turn 
shape future political/military ideological development/decision making 
(Volkan, 2000: 3). 
 
Thus, the World Health Organisation, for example, invokes a ‘vicious cycle’ of 
brutality, ‘psycho-social dysfunction, new instability, new vulnerabilities and 
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new hazards’ (WHO, 2002: 6). Explanations of wars now sit in human 
psychology rather than old socio-economic explanations of tribalism, or the 
ritualistic imperatives of revenge.  
 
The online material contains one swingeing attack by Vanessa Pupavac on this 
new therapeutic basis for international governance (Pupavac, 2004), making the 
following points: first, that Mollica’s is not a lone voice but part of what is now 
the prevailing discourse among international agencies (UNICEF, the World 
Bank and WHO, for example, as well as a multiplicity of NGOs). She argues 
that: ‘a therapeutic ethos now pervades international policy making with its 
diagnosis of traumatized identities around the globe’ and that this ethos extends 
not just to short term emergency intervention but to issues of security, 
prevention and long term governance (Pupavac, 2004: 159). She cites the 
example of international intervention in Bosnia for therapeutic purposes, the 
practices of innumerable psycho-social programmes and interventions, spiralling 
into general involvement in public policy by the Office of the High 
Representative after the Dayton Agreement (1995)89 in a way which vitiates 
local institutions and undermines national sovereignty (Pupavac, 2004: 160). 
 
Second, Pupavac comments that international post-conflict management, too, 
has become therapeutised in its focus, in the post-Yugoslav states, on improving 
the self esteem and soft communication skills of individuals rather than capital 
investment. The failure of political resolution or economic development in post 
conflict states is attributed to the low psychological state of its population, rather 
than to structural explanations like current political arrangements, histories of 
exploitative imperialism or the poverty and inequity which results from global 
capitalism. 
 
                                                 
89 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed Dayton 
Ohio, 21 November 1995. http://www.nato.int/Ifor/gfa/gfa-home.htm [accessed 24 January 
2009]. 
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Her third critique is that this Western psychological paradigm pathologises 
ordinary feelings of grief and anger in culturally inappropriate ways. Insisting on 
the need for specialist support and counseling undermines people’s power to 
invoke social solidarity and to make changes. Pupavac draws attention to the 
oxymoron in international policy talk in Bosnia of ‘self help through 
professional intervention’, so reminiscent of the contradictions contained in the 
foreword to the self-help book with which this chapter starts. Since this 
therapeutic understanding has been extended to the notion of human rights, there 
seems, she says, to be ‘no contradiction in the formal upholding of Bosnian 
sovereignty and its effective suspension’ (Pupavac, 2004: 160). She argues that 
the holder of human rights seems to have slid from the classic legal concept of 
the autonomous subject with negative rights to lack of interference, to an 
emotional, vulnerable, damaged self who has positive rights to have his/her 
needs met. ‘The therapeutic construction of the subject as a vulnerable damaged 
victim requires third party enablers for self-empowerment’ (Pupavac, 2004: 
161). This, she says, provides an excuse for long term Western occupation of 
sovereign but war torn countries and, it has been suggested here, paralleled on 
an individual level by Foucault’s conception of the role of the psychotherapeutic 
confessional in making and bringing the individual subject under regulation?  
 
 
V. THE VOICE OF THE TRAUMATISED SUBJECT 
 
So far, it has been argued that the metaphor of the invisible wound has helped to 
create a version of the self which is vulnerable or injured by events in the social 
world and in need of professional facilitators to bring it forth; that is, to make it 
visible, observable, a subject of science or quasi science, or the religious, 
psychoanalytic or self help confessional. But in looking at Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions, for example, we have also found a discourse 
which suggests that the individual, private self behind its boundary is not only 
wounded by the social world but can and must then speak out, give testimony, 
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use the language of the social world to give shape and meaning to his 
experiences. This relies on the notion that the individual, by giving voice to his 
suffering, by naming the trauma, by narrating its details in the metaphorical 
language of the wound, can bring it forth into the social world unaided by 
science and professional expertise. Further, that this is a process that can create 
individuals anew, re-author them as subjects with an active rather than a passive 
voice and bring about the healing of their wounds.  
 
From this stems the South African TRC’s rhetoric of ‘testifying’ as the 
restoration of dignity to the subject and the healing power of storytelling – what 
Fiona Ross identifies as ‘the equation of self with voice’ (Ross, 2003; Tutu. 
1997) ‘Revealing is Healing’ read the banners at its meetings. More generally 
the discourse was characterised by Achille Mmembe in his work on the issue of 
suffering and self creation in Africa as ‘I can tell my story, therefore I am’ 
(Mbembe, August 2000). This call to testimony was also accompanied by what 
Ross called its ‘construction as an authentically African mode of 
communication’ ( Ross, 2003: 328; TRC, 1998)), through the oral tradition and 
the notion of individual and communal healing and redemption (TRC, Volume I: 
112). It should also be pointed out, however, that the oral tradition as self 
affirmation and a site of resistance to oppression is still alive and well in those 
Western countries where science, as knowledge, is most privileged – and, 
perhaps for that reason.90  
 
This approach to testimony of trauma is supported by a raft of literature, (Agger 
et al, 1990; Gurr et al, 2001; Herman, 1992, for example). Agger and Sorenson 
describe testimony as ‘a universal ritual of healing’ in which the individual 
becomes whole by reincorporating painful experiences into the self.  
 
                                                 
90 Examples would be the framing of the process of disclosure in cases of sexual abuse as 
'therapeutic', or the ritual of self revelation on US daytime television. 
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[Self] as a concept has a special double connotation: it contains objective, 
judicial, public and political aspects as well as subjective, spiritual, cathartic 
and private aspects (Agger, 1994; 9, cited in Ross, 2003). 
 
The approach has, also, been subjected to major critique, however. The first, by 
Fiona Ross, accepts the possibility of benefits to the individual from testimony 
but questions whether these have transpired in the context of the TRC hearings 
in South Africa. 
 
Much of the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions work was publicised in 
terms of giving voice to the voiceless, assuming an unproblematic link 
between ‘voice’ and ‘dignity’ and between ‘voice’ and ‘being heard’…. 
Transparency of communication and clarity in reception are presumed; the 
unevenness of social fields and their saturation with power are not                    
(Ross, 2003: 327). 
 
Crudely, her argument is that the format of the TRC proceedings produced 
formulaic testimonies and, more importantly, the workings of the media, radio 
television and print served to alienate testifiers from their story, since it became 
public property and, in some sense, commodified. She also links this process to 
the problems of interviewing for any academic piece of research, where 
individuals attempt to operate in fields of power over which they have no 
control. 
 
The critique operates at another level by questioning whether it is possible to 
bring forth private suffering in a shared and therefore public language at all. 
Elaine Scarry’s book, The Body in Pain, was the seminal text for the 
examination of the rupturing, fragmenting effects of violence and terror on 
communities and individuals and the relationship of their experience to time and 
language. Pain, she says, is ‘the unmaking of the world’ (Scarry, 1985). Of 
others writing on the same theme, Agamben’s book on Holocaust witnessing is 
the most cited: 
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Testimony is the disjunction between two impossibilities of bearing 
witness…. Language, in order to bear witness, must give way to non-
language, in order to show the impossibility of bearing witness. The 
language of testimony is a language that no longer signifies (Agamben, 
1999: 39).91  
 
Writing in Trauma and the Memory of Politics on ways of communal 
memorialisation, Jenny Edkins develops this failure of language in 
communicating trauma: 
 
There is no language for it. Abuse by the state, the fatherland, like abuse by 
the father within the family, cannot be spoken in language, since language 
comes from and belongs to the family and the community…. By situating 
ourselves as citizens of a state or political authority or as members of a 
family, we reproduce that social institution at the same time as assuming our 
own identity as part of it…. In what we call a traumatic event, this group 
betrays us…. The language that we speak is part of the social order and 
when that order falls apart around our ears, so does the language…. This is 
the dilemma survivors face. The only words they have are the words of the 
very political community that is the source of all their suffering. This is the 
language of the powerful, the words of the status quo, the words that delimit 
and define acceptable ways of being human within the community (Edkins, 
2003: 7). 
 
This discourse about both the possibility or the impossibility of bringing forth or 
making public invisible wounds, not through the visual but the oral register, on 
one level confirms the picture of individual identity that, it is argued here, the 
metaphor of the wound creates. First it relies on the idea that personal narrative 
is a social affair; it takes place within ‘fields of intersubjectivity’, where in the 
dialogical process of speaking and being heard we constantly re-author our 
identity (Jackson, 2002; Jackson, 2005).92 But what it also assumes is an 
authentic and continuous private self and an authentic private hurt, existing at a 
pre-linguistic level (Elaine Scarry’s irreducible, incorrigible sense of pain), 
                                                 
91 See also Das, V. (2003) Trauma and Testimony: Implications for Political Community. 
Anthropological Theory, 3(3), 293-307., for a discussion of an alternative to anchoring narratives 
of violence to juridical discourses – finding 'forms of making the experience knowable, when 
saying gives way to showing': 293. 
92 Note the Lacanian notion that identity lags action in dialogue so that we are constantly in a 
state of becoming – and never become. 
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calling up the concept of private ‘experience lived’, as opposed to public 
‘experience told’, of some feminist research (Ribbens et al, 1995), in which the 
image of midwifery is hard to escape. There is an implication that trauma is 
experienced viscerally, bodily, or as if there were a psychic space of pure 
emotion, of private pain and suffering that is not mediated by thought and, 
therefore by language; that there is some part of the individual which is not 
social, lurking, presumably, behind the protective shield and not subject to the 
constructing and constraining forms of language and relations of power, and that 
this is a real or lived referent for the metaphor of the wound, as that which words 
can, or cannot, bring forth. A less political version of this is the idea of 
repression or traumatic memory, which is discussed in Chapter 2, or in the 
theories of differential hemispheric brain function in memory, touched on in 
Chapter 7. 
 
Lastly, this ‘lack of language’ can be juxtaposed against a very different version 
of invisible wounds. This is the Post-Lacanian position, in which individual 
identity, including the unconscious, is thoroughly socially constructed in the 
flux, the uncertainty and the provisionality of social forms and of language. 
There is no authentic self (Zizek, 1999). For this social individual the only 
certainty is the flux, itself, and the impossibility of closure, either at a personal 
or a socio/political level – what Zizek calls ‘the ontological crack in the 
universe’ (Zizek, 1997: 214). It is this cosmic insecurity, this lack of closure, 
which is trauma, the traumatic reality which lurks at the centre of every shifting 
subjectivity, although we deny it and fantasise its absence. It is this trauma, 
which is exposed in the context of violence and horror. And it is this trauma 
which is the one real aspect of the world which all our social fantasies cannot 
eliminate.  
 
This is a tragic but tempting version of the human condition with which to close. 
But it should be observed that this account of trauma is the product of a highly 
esoteric academic elite. In its own terms, it can be seen as the most recent 
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epicycle in the social production of knowledge of the psyche, in which trauma 
seems to offer to replace sex as the human fundamental. Thus it is yet another 
way in which the metaphor of the invisible wound creates a psychic space as fact 
– in this case, it would seem, its only occupant! 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
What I have argued here is that the metaphor of the wound is not just a bringing 
forth of a private psychic space but also that which serves to create it. Further, 
that whatever the claims to locate and identify the real referent of the metaphor 
of the invisible wound, this concept has been inscribed on an internal space by 
particular forms of linguistic use and their accompanying practices. I have also 
argued that this metaphor and its use also bring forth a somatic version of this 
space and of the individual’s relationship to the social world. The implications 
of this relationship in reducing social and political problems to one of individual 
psychology have been examined and the tension noted between the demands of a 
traumatic identity and both individual and national recovery. These are partly 
problems created by pathologising the individual or collective self, which 
emphasises individual and national healing at the expense of wider socio-
economic change. It is also the tension described in the foreword to this chapter. 
Trauma is a pathology which is also normal, common, (one sixth of the worlds 
population!) but the pathologisation of normal individuals inherent in the 
discourse of the wound, so the critics argue, renders them helpless, cuts off their 
recourse to ordinary community support, or their own resources, and leaves 
them with the imperialist interventions of ‘experts’, whom they both need and 
do not need. 
 
Also, on a more abstract level, what I have traced here (and it is developed in 
Chapter 2) is that, despite its obvious figurative uses, this metaphor of the 
invisible wound, as transposed into the concept of trauma, has, through the 
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migration and creeping technicalisation of metaphor (Manier, 1980), become 
reified in medical, psycho-analytic and therapeutic discourses into an observable 
diagnostic category or an authentic, positive fact about the world and 
individuals, problematically related to language and voice. No longer a 
metaphor; in the last version, it is the only real fact about humanity! But if it is 
not a metaphor, it presents, in the dualistic context of language, a puzzling 
contradiction in terms. Consider the concept of a psychic lesion for an 
enlightenment thinker, or a more extreme version of the oxymoron, the 
description of sexual assault or racist hate speech as ‘soul murder’ (Shengold, 
1979) or ‘spirit murder’ (Williams, 1987), for anyone reared in the Judaeo-
Christian tradition. It is as if the immortal human soul had put on the 
vulnerability of the body once more; as if, in a new epicycle of the 
Substantiation Story, the agonised, Godless, self-referential and decentred 
subjects of late modernity desperately seek to prove their authority and agency 
by assuming flesh and wounding themselves – thus only confirming the closed 
cycle of their self reproduction. 
 
Whatever else, this contradiction is solved in two different ways: first, by a 
thoroughgoing somatisation of those parts of the soul which are thought 
vulnerable to distress, as I discuss in the next two chapters on the technical 
medical category of PTSD and its legal form and in Chapter 7 on Attachment 
Theory. The second alternative is to remain in the linguistic domain – accepting 
the metaphor, remembering its figurative aspects, which whilst they depend on 
this dualistic distinction, also fudge it. The implication of both solutions is that 
the secularised, ‘scientised’ soul of the late 20th century,93 far from being 
everlasting, is mortal, as the flesh is. The bodily metaphor places the human 
spirit in domains of destruction; the cockpit of war, fields of criminal or 
accidental violence and, above all, the hospital ward. Just as the regulation of 
bodies in the military, the law, the criminal justice system and local authority 
                                                 
93 See Hacking, I. (1995b) Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of 
Memory. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
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tutelage has come to need the legitimation of the medical profession, so 
knowledge of the destruction of the human spirit has become a special branch of 
medicine; the wounded soul is the bearer of a particular sort of illness, in need of 
expert care and techniques of healing, encompassing the solace or forgiveness of 
religion, politico/ legal rights claiming and social welfare, and ensuring its 
continual oversight. 
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                          CHAPTER TWO: 
               SUFFERING FROM NERVES:  
        THE MEDICAL MANAGEMENT OF 
  SUBJECTIVITY AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CLAIMS 
                      TO PSYCHIC HARM 
 
 
Mind-body dualism, because it insulates mental life and psychological 
processes from their biological substratum, torpedoes the hierarchy of 
nature and science on which psychiatric fallibilism has constructed its 
distinctive epistemology. In the contest between dualism and fallibilism, 
dualism (whose standard bearer is psychodynamic psychiatry) has lost out 
(Young, 1995: 287). 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
After this overview of the way the metaphor of invisible wounds is used in a 
variety of social settings, I now go on to examine in more detail four specific 
social contexts in which different versions of the metaphor are made into fact, 
acquire form, life and social importance. In this chapter and the next, I look at 
how the language of nerves and the putative occurrence of an overpowering, 
negative environmental event is used, in sites in the psychiatric profession and 
the law, for the production of two related versions of psychological harm, in 
which an individual history is said to be overthrown as the result of a sudden 
trauma. These are versions which, as in all that follows, are made, over time, by 
 105 
‘experts’ and the subjective experience of an individual is subordinated to 
objective, ‘scientific’ observation (or the gaze of the ‘man on the Clapham 
omnibus’, which is the speciality of the law). 
 
This present chapter addresses the medical concept of psychic trauma and the 
diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder, which came to be enshrined in 
psychiatric nosology in the 1980 version of DSM III. (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1980).94 It gives what can only be an outline account of the 
diagnosis, in order to provide an essential context for the next chapter, which 
looks at the rewriting of this medical concept and diagnosis as the legal category 
of ‘nervous shock’. This is the name for psychic harm in the English law of tort, 
which is the area of the law which processes claims for damages for negligently 
inflicted psychiatric illness. This process is examined mainly through a reading 
of the findings, or ‘dicta,’ of Appeal Court judges in cases spanning the whole of 
the 20th century up to the year 2000, backed by some academic commentary on 
this area of tort and the report of the Law Commission on Liability for 
Psychiatric Illness (The Law Commission, 1998).  
 
Although they are set in quite different professional contexts, both chapters 
describe versions of psychological harm which elaborate the sort of tensions and 
contradictions that were identified in the last chapter and which seem to run 
through all the different forms of the wound metaphor. First, and notably, is the 
way that the metaphor moves over time from a concept hooked onto a physical 
reality to something which has a reality of its own, creating new and complex 
relationships between mind and body. Is the locus of an invisible wound the 
putative inner space of psychology, or does it lie in the body in the micro 
                                                 
94The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric 
Association (DSM I – IV) is an authoritative compendium of diagnoses used across American 
and then Western psychiatry for the purposes of clinical consistency and epidemiological 
research. For a particular take on the history of this manual see Kutchins, H. & Kirk, S. A. 
(1997) Making Us Crazy: The Psychiatric Bible and the Creation of Mental Disorders. New 
York: Free Press. The only alternative system to be so widely used is the WHO International 
Classification of Diseases, ICD 10. http://www.who.int/classifications/apps/icd/icd10online/ 
[accessed, 3rd January, 2007]. 
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processes of the neuro-endocrine system? Second, the environmental and 
therefore potentially universal nature of the wound’s cause which raises difficult 
questions: are its symptoms a normal reaction to such a cause, or are they 
symptoms of a pathology and, depending on the answer, how are such harms to 
be compensated and treated? These are both questions which continue to be 
raised in the present chapter and the next. Further, one more crucial and related 
issue, only touched upon in the last chapter, is added in this present chapter on 
PTSD. It concerns this notion of environmental cause, the weapon, the hostile 
act, the accident or the ‘aetiological event’, as it is called here. How does this 
‘external enemy’ – something real and observable – which the metaphor of the 
wound binds together with an interior harm, endow a series of sometimes 
nebulous, contradictory and invisible symptoms with objective reality and 
meaning, so that the specification of what counts as an aetiological event vitally 
affects the inclusiveness of psychological injury as a social problem category?  
 
Here we also look more closely at an elaboration of the wound metaphor. This, 
in its simple form described in Chapter 1, suggests a force from the outside 
world piercing the boundary of some inner space of an individual to inflict a 
kind of damage. Theories about the exact nature of this kind of damage were 
only mentioned briefly there. But consideration of the history of PTSD adds a 
more precise specification of the sort of harm that might be caused and the way 
in which suffering and abnormal behaviours are produced. As already described, 
what developed in late 19th century psychology and psychiatry was an account 
of the crucial causal mechanism which links very shocking, horrific events to 
resulting symptoms of traumatic stress – a mechanism which became known in 
the literature as ‘traumatic memory’, a memory so horrific that it has to be 
repressed below the level of consciousness (Young, 1995). This new version of 
memory had important ramifications for the history of the psy sciences and all 
the proliferation of social agencies and organisations dependent on their 
knowledge. Not only did it produce, over time, changes in the way that certain 
forms of invisible wounds were apprehended and sited, but, in the words of the 
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title of Ian Hacking’s book on multiple personality, it succeeded in ‘rewriting 
the soul’ (Hacking, 1995b). For, in the concept of repression, the old 
enlightenment version of agency, self knowledge and moral responsibility was 
challenged95 and the soul became, not just the subject of self reflection and 
action but an object of the nascent science of psychology and psychiatry, 
producing experts in understanding what is hidden – not just from others, but 
even from the self (Harris, 1989, cited in Young 1995). The idea of traumatic 
memory reduces the autonomous subject of enlightenment thinking to an 
objectifying medical gaze.  
 
It was out of the history of this ‘traumatic memory’ – and of psychiatric 
medicine and its war time forms – that the diagnostic category of PTSD 
emerged, claimed by two of its enthusiasts as opening ‘a door to the scientific 
investigation of the nature of human suffering’ (van der Kolk et al, 1996a). It 
was written into DSM III in 1980 – a document which represented the 
culmination of a modernising project for US psychiatry, which, as ever, 
influenced its counterparts in the UK and other Western countries. Its production 
was timely – one response to the pressing social and political problem for the US 
administration caused by disaffected Vietnam veterans and their demand for 
compensation. It provided a bona fide diagnosis allowing legitimate claims to be 
made. The process of its production was made complex, however, by the fact 
that traumatic memory, like psychiatry in general, had, over time, developed 
along two different tracks: the neurological and the psychological. The 
psychological version of PTSD was placed in a psychoanalytic interior, which 
could only be accessed by experts in analysis; attempts to access it by the 
positivist questioning of modern medicine entailed all sort of contradictions. So, 
while both versions are written into the diagnosis, in the recent history of 
                                                 
95 In the dualistic enlightenment philosophy of Locke and Hume (Hacking, 1995), memory, its 
content of words and images, the capacity for retrieval and the location in which they are stored, 
was that which formed identity and held together momentary flashes of self consciousness and 
sense data reception into some continuous subject with will and responsibility for the behaviour 
of the body. 
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psychiatry, modernisation has been achieved somewhat at the expense of this 
psychological strand. There has been a reinstatement, after the Freudian 
revolution, of the somatic understanding of mental illness, which as prevalent in 
the 19th and early 20th century as the product of hereditary taint or physical 
disease.96 Now, a highly elaborated language of neuro-endocrinology is used: 
then, the simpler, now vernacular, language of ‘nerves’ and ‘nervous shock’ was 
important and still plays its part (Shephard, 2002). 
 
The language of nerves, neurasthenia, nervous shock, shell shock, traumatic 
stress and PTSD have a long and fascinating history, which I can only touch 
upon here. Much work has been done in this area of medical and military 
history, including a raft of recent research by Edgar Jones at the Institute of 
Psychiatry, London.97 I have used sources in the psychiatric and psycho-analytic 
literature, but have relied heavily on two books for historical details: Ben 
Shepard’s A War of Nerves (Shephard, 2002) and Allan Young’s A Harmony of 
Illusions: Inventing Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (Young, 1995). For 
analysis, Ian Hacking’s Rewriting the Soul (Hacking, 1995b) has been helpful, 
but I have returned repeatedly to Allan Young’s book and later work, which 
presents a rich anthropological version of the making of PTSD. As a case study 
of social construction, within the constraints of a particular symbolic order, it 
seems to me impeccable, if at times obscure. The medical story I refer to here is 
essentially his.  
 
                                                 
96 The idea that the soul could be sick or the object of harm was still something medical men of 
that time, socialised as dualistic enlightenment thinkers, found hard to swallow. They were 
presented with a conundrum when confronted by madness – if the individual mind was the 
rational, autonomous subject of moral decisions, heroic observer of a world which includes the 
body machine that he inhabits, then how could he (used advisedly) ever be mad? Disorder or 
pathology must be an attribute of the body. The response to this problem was a strong streak of 
somaticism or biological reductionism in their characterisation of psychiatric disorder. After all, 
the asylums for the insane were largely populated by those in the advanced stages of syphilis and 
other forms of neurological degeneration (Porter, 2002 and Scull, 2005). 
97 For example, Jones, E. & Wessely, S. (2005a) Shell Shock to PTSD: Military Psychiatry from 
1900 to the Gulf War. Hove: Maudsley Monograph, Psychology Press. 
 109 
In Part I, I have very briefly summarised his version of the history of traumatic 
memory, as the theory behind PTSD and also the main historical trends in 
Western psychiatry. After this, any historical references here are partial and used 
in an analysis of the controversial PTSD diagnosis, itself, and its place in the 
shifting constellations of diagnostic categories which constitute the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manuals of the authoritative American Psychiatric Association. 
For setting out the features and implications of this problem category is an 
essential preamble to my account, in Chapter 3, of the making of the concept of 
psychological harm in the related area of nervous shock in tort law. 
 
This chapter and the next should be seen as twin studies, set in two different 
social organisations, first, Western psychiatry, especially in the USA, whose 
powerful research establishment also dominates the medical extablishment in the 
UK, and, second, in the English legal system, in particular within a system of 
case law in which judgement is based on precedent. It is also the study of two 
different ‘regimes of truth’ and how one is exchanged for another, as the Law 
Lords make clear that while medical positivism is gaining in prestige and 
respect, even in the ‘suspect’ area of psychiatry, the truth that prevails in the law 
is quite different – more of an idealized common sense. But it also argues that, 
in spite of this declared difference, the two rationalities, medical and legal, have 
three significant factors in common. These are: 
 
I. They seem to manage subjectivity, not just by the employment of ‘objective’ 
psychological science for the identification of a wound, but, further, by the 
tendency to place the invisible wound in a biological, as opposed to an 
emotional or psychological space, though they place it there for very different 
reasons (philosophical, organizational, and political) and, of the two, the law 
emerges as the more committed to a historic form of dualism.98  
 
                                                 
98 This is the Cartesian dualism of legal philosophy, as set out on at the start of Chapter 3. 
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2. Both medical and legal traditions deal with the tension between normality and 
pathology endemic to their problem categories by evoking an aetiological or 
causal event of such magnitude and horror that anybody who experienced it 
would, against the drift of recent epidemiological evidence, become ill. 
 
3. They hypothesise an event which is not just universally pathogenic, it is so 
shocking and immediate that there is a suggestion that it operates entirely at an 
intuitive and neurological level, in which any psychological or cognitive 
mediation may be fleeting, at best. In this last, the psychiatric profession and the 
law part company, as diverse social conditions differentially affect the 
specificity with which they define the nature of the event and so the size of the 
category. As we shall see, the use of the medical category as a diagnosis has 
continued to grow, especially in epidemiological research, where its definition 
has become much more inclusive. In contrast, the Law Lords have so tightly 
defined the conditions of the causal event in nervous shock that this branch of 
tort law has almost fallen into disuse. 
 
 
I. TRAUMA AND ITS BACKGROUND HISTORY 
 
The development of the concept of PTSD and its inclusion in DSM III in 1980, 
as a diagnostic category, emerged out of two histories: first, that of traumatic 
memory touched on in Chapter 1 and elaborated further here and second, the 
history of Western psychiatry over the 20th century, whose broad trends are 
summarised next. 
 
       Traumatic Memory 
 
Neurological Memory 
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As described already in Chapter 1, the phenomenon of ‘nervous shock’ was first 
noticed in the victims of railway accidents by a 19th  century neuro-surgeon 
called John Erichsen. Patients with the condition of ‘railway spine’, as he called 
it, seemed to display all the symptoms of a physical wound, where none was to 
be seen and ‘compensationitis’ or malingering was ruled out99. Seen as a 
functional equivalent of the phenomenon of ‘surgical shock’ (see Chapter 1), 
railway spine was as like a wound as it could be without actually being visible 
within current medical techniques (Erichsen, 1866; 1883). Since anyone, even 
the strongest and most robust person is vulnerable to a physical wound (even if 
invisible) this normalised the condition of nervous shock. So his findings were 
helpful to plaintiffs seeking compensation from the railway companies. 
Paradoxically, his contemporary, Herbert Page, another neurosurgeon, who also 
attributed symptoms to ‘morbid changes of the nerve centres which underlie 
them’ (Page, 1883), was hired by the railway companies defending these claims. 
This, argues Shepard, is because Page’s interpretation of nervous shock was 
more ‘psychological’ (Shephard, 2002), this word implying, at that date, at least 
some kind of susceptibility or weakness of the ‘nerves’. Certainly, he saw the 
affected nervous system as more diffuse and elusive; not just the spine. He 
thought he was observing changes ‘very materially different from the gross 
pathological changes we are accustomed to see upon the post mortem table, or 
… [through] the microscope’ (Page, 1883:198-99), suggesting some kind of 
secondary or parallel nervous system of the type posited by Hughlings Jackson 
(Jackson, 1931a; Jackson, 1931b), or Freud himself (Freud, 1966 [1895]). 
Whilst Erichsen put this down to the forces present at the traumatic event, the 
particular percussive, violent and sudden nature of railway accidents themselves, 
Page acknowledged certain factors which could be thought of as mental: the 
desire for compensation and fear. 
                                                 
99 Since 1864, when the provisions of the Campbell Act, 1846 (under which compensation was 
paid to the families of those killed by accidents caused by the negligence of a second party, was 
extended to the victims of railway accidents), both Erichsen and his colleague, Page, recognised 
that desire for compensation may be a powerful psychological cause of the symptoms of nervous 
shock, even, according to Page, working at an unconscious level (Page, H. W. (1883) Injuries of 
the Spine and Spinal Cord without Apparant Mechanical Lesion, and Nervous Shock, in Their 
Surgical and Medico-Legal Aspects. London: J. and A. Churchill.  
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By the 1880s, it was accepted among medical men that extreme fear on its own 
could produce consequences comparable to surgical shock, through neuro-
physiological pathways (Jordan, 1880 cited in Young, 1995), though they never 
quite solved the puzzle of exactly how ‘fright and fright alone’ (Page, 1883:117) 
could reproduce the effects of a physical blow or injury.  
 
Whether such effects of fear were seen as quite normal is another matter. 
Certainly, the lectures of Charcot at the Salpetrière100 suggested otherwise 
(Charcot, 1889). He too saw fear acting to produce symptoms of a hysterical 
nature, bodily conversions with no organic origin. For him, however, they were 
produced by psycho-neurological pathways (Young, 1995). The effect of fear or 
extreme shock was to produce a sort of self induced hypnotic state in which the 
victim is open to auto-suggestion from powerful ideas, which presumably 
remain after the event is over, a sort of memory (Charcot, 1889). But, in contrast 
to anything previously thought of as memory – a store of ideas in the form of 
words and images (following Hume) – this memory was converted into physical 
symptoms. So, Charcot insisted, the effect of nervous shock was a form of 
hysteria, which was not just a female malady, in that it presupposed no 
necessary constitutional susceptibility or vulnerability; its origin was merely 
fright. And yet he seems never to have abandoned the idea that hysteria was a 
unitary phenomenon with an underlying physiological aetiology and with 
heightened suggestibility as one of its symptoms: that is, a conventional mental 
illness in those biological times (Barossa, 2001; Harris, 1989; Showalter, 1985). 
Something of this ambivalence is still observable in modern psychiatry. 
 
Despite Charcot’s thoughts on the explanatory power of suggestion and 
therefore of ideas in hysteria (a theme developed by others, including Freud, as 
discussed below, and W. H. R. Rivers (Rivers, 1920) whose work as Siegfried 
                                                 
100 This was the hospital in Paris where Charcot, the prominent French neurologist, was 
Professor of Anatomical Pathology. 
 113 
Sassoon’s therapist has recently acquired literary fame quite disproportionate to 
his contribution to the history of PTSD),101 the neurological strand and the 
discourse of nerves still dominated the medicine of WWI and the diagnosis of 
shell shock. This seems to have resembled ‘railway spine’ quite closely, at least 
at the beginning of the war. It required the witnessing or participation in an 
event, which most people would find horrific, at close quarters, close enough to 
experience what could only be described as ‘shock waves.’ Though these could 
not be shown to have any existence in physics, there was a sense that the 
diagnosis required the experience of ‘commotional’102 as well as emotional 
shock. Any psychogenic factors were mostly seen as operating with physical 
factors or as mediating invisible, physical micro-processes (Young, 1995). 
 
Later, after 1916, shell shock just became a generic word for the ‘war neuroses’ 
– hysteria, a diagnosis largely given to the ordinary soldier and neurasthenia, an 
emblematic disorder for artists among the Edwardian upper middle-classes, for 
the officers (Shephard, 2002; Young, 1995; Young, 1999). For the Royal Army 
Medical Corps, the war neuroses were called ‘neurological disorders’ and the 
doctors who attempted to treat them, ‘neurological specialists’. These disorders 
were also seen as ‘functional’, in the sense that they reproduced the symptoms of 
known neurological problems but did not share the same aetiology, which was a 
puzzle (Young, 1995). The specialists, were, on the whole, not too interested in 
the aetiology of shell shock itself, or its exact location, and expended less time 
on worrying about its cause and refining its classification and more on getting its 
sufferers back to the front (Shephard, 2002). 
 
Around this time the neurological strand was also developing experimentally 
and the laboratory research done by US neurologists, George Crile and Walter 
Cannon (Cannon, 1942: 177), on decorticated cats would have been known to at 
least some medical personnel. These showed the process by which fear 
                                                 
101 In Barker, P. (1991) Regeneration. Harmondsworth: Penguin.  
102 Commotional shock is defined as delivered by an explosive and concussive force (Young, 
1995). 
 114 
reactions,103 assumed to be normally adaptive stimulus responses and part of 
everyone’s ontogenetic and phylogenetic inheritance, could become pathological 
(Cannon, 1942). The deactivating of the cerebral cortex, the part of the brain 
which damps down the activity of the sympathico-adrenal system, reproduced a 
continuing state of intense arousal, as in anger or fear, and this arousal, 
experienced without cease, seemed to lead eventually to exhaustion of the body 
and a gradual drop in the animal’s blood pressure, until the heart stopped beating 
(Cannon, 1914; Cannon, 1929). Continual but lesser, intermittent shock had, 
through a process of ‘summation’, a similar effect. This Cannon graphically 
illustrated by a study of the workings of fear in the victims of voodoo death 
(Cannon, 1942). 104 This work was taken an important stage further by Pavlov’s 
famous operant conditioning experiments on rats (Pavlov, 1927), as he showed 
that the rats, subject to intermittent, inescapable shock seemed to internalise the 
source of pain by coming to associate the contiguous conditions of the shock 
with the shock itself – what he called conditioning – so that these sensory 
associations acquired a sort of ‘mnemonic power’ (Young,1995), the power of 
calling inexorably on some sort of pathogenic memory of the pain. Since, in 
Pavlov’s thinking, stimulus and response were in no way cognitively mediated, 
this pathogenic memory was essentially somatic.  
 
Modern neo-pavlovians such as Bessel van der Kolk and Roger Pitman, taking 
up Crile and Cannon’s basic emphasis on the neurological adaptation of 
organisms to their physical environment, evolved a further theory in relation to 
PTSD. It was framed as a description of the neuro-physiological analogue of 
memory, explaining shock victims compulsion to revisit the event or its 
associations by their development of an addiction to the endogenous opioids 
released into the bloodstream in moments of traumatic shock. Whilst Pavlov’s 
rats’ fixed pattern of stimulus response is the source of pathology, lurking as it 
                                                 
103 They also extended Page’s understanding of fear reactions to include the vital notion of pain 
and the memory of pain, understanding that fear was not fear of injury per se but of the pain that 
goes with it. 
104 Essentially death from a prolonged state of fear, induced in someone by the belief that he/she 
was the object and victim of voodoo magic, practiced in South and Central America.  
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were in their bodies, exactly like the metaphorical piece of shrapnel in the 
wound, Van der Kolk and Pitman hypothesised endorphin addiction as 
something going wrong with a complex and ever changing process of the neuro-
endocrinal adaptation of an individual to his equally complex and protean 
context. It was a disequilibrium – no longer a pathology but a disturbance of 
function (Pitman et al, 1990; van der Kolk et al, 1985). Broadly speaking, the 
work of Crile and Cannon and its Pavlovian offshoots is still the basis of current 
neurological research on PTSD, albeit at a highly elaborated and technically 
more sophisticated level. 
 
Psychological Memory 
 
Traumatic memory in the more familiar form of an idea, words and visual 
images, was well developed before Pavlov. Although it started out in a more 
abnormally pathogenic form, as with its somatic analogue, it also became, by a 
series of interesting transformations, just a disturbance of the normal processes 
by which an individual organism regulates its relationship with the outside 
world. This change can be tracked by the way the notion of the unconscious 
mind developed among psychiatrists over the late 19th and early 20th century, 
from Charcot, through Ribot and Janet to Freud. The story, already touched on 
in Chapter 1, runs, very briefly, like this. 
 
Charcot was only interested in the unconscious as the place, cut off from 
conscious processes. The patient knows nothing. Ideas were implanted in the 
unconscious by hypnotic suggestion and produced a paralysis, not at the time of 
the terrible event or accident, but ‘only after an interval of several days, after an 
incubation stage of unconscious mental elaboration’ (Charcot, 1889: 387). The 
content of these ideas was only of interest in that it determined the form of 
patients’ hysterical conversions (Barossa, 2001; Harris, 1989; Showalter, 1985). 
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Whilst the French philosopher and psychologist, Theodule Ribot, took up this 
idea of thoughts ‘incubating’, concealed and cut off in the subconscious, calling 
this pathogenic memory ‘a parasite’ (the psychological equivalent of shrapnel in 
the wound), his main contribution to its development in his monograph on 
Diseases of Memory: an Essay in Positive Psychology (Ribot, 1883:108-9) was 
threefold: first, he formalised, for the first time, the problem of hypermnesia, 
remembering too much, which he sees as symmetrical with the well recognized 
problem of amnesia. ‘Forgetfulness,’ he argued, ‘except in certain cases, is not a 
disease of memory, but a condition of health and life’ (Ribot, 1883: 61). Second, 
as a basis for this adaptive view of forgetfulness, he formulated a twofold 
version of the self which was to influence the developing theories of the young 
Freud – a model of constant turnover, predicated on some normative 
assumptions about the limited capacity of the human mind and so some healthy 
or equilibrium level of activity. And third, in relation to the unconscious mind, 
he distinguished between two types of amnesia: the ‘underdeveloped’ form 
associated with ‘the victims of somnambulism, natural or induced’, and the 
‘developed’ form, which consists of alternating conscious personalities, each 
with their own self narratives, which he called ‘double consciousness’, a state in 
which one fully developed personality took turns with another, of which she 
(used advisedly) had no knowledge (Ribot, 1883). It was Pierre Janet, the French 
psychiatrist, who in 1889 described how, by using techniques of ‘distraction’, he 
could talk to more than one such personality at a time, 105 and so made the first 
suggestion that the mind could be split into parallel and co-existing domains of 
consciousness: the conscious and the ‘subconscious’, or ‘that which is hidden 
from the other’ (Janet, 1889). 
 
                                                 
105 See his descriptions of his experiments with Leonie, a middle aged woman who had been a 
somnambulist since the age of three years. Through 'distraction' he discovered that Leonie I had 
an 'alter', Leonie 2, of whose existence and actions, in response to Janet’s commands and 
questions, Leonie I had no knowledge. Janet, P. (1889) L'automatisme Psychologique: Essai De 
Psychologie Experimentale Sur Les Formes Inferieures De L'activite Humaine. Paris Alcan. 
243-4. 
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For Janet, this split was pathological, and associated with ‘psychological 
automatisms’ of a total or partial variety, which often originate in traumatic 
experiences (Janet, 1889). Two sorts of secret, pathological remembering and 
pathological forgetting were both thought of as ‘subconscious fixed ideas … 
[that] grow, [that] install themselves in the field of thought like a parasite’ 
(Janet, 1901: 267). And the reason why they are thus ‘split off’ into the 
subconscious mind is the unassimilability of these memories. They cannot be 
accommodated in a person’s account of himself; they make no sense within his 
existing cognitive schema and the emotions they stimulate cannot be tolerated. It 
is the existence of these ideas which is the malady, rather than the symptoms 
themselves (Janet, 1889: 345). Therapy helps the patient to discover the ‘fixed 
idea’ and by a constant verbal re-recital put it in its proper narrative place (Janet, 
1925).  
 
Initially, there was very little difference between Freud’s and Janet’s accounts of 
traumatic memory, though, as already noted in my introductory chapter, Freud 
was the first of the two to use the word ‘trauma’ or ‘wound’ as metaphor for a 
psychic injury.106 His main contribution to the development of this concept and 
the process of the normalisation of pathology contained in its history was 
threefold. First, though Janet, according to Freud, attributed to hysterical patients 
‘a constitutional incapacity for holding together the contents of their minds’, for 
Freud and his collaborator, Breuer, traumatic hysteria, though enhanced by 
hereditary disposition, could occur in people of the ‘greatest character and the 
highest critical power’ (Breuer et al, 1955 [1893-1895]: 13). Like PTSD after it, 
traumatic memory could afflict just about anybody who experienced the right 
(or, rather, wrong) environment. Second, his notion of the unconscious extended 
it from Janet’s subconscious, the hiding place of pathogenic ideas or ‘alters’, to 
                                                 
106 This was first used in 1892 in his notes on an edition of lectures by Charcot, where he talks of 
the 'traumatic hysteria' and 'psychical trauma' (Freud, S. (1966 [1892-94]) Extracts from Freud's 
Footnotes to His Translation of Charcot's Tuesday Lectures. In The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Volume 1 (ed J. Strachey), pp. 137-143. 
London: Hogarth Press. 'A trauma', he writes, 'would have to be defined as an accretion of 
excitation in the nervous system, which the latter has been unable to dispose of adequately by 
motor reaction.' Ibid: 137. 
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the unconscious, a permanent part of normal psychic functioning – a universal. 
Third, he elaborated the ideas of Ribot and Janet on psychic structure and 
memory into an (almost) coherent equilibrium model of a system, which 
processed forces or energy fed in from the outside and organised for its own 
defense and regulation in an unstable environment (Freud, 1966 [1895]). Here 
an excess quantity of excitation of an aversive kind might be impossible to 
discharge in the usual way and would thus disturb its homeostasis (Young, 1995: 
40). Paradoxically, the second achievement could not be complete until he had 
abandoned the third, namely the psycho-neurological basis for the traumatic 
origin of hysteria and other psychoneuroses. But, in spite of his controversial 
dropping of the seduction theory of infantile sexuality for the Oedipus complex 
of Beyond the Pleasure Principal, (Freud, 1950 [1920]), much of the basis for 
his later work on the dynamic and split self, to be found in his concepts of 
defense or repression and their rationale, was essentially there in the psycho-
neurological modeling of his early work with Breuer and underlies most of our 
current understandings of the psychology of memory, even of a non-
psychoanalytic variety. 
 
After Freud, there have been as many versions of the traumatic memory as there 
are psychotherapies, as well as of its neurological analogue. Horowitch’s 1976 
generic version of modern traumatic memory, as described in Ch 1, is perhaps 
the best example, and is still recognisably Freudian. To summarise: an 
individual is a homeostatic system operating in an energy field or (later) an 
informational environment and seeking pleasure. Some stimuli are so powerful 
that she cannot deal with the quantity and unpleasing nature of the information. 
She repressses its perception at the conscious level. She tries to process it in the 
way she would normally, by successive registrations and verbalisations at the 
level of consciousness, until it loses its power (displayed in flashbacks dreams 
and other symptoms) but this fails because the verbalisations are too painful. So 
the memory gets ‘stuck’, as it were, at an unconscious level, like a ‘foreign 
body’ (Breuer et al, 1955 [1893–1895]: 6), generating both the symptoms of 
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unbearable memory and complete forgetfulness in dissociation or amnesia. As 
outlined in Chapter 1, Freud’s original model is criticised, even within the 
psychoanalytic community (Garland, 1998), as being too mechanical and taking 
no account of the memory’s meaning for different individuals.107 This is 
rectified by cognitive or cognitive-behavioural versions which use the notion of 
cognitive dissonance and ‘individual fear structures’ (Foa et al, 1986; Lang et al, 
2001) and by more psycho-analytic accounts, including the English Object 
Relations school, which see trauma as the ‘collision’, for an individual, of their 
inner and their outer worlds (see Garland in Chapter 1).108 
 
Trends in Twentieth Century Psychiatry 
 
The first of these trends, as suggested in the introduction, represents the 
successful project of psychiatry as serious science. In the 19th century, 
psychiatrists were little more than asylum keepers (Scull, 2005) and, even at the 
International Medical Conference of 1913, the small psychiatric section was 
considered, by the neurologists at least, not to be serious.109 While Freud and the 
psychoanalytic movement brought, after World War I, a whole new inner, 
psychological dimension to the possibilities for psychiatric treatment by the 
profession and was embraced by some part of the intelligentsia, the emblematic 
psychiatrist of popular culture was still a little tainted by the 19th-century craze 
of mesmerism – a white haired old man with a couch and alien English; a 
                                                 
107 Both Freud’s and Horowitch’s version of traumatic memory is also criticised as failing to 
generate the depressive symptoms which feature in the PTSD constellation.  
108 Lately, other theories of memory function in PTSD have been put forward, including that of 
Chris Brewin, who hypothesises a version of traumatic memory in which everyday mnemonic 
mechanisms, consisting of two neural networks, supporting both a consciously retrievable verbal 
memory and a situationally accessible memory, are functioning in unusual ways, due to the 
physical effects of high levels of arousal, following the traumatic experience. As Allan Young 
suggests in his review of Brewin’s book, this theory implies that 'repressed memory' and the 
theories that go with it 'are no longer credible features of PTSD'. Brewin, C. R. (2003) Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder: Malady or Myth. New Haven: Yale University Press, Young, A. 
(2005) Review of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: Malady or Myth? Transcultural Psychiatry, 
42, 155-157.  
109 In one session, the neurologists speculated on what the Psychiatrists could possibly find to 
talk about and were much amused when someone suggested that they were exchanging 
information on a new sort of chubb lock. Shephard, B. (2002) A War of Nerves: Soldiers and 
Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
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Svengali-like figure who promised enchantment, but was hardly respectable. By 
the 1960s, psychoanalysis as a cure for disorder was beginning to be the subject 
of critique (Wootton, 1959), prompting negative evaluations written up in the 
1970s (Luborsky et al, 1975; Strupp et al, 1979). The psychiatric establishment, 
which had embraced it, was in some disarray. But while the 1960s was its nadir, 
the 1970s saw a campaign of ‘modernisation’ by a section of US professionals110 
following ‘neo-Kraepelinian’ positivism, with its emphasis on the ordering and 
rationalisation of diagnostic categories, based on symptom clusters alone111 and, 
thus, ‘theory free’. This culminated in the publication of DSMIII, where PTSD 
was, in fact, the only exception to the rule, in that the diagnosis included its own 
aetiology (American Psychiatric Association, 1980). Once the DSM III method 
of diagnosis was generally, though by no means universally, accepted,112 
differences in explanatory theories became less threatening to professional unity. 
Thus the classification of behavioural symptoms alone became the basis for 
epidemiological and clinical research, which might conform to some accepted 
norms for statistical reliability and validation (Young, 1995). 
 
The second trend is the grounding of the modernisation movement in the 
techniques and subject matter of the harder and therefore hierarchically superior 
biological sciences, laboratory research, biostatistics and psychometrics (Young, 
1995). This form of modernity was not implied by the diagnostic system itself, 
although the latter was necessary to it. If the new diagnostic uniformity it 
brought enabled the start of a more scientific, research based approach to 
psychiatry, this is not to say that a uniform biologically based understanding of 
mental disorder was thereby imposed on the profession. DSMIII left enormous 
                                                 
110 In 1974, the American Psychiatric Association set up a task force to devise a revision of DSM 
II, headed by Roger Spitzer, who is seen as a leading force in 'The DSM Revolution' (Young, 
1995: 89-117).  
111 The reformulation of diagnostic categories for the DSM III purely as symptom clusters is 
widely attributed to the writings and methodology of Kraepelin. In fact, he favoured the use of 
case studies, which included the consideration of aetiological histories and outcomes as well as 
symptoms, as a way of formulating a set of diagnostic categories. 
112 The DSM methodology has remained a subject of contention, especially in the UK. See also 
Horwitz, A. V. & Wakefield, J. C. (2007) The Loss of Sadness: How Psychiatry Transformed 
Normal Sorrow into Depressive Disorder. New York: Oxford University Press. 
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room for professional discretion among psychiatrists, which was well used. 
Treatments, including the use of pharmaceuticals, varied enormously and 
psychological therapies did not disappear; on the contrary. Nevertheless, it 
seems to be a consensus among historians of psychiatry that, after the 
publication of DSMIV in 1994, the profession took a more biological turn – post 
hoc, though not necessarily propter hoc.  
 
As a matter of fact, over the 1980s, organisational change, in the UK NHS, for 
example, meant that diagnosis and treatment of mental health problems was 
increasingly accomplished by a multidisciplinary team. Growing specialisation, 
as a result of the increasing bureacratic and organisational pressure of audit to 
specify and count exactly what work is performed by whom, resulted in clinical 
psychologists, social workers and psychiatric nurses taking on different forms of 
the psychological therapies, whilst medical personnel dealt more and more 
exclusively with the pharmacopoeia (Horwitz et al, 2007). Besides this, the 
1980s saw a dramatic increase in neurological research, publications and 
legitimate knowledge for professional consumption and, whilst the language of 
DSM IV is holistic (mind and body are one113) as a matter of fact, most of the 
psychiatrists working on this document were based in biological medicine 
(Horwitz et al, 2007; Rose, 2007). Perhaps because of this, the diagnostic list 
increased substantially over that in DSMIII, and its revision in 1987, (DSMIIIR, 
87) as the fragmentation and differentiation of categories rose dramatically. As 
Rose suggests, this was in line with the discovery, over the growth of 
neurological research in the nineties, of a multiplying complex of neural circuits, 
each one of whose chemistry might be targeted by psychotropic drugs of 
increasing sensitivity and specificity (Rose, 2007). 
  
                                                 
113 'The term ‘mental disorders’ unfortunately implies a distinction between ‘mental’ disorders 
and ‘physical’ disorders that is a reductionistic anachronism of mind/body dualism.' American 
Psychiatric Association (1994) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. (4th 
edn). Washington, D. C.: American Psychiatric Association.: xxi. 
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So, in spite of the developments of psychological studies after Hume,114 in spite 
of the Freudian revolution of the early 20th century and the elaboration of a new 
and timeless emotional interior which contributed so much to the practice of 
psychiatry and in spite of the sophisticated vernacular language of psychic harm 
to be read in self help books and in other media, the old organic tendency in 
psychiatric medicine seems to have been firmly re-established over the last 
quarter of the 20th century, although it is presented in a more holistic dress 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994:xxi). The current developments in 
pharmaceuticals, in computer modeling of the brain in cognitive psychology, in 
brain imaging in neurology and in the breakthroughs in bio-genetics, have all 
contributed to a burgeoning discourse of a subjectivity rooted in the body and 
bodily processes, no longer in the place within (Young, 1995 and Rose, 2007). 
  
The third broad trend was one which might be called, somewhat paradoxically, 
‘the normalization of pathology’ (Young, 1995). Within this, there were several 
strands. First, whilst psycho-analysis might be suspect, the Freudian notion of 
the unconscious as a universal phenomenon, rather than just a hideaway for the 
pathogenic secrets of the abnormal, was a powerful idea: it was the first coherent 
theory of human desire; the first suggestion that we all have our own ‘neurotic 
style’. The second, related strand was that of the inner world of an individual as 
reactive, not just to internal biological drives, or physical pathogens, hereditary 
taint, and the like, but to the forces of a social world outside – as a place, out of 
time, yet shaped in complicated ways by its own history ((Steedman, 1995). 
And, third, in the other ‘positivist’ project of psychology, emerging after World 
War II, alongside psycho-analysis and medicine, another case was being made 
for the psychological mediation of exogenous causes for both the social and the 
symptomatic bodily behaviour of an individual. The rather primitive notions of 
Pavlovian operant conditioning gave way to learning theory (Bandura, 1977) 
and cognitive behavioural theories (Beck, 1976), which applied to treatment of 
                                                 
114 For a history see Danziger, K. (1997) Naming the Mind: How Philosophy Found Its 
Language. London: Sage.  
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behavioural problems or psychiatric symptoms, in which people were thought to 
be the objective observers of their own mental behaviour and strategic 
generators of their social acts, according to some (tautological) imperative about 
maximising social rewards. Fourth, was a more sociological point of view. 
Although the radical critique of psychiatric diagnosis as constructed in social 
interaction (Scheff, 1966), and psychiatric illness as a myth (Szasz, 1962) or an 
epistemological error (Laing, 1961; Laing, 1964), rather faded after the 1960s, 
and systems theory has always remained marginal as therapy, the socio-
economic correlates of mental illness were recognised in the few but powerful, 
because large, epidemiological studies conducted on mental illness over the 20th 
century.115  
 
The problem here was always to construct convincing models which relate 
social factors causally to psychological sequelae, in which the recent 
development of a species of ‘stress’ models to explain psychiatric symptoms 
might be thought of as an unhelpful reification. 116 Nevertheless, and despite the 
development of a diagnostic scheme to which cause is irrelevant, the idea that 
social forces to which we are all vulnerable can trigger the symptoms of 
pathology persists in pockets of the psy professional populations and beyond. 
This pathology is seen not necessarily as a sign of psychic abnormality or 
special vulnerability but just the result of one of the environmental risks that we 
all face. It is envisaged as a breakdown of normal functioning in the face of an 
                                                 
115 For example, Brown, G. W. & Harris, T. (1978) Social Origins of Depression: A Study of 
Psychiatric Disorder in Women. London: Tavistock. (See, also, the 1970's work of Paykel on 
depression, Paykel, E. S. (1978) Contribution of Life Events to Causation of Psychiatric Illness. 
Psychological Medicine, 8, 245-253; Leff and Vaughan on schizophrenia, Vaughn, C. E. & 
Leff, J. P. (1976) The Influence of Family and Social Factors on the Course of Psychiatric 
Illness: A Comparison of Schizophrenic and Depressed Neurotic Patients. British Journal of 
Psychiatry, 129, 125-137.and Michael Rutter on a career of studying the social causes of child 
psychopathology in Rutter, M. (1989) Isle of Wight Revisited: Twenty-Five Years of Child 
Psychiatric Epidemiology. Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 
28, 633-653). 
116 Brown and Harris, op cit., for example, use a psychodynamic model of depression taken from 
Fenichel, O. (1945) The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis. New York: W. W. Norton., but 
seem to have difficulty in connecting this model of an internal process with the predisposing and 
precipitating social factors which they extract from their study of the circumstances of the 
depressed women of Camberwell. 
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external shock, the loss of equilibrium in the individual, as a homeostatic 
system, functioning defensively in a potentially hostile environment.  
 
 
II. PTSD: THE DIAGNOSIS 
 
The process by which the, initially, unique diagnosis of PTSD has been endowed 
with fact or facticity embodied all the trends in the social history of psychiatric 
knowledge itemised above: 1) the modernisation according to neo-kraepelinian 
symptomatic, ‘theory free’ diagnoses, 2) the tendency to somatisation and 3) to 
the normalisation of pathology…. and more. Nevertheless, according to the 
somewhat triumphalist history of positivist psychiatry, the DSM III had 
succeeded in giving a name and a status to something that was always there in 
the human story (Herman, 1992; Trimble, 1985). Not only was it that the long 
history of human suffering had been introduced to science; it was that, in this 
history, a particular symptomatic form could be recognised – as far back as the 
myth of Gilgamesh – once the symptoms had been collected in a unified 
diagnostic form and historians of psychiatry knew what they were looking for.  
 
These symptoms are found in many contemporary accounts of the effects of war 
or major catastrophes, a supposed universal and constant over different histories 
and cultures (Young, 1995). Iconic figures in our British history are thought to 
have suffered PTSD: Samuel Pepys, after the great fire; Charles Dickens after a 
train accident, and so on. In fact, the term embraces all people who are said to 
have exceeded by far the boundaries of the word ‘distressed’; people in a 
constant state of hyper-arousal, as in intense fear; who relive horrific past events 
in the present in the form of intrusive thoughts and flashbacks with all their 
original emotive power, at the same time avoiding, or sometimes, conversely, 
deliberately seeking similar or associated situations; occasionally amnesiac or 
dissociated and generally numb and uninterested in social and physical 
surroundings. All these symptoms are predicated on the one necessary condition 
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for the diagnosis of PTSD to be given: the occurrence of an objectively 
verifiable, objectively horrifying event, previous in time to the symptoms, 
recalled verbally by the individual sufferer, and established clinically to be the 
disorder’s ‘aetiological event’.  
 
It is essentially the memory of this event inscribed on the person of the sufferer 
– lodged in an invisible wound – which is the cause of these symptoms. These 
are of both a neurological and a psychological kind – this is especially clear in 
the revised version of DSM III – representing the two disparate strands of 
psychiatric thinking, ‘psyche’ and ‘soma’ ((van der Kolk et al, 1996a). Not only 
did this diagnosis reflect psychiatry-wide developments by achieving a measure 
of agreement on the diffuse and somewhat contradictory characteristics of this 
disorder; the composition of the diagnosis itself embodies the two strands. In 
this way, though the diagnosis did not avoid a basic causal proposition in terms 
of the traumatic event, it left room, in accordance with the ‘theory free’ 
requirements of DSM III, for different theoretical understandings of traumatic 
memory and different explanatory theories for the array of symptoms. 
 
These two strands are held together in the diagnosis by the specification of the 
essential aetiological event. This unifies and makes sense of the diffuse 
symptoms and also distinguishes them from the more conventional and 
widespread psychiatric diagnoses of depression, generalised anxiety disorder 
and panic disorder, many of whose symptoms are indistinguishable from the 
PTSD constellation – according, at least, to its critics (for example, Field, 1999; 
Young, 1995). The inclusion of the event in the diagnosis is what accounted for 
its social and political acceptance. It allowed the claims of the Vietnam Veterans 
to compensation for psychological injury in war. A diagnosis of depression, say, 
implying individual psychological susceptibility, would have made claiming 
much more difficult, as the next chapter elucidates. In this context, this special 
form to the diagnosis – the only one in DSM III which contains its own 
aetiology – was helpful, seen as a success and making a unique contribution to 
 126 
modern psychiatry and its more austere and pared down diagnostic processes. In 
the words of two of its enthusiastic protagonists,  
 
The PTSD diagnosis has reintroduced the notion that many ‘neurotic’ 
symptoms are not the results of some mysterious, well-nigh inexplicable, 
genetically based irrationality, but of people’s inability to come to terms 
with real experiences which have overwhelmed their capacity to cope…. 
The study of trauma has become the soul of psychiatry (van der Kolk et al, 
1996a:4). 
 
But, soul or not, the study of trauma encapsulates some major conceptual 
problems, which all centre on the inclusion in the diagnosis of the aetiological 
event, discussed below.  
 
First, this inclusion must be the cause of the somewhat puzzling claim in the 
literature that PTSD is ‘naturally occurring’ but also ‘man-made’ (van der Kolk 
et al, 1996a). It would seem that the symptoms are thought of as ontologically 
objective – in the world, a universal, free of historical context – but that the 
diagnosis is ‘man-made’ in that the symptoms are given their diagnostic status 
by being linked up to a real happening, the aetiological event within the 
diagnosis. So the symptoms are, paradoxically, not free of historical context at 
all, since it is the historic event which gives the symptoms their special 
meaning. 117 This evokes some of the thinking about invisible wounds in the last 
chapter, where, in the case of emotional abuse, it was the objective ontological 
status of the abuser and his/her actions which guaranteed the reality of the 
psychological harm, the ‘battering inside’ and its symptoms, and gave them 
significance. It also, in theory at least, compromises the usefulness of the 
diagnosis for research into its causal conditions, since its symptoms cannot be 
identified independently of their aetiology (Horwitz et al, 2007). 
 
Second, the environmental origin of the PTSD symptoms really complicates the 
problematic notions of normality and pathology in psychiatry, although it seems 
                                                 
117 See Child Sexual Abuse, Battered Wife Syndrome etc in DSM IV. 
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initially to solve them for the purposes of awarding compensation. These two 
notions can so easily be stood on their head. Whilst the development of PTSD 
can be thought of as part of a process which normalises pathology, in that the 
diagnostic symptoms depend on an event which could severely affect anybody, it 
could equally be part of a process which pathologises normality, as some other 
critics maintain (Double, 2002; Summerfield, 1996; Summerfield, 2001; 
Summerfield, 2004). For example, Horwitz and Wakefield, in their book on the 
ever increasing diagnosis of depression, The Loss of Sadness, claim that its 
present over-diagnosis pathologises completely normal reactions to historical 
events and creates informational noise (Horvitz and Wakefield, 2007). PTSD is, 
by definition, essentially reactive to an event; the aetiological event is a 
condition of its status as a diagnosis of pathology. But, if we apply the argument 
above, it could be thought of as a condition of non-diagnosable normality. 
 
The third, and most important, problem is the contradiction set up in the 
diagnosis between the symptoms of the causal trauma and the memory of its 
occurrence. The necessary inclusion, within the diagnosis, of the aetiological 
event recalled to verbal memory relies on individual testimony. But since this is 
delivered in the context of a disorder of memory, the content of the 
psychological strand is somewhat confused and its validity as a causal theory put 
into question (Young, 1995; Young, forthcoming). This, it is argued, opens the 
way to the more objective neurological approach which relies on the visual 
techniques of neurophysiological measurement and brain mapping (Young, 
1995). These developments turn on the complex and contentious nature of 
traumatic memory and recall of its symptoms’ horrific cause, as set out below.  
 
Causality and Time 
 
In the workings of medical positivism, cause precedes effect. It is one of the 
main arguments of Allan Young’s book, The Harmony of Illusions, that the 
inclusion of the causal event preceding the symptoms in the diagnosis of PTSD 
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‘reverses time’, as it is experienced, subjectively, by patients supposedly 
suffering traumatic memory; it elevates, by implication, the importance of the 
patient’s subjective memory, and thus, the psychological understanding of the 
symptoms. At the same time, it makes a sort of nonsense of it and, therefore, of 
its function as a psychological explanation.  
 
This is a complicated argument. The requirement of the DSM III diagnosis is 
that the aetiological event is not only something which is objectively horrifying, 
that is ‘horrifying to almost anybody’ but, by the 1987 revision DSMIIIR 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1987), that it is clearly, and in the mind of 
the patient, the event from which all his/her symptoms spring. The ‘re-
experiencing’, ‘the avoidance’ of or ‘intensification of symptoms after re-
exposure to similar situations’ all predicated on the occurrence and, indeed, the 
memory of the event, if they are to have any diagnostic meaning. This is true 
even if the patient himself may have forgotten or never consciously remembered 
the precipitating situation or may never have thought there was one. For, unlike 
other medical assessments of mental state, which do not necessarily privilege the 
content of subjective testimony over that of significant others or medical 
observation, diagnosis relies on a subjective declaration of the patient about an 
incorrigible mental event in the affirmation of a ‘memory’, which, of course, 
assumes something to be remembered. But the psychological version of 
traumatic memory essentially models a process which could be described as a 
disorder of memory, in which patients are troubled by exactly that which cannot 
be consciously recalled or verbalised. So the version of cause preceding effect is 
the opposite of the way in which the aetiological event is often psychologically 
and subjectively experienced. This was especially relevant in the case of 
Vietnam Veterans, many of whom were said to have ‘late onset PTSD’, possibly 
years after the so called aetiological event. Fifty years before this, during World 
War I, Rivers, for example, was not interested in what may have actually 
triggered symptoms in his patients. He saw remembered events as merely 
images on which the men could hook their distress (Young, 1995). 
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Since the diagnosis of PTSD imposes a framework which makes sense of the 
patient’s troubled and often dissociated subjective state by undermining it, its 
use in the ordering and measuring of the clinical facts requires intensive work 
from the PTSD knowledge makers, from researchers and clinicians dispersed 
around the Western world in widely diverse therapeutic contexts, who, in a 
sometimes slow and painful negotiation with their patient, reverse time and 
produce the objectivity of the event – a fact created with hindsight, as in 
‘recovered memory’.118 And this process of fact finding is aided by the discourse 
of disaster, since much of the clinical and epidemiological work described in the 
literature has been done in the wake of high profile horrors – as in England, for 
example, following Lockerbie or the sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise,119 
which first mobilised clinical interest among those who would found the Trauma 
Department of the Tavistock Clinic in London (Garland, 1998). In the public 
presentation of PTSD as both a clinical and a research phenomenon, the tenuous 
and subjective attachment of the patient to the event, its uncertain memory and 
meaning, is lost from the story, whilst the objective significance and horror of 
the occurrence is deemed to have brought their symptoms into being and given 
them this unique sense (Young, 1995).  
 
With this complication of the psychological strand in the making of PTSD, it 
goes without saying that the more reliance can be placed on neurological 
symptoms and manifestations of this diagnosis, both clinically and 
epidemiologically, the more easily the aetiological account of the symptoms can 
be validated, or so it is claimed. As Young writes: 
                                                 
118 This refers to the controversial claim that memories of childhood abuse can be recovered by 
adults in therapy. This is contentious partly because of the fact v. fantasy dispute in 
psychoanalytic theories of the origins of neuroses, and partly because of its concrete result in the 
retrospective prosecution of parents. For accounts see Lynne Segal (1999) Why Feminism, 
Polity Press, Cambridge: 116-48, especially 131-3, and Hacking, I. (1995b) Rewriting the Soul: 
Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.: 
Chapter 8. 
119 They were both major disasters, an aeroplane crash and the sinking of a large passenger and 
car ferry, involving many deaths and injuries, highly distressed participants and onlookers and 
bereaved families.  
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The neural-hormonal theory offers an … advantage to PTSD researchers for 
it provides a solution to the problem …with veterans’ verbal accounts of 
their traumatic memories: the problem of getting time to run consistently in 
the right direction. The neural-hormonal theory solves the problem by 
shifting the locus of enquiry downward, from words and meanings to 
biological states and substances. To obtain facts and findings, researchers 
now interrogate blood and urine, rather than men (Young, 1995: 283). 
                             
A move from the aural to the visual register potentially establishes PTSD as a 
fact of nature, the invisible wound firmly established in a biological site. But 
those who study blood and urine so carefully may use crude, stereotypic 
psychological stimuli in words and images, assumed to have universal meanings, 
to promote symptomatic neurological reaction in the laboratory or consulting 
room, and this might remain another difficulty (Young, 1995).120 
 
PTSD: The Research 
 
Since its naming in 1980, the phenomenon of PTSD has been the subject of a 
rapidly growing research effort, which seems to have established it more firmly 
within the diagnostic firmament. In the medical literature it is celebrated as a 
success (van der Kolk et al, 1996b), the final achievement of a name for 
something that was always there in nature: 
  
‘The vast majority of researchers believe that PTSD is real in the same way 
that polio is real: it is a natural phenomenon that exists independently of the 
diagnostic conventions, technologies, and practices through which PTSD is 
encountered in the clinic and represented in psychiatric research (Young, 
Forthcoming: 2).                                                        .  
 
The invisible wound has achieved ontological objectivity and, as a name for this 
fact of nature, PTSD is a sound diagnosis, which has also achieved reliability in 
the statistical sense. This, in turn, has been the necessary basis for a research 
programme of quite mammoth proportions – not just clinical and laboratory 
                                                 
120 This is a difficulty not confined to neurological research on PTSD. 
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studies – slanted to establish internal processes, whether psychological or 
neurological, but also to a burgeoning epidemiology. It is these statistical 
studies, which have implications for questions about the normality of this 
particular pathology, about its prevalence and about the size and inclusiveness of 
this category of internal harm.  
 
The triumphalist version of PTSD is not without its critics, however. In fact, 
PTSD is presented in more recent literary reviews as ‘highly controversial’ and a 
set of ‘skeptics’ in the research establishment are identified (Brewin, 2003).121 
Whilst these ‘skeptics’ question the ontology of the PTSD enterprise122 and 
others, at a political level, question the value of a psychiatric diagnostic category 
in helping or healing those who are victimised (Summerfield, 2004), at the level 
of method, there is the view that these ‘fact making technologies’ do not even 
conform to their own norms of truth. For example, the research literature 
contains the sort of statistical sleight of hand that many similar bodies of 
academic literature display. Studies in which hypothesised relationships do not 
reach the required level of significance are not published, thus creating the 
impression of unanimity in the literature. If they are published anyway, their 
caveats are soon forgotten and their results become part of the accepted wisdom, 
assumed up to the level of facts. Studies with contradictory results123 also 
become part of the citation ritual and the negative nature of their findings is 
conveniently overlooked; indeed, criticism and controversy expand the body of 
                                                 
121 These skeptics include Simon Wessely and Edgar Jones (psychiatrist and historian, authors of 
seminal research on socio-genic disorders and post traumatic symptom attribution (Jones et al. 
2003, 2002; Wessely 2004; Wessely and Jones 2005; Bartholomew and Wessely, 2003); Richard 
McNally, an authority on memory (McNally, 2004, 2003), and Allan Young (see Brewin 
2003:23, 41, 225-8 on his work).  
122 The skeptics think that 'the operant mechanism in the emergence of PTSD consists of social 
practices and fact-making technologies, a collective mode of knowledge production rather than a 
psychological process of empathetic identification with the victims of the attacks.’ (Young, 
Forthcoming: 2).  
123 For example, Macfarlane, A. C. (1986) Post Traumatic Morbidity of a Disaster: A Study of 
Cases Presenting for Psychiatric Treatment. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 174, 4-14. 
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the literature (Young, 1995). Second, the diagnosis may have reliability but it 
has no independent validity.124  
 
More telling for my question about normality and pathology is a critique at the 
empirical level. This relates to epidemiological findings that throw the original 
formulation of PTSD into doubt and which have multiplied since Young’s book 
in 1995. McFarlane’s study of the psychological effects on fire-fighters in a 
major Australian bushfire was one of the first to suggest that the incidence of 
PTSD among an event-exposed population depended on pre-existing 
vulnerability factors or risk factors, rather than being ‘dose related’ – that is, 
depending, as it were, on the extent of exposure to the aetiological event, or the 
level of intensity of the event itself (Mcfarlane, 1986). McFarlane had access to 
medical records predating the event, but most studies before and since have had 
no such information and concentrated on exposed populations, in whom, what 
were taken to be symptomatic features of PTSD, could easily have been pre-
existing risk factors for developing the symptoms associated with this diagnosis 
(Bowman et al, 2004). The psychiatric evidence to the Law Commission’s 
Report on Liability for Psychiatric Illness (The Law Commission, 1998: 38-47), 
especially that from Richard Mayou and Bridget Bryant, question the prevalence 
of PTSD rather than other psychiatric conditions after major accidents.125 This 
raises the whole question of the normality or otherwise of the PTSD symptoms 
as a reaction to traumatic stress: is it the event which is the pathogen, inducing 
                                                 
124 Reliability of a diagnostic category is the consistency of its application over time by one rater 
to the same patient (test and retest reliability) and over different raters of the same patient (inter-
rater reliability). By convention, reliable classification is a precondition for aggregating cases for 
research purposes and, for psychiatric diagnoses, demands either expert raters or a rigid, 
structured interview schedule. Problems here with specificity and sensitivity of classification 
negatively affect validity. Validity, in the psychiatric research literature, indicates that a given 
classification possesses intrinsic unity – it is neither a random phenomenon nor a product of 
research or treatment techniques. There appear to be three standards for validity: 1) face validity 
of a disorder is established when its critical features accord with the impressions of experts; 2) 
predictive validity if the disorder manifests itself along certain expected lines over time, and 3) 
most important, independent validity is acquired by a classification when research findings are 
thought to have established an underlying cause or process…like a biological marker. Young, A. 
(1995) The Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
125 See for example, Mayou,, R (1996) Accident Neurosis Revisited Br J Psychiatry 168: 399-
403. 
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symptoms in otherwise normal people? Or, are the symptoms the pathological 
response to an event which by no means induces PTSD symptoms in everybody, 
or even in the majority of those affected, but only in those ‘susceptible’ by virtue 
of pre-existing characteristics of self and/or social environment? 
 
‘Conceptual Bracket Creep’126: The Inclusiveness of the Aetiological Event 
in DSMs III, IIIR and IV. 
 
As for the inclusiveness of this version of the invisible wound, it crucially 
depends on what horrific happenings exactly constitute the part of the diagnosis 
which is the aetiological event. This is, also a matter of some uncertainty and the 
rather stringent requirements of Criterion A in DSM III and DSM IIIR (that ‘the 
individual has experienced a traumatic event that (1) is outside the range of 
usual human experience and (2) would be markedly distressing to almost 
anyone’) were relaxed in the formulation of DSM IV in 1994. These now 
include, in Criterion A, those who ‘experienced, witnessed, or were confronted 
with an event or events’ involving fear for the physical integrity of themselves, 
but also of others, and not just family members or other close associates; that is, 
no relational limits are mentioned. To be ‘confronted’ by such events is vague 
and might include not just witnessing, but also ‘learning about’ them, 
simultaneity not specified, as long as ‘the traumatized person’s response to these 
events involved intense fear, helplessness or horror’ (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994: 424, 427-8). This was some acknowledgement of the 
individual meaning of experience, which added another paradox to the 
diagnosis, as observed by Richard McNally, himself a member of the DSM IV 
Committee. He points out that, under Criterion C, symptoms of dissociation or 
numbing, especially prevalent in sexually abused or raped women, are a feature 
which make nonsense of the feelings of horror required by criterion A (McNally, 
2004). Most important, DSM IV significantly enlarged the range of experiences 
                                                 
126 McNally, R. J. (2004) Conceptual Problems with the DSM-IV Criteria for Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder. In Post Traumatic Stress Disorder: Issues and Controversies (ed G. Rosen), pp. 
1-14. London: Wiley. 
 134 
that could officially be regarded as major stressors and so the range of people 
who could claim to be suffering from PTSD. 
 
The submergence of the subjective in the elevation of an objectively horrifying 
aetiological event, set out in DSM III, of course, made PTSD a diagnosis which 
was eminently suitable for legitimating claims to compensation, because it 
appeared closely defined, stringent as well as generally accepted. This seems to 
have been one of the more political motives behind its creation. It was also 
accepted by the academic medical establishment as a measure with proven 
reliability, so that it became the subject of a major research program. 
Paradoxically, once it was accepted in this way, it seems that a sort of political 
volte face could be achieved. The criteria defining the aetiological event could 
be relaxed; it could become more inclusive. In this way, the ease with which the 
diagnosis could be applied and with which not just US Vietnam veterans, but 
others, could claim compensation increased, as new wars and disasters came 
along and social and political circumstances changed. PTSD became, for 
example, a disorder found in children (Dwivedi, 2000). Allan Young calls the 
publication of DSM IV ‘the repatriation of PTSD….bringing it back home from 
the jungles and highlands of Vietnam’ (Young, 1995: 290). He argues that this 
opened the way to a sort of ‘conceptual bracket creep’ in the diagnosis, leading 
to it generally having much greater coverage by the year 2000 (Young, 
forthcoming). A revealing epidemiological study of adults in the Detroit 
Metropolitan Area, undertaken at the turn of the century, showed that, using 
criterion A in DSM IV, 89.6% of the population claimed life experiences that 
could be used to diagnose PTSD (although only 9.2% were actually so 
diagnosed). Using Criterion A in DSM IV instead of Criterion A in DSM III 
increased the total number of all such experiences by an astonishing 59.2%. 
(Breslau et al, 2001:703). As Young writes some eight years later, 
 
In 1980, the stressor was initially defined as a rare event which always 
produces severe distress. Today it includes relatively common events that 
induce serious distress in only a minority of individuals. Thus the repertoire 
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of attributable memories and events has vastly enlarged (McNally, 2004) 
(Young, forthcoming: 3).  
 
The possible set of causal events to which a diffuse set of symptoms can be 
attributed has grown to encompass more experiences, as its definition has 
become looser and more expansive. PTSD as a social problem category has 
expanded considerably over time.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I have concentrated on three main questions about the diagnosis 
of PTSD. First, the uncertain location of trauma in a cognitive/affective space or 
a biological space or both; second, the problematic relationship of normality to 
pathology in psychiatry when exogenous causes are mooted and, third, the status 
of this external environmental cause: the aetiological event. All of these 
ambiguities, which were each raised and discussed in Chapter 1, beset the 
diagnostic system of Western psychiatry, and they are particularly relevant to a 
diagnosis, such as PTSD, which, unlike the other diagnostic categories of DSM 
III, was established in relation to its social or environmental causation. 
 
The dilemmas of PTSD spelt out in this chapter reflect generic difficulties in 
constructing meaningful operational versions of invisible wounds. The concept 
of invisibility is not just the essential qualification that makes trauma a metaphor 
– like a wound, but not a wound – but a genuine challenge to any positivistic 
explorer of a psychic interior. This is especially true of an interior which was 
first colonised as a psychoanalytic space, in which the wound lies buried – not 
just unspeakable, but also unthinkable, as memories of shock and horror are 
repressed at the level of the unconscious mind.127 It may be possible, in time, to 
access these memories aurally, through the interpretive conversations of the 
                                                 
127 And even cognitive or cognitive-behavioural versions have to include some version of 
repression like 'cognitive dissonance'. 
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confessional, where there is expertise at discovering what is hidden, but not 
through the administration of the DIS, or any schedule whose questions and 
interview techniques assume away the existence of what cannot be revealed. 
But, if the explorer attempts to identify a wounded interior through observation 
of visible behavioural symptoms, how can he/she distinguish the effects of a 
wound from the signs of other diagnostic categories? If, to solve this problem, a 
named horrific event is included in the diagnosis, this demands a clear, spoken 
memory of the trauma – precisely that which is not available! It is not surprising 
that the newer techniques of neuro-physiological mapping and measurement128 
which seem to give direct, non-paradoxical access to a biological interior and a 
physical wound, albeit at a microbiological level, might be preferred by the 
medical establishment, especially as it grounds its practitioners in the more 
prestigious natural sciences, nearer to the fount of funding. 
 
The above is a classic double bind and one found in other situations in which a 
precise positivistic version of invisible wounds is imposed on this vague literary 
or psychodynamic idea that functions at the level of metaphor.129 But such 
versions are required, not so much for clinical treatment, where the 
psychological and the neurological forms can coexist, but for medical research, 
epidemiology and for the legal and administrative imperatives of establishing 
guilt, accountability and the terms of compensation. Here, not only does an 
unambiguous pathology have to be established, but also an unambiguous cause, 
one that unequivocally induces pathology in normal people, where there was 
none. This is not helped by more neutral investigations of symptoms in recent 
reviews of the epidemiological research, which show that questions of causality, 
and normality versus pathology in the individual or the event are not, in fact, 
answered definitively (Bowman et al, 2004).  
 
                                                 
128 See Chapter 7. 
129 Lynne Segal (1999) Why Feminism, Polity Press, Cambridge: 116-148, especially 131-3 and 
Hacking, I. (1995b) Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Chapter 8. 
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Finally, the specification of the aetiological event decides how many people can 
be classed as psychologically harmed – whether they are a small exclusive set or 
whether they are legion. I have argued here that although its dilemmas have laid 
the diagnosis of PTSD open to increasing criticism, both within and without the 
profession, it has not obstructed its use, which has grown considerably both 
within the clinical and the epidemiological community. At first, this growth was 
predicated on an indication of the objective uniqueness of the sort of event 
which could induce this psychological harm, producing a diagnosis of great 
reliability and a basis for successful claiming and statistical research. Then, with 
acceptance and success within the psychiatric profession and academy, a 
loosening in the definition of what is to count as a causal event in DSM IV has 
greatly increased its inclusiveness, and thus the number of people who can make 
a medical claim to psychological (or neurological) harm. As the number of 
wounding events in the environment increase, then more people can claim 
invisible wounds.  
 
The aetiological event seems to dominate the appraisal of those deemed to be 
harmed by suffering, much as the tail wags the dog. Not only is the existence 
and nature of the shocking event used to give meaning to vague symptoms, 
endowing them with the status of visible signs of an invisible wound, it is as if 
the shock itself makes a way into the interior. The trauma opens up the 
‘protective shield’ to make it available, through the breach, for inspection by 
explorers from the outside world. 
 
Of course, all three of these questions about invisible wounds – location, 
normalcy and cause – are much more tightly interrelated in the case of nervous 
shock in tort law. As we will see in the next section, they affect the inclusiveness 
of any diagnostic or other social problem category. It is the task of managing 
inclusiveness that makes these three problems a lot more pressing for the Appeal 
Court judges in their construction of a legal form of traumatic stress, than for 
psychiatrists or epidemiologists after 1980. Although it goes almost without 
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saying that law and psychiatry in the anglophone world influence each other and 
share the same cultural context, nevertheless, we will argue that the English Law 
Lords were subject to a very different set of social constraints from psychiatrists 
over the 20th century and certainly felt themselves to be. These constraints were 
often conflicting, but all related, in different ways, to the size of the category of 
those who could claim damages for negligence under tort law in cases of 
nervous shock. The category potentially expanded with the growth and influence 
of psychiatry but then, quite unlike the diagnosis of PTSD, which, one way and 
another, has gone on expanding, contracted again by the end of the 20th 
Century. 
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      CHAPTER 3: 
                   NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED PSYCHIATRIC 
                              ILLNESS OR NERVOUS SHOCK 
              
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The last chapter presented the thesis that the history of the medical version of 
trauma is partly the story of the development of a biological form of knowledge 
of the self and psychic harm, which has developed alongside the psychological 
and threatens to supplant it. In the development of trauma studies, the 
psychoanalytic dualism that predominated in psychiatry in the second and third 
quarters of the 20th century has been largely sidelined, along with the notion of 
subjectivity managed by medical positivism largely based on neuro-physiology. 
This chapter looks at how this medical version of trauma has been used by the 
English Appeal Courts to legitimate legal decisions about compensation for 
psychiatric illness due to negligence, as the Law Lords create their own somatic 
version of psychic harm. It is not claimed here that these developments have 
necessarily occurred because they are functional to this or that social group, 
either within medicine or the law. However, it does seem that the persistence of 
the language of nerves in medical discourse has allowed the law to incorporate 
the notion of psychic harm within the broad area of damage to property and, by 
analogy, to the body, just as the old common law ‘psychic assault’ is a sub-
category of grievous or actual bodily harm as a criminal offence. Thus, an older, 
more historic form of dualism, legal rather than psycho-analytic, has been 
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maintained.130 By drawing the definition of the aetiological event very tightly, 
implicitly defining causal shock by its physical rather than mental 
accompaniments, the law finds its own solutions to the vexed questions of 
normality versus pathology in the recipient of psychological harm and limits the 
size of nervous shock as a problem category. 
  
As with medicine, we can see this position as partly dependent on philosophy or 
forms of knowledge. Cartesian philosophy is still the basis for legal thinking, as 
much as it was for medical men before Freud. The legal subject is rational, 
autonomous, morally responsible, and possesses and controls the body, where 
the passions reside. The idea of a psychic hurt or injury as a harm which is 
claimable is hard for this legal dualism to accommodate. Granted, the 
construction of the legal subject with its implications for criminal responsibility 
has changed over time131 and psychiatry since the late 19th century has played a 
role in providing evidence on the fitness to plea and the ‘dangerousness’ of the 
accused (Foucault, 1978; Smith, 1984), whilst, for example, ‘mental distress’ 
has a history as mitigation in criminal proceedings132. But the nature of 
subjectivity, or this interior world, as an object of crime or negligent damage is 
little contemplated in tort law. It raises awkward questions; it challenges a 
hierarchy of harms implicit in a law based on sovereign rights, with harm to land 
at the top, then harm to property, then harm to the body (in its cold, mechanistic 
legal construction as property), beneath which lurks a more sentimental version 
of the body in pain (Hyde, 1997). The notion of mental distress is hardly 
considered as a legal harm (Hyde, 1997). Note that the crime of sexual assault is 
still constructed in law as a harm which is inscribed on property – on the body as 
metaphorical property whose use is subject to consent.133 The Lockean precepts 
                                                 
130 See Horder, J. (1998 ) Reconsidering Psychic Assault. Criminal Law Review, June, 392 - 
403.  
131 Nicola Lacey, for example, has looked at this historical movement in 'black letter law' as well 
as contemporary literature See Lacey, N (2008) Women, Crime and Character from Moll 
Flanders to Tess of the D'Urbevilles .Oxford, Clarendon Press.   
132 The nearest the English Common Law approaches to the French 'crime passionelle'. 
133 The principle of 'consent' still dominates the prosecution of trials for rape in the UK, hence a 
raft of work by feminist legal scholars insisting that the harm in sexual assault is inscribed also 
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underpinning the Anglo-Saxon liberal rule of law envisage the maximum 
freedom for society’s atomistic individuals, preserved by limiting state 
intervention to a minimum. The idea of a psychic hurt raises the question of 
whether redress for ‘mere mental distress’ can be included within this minimum; 
is such a hurt to count as a harm and, even if it is, is it a harm that is to count? 
(Hart, 1961; Hyde, 1997) More broadly, how can it be contemplated at all within 
the Cartesian system of thought? It is simply a contradiction in terms. 
Psychiatric illness, seen as a physical illness like any other, is a better fit with 
legal thinking. 
                                                . 
This is not a simple matter, however, and for the law, also, not just a question of 
its dualistic philosophy, but of its social and political context. For the first three 
quarters of the 20th century, the problem for the Appeal Court judges appeared 
to be how to think about and justify commonsense and humanitarian decisions to 
allow claims for psychological harm, especially where this had obvious physical 
manifestations. The diagnosis of PTSD, made official in 1980, conveniently 
legitimated legal decisions in this area of tort, and a bona fide psychiatric 
diagnosis became a necessary condition for successful claiming (The Law 
Commission, 1998). After this, the problem seems to have reverted to the central 
preoccupation of tort law, which is how to allow citizens access to compensation 
for harm and, at the same time, limit the amount and number of these claims. 
This dilemma came to a head with the aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster, 
when the floodgates of litigation were so nearly breached.134 The judges 
wrestled with the question: does the relentless ‘progress of medical science,’ 
enhancing the authoritative nature of its diagnostic activity, mean that the area of 
‘mere mental distress’, for which no damages are traditionally allowed (Hart, 
                                                                                                                                                 
on a psychological space, or, in the more holistic, thinking of some feminist philosophers 
recently, on the whole person. (Butler, J. (1993) Bodies That Matter. London: Routledge. 
Grosz, E. (1994) Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism. Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. and Lacey (1998) Unspeakable Subjects. Oxford: Hart 
Publishing.  
134 For a gripping account of politics of Hillsborough see Scraton, P. (1999) Hillsborough: The 
Truth. Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing Projects. 
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1961) is an area ripe for colonisation by claimants? At this point, the new-found 
authority of medical science was discovered to have become a little less certain. 
 
The relationship between psychiatry and the law, it seems, was ever ambivalent. 
The law’s uneasy use of psychiatric expertise in questions of criminal 
responsibility, dangerousness, risk and so on, has been described elsewhere 
(Foucault, 1978; Smith, 1984), as has the use of ‘welfare science experts’ in the 
practice of law relating to children – in juvenile justice and family law – by 
Christine Piper and Michael King (King et al, 1990). The latter, following 
Luhmann (Luhmann, 1988) and Teubner (Teubner, 1989) see medicine and the 
law as two informationally closed, or ‘autopoietic’ function systems; the law’s 
truth is not scientific truth, the law’s notions of rationality and normality bear 
scant relation to their scientific counterparts. So, they argue, within a legal 
context, information constructed medically, for example, can only be used if it 
‘fits’ with legal notions of admissability. In this process of ‘fitting’, the two 
systems are said to be in a relationship of structural coupling, in which the 
medical can do no more than ‘perturb’ the legal (King et al, 1990; Luhmann, 
1988; Teubner, 1989). 
 
What follows is the story of this relationship in the area of claims to damages for 
psychic harm, in which the medical diagnosis of PTSD can be said to have 
‘perturbed’ the legal in every sense of the word. But it argues that this is not just 
an account of the fit – or lack of fit – between two knowledge systems, but of the 
relationship between two regimes of truth as shaped by their social conditions, 
their professional imperatives and functions. While this chapter is an 
examination of the way that the notion of psychiatric illness or nervous shock 
has been constructed by the judges of the Appeal Court as they have talked their 
way round these three, now familiar, problems besetting psychiatry and PTSD 
(the location of the wound, the nature of normality and pathology, and the status 
and definition of the aetiological event) much of their voluble explanatory dicta 
is directly taken up with what they see as the social constraints which bear in a 
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conflicting way on their position. They present themselves as steering a difficult 
course between the rock of natural justice and a hard place manning ‘the 
floodgates of litigation’, swept along on the relentless progress of medical 
science, but always guided by a star that states that mere mental distress cannot 
be claimed for.  
 
 
I.  TORT LAW IN ENGLAND 
 
The complexity of the English Law Lords’ position in the area of ‘nervous 
shock’ has to be seen in the context of the complicated nature of tort law in 
general, of which it is seen as a particularly troublesome sub-category (Harlow, 
2005). Tort law is essentially case law in which decisions are based on 
precedent. It has never been rationalised and codified, like so many other 
branches of the common law, and various legal philosophers have tried, in vain, 
it would seem, to produce a satisfactory account of its rationale. Tort law cases 
are actions which exist between private individuals, in which one person sues 
another for compensation for a loss for which that other is held responsible. The 
law exists to make the loss whole, in what has been called ‘corrective justice’. 
But this law is just a small complement to a complex of state-run schemes for 
victim compensation and, as such, is also part of a system of ‘redistributive 
justice’, which has become more important in a ‘victim culture’, where the 
politics of class have somewhat given way to the politics of injury (Brown, 
1995). Its deterrent and punitive aspects also link it to wider policy issues about 
society-wide risk management and security, and to the ambivalent relationship 
between lawyers and politicians, especially in matters of political economy. 
 
Historically, tort was a relatively small and confined area of the law in the US 
and the UK, until a landmark case in 1932 put the tort of negligence on the legal 
map. After this, tort law grew quickly, culminating in something of an explosion 
in negligence litigation in the US and then the UK in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
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The US in particular is described as a ‘compensation culture’, in which litigation 
for employer and professional negligence (particularly medical) increased 
dramatically. The sums awarded in certain famous, indeed notorious, class 
actions reached many billions of pounds, a large proportion of which went to 
legal expenses (Harlow, 2005: 153-155). Although litigation in the UK has 
never reached such extremes and the approach of the judges has become more 
pragmatic and cautious in the last quarter of the 20th century, the ease of 
litigation for negligence is still argued by some to deter people embarking on 
risky, but innovative enterprises and socially necessary professions, as the cost 
of personal or professional insurance in some parts of the economy becomes 
prohibitive (Harlow, 2005: 164). 
 
Thus the Law Lords’ pronouncements on appeals against the judgments of the 
lower courts in cases of nervous shock in tort, in which they hammer out a 
version of psychiatric illness or psychological harm, are subjected to all sorts of 
political and organisational pressures that hardly touch the medical profession. 
These are not just about keeping state intervention in private life to a minimum, 
but, given the above, to minimise costs both to the Exchequer and to employers 
and professional groups as well as private insurers. This is in contrast to the 
medical profession, whose Hippocratic imperative to cure and save lives at 
whatever cost have only recently become susceptible to the bureaucratic needs 
of budgetary rationalisation and the optimisation of spending on health in the 
UK. In the USA, the insurance system still perpetuates an extremely expensive 
service. Psychiatrists, also, have enormous space for professional discretion in 
decision making, behind the closed doors of the clinic and the therapy room. If 
the diagnosis of depression is anything to go by, they are not constrained in 
expanding a diagnostic category. In contrast, the Law Lords make the law in 
discussing and confirming or overturning what has gone before in a public, 
transparent and innately conservative process, like a huge, moving committee 
decision, where there is little room for mavericks. All these pressures on the 
Law Lords seem to produce a process which is dedicated to limiting the size of 
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this area of litigation to ‘reasonable’ bounds and a particular anxiety about the 
containment of the size of a claimable category called ‘nervous injury’ which, 
‘once recognised, may extend indefinitely’ (Harlow, 2005:68).  
  
Following this process, which is so constrained by legal, political and economic 
considerations, we look at how the Law Lords have constructed a closely 
circumscribed, somatic version of psychiatric illness; how a certain sort of legal 
dualism has been uncomfortably maintained, and how professional expertise 
over the nature and applicability of this and other diagnostic categories has been 
allocated. Overall, the findings of the Appeal Court judges can be read as a 
strange play of professional rationalities in which these fundamental psychiatric 
questions are given a distinct legal interpretation. 
 
As if the status and description of PTSD were not complex enough, the English 
law in the area of nervous shock has its own added complications, the details of 
which must be gone through before we can get at the underlying legal 
constructions of psychiatric illness. Before these are discussed, I give a 
somewhat bald, brief statement of how the law stands now or rather stood in the 
year 2000, though there is little difference. Second, I present a historical section 
which gives a survey of how this situation was achieved. For tort is, of course, 
case law, and the notion of nervous shock has been negotiated in a series of 
landmark cases over the 20th century. This process of negotiation is described 
here and the main legal developments drawn out. This is, of course, material 
which is extensively dealt with in the legal literature on tort.135 The brief sketch 
given here is designed to set the scene for what follows, which is a discussion of 
their Lordships’ notions of psychological harm, normality and causality. 
 
 
II. NERVOUS SHOCK: THE LAW AS IT STANDS 
                                                 
135 For instance, Handford, P. R. (2006) Mullany and Handford's Tort Liability for Psychiatric 
Damage (2nd edn). Sidney: Thompson Lawbook Co, Mullany, N. J. & Handford, P. R. (1993) 
Tort Liability for Psychiatric Damage: LBC Information Services. 
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What the PTSD diagnosis produced was an affirmation of an injury or a harm – 
something that could happen to anyone in such violent circumstances – caused 
by an identifiable event. Perhaps not a physical injury exactly, but as like one in 
its causes and effects as should make no difference to recoverability. Crucially, 
the fact that the medical assessment of these may only be minimally dependent 
on the patient’s subjective account, paves the way for a legal assessment which 
is even less so. 
 
Of course the law adds several more epicycles to the PTSD story of psychiatric 
illness caused by an event whose experience would be markedly distressing to 
just about anyone. To start with, ‘the patient’ becomes ‘the plaintiff,’ who, with 
the help of his psychiatrist, has managed to remember that a certain accident or 
threatening happening in his life is the aetiological event which has caused all 
his debilitating symptoms of psychological harm for which he can claim 
monetary compensation at law. The uncertain nature of traumatic memory does 
not even surface as a problem in this context. Next, another person is introduced 
into the dramatis personae – another person, whose negligence or lack of care 
results in this event, which is, in law, the ‘reasonably foreseeable’ cause of the 
damage to the plaintiff, namely the defendant. Successful claiming for damages 
in the area of tort liability is organised around the necessity to establish three 
claims: first, that the defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff; second, that 
the defendant breached this duty of care, and third, that this breach was the cause 
of a particular sort of actionable damage. In tort, it is mostly damage to property 
or the person, resulting in economic loss in its widest sense. 
 
The diagnosis of PTSD, which establishes a particular, objectively horrific 
causal event as part and parcel of a consequent ‘recognizable psychiatric 
illness’136 provides for one of two necessary, but by no means sufficient, 
preconditions for recovery of damages. (Of course, damages have been granted 
                                                 
136 Hinz v Berry [1970] 2 QB 40, 42, per Lord Denning MR. 
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for other ‘positive’ psychiatric illnesses,137 listed in the Law Commission 
Report,138 but PTSD has become the diagnosis of preference139 because the 
others present the major difficulties discussed below). If the first precondition is 
the establishment, medically, of the illness itself (the actionable damage), the 
second precondition is the reasonable foreseeability, by the defendant, of the 
psychiatric illness of the plaintiff, should he breach his duty of care. Indeed, 
without this ‘reasonable forseeability’, he has no duty of care.  
 
In the foreseeability criterion, the law begins to tighten its requirement for its 
own version of psychiatric illness. First, the event’s horrific nature (much less 
expansive than the DSM IV definition) has to consist in sudden or shocking fear 
of injury to self or another, felt by the plaintiff – and, specifically, injury to 
another who is close in ties of affection, a threat proximate to the plaintiff in 
time and space and apprehended by him/her directly and not through 
intermediaries. Second, in case of fear of injury to another, the defendant is 
entitled to assume, in assessing reasonably foreseeable psychiatric injury, that 
the plaintiff is a person of reasonable fortitude or ‘a normal standard of 
susceptibility’. Whilst the medical claim for the psychiatric condition of PTSD 
(questionably supported by the epidemiology) is a disorder which can be 
sustained by anyone subject to environmental trauma, it does not guarantee lack 
of susceptibility or zero predisposition to psychiatric illness in all those who are 
given this diagnosis. Nor can the law, in fact, guarantee that only the non-
susceptible can claim. What it can do, in the interest of natural justice to the 
defendant, is to require, like the diagnosis, that the damage is sustained in 
conditions in which it would be reasonably foreseeable that even a person of 
‘customary phlegm’ might suffer a recognisable psychiatric illness. The 
foreseeability criterion, also, lastly, requires that the question of whether a 
                                                 
137 McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410, 431, per Lord Bridge. 
138 Liability for Psychiatric Illness (1998), p. 47-51. 
139 See Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1991] House of Lords 310. The Law 
commission report, Liability for Psychiatric Illness (1998:39-51) suggests that, while PTSD is 
the diagnosis most favoured by claimants because, in its cause-and-effect form, it is most 
suitable for establishing liability, many of the psychiatric consultants to the Commission’s 
inquiry pointed out its inadequacy in capturing all the symptomatic consequences of shock.  
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psychiatric illness is foreseeable is considered after the fact; that is, after the 
event which causes the psychic injury. Otherwise, plaintiffs may claim for 
genuine harm caused by genuine fear, for self or a proximate other, simply about 
what might happen – an infinite set of possibilities ex ante, especially for those 
of a particularly anxious and imaginative disposition, and in no way reasonably 
foreseeable by the defendant. 
 
 
III. NERVOUS SHOCK: THE CASE HISTORY 
 
Dulieu v White & Sons[1901] 2 Kings Bench 669 is constantly cited as the case 
which established nervous shock in the English law of tort. A pregnant barmaid 
was made ill when a brewer’s dray was driven into the pub where she was 
working. She feared for her life and the baby was born prematurely, ‘an idiot’. 
Here, Kennedy J. established that the only shock that can be claimed for is ‘one 
which arises from a fear of immediate personal injury to oneself’’.140 The issue 
at debate was: could mental states count as part of a ‘natural’ causal sequence in 
the infliction of physical damage, to someone ‘ill in body by negligent driving 
which does not break his ribs but affects his nerves’. Phillimore J. was of the 
opinion that ‘the fact of one link in the chain of causation being mental only 
makes no difference’.141 For the first time, damages were allowed for physical 
illness (miscarriage) caused by ‘fear and fear alone’. Here we can see the 
influence of Page, if not Charcot, although whether fear, which might be thought 
of as an emotion (and, therefore, in legal philosophy as a bodily state), also had a 
cognitive component was a moot point, as seen below. 
 
In the history of tort it has been said that, in Hambrook v Stokes Bros [1925] 1 
Kings Bench 141, the ‘impact theory’ – nervous shock is the result of a 
reasonable fear of impact to oneself– was challenged by a more general ‘shock 
                                                 
140 [1901] 2 KB 669 675. 
141 [1901] 2 KB 669 682. 
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theory’ in which, for example, the fear might conceivably be for impact and 
injury to another. This was a move which in the official DSM diagnostic 
category of PTSD did not happen until 1994, clearly reflecting the difference in 
the sort of cases to which it was applied. Here – and a far call from Vietnam 
veterans – the estate of an erstwhile pregnant mother of three claimed for 
damages for nervous shock, caused by the woman’s reasonable fear, not that she 
would be hurt, but that her children would be hurt by a lorry she saw careering 
down the hill without a driver. One child was, in fact, killed and the mother 
became ill, miscarried and died. Again, there was much discussion of the 
relation of mental states to physical hurt and the nature of shock, but the shock 
theory was never put to the test, because the claim was allowed on the grounds 
of a very narrow extension of the duty of care. The defendant did have a duty of 
care – not just to the children but to the mothers of endangered children, who 
witnessed all the relevant events. How could the judges allow a mother in such 
circumstances to claim, if she (selfishly, it was implied) feared for her own life, 
but not if she feared for her children? 
 
Bourhill v Young [1943] House of Lords 92 was a further test of which theory 
was to apply – impact theory or shock theory. A woman, again eight months 
pregnant, heard a motor cycle collision with a car, although she did not observe 
it because there was a bus in between her and the accident. As she said, she 
‘came over a pack of nerves’ and her baby was stillborn. As a ‘pursuer’ only, the 
plaintiff was not near enough to the accident to be in fear of physical injury to 
herself through impact. The issue was: could she claim for mental shock which 
was actionable under other circumstances (thus turning over the point of law 
established by Judge Kennedy in Dulieu v White & Sons), rather than just 
extending it to mothers? This was discussed at length, including the highly 
pertinent question of whether it was relevant to the concept of nervous shock 
and its effect on the victim, that the mental state of the plaintiff, as one step in a 
causal chain, contained particular beliefs or fears. As the plaintiff described her 
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mental state, she seemed to have none: her mind was a blank. Thus Wright L. J. 
plumped for a thoroughly mechanical approach: 
 
Modern medicine may, perhaps, show that nervous shock is not necessarily 
associated with any particular mental ideas. The worst nervous shock may 
for the moment paralyse the mind.142  
 
This interesting question, still not solved by the medical experts, was never 
decided, as the appeal was not allowed on the grounds that the defendant (now 
dead in the accident) did not owe the appellant a duty of care. She was too 
remote from the accident, so that her injuries were not ‘reasonably foreseeable’ 
by virtue of her lack of physical proximity. The defendant could expect 
‘customary phlegm’ and ‘a normal standard of susceptibility’143 from someone 
in this position, a requirement which, as Lord Hoffman, in White v Chief 
Constable of South Yorkshire [1999], pointed out, reflected ‘a robust wartime 
attitude’.144 
 
By the time of the next significant case, McLoughlin v O’Brien [1983] 1 House 
of Lords 410, the diagnostic category of PTSD had been established in DSM III 
and the notion of psychiatric illness as an illness of the mind, but an illness like 
any other, had gained more currency in medicine and the wider world. The 
House of Lords allowed the plaintiff’s appeal for damages for this ‘psychiatric 
illness’ although she also had physiological symptoms. Her husband and 
children were injured in car crash. She heard of it from a neighbour and arrived 
at hospital a while after her family, finding them all covered in blood and oil, in 
shock and her youngest daughter dead. The issue was, would this claim satisfy 
the foreseeability criterion, as she was not physically close to the accident? In 
allowing it, this criterion was stretched to its utmost and the so-called ‘aftermath 
principle’ established, in that experiencing the direct aftermath of a bloody 
accident might be as shocking as witnessing it oneself. 
                                                 
142 Bourhill v Young [1943] 1 AC 92 110.  
143 Bourhill v Young, [1943] AC 92 117, per Lord Porter and 110, per Lord Wright. 
144 1 ALL ER 1 40. 
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The case is considered to mark the height of the expansion of tort liability and to 
have finally established the more general ‘shock’, rather than ‘impact’, criterion 
for the application of the foreseeability principle. The dicta support a wide 
theory of liability for claims for psychiatric injury in principle. But it is noted 
that, although so far in the history of nervous shock the floodgates argument had 
proved inapplicable, the embracing of the shock criteria might encourage 
increased pressure of litigation. There was much discussion about the need for 
limitations on the extension of the foreseeability criterion as a matter of policy. 
And Lord Wilberforce first enunciates the principle of policy limitations to 
claims, on the basis of close relationship to the victim physically endangered, 
proximity to the accident in time and space and the learning of it by direct 
apprehension, rather than communication by a third party. These so-called 
‘control mechanisms’ limit the reasonable foreseeability of psychiatric illness 
but also, by limiting the process by which claimable harm can be sustained, 
implicitly limits the type of damage which is recoverable.145  
 
The famous case of Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1991] 1 House 
of Lords 310 saw this policy principle of limits to recovery put into practice. 
This was a case stemming from the Hillsborough disaster of 1987, where the 
stands of the Liverpool football stadium collapsed, 95 spectators were crushed to 
death and over 400 injured in the most horrific circumstances. A failure of 
policing was held responsible. The plaintiffs in this case, who all had relatives 
and friends among persons killed or injured, saw events in the stadium or on live 
television or heard a live radio broadcast, with seemingly devastating results to 
their health. They were all diagnosed with PTSD – the first time this diagnosis 
was so uniformly used – and incorrectly, according to the strict criteria of DSM 
III which then applied.146 The defendant admitted negligence, but the question of 
                                                 
145 McLoughlin v O’Brien [1982] 2 ALL ER 298 303. 
146 Those who did not experience the event directly were excluded by the aetological event 
definition in DSM III and, as to fear not for self but for a relative, this was not specifically 
mentioned. The DSM IV Task Force committee reviewing this diagnosis decided that the initial 
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his duty of care to the plaintiffs remained. Were they sufficiently proximate in 
relationship to those for whom they feared? Is proximity of time and place to the 
event provided by a television broadcast? The judges ruled in the negative to 
both questions and the appeals were not allowed. What had to be reasonably 
foreseeable was not just any psychiatric illness but a psychiatric illness produced 
under certain conditions; implicitly, the type of harm had to be of a certain sort.  
 
This was made more explicit by the judges adding a further epicycle to the 
conditions of proximity, which is known as the ‘shock requirement’. This stated 
that a claimable psychiatric illness had to be the result of shock – in the sense of 
‘a sudden assault on the nervous system’ which could only be produced by 
direct sight or hearing of the event, or its near aftermath. The aetiological event 
was all important. From this it followed that mere fear or grief, ‘mere mental 
distress’, however much it produced the symptoms of a psychiatric disorder, was 
not sufficient to recover. It was a vital and contentious distinction (discussed 
below). In fact, this case became a cause celèbre, a cause of outrage among the 
general public and some legal experts, who argued that these limits to recovery 
were arbitrary and imposed by policy quite against the dictates of natural 
justice.147 One academic even went as far as arguing that nervous shock as a part 
of tort law should be abolished altogether, because it had fallen into such 
disrepute (Stapleton, 1994, p. 87).148 
 
Walker v Northumberland County Council [1996] Queens Bench Division 2149 
was something of an exception to the usual cases and not obeying the shock 
                                                                                                                                                 
definition of a traumatic stressor as 'being outside the range of usual human experience was 
“vague and unreliable” '. Young, A. (1995) The Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
147 This view is put forward most forcefully by N J Mullany and P R Handford in their seminal 
book on this subject, Tort Liability for Psychiatric Damage (1993 and further in its second 
edition Handford, P. R. (2006) Mullany and Handford's Tort Liability for Psychiatric Damage 
(2nd edn). Sidney: Thompson Lawbook Co.. 
148See Dr J Stapleton, 'In Restraint of Tort' in P. Birks (ed.), The Frontiers of Liability (1994) vol 
2, pp 94-6, who describes the law relating to liability for psychiatric illness as 'the area where the 
silliest rules now exist and where criticism is almost universal'. 
149 [1995] 1 All ER 737. 
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requirements. A social work manager ‘brought down by the impact of the work 
on his personality’ was allowed to claim for ‘stress at work’. The other major 
cases in this field centred, as discussed above, round the question of how tightly 
these limiting conditions to recovery could be drawn. In Page v Smith [1996] 
House of Lords 155, a plaintiff claimed for damages for psychiatric illness 
resulting from a car crash in which he was involved but physically uninjured, 
although his existing chronic fatigue syndrome was exacerbated. His appeal was 
allowed by means of a newly drawn distinction between primary and secondary 
victims. Primary victims were those at risk of physical injury; secondary 
victims, those merely close in time place and relationship to those physically 
endangered. For primary victims, of whom Page was one, the foreseeability of 
physical injury was held to be a sufficient condition for claiming for psychiatric 
injury on grounds of a duty of care. Both physical and psychiatric injuries are 
personal injuries and not ‘different kinds of damage’. So the requirement of the 
foreseeability of psychiatric injury, of ‘reasonable fortitude’ (which Page’s claim 
would not have met) were dropped for primary victims. By the same token, in 
the case of secondary victims, the need for ‘control mechanisms’ as they were 
then called, was clearly recognised and asserted. These limits were again 
confirmed when in White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1998] the House 
of Lords reversed the findings of Frost (1997). This had allowed police and 
rescuers in the aftermath of Hillsborough to claim, although the families of 
victims had been denied damages in Alcock. It was ruled in White that rescuers 
are not a special case of secondary victim and that the restrictions on the claims 
of these secondary claimants should apply on the grounds of distributive equity. 
The claims of natural justice (always a flexible concept) were, it seems, subtly 
rewritten here. No longer did they dictate arguments for meeting the claims of 
secondary victims, however pressing. Distributional equity dictated confining 
these claims to an absolute minimum, otherwise any lines drawn further out 
would seem arbitrary and unfair. 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
 
In 1861, Lord Wensleydale in Lynch v Knight. [1861] 9 HLC 577 590, described 
mental pain or anxiety as ‘something which the law does not value and does not 
pretend to redress’. One hundred and twenty years later, in his authoritative 
Casebook on Torts 7th Edn. (1992) p 88, Weir gives the following account of 
nervous shock, in which he almost agrees: 
 
There is … no doubt that the public … draws a distinction between the 
neurotic and the cripple, between the man who loses his concentration and 
the man who loses his leg. It is widely felt that being frightened is less than 
being struck, that trauma to the mind is less than lesion to the body. Many 
people would consequently say that the duty to avoid injuring strangers is 
greater than the duty not to upset them. The law has reflected this distinction 
as one would expect, not only by refusing damages for grief altogether, but 
by granting recovery for other psychical harm only late and grudgingly, and 
then only in very clear cases. In tort, clear means close – close to the victim, 
close to the accident, close to the defendant. 
 
This is an ex post comment from a historian of ‘Black Letter Law’, for whom 
there is a distinction between observable physical harm to property or body and 
‘mere mental distress’ or ‘psychical’ harm. Not only is this distinction clear, it is 
supported by public opinion which embodies a natural hierarchy of importance 
for these two harms, physical injury and ‘being upset.’ The late and grudging 
allowance of claims for psychic harm are seen as the exception which generally 
proves the rule; that you can claim for the first but not the second. This may be 
an accurate summary of where this particular section of the law of tort ended up 
by the turn of the century. But, it is argued here, it does not reflect the moral 
reasoning of the appeal court judges, whose dicta and decisions formed the 
concept of nervous shock and its ambivalent history over the whole of the 20th 
century. 
 
As already suggested, there are at least four major interdependent themes which 
can be read into the discourse of the Appeal Court judges, which naturally 
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changed over this time – though, perhaps, not as much as might be expected. 
The first two themes feature strongly in the report of the Law Commission on 
psychiatric illness, published well after the Hillsborough disaster.150 In fact, the 
Commission seems haunted by two major sources of anxiety, mentioned on 
nearly every page. The first is, predictably enough, the old fear of the opening of 
‘the floodgates of litigation’, if what counts as a claimable harm is too inclusive. 
The second object of concern, and the potential cause of the first is the relentless 
progress of medical science, particularly after 1980. This second narrative refers 
to events detailed in the last chapter: the profession’s expertise is credible and 
useful in legitimating certain legal moves and the whole notion of psychiatric 
illness is more acceptable, more normal even, and has the weight of 
authenticated academic research behind it. This of course has its downside in 
potentially enlarging the numbers of those claiming for nervous shock; the 
‘floodgates’ threaten to open, because of the expanding knowledge base and 
respectability of psychiatry – a somewhat surprising story given the 
uncomfortable nature of the old relationship between medicine and the law. 
 
The third narrative centers around concepts of natural justice: the judges are 
humane and liberal men – and they are men – determined to show that there is 
no intrinsic reason to distinguish between physical and mental illness. They 
recognise that psychiatric illness can cause as much damage and disruption to 
lives as physical illness – more even! Medical science tells us so. Even mere 
mental distress can have appalling and debilitating effects on people’s lives. 
There is no intrinsic hierarchy in these different forms of harm. This expansive 
narrative was at its widest in the early 1980s, at the time of McCloughlin v. 
O’Brien [1982] but this was also the time when a fourth narrative came into 
play: that of the dictates of policy. It was also clearly recognised by Lord 
Wilberforce151 that, if there was no intrinsic hierarchy of harm, one might have 
to be created as a matter of policy for ‘floodgate’ reasons, as well as natural 
                                                 
150 The Law Commission (1998) Liability for Psychiatric Illness. London: The Law 
Commission. 
151 [1982 2 ALL ER 298 303 per Wilberforce L. J. 
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justice to the defendant. There was much discussion in McCloughlin among 
other judges (notably Lords Scarman, Bridge and Edmund Davies) about 
whether it was the responsibility of the judiciary to include public policy matters 
in their deliberations. The question was whether these are ‘justiciable’ or should 
hold no relevance for legal decisions and are better left to the legislature. Still, 
this case gave a very different account of the ‘control mechanisms’ from that of 
Weir, above. 
 
What we seem to be seeing here is the management of the old legal imperatives 
in a social context in which, as described in the last chapter, mental distress or 
harm has gradually come to be taken more seriously as a genuine affliction, This 
affliction is literally embodied in a branch of medicine rapidly improving its 
scientific credentials. It is an accepted cause for suffering and therefore 
complaint. Further, it is a context in which, in the search for legal as well as 
unofficial solutions to social wrongs, the voice of victims is increasingly heard. 
There is no way in which this is an easy tension to manage. The judges argue at 
length for embracing psychological harm as a cause for damages, talking 
themselves volubly into a position which potentially flies in the face of the 
English public school culture152 in which they were socialised, which devalues 
the emotions, suspects the neurotic and elevates the traditional British virtues of 
fortitude and phlegm. (It is no accident that the first three claimants in landmark 
cases were pregnant women and the fourth a prolific mother.) 
 
And yet what Weir describes is indeed the state of the law of nervous shock at 
this time. The rulings after Hillsborough still outrage a section of public and 
legal opinion, which appeals to natural justice for shocked and bereaved families 
and rescue workers who have suffered since without compensation. So what 
happened? And why did the expansive narrative of the judges in the end become 
so confined? To invoke the floodgates argument and the powerful legal 
                                                 
152 Their are some exceptions to this generalisation. For example, Lord Hoffmann was brought 
up in south Africa. 
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imperative to maintain Weir’s hierarchical distinction between physical and 
mental harm gives only part of the answer. Another part at least must lie in the 
way the judges constructed the notion of psychological or psychiatric illness as a 
certain sort of harm for which damages can be claimed, particularly in the way 
they used what was relevant from medical knowledge and its social status to 
both expand and then contract the category. 
 
This is not to claim causal power or status for an idea, but rather it could be said 
to be permissive, a flexible concept which was functional to the judges in 
arguing the way that legal and organisational imperatives pushed them, as these 
sometimes cancelled out the dictates of natural justice to claimants. It could be 
said that the driver in the case of Dulieu v White took a coach and horses through 
Weir’s clear distinction between physical illness or injury and mental distress. 
What emerged from this case and those subsequent was a mediating concept – 
something between the two, later called psychiatric illness, which fudged the 
distinction and which, variously defined, belonged in either camp, both, or 
neither. The rest of this chapter is about the way that the legal version of a 
psychiatric illness due to traumatic stress, and called nervous shock, is made in 
the discourse of the judges. It describes how this version changes over its 
history, and how it differs from its medical counterpart. The process is viewed 
through its changing boundaries, first, with the concept of physical illness or 
injury, on the one hand, and, second, with mere mental distress on the other. A 
reading of the judgments for both of these distinctions can be divided into the 
three historical phases: 1) the impact phase, 2) the shock phase and 3) the policy 
phase. 
 
The Physical/Psychological Illness Distinction 
 
1) The impact phase 
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In this first phase, the judges predicated this expansive acknowledgement of the 
devastating nature of psychic harm on the indisputable claimability of physical 
harm, where there is a duty of care. They hooked psychic harm to the notion of 
bodily injury – just as bodily harm is hooked to the notion of damage to land and 
property. In their pronouncements, it was, in fact, just another version of 
physical harm and, as such, was clearly distinct from mere mental distress. The 
pronouncements in Dulieu v White & Sons, about ‘fright with consequent 
physical damage’ sounds much like those of the neurologist Page, already 
mentioned in the last chapter, whose work would have been well known in legal 
circles. Fear is inscribed on the nervous system, a trigger of bodily reaction and 
‘gross’ physical symptoms. Phillimore J was of the opinion that ‘a bystander 
may have an action for physical damage, though the medium through which it is 
inflicted is the mind.153 The means of infliction may be mental but the harm is 
physical. As noted, the three claimants in the main cases of the first phase were 
all pregnant women who lost their babies following the shock of a threatening 
incident. 
 
Not surprisingly, there are still puzzles, partly due to the ambiguities of the 
English language, in which expressions like ‘injury’ or ‘abuse’, refer to the act 
as well as its results. For example, Kennedy J plays with the question of whether 
nervous shock which causes serious physical illness, is accompanied by a 
physical injury as well or is itself a physical injury, or whether physical injury is 
merely its consequence: 
 
For my own part, I would not like to assume it would be scientifically true 
that a nervous shock which causes serious bodily illness is not actually 
accompanied by physical injury, although it may be impossible, or at least 
difficult, to detect the injury at the time of the living subject. I should not be 
surprised if the surgeon or the physiologist told us that nervous shock is or 
may be in itself an injurious affection of the physical organism…. 
 
But he decides, anyway, that it does not matter. 
                                                 
153 Dulieu v White & Sons [1901]2 KB 669 682 ALL ER Rep 353 366. 
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Let it be assumed, however, that the physical injury follows the shock … as 
its direct and natural effect. Is there any legal reason for saying that the 
damage is less proximate in the legal sense than damage which arises 
contemporaneously?154 
 
Presumably damage would arise contemporaneously if the shock were the 
physical injury. 
 
Sargeant LJ in Hambrook v Stokes takes up the question of how an event which 
only threatens forceful impact to the body of the plaintiff, but does not produce 
it, could produce a physical injury. This is just, simply, the forceful effect of 
shock on the nervous system – ‘such an immediate threat of impact on the 
plaintiff as to produce physical injury to him, or her, through the nervous 
system’. There seemed to him ‘no magic in actual personal contact. A threatened 
contact producing physical results should be equivalent’ and analogous with a 
threatened battery which may justify damages for assault.  
 
In the case of a threat of imminent danger to a plaintiff resulting in illness 
through nervous shock, there is … as real and direct an interference with the 
personality of the plaintiff as if the illness had been caused by actual 
physical contact with him.155 
 
 
The shock is the assault equivalent. 
 
If Kennedy J had been unsure of the exact position of science in all this, later 
Appeal Court judges had no hesitation in invoking their own versions of it. Lord 
Atkin , in Hambrook v Stokes Bros,156 recalled that there has been a theory ‘that 
damages at Law could not be proved in respect of personal injuries unless there 
were some injury that was called "bodily" or "physical", but which necessarily 
excluded an injury which was only "mental" There could be no doubt at the 
                                                 
154 Ibid 362. 
155 [1924] All ER Rep 110 113. 
156 [1924] All ER Rep 110 114/5. 
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present day that this theory is wrong…. ‘ He suggests that it was based on a 
‘false analogy between the action of negligence and the action of trespass to the 
person, involving some sort of impact to the person’ and ‘a belated psychology 
which falsely removed mental phenomena from the world of physical 
phenomena’. (Is he referring to psycho-analysis?) His stance is supported later 
by Lord Macmillan in Bourhill v Young, who stated firmly that ‘the distinction 
between mental shock and bodily injury was never a scientific one’.157 In short, 
the latter produces gross damage and the former, neurological damage of a much 
finer kind, which may then manifest itself in more or less visible or gross 
physical symptoms. There is no distinction in science. Nervous shock is or 
produces bodily injury. 
 
2) The shock phase 
 
This phase starts after WWII and coincides with a period where psychoanalysis, 
and then other psychological therapies, achieved more of an influence medically 
and culturally in thinking about psychological illnesses or problems. It 
culminates in the case of McLoughlin v O’Brien [1982], which effectively 
establishes the ‘shock principle’, proposed by Hambrook but never really 
decided upon by a landmark caseup to this point, since there was no decision on 
this matter in Bourhill. By 1982, nervous shock has become not a physical 
illness or injury whose origin was a causal event in the form of shock, but a 
‘psychiatric’ one, pure and simple. In the first case Lord Wilberforce states: 
 
Although we continue to use the hallowed expression ‘nervous shock’, 
English law and common understanding, have moved some distance since 
recognition was given to this symptom as a basis for liability. Whatever is 
unknown about the mind-body relationship (and the area of ignorance seems 
to expand with that of knowledge) it is now accepted by medical science that 
recognisable and severe physical damage to the human body and system 
may be caused by the impact, through the senses, of external events on the 
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mind. There may thus be produced what is as an identifiable an illness as 
any that may be caused by direct physical impact.158 
 
But, according to Lord Bridge, another judge in this case, this identifiable illness 
is not a physical one produced by a mental event. It is ‘a psychiatric illness’ – an 
entity in its own right and, by implication, a state of mind, since it may or may 
not have ‘psychosomatic symptoms’.159 The plaintiff is described by Lord 
Wilberforce160 as suffering from ‘severe shock, organic depression and a change 
of personality’. He adds that ‘numerous symptoms of a physiological character 
are said to have been manifested’, but these seem to be symptoms of a 
psychiatric illness as distinct from a physical one. 
 
At this point, although there is still a legal tradition that follows much medicine 
in grounding psychiatric illnesses in the physical – note the attribution of 
‘organic’ depression to the plaintiff, though all the circumstances point to it 
being ‘reactive’ – it is clear that psychiatric illnesses do not need to be ‘physical 
illnesses’ to have claimable status. The plaintiff’s state is claimable by applying 
‘the ordinary criterion of reasonable foreseeability to the facts, with an eye 
enlightened by the progressive awareness of mental illness’.161 As later 
confirmed in Page, psychiatric illnesses are another form of personal injury, 
equal in claimability for primary victims as physical injury – medically a 
different kind of damage, but not legally.162 Even for those in Page called 
secondary victims, later clarified in White as suffering from ‘pure psychiatric 
harm’, the final demise of impact theory establishes that claimants do not need 
the threat of physical injury to themselves to claim. 
 
So the category of psychiatric illness threatens to unhook itself from its pairing 
with physical injury and, as it were, float free. The category of those claiming 
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for psychiatric illness due to shock becomes potentially boundaryless and not 
necessarily contained by the foreseeability criterion. This is one problem, as 
already noted, much discussed in McLoughlin. The other, more pressing 
problem, as this pairing drifts apart, is that the distinction it maintained between 
psychiatric illness and mere mental distress becomes a lot less clear than when 
‘illness’ was physical and ‘distress’ was mental. Although this was not discussed 
in McLoughlin, the horrific circumstances of Hillsborough, which involved so 
many in such distressing experiences, meant that the floodgates really threaten to 
open in this section of tort litigation for the first time. 
 
3) The policy phase 
 
This phase is marked by the reaction to Hillsborough and particularly by Alcock. 
With a reaffirmation of the control mechanisms and the specification of the 
nature of shock as opposed to other causes of psychiatric illness, ‘the shock 
principle’, the language of nerves that characterised the first phase and largely 
disappeared in the second, is back. With the reaffirmation of the shock principle, 
so the language of assault, damage and injury (see Page) becomes 
interchangeable with illness. Psychiatric illness is hooked up to physical illness 
again. Nevertheless, there is notably a subtle change in the argument. In the 
impact phase (1), nervous shock was claimable as a version of physical illness or 
injury, set in a cultural context which more or less took for granted Victorian 
neurology and the discourse of nerves still prevailing in World War I. In this 
policy phase (3), nervous shock becomes a psychiatric illness, whose status to 
claimability is supported by the advance in medical science, freeing itself from 
psychoanalysis and supported by the strong neurological, organic base of 
modern psychiatry. As Lord Lloyd said in Page v Smith:163 
 
In an age when medical knowledge is expanding fast, and psychiatric 
knowledge with it, it would not be sensible to commit the law to a 
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distinction between physical and psychiatric injury, which may already seem 
somewhat artificial, and may soon be altogether outmoded.164 
 
This is confirmed by Lord Goff in White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire 
Police. ‘Psychiatric advances,’ he says, ‘are revealing that psychiatric illnesses 
may have a physical base.’165 
 
Somewhat puzzlingly, the story of the first phase seems to have been turned on 
its head. Having established first that a mental state can mediate physical illness 
and then, by appeal to the progress of psychiatric knowledge, that psychiatric 
illness is a claimable entity in its own right of equal status with physical injury, 
their Lordships next use the relentless progress of medical science to legitimate 
this process by arguing afresh for the grounding this illness in bodily function. 
But it is puzzling only until it is remembered that these shifts track the changing 
relationship of neurology to psychiatry in general, shown, in particular, in the 
history of PTSD. 
 
The Psychiatric Illness/Mental Distress Distinction 
 
If, in managing the boundary between psychiatric and physical illness or injury 
and keeping the two phenomena close together, the progress and reliability of 
psychiatry is continually called upon in one way or another, in the management 
of the boundary between mental distress and illness, it is the inexactness and 
lack of progress of psychiatry which is appealed to. 
 
1) The impact phase 
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 In phase 1, mental distress features prominently in the discourse of the judges as 
‘that which cannot be claimed for’ – rather as sex features in the discourse of 
Victorian England as ‘that which cannot be talked about’.  
 
2) The shock phase 
 
The importance and the difficulty of distinguishing mental distress from 
psychiatric illness gets its first outing in phase 2 in McLoughlin. Lord Bridge, 
again, is acutely aware that his version, at least, of psychiatric illness begins to 
challenge this distinction. 
 
The common law gives no damages for the emotional distress which any 
normal person experiences, when someone he loves is killed or injured. 
Anxiety and depression are normal human emotions. Yet an anxiety neurosis 
or a reactive depression may be a recognisable psychiatric illness, with or 
without psychosomatic symptoms. So the first hurdle which a plaintiff 
claiming damages of the kind in question must surmount is to establish that 
he is suffering, not merely grief, distress or any other normal emotion, but a 
positive psychiatric illness. 166 
 
Here Lord Bridge establishes a normal/abnormal distinction, which on first 
reading seems plain enough. And yet relatives suffering from extreme reactions 
to Hillsborough and diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder, who could, 
presumably, be classed as displaying abnormal behaviour, were refused claims 
on the grounds of the proximity criterion. 
 
3) The policy phase 
 
Further discussion of this distinction in White suggests that this is a problem 
which could run and run, as phase three extends itself. Lord Justice Steyn gives 
this somewhat confusing summary of the position: 
 
                                                 
166 [1982] 2 ALL ER 298 311. 
 165 
There are those who did not suffer any physical injuries but sustained mental 
suffering. For the present purposes this category must be subdivided into 
two groups. First, there are those who suffered from extreme grief. This 
category may include cases where the condition of the sufferer is 
debilitating. Secondly there are those whose suffering amounts to a 
recognisable psychiatric illness. Diagnosing a case as falling within the first 
or the second category is often difficult. The symptoms can be substantially 
similar and equally severe. The difference is a matter of aetiology…. Yet the 
law denies redress in the former case: (see Hinz v Berry [1970]) but compare 
the observation of Thorpe LJ in Vernon v Bosely [1997] that grief, 
constituting pathological grief disorder is a recognisable psychiatric illness 
and is recoverable). Where the line is to be drawn is a matter for expert 
psychiatric evidence…. 167 
 
Or is it? Lord Hoffman, in the same case, casts some doubt on the helpfulness of 
psychiatry in determining this issue: 
 
The courts have developed sufficient confidence in medical expertise to be 
willing to award damages for mental disturbances which manifest 
themselves in bodily symptoms (such as miscarriage) or in a ‘recognised 
psychiatric illness’. The latter is distinguished from shock, fear, anxiety or 
grief, which are regarded as normal consequences of a distressing event and 
for which damages are not awarded. Current medical opinion suggests that 
this may be a somewhat arbitrary distinction; the limits of normal reaction to 
stressful events are wide and debatable, while feelings of terror and grief 
may have as devastating an effect on people’s lives as the ‘pain and 
suffering’ consequent upon physical injury for which damages are regularly 
awarded.168 
 
In the management of this distinction, the success of psychiatry-as-science has 
produced great complications with the proliferation of diagnostic categories 
around the emotions of everyday life, in which distinctions are quantitative 
rather than qualitative and, as Hoffman says, lines drawn may be arbitrary. From 
the point of view of the Lord Justices trying to maintain a tight line between 
psychiatric illness and mental distress, the project of modernising psychiatry, at 
least in terms of its production of unquestionable illness categories, had better be 
seen as less successful after all. The Law Commission report for example refers 
                                                 
167 White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 1 ALL ER 1 32. 
168 ibid [1999] 1 ALL ER 1 40. 
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frequently to DSM definitions of mental disorders and diagnostic categories, but 
quotes the DSM IV document itself as stating categorically that these diagnoses 
have been drawn up for clinical and medical research purposes. This ‘should not 
imply that these conditions meet legal or other non-medical criteria for what 
constitutes mental disorder’169. 
 
The Normal/Abnormal Distinction 
 
So, somewhat surprisingly, given their celebration of psychiatric advances, there 
seems to be a legal consensus that psychiatrists cannot be called upon to manage 
the distinction between the normal and the abnormal in this branch of litigation. 
There is a legal category called psychiatric disorder organised around the notion 
of claimability. Mental distress is excluded by definition, as not being a 
psychiatric diagnosis and second any claims for excessive or abnormal distress, 
which might otherwise attract a diagnosis, are not reasonably foreseeable, as the 
defendant is entitled to expect a normal standard of susceptibility in the plaintiff. 
Now, it might be thought that psychiatrists whose distinction between normality 
and pathology and views on aetiology are, in modern medicine, supposed at least 
to be strictly statistical, might supply the best evidence to a judge ‘as to the 
degree of probability that a particular cause would have a particular effect’ (Lord 
Bridge).170 But what is reasonable in legal discourse appears not to be that of 
science, presumably based on statistics, fact, ex post, and the laws of logic and 
inference. There is almost instant slippage in legal ‘rationality’ talk from what is 
reasonable to what is average or customary or even just intuitively obvious. The 
                                                 
169 ‘DSM-IV itself specifically cautions that it was developed for clinical, educational and 
research purposes and in many cases the clinical diagnosis of a DSM-IV disorders not sufficient 
to establish the existence of a mental disorder for legal purposes, because of the imperfect fit 
between the questions of ultimate concern to the law and the information contained in a clinical 
diagnosis. Furthermore, it states that it includes, for research and clinical purposes, diagnostic 
categories such as pathological gambling and paedophilia, but that this should not imply that 
these conditions meet legal or other non-medical criteria for what constitutes mental disorder. 
The clinical and scientific considerations involved in the categorisation of these conditions as 
mental disorders may not be relevant to legal judgments which take into account such issues as 
individual responsibility, level of disability and competency’ The Law Commission (1998) 
Liability for Psychiatric Illness. London: The Law Commission. 52. 
170 McLoughlin v O’Brian [1982] 2 ALL ER 298 312. 
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legal distinction between the normal and the abnormal is normative and ex ante. 
In considering reasonable foreseeability, ‘the route usually taken and the route to 
be preferred,’ according to Lord Bridge, is that the Judge,  
 
Relying on his own opinion of the operation of cause and effect in 
psychiatric medicine, as fairly representative of that of the average layman, 
should treat himself as the reasonable man and form his own view from the 
primary facts as to whether the proven chain of cause and effect was 
reasonably foreseeable.171  
 
In other words, the legal distinction between mental illness, which is 
pathological, and mental distress, which is normal, is based on what a group of 
highly educated upper class men think that the man on the Clapham omnibus 
would think would be the medical view of the likely aetiology of certain 
behaviours and the degree of their pathology. 
 
So a view of the legal construction of psychiatric illness which is a slightly 
strange one from a lay or medical point of view emerges. There is a hint of 
paradox about the way certain cases are described in the Law Reviews. In 
Hunter v The British Coal Corporation and Another,172 for instance, the plaintiff 
suffered ‘nervous shock and depression’ from hearing of a friend’s death in an 
accident that happened at about thirty yards’ distance from him. His claim, as a 
secondary victim, was not allowed, because his illness was ‘an abnormal 
reaction to the news of [his friend’s] death, triggered off by an irrational feeling 
of responsibility and not a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s breach of 
a duty of care.’ It is as if the foreseeability criterion constructs a legal version of 
mental illness in which only the normal can be held to be mad and the abnormal 
must be held to be sane. Of course, once traumatic time is introduced here then 
the paradox unravels. It is the aetiological event which is crucial, as Lord Steyn, 
already quoted in White, averred. The legal notion of mental illness here 
constructed depends crucially not just on the reaction to the event attracting a 
                                                 
171 Ibid. 
172 [1998] 2 ALL ER 97. 
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psychiatric diagnosis, but on which psychiatric diagnosis, and attracting the right 
sort of diagnosis depends on the aetiological event itself being horrific in a way 
which is beyond everyday experience. So, psychiatric illnesses such as 
depression and anxiety, which are abnormal extensions of mental distress, are 
pathological reactions to everyday events such as losing loved ones, seeing 
gruesome accidents and dead bodies strewn about the place, which those of 
‘customary phlegm’ take in their stride. In other words, they are abnormal 
reactions to normal events. The psychiatric illness of PTSD, on the other hand, 
is a normal reaction to extremely abnormal events and the quality which defines 
the abnormality of this event is what it produces in the way of shock. 
 
Shock 
 
Brennan J in Jaench v Coffrey [1984],173 quoted by Lord Ackner in Alcock v 
Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992]174 defines ‘shock’ as ‘the 
sudden sensory perception – that is by hearing or seeing or touching – of a 
person, thing or event, which is so distressing that the perception of the 
phenomenon affronts or insults the plaintiffs mind and causes a recognisable 
psychiatric illness’. This definition suggests that shock, in legal discourse, is, 
literally, the relationship of three factors: (1) a uniquely horrifying event, (2) its 
proximate, immediate and therefore forceful perception and (3) its consequent 
effect on the plaintiff’s health and functioning – and any or all of these three. All 
are features in the legal usage of this very slippery concept. Shock (1) an event, 
appears in the Law Commission Report (1998)175 as ‘a sudden occurrence’, or, 
according to Judge White, as ‘effectively one event.’176 Shock (2) is a 
perception, and, according to Ackner LJ in Alcock,177 ‘the sudden apprehension 
by sight or sound of a horrifying event which violently agitates the mind,’ which 
is in turn the trigger to a neurological reaction. Or it is ‘a sudden assault on the 
                                                 
173 Jaench v Coffrey (1984) 155CLR 549 587. 
174 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (1992) 1 AC 310. 401. per Lord Ackner. 
175 Report of the Law Commission: Liability for Psychiatric Illness (1997) p.35, note 177. 
176 Tredget v Bexley Health Authority [1994] 5 Med LR 178 (CC) per Judge White. 
177 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310, 401. 
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nervous system’ (Keith LJ in Alcock)178 which produces shock (3), a ‘shock 
induced injury,’179 ‘a shock induced psychiatric illness’180 or ‘nervous shock.’ 
 
It is the nature of definition (2), or shock as a perception, which remains 
problematic in these pronouncements. A perception is usually thought of as a 
mental event, a cognitive process which may trigger an emotional one. But a 
shock or a fright can be and is, also, thought of as operating at an emotional 
level only – an instinct; our flight/freeze/fight responses programmed by our 
phylogenetic inheritance. We see the opinion that the neurological reaction to a 
horrific event is not necessarily mediated by any particular thoughts discussed in 
Bourhill, where the plaintiff ‘came over a pack of nerves’. Unlike grief ,which is 
always described as ‘a mental state’, and relies by definition on certain 
subjective and therefore incorrigible thoughts (Scarry, 1985), shock is a word 
that slips around. Some of its connotations are of physical forces like electricity, 
reminiscent of Freud’s early physiological explanations of ‘trauma’. It is the 
logic of the control mechanisms established in Alcock that shock (2) does not 
need to be verified by any thoughts stated by the plaintiff, but by its mechanical 
processes or effects. It could be subjected to the same criticism that Freud’s 
theory received from the psycho-analytic community, that the essence of 
nervous shock lies not in how the event is perceived in terms of its meaning to 
the plaintiff, but in how, in the sense of by what means, the plaintiff apprehends 
it: the suddenness, the forcefulness, the violence of the agitation, that is only 
produced by a physically proximate experience. This is emphasised, in 
particular, by the judgment in Alcock that words and images were not 
sufficiently forceful to convey the full horror of an experience recoverably 
shocking. In other words, their Lordships seem to be talking about shock and its 
effect on the individual organism not as an information processing model, but 
rather some model of physical forces, ‘commotional as well as emotional shock’ 
                                                 
178 Ibid, 398. 
179 Young v Charles Church (Southern) Ltd, The Times 1 May 1997; Transcript No QBENF 
96/0920/C at p add page number. 
180 Hegarty v EE Caledonia Ltd, [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 259, 266 per Lord Brooke. 
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and those palpable shock waves, unknown to physics, yet the cause of shell 
shock in World War I. 
 
In this discourse, not only does ‘the nervous system’ stand proxy for the 
complex interaction between mind and body in a way which is no more worked 
out than in the time of Rivers and Freud, but this branch of the law has travelled 
even less far than the psychiatric profession away from ‘Railway Spine’. It is not 
quite back with Dulieu v White & Sons, where their lordships barely held the 
claimability of psychological illness caused by fear of impact on the person. But 
it has reproduced the opinion of the neurologist, Page, in which fear is the 
impact.181  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
  
It has been argued here that the internal wound or trauma, constructed by the 
discourse of the Appeal Court judges in processing claims for compensation for 
psychiatric illness in the area of nervous shock in English tort law, is, at the end 
of the 20th century, much as it was at the beginning. And thus, it is suggested, a 
traditional form of legal dualism182 has been maintained. This has been achieved 
not only by an insistence on a physical location for the wound and its symptoms, 
but by the visceral unmediated nature of the shock administered by the 
aetiological event, arising from the tight definition of the ‘forseeability criteria’, 
                                                 
181 This has interesting parallels with the crime of Psychic Assault. Discussion of Clause 4 of 
The Offences Against the Person Bill, which proposed a definition of assault in the following 
terms:  
“a person is guilty of assault if – 
a) he intentionally or recklessly applies force to or causes impact on the body of another ... or …  
b) he intentionally or recklessly, without the consent of the other, causes the other to believe that 
any such force or impact is imminent. 
In a discussion of this legislation, Jeremy Horder proposes that it is not the belief per se that 
constitutes the assault but the fear which goes with the belief. That is, that the crime of assault is 
the production of an affective rather than cognitive state. Horder, J. (1998 ) Reconsidering 
Psychic Assault. Criminal Law Review, June, 392 - 403. 
182 As opposed to a psychodynamic dualism in which the emotions move from the body to the 
inner life of an individual.  
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which determine a duty of care for the plaintiff. First, the Appeal Court judges 
have been very much less open than the psychiatric profession to any 
consideration of the psychological mechanisms underlying the sustaining of an 
invisible wound. Not seen by the naked eye, it lies in the microcosmic level of 
the neurological system, which is visible in principle. Second, since mind or 
mental states are more or less eliminated from the symptoms and their cause, 
there is no taint of mental abnormality or weakness; this wound is only to be 
reasonably expected even in someone of normal or ‘customary phlegm’, given 
the enormity of the fear and shock which are its cause. Third, the policy 
conditions dictate that this shock is mechanical; it involves such proximity to its 
source for the plaintiff’ as would be necessary for the infliction of an assault by 
physical forces. The wound produced by the judges is as near to an observable 
physical wound as possible, without actually being one, and the causal assault, 
in the experience of the body assailed and the consequences it bears, as much 
like a physical assault as possible without actually being one.  
 
It is also argued that this is somewhat different from the position of psychiatrists 
in relation to administering the diagnosis of PTSD. It has been suggested that the 
law and psychiatry shared three philosophically problematic areas, at least in this 
area of case law: first, the relationship between mind and brain or the 
psychological versus the neurological strand; second, the ‘normality’ of 
psychiatric disorder, and third, what was to count as an aetiological or causal 
event in the environmental induction of this condition. It has also been shown 
that the advance of medical science was accorded a significant influence in the 
development of this area of tort law. However, the diagnosis it developed offers 
a far more inclusive category than that of nervous shock in legal terms. Despite 
the rise and rise of the bio-medical sciences in the 20th century and a positivist 
science of psychiatry which has all but taken over from the more psychoanalytic 
approaches of the mid-century, the psychological strand in the history of PTSD 
still exists, even if in much attenuated form. The contradictions and criticism 
around PTSD are managed within the profession and even add to the impressive 
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size of its body of literature. If the internal locus of the wound in PTSD is 
ambiguous or shifting, the causal happening that the diagnosis of PTSD allows 
is also now far more subjective. The definition allows thoughts as well as bodily 
instincts in the apprehension of events; it leaves little holes through which 
cultural meaning and interpretations, new forms of relationships and 
informational media can seep. Fear is not just a bodily assault. This difference in 
the way the two professions solved these problems seems closely related to the 
divergent organisational imperatives and social conditions to which the two 
disciplines were subjected over the course of a century.  
 
Postscript 
 
I have been discussing two very different socially produced versions of 
psychological harm and nothing points up the effects of social pressures on their 
organisational form more than their continued divergence since the millennium. 
Whilst there have been no new landmark cases in the area of nervous shock in 
English tort law, and the criticisms over the Hillsborough related findings are 
still being voiced, the use of the diagnosis of PTSD continues to grow in clinical 
practice in both psychiatry and psychology and in psychiatric epidemiology. It is 
particularly here, in this last site, that new forms and subtypes are continually 
being thrown up, as academics do not, it seems, feel the need to adhere to the 
DSM manual for the identification of what they are studying. For instance, 
already, by the turn of the century, there were the beginnings of a raft of work on 
‘partial PTSD’ – a subtype of the diagnostic category, where not all the 
symptoms are present, but is deemed to be equally debilitating and potentially 
claimable for US health insurance purposes (Stein, 1997) cited in (Young, 
forthcoming).  
 
Initially, these epidemiological studies were concentrated on Vietnam and Gulf 
War veterans and sexually abused respondents, but, by the end of 2001, history 
had provided a whole new set of research subjects at the epicentre of an event of 
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truly mammoth and unpredictable proportions. There was no happening in the 
history of the USA which had more potential as an aetiological event for PTSD 
than the bombing of the Twin Towers in September 2001. The US Authorities 
moved to protect the privacy of anyone actually involved, personally or through 
close relationship, with the fallout of the attack. Thus the PTSD researchers, 
who seemed determined not to lose the opportunity provided by this unique 
event to measure its effects on the nation’s psyche (Behrens et al, 2007; Yehuda 
et al, 2005; cited in Young, forthcoming), turned to those millions of Americans 
who had watched the events, repeatedly, on television. Their symptoms, of 
which there were many, were identified in telephone interviews (rather than the 
clinic) and formulated into the epidemiological category of ‘Virtual PTSD’ – 
PTSD at a distance, in which the criteria of ‘confrontation’ defining the 
relationship of the patient with the aetiological event seem to have been relaxed 
out of sight. Certainly, it would not have been recognised by the uncompensated 
claimants of the Hillsborough disaster, for whom harm from repeated televisual 
images of a disaster to strangers violated all the legal conditions of ‘closeness’. 
In this new disaster, television images of collapsing twin towers were deemed, 
epidemiologically at least, to be an assault equivalent. Although found to be 
individually ‘dose related’ (Ahern et al, 2004), they could also be seen as 
producing symptoms en masse, as the discourse turned from individual 
psychiatric illness to the reaction of a nation to the threat of international terror, 
and the containment of a mass expression of ontological insecurity – the 
collective wound discussed in Chapter 1. As Young concludes, the production of 
this new virtual version of PTSD was not just ‘bracket creep’, but an example of 
how new social circumstances, breeding different purposes and practices, may 
give rise to different and quite ‘new forms of life’ (Young, forthcoming: 10,11) 
and to different and quite new versions of invisible wounds and their causes and 
consequences.  
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                                                CHAPTER 4: 
THE EMOTIONAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN: 
A CONCEPT’S CAREER 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Overview 
 
In the last two chapters about the medical and legal versions of psychiatric 
illness due to traumatic stress, I looked at the way the fundamental problems 
endemic to notions of environmental harm to the psyche (its varying location, 
normality and cause) were managed in these two different regimes of truth. 
Also, the notion of ‘bracket creep’ was introduced and the idea that categories 
may bifurcate, or throw up new and divergent forms. This chapter and the next 
on the emotional abuse of children are about a social problem category, which is 
in some ways similar to the medical and the legal versions of post-traumatic 
shock, in that it, too, comprises three distinct forms of life: the medical/clinical, 
the medical/statistical and the administrative/legal. There are two differences 
here, however. The first is that, in these chapters, medicine takes the form of 
child welfare and paediatric knowledge, as well as psychiatry, and, in terms of 
the legal, court room action gives way to the workings of a statutorily 
constituted administrative system for Child Protection.183 The second difference 
is that PTSD and nervous shock are the products of two separate regimes of 
truth, which existed side by side over the 20th century. In contrast, the medical 
and the administrative versions of emotional abuse arose almost simultaneously 
                                                 
183 A study of the legal processing of cases in the English Family Courts, where emotional abuse 
has been registered, was beyond the scope of this thesis. It would involve extensive interviewing 
and preferably some ethnography. Meanwhile there is little UK research to call on and the 
DOH/DfES statistics on care proceedings and numbers in care do not relate to registration 
categories. 
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and formed a single, hybrid version, which expanded by ‘bracket creep’, until a 
statistical form broke off to make a life of its own. The clinical and 
administrative forms are still closely tied, however, causing tensions and 
confusions within the Child Protection system, where they are found. 
 
Conceptually, whilst the idea of traumatic stress is rather simple, albeit complex 
in its elaboration and development, even the idea of emotional abuse is very 
complicated. To start with, unlike PTSD, where the injury inheres in the victim, 
there is the obvious ambiguity that this form of abuse can refer to a destructive 
act, the cause of an invisible wound, as well as the wound itself. In PTSD, the 
diffuse, non-specific symptoms of a wound are tied by diagnosis to a one-off, 
dramatic and supposedly incontrovertible cause. But in the case of emotional 
abuse, the cause itself is non-specific: first, the wound’s cause is not just a single 
one off ‘event’ of major proportions; it may be an accumulation of smaller 
negative events over a whole life. Second, these events, these hurtful actions or 
words, may be of different types, whose number varies with the inclusiveness of 
the definition. In a word, the cause may be multidimensional. Further, the 
concept can be said to describe an intimate human relationship. This implies 
that, as a relationship, it may defy the metaphor of the wound, which is one-
sided, intransitive, characterised by the wounder, the weapon and the wounded 
in a rigid pattern. With emotional abuse, the wound’s cause, the wounder’s 
behaviour, as well as its effects, may be developmental, ontogenetic, part of an 
interpersonal or systemic process in which identities are created over time.  
 
Even if this lack of specificity of either symptoms or cause is a problem in 
describing and locating this version of the invisible wound, the requirements of 
the administrative and legal system which is Child Protection still demands a 
positive identification of the source of a child’s distress or deviance. And this 
difficulty is not solved by any direct access to an emotional interior. It is not that 
psychoanalytic explorers have laid repressed memory there, as in the dilemmas 
of PTSD, or that a social context is unsympathetic to disclosure, or that language 
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itself is insufficient because the words of the powerful cannot encapsulate the 
horror of the oppressed, as discussed in Chapter 1. This wounded inner life is 
that of a child and has been formed over time by abusive circumstance, so that, 
even if the language is available, there is nothing to say. The ‘abuse’ cannot be 
recognised by a victim, who has known no other life. So, in terms of the three 
major considerations that dog the idea of environmental harm (its location, 
normalcy and cause), questions about the wound’s location in some 
psychological, analytic or neuro-physiological interior are hardly asked. The 
academic and professional literature does not contain much complex theorisation 
of an inner life; indeed, the harm is defined by its obvious differences from 
visible bodily harm of child physical abuse or the visible or narratable trauma of 
sexual abuse. Its nature is assumed rather than explored. Whilst this invisible 
wound is located in increasing numbers of children by the Child Protection 
process, it is only in the statistical work of psy academics that some version is 
accessed and measured – in representative samples of adults by retrospective 
questionnaire.  
 
Also, questions about the ‘normality’ of the symptoms of emotional abuse, so 
important in the last two chapters, are put in the background. Emotional abuse is 
not seen as a pathology in itself; it does not feature in any official medical 
diagnostic system – as do the other forms of child abuse.184 The focus of the 
emotional abuse literature appears to be the third problematic: the relationship 
between the wound’s cause and its effects, mostly long term and developmental. 
This is either discussed statistically, as described in the second part of this 
chapter, or it is looked at in terms of the definition and application of the 
category in a welfare system, which is the product and basis of medical and 
administrative action, as described in the following chapter. Thus it is the 
specification of emotional abuse and how it has changed over time and context 
that forms the subject matter of these two chapters. As ever, the inclusiveness of 
this invisible wound category and the space it occupies depends, tautologically, 
                                                 
184 Both Physical and Sexual Abuse are diagnostic categories in DSM IV.  
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on the varying set of hypothesised dimensions of what is claimed to constitute 
causal, emotionally abusive acts. 
 
The Shifting Terrain 
 
Emotional abuse is an expanding category in everyday language as well as in the 
administrative discourse of the Child Protection system, through which the 
predicament of UK children is policed. It features increasingly in accounts of 
unhappiness in adult relationships, also, and the attributions of blame that are 
made. As in the forward to Chapter 1, it is part of a growing self- help literature 
and of the obsessive unpacking of remembered family life so popular in the 
media. It draws on an old moral language of unkindness, loss and pain in the 
iconography of the broken heart, a sort of cruelty behind closed doors. But it 
also invokes a more technical public discourse: the medical notion of a wound as 
psychic trauma, the welfarist notion of emotional needs and the quasi-legal 
language of rights and responsibilities. All these are impacted in a concept 
which, through the pervasive influence of a radical identity politics, has become 
primarily political. To claim that one has been emotionally abused is to invoke 
the concern and recognition of others. It is to become part of a great community 
of victims who feel each other’s pain. And it is to be legislated a plan of action; 
not just private revenge or assertiveness, but a programme of combat and 
survival in the great socially sanctioned battle for the unimpeded burgeoning of 
the self. 
 
And if the wider concept of emotional abuse in general has become part of the 
‘moral fabric’ of our society and of a well-developed commonsense language of 
psychic hurt which can be used by both adults and children alike, it was the 
growth trajectory of the narrower social problem category of emotional abuse as 
a risk to children that propelled it into this position and still gives it meaning. 
This chapter and the next concentrate on the history of this narrower concept as 
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it emerged as a separate entity from the much more widely discussed, official 
category of child abuse in general. 
 
Child abuse in the USA and the UK has been an ever expanding, fragmenting 
and transforming category from the early 1960s onwards. It named a 
phenomenon which was cast as one of the major social problems of our time, 
whose wide, detailed and emotive coverage by the media, professional and 
campaigning groups was characterised by Hacking in 1995 as ‘the most 
important piece of consciousness raising in the past three decades’ (Hacking, 
1995b: 66). This was a campaign that hit a nerve. It was about children, whose 
iconic potency in our culture has not changed since the 19th century. It was also 
part of an expanding discourse about individual rights and their endangerment 
(Douglas, 1992), in which the diptych of child villain and child victim was much 
invoked. It is claimed that over the last half of the 20th century, Western societies 
have come to view the world no longer through the rose coloured spectacles of 
progress and utility, but through a complex calculus of risk (Beck, 1992), to the 
management of which the law may no longer be central (Luhmann, 1993). The 
safety of children has become a particular preoccupation in this ‘risk society’.  
 
The emotional abuse of children is a special case of this abuse phenomenon – 
intriguing, as a problem category, because something of an exception. Unlike the 
other forms of child abuse, emotional abuse has not been the subject of major 
displays of public outrage and, presumably for this reason, has not been on any 
public political agenda, either here or in the USA. It was as physical abuse that 
child abuse first burst upon the world in Denver, Colorado, USA, as a serious 
and dramatic social problem, ‘an issue leader’ (Nelson, 1984). It was as a 
medical category, more precisely a phenomenon of paediatric radiology; ‘The 
Battered Baby Syndrome’, (Kempe, et al, 1962) in which the media assisted 
with a recital of horrors and the visual presentations of the wounding and 
emaciation of the frail, small bodies of children. It was later, during the 1980s, 
after ten years of feminist campaigning and mounting public scandals about 
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incest, that child abuse became synonymous with sexual assault (Hacking, 
1999). As such, it was cast less as a diagnostic, more as a forensic phenomenon; 
the thrust of professional activity became more a matter of investigation of 
criminal adults, in which medical evidence became secondary to the child’s own 
story as the main evidence (Parton, 1991). Either way, the newsworthy and 
publicly revealed aspect of child abuse was, and is, that of assault on a child’s 
body; the symptoms of a syndrome, the physical evidence of molestation or the 
narratives of survivors. The category of emotional abuse, in contrast, is a cruelty 
which does not touch the body – a ‘non-physical variation’ (Hacking, 1999: 
138) – and, it seems, cannot be encapsulated in a child’s narrative. It emerged 
without public notice, almost as an afterthought to the medical and feminist 
furore – appropriately voiceless and invisible.  
 
Yet the use of this voiceless and invisible category has grown enormously – 
albeit silently and out of the public gaze. Although it would be possible to trace 
its multiple genealogies from child welfare, psychiatry, trauma studies and the 
law, emotional abuse entered statutory language in the UK as a narrow, small 
administrative and legal category under which children are registered by their 
Local Authority Personal Social Services Department (LASSD) as likely to 
suffer harm from a caretaker, unless some remedial action is taken. It was 
slipped, unpublicised, into official usage by a Department of Health and Social 
Services (DHSS) amendment to statutory guidance to the Local Authorities in 
1980 (DHSS, 1980), lagging similar additions to Child Abuse Reporting Laws in 
the USA by a few years (Nelson,1984). Initially, it was not much used as a 
registration category, with only 4% of the total until the early 1990s, when it 
increased rapidly to 14% (DOH, 1999). It is now running at over 23%, a much 
larger percentage than child sexual abuse (CSA) at 7% of the total and, in 2003, 
overtaking even the category of child physical abuse (CPA) (DfES, 2003).185  
 
                                                 
185 Only the other 'hard to define' category of neglect has shown similar growth. 
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Though its official definition (DHSS, 1980) has not much changed, the category 
has clearly become a great deal more inclusive. What is more, there are 
increasing claims by therapeutic and welfare professionals that, despite the 
tendency of the medical and legal professions to somatise psychic hurt, all forms 
of abuse, physical and sexual assault, as well as harsh and threatening words, are 
inscribed, not just on the body, but more deeply and lastingly on the soul itself, 
or some modern version called ‘identity’ (Glaser, et al, 1997; Iwaniec, 1995, for 
example). In the case of voiceless children, this inscription cannot be spoken and 
is recognised by disordered behaviour and developmental delay.  
 
The growth of this category’s application and its changing place within an 
official taxonomy of harm can be seen as part of a cultural shift or social change 
within the Child Protection arena or the field of child welfare, reflecting all the 
other contexts in which the gaze of professionals has gradually turned inwards 
and psychic trauma or emotional harm have become a popular currency. Here, I 
am not going to endow a discursive shift with causal status, however, but rather 
concentrate on the story of the emergence of the concept of emotional abuse. 
This is partly in the work of academics who have presented this category of 
abuse as underused, under researched and underestimated in its prevalence and 
damaging consequences and partly in the working out of child welfare policies 
at governmental level and in the inter-professional politics of the Child 
Protection system. 
 
The tensions here should not be underestimated. This is a multiprofessional 
system which comprises statutory, administrative, therapeutic and legal activity. 
Emotional abuse, like other forms of child abuse, is the object of specialist, 
professional and/or ‘scientific,’ as opposed to lay knowledges. Decision taking 
in this area is accomplished within a dense discursive context, which includes 
the complex interplay of different organisational interests and practices. For 
instance, as an administrative concept, it is formally, at least, coded in the 
language of risk. As a legal concept under the Children Act, 1989, 
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considerations of child welfare are, in theory, paramount, although the doctrine 
of rights, both parents’ and children’s, tends to dominate practice. However, the 
traditional knowledge of welfare professionalism, which is grounded in 
medicine – paediatric, psychological and psychiatric expertise – is still used to 
treat and, also, to legitimate the legal processing of extreme cases. Moreover, all 
this activity occurs in a context in which the official application of this category, 
as with other forms of abuse, has enormous effects on the lives of the increasing 
numbers of those whose relationship is so classified. This is either directly 
through the power of the state acting through the courts, or within the court’s 
gaze, which does not go uncontested, or, indirectly, through the subtle, recursive 
effects of labeling; the ‘looping back’ through which people are made up 
(Hacking, 1995a); and the ‘iatrogenic’ effects on the behaviour of those who 
have ‘caseness’ thrust upon them. 
 
Chapter Structure 
  
With such a protean context, the space into which this concept emerged was not 
a clearly bounded one, but constantly shifting over time. One can identify 
several, not entirely distinct dimensions to such a genesis – first, developmental: 
gestation, and birth, growth etc to its mature form; second, textual: its different 
locations in a professional or academic literature, in legislation and social praxis; 
and third, spatial: its migration or spread across different sections of society and 
between societies or cultures. There is no room here to take all these dimensions 
separately (let alone all their combinations) and what follows in this chapter and 
the next is an account in three parts only:  
 
The first is a summary of emotional abuse’s gestation and birth up to the end of 
the 1970s, in both the US and UK, where the first can be seen as influencing the 
second (and not just on a ‘post hoc, ergo propter hoc’ basis). In this phase, the 
academic literature, legislation and institutional practice are closely interrelated 
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and organised around a primarily medical/clinical concept, which expanded to 
incorporate social and administrative aspects.  
 
The second section is a description of the US academic literature, which, from 
1980 up to 2003, seems to take on a flourishing life of its own – the product of 
research programmes run from psy university departments, for which any 
definition of the concept of emotional abuse is made for the purposes of 
positivistic research. This is an approach which no longer identifies abuse with a 
‘disease’, as did earlier research (Parton, 1985) but which, with its explicit use of 
a calculus of risk, is more appropriate to modern statistical medicine, 
epidemiology and psychometrics. More important, without the constraint of the 
treatment or administration of clients, these academic psychologists develop a 
technique for locating and measuring invisible wounds, through the direct 
interrogation of adults and their memories of childhood, which are quite 
uncomplicated by fantasy or repression.  
 
The third section, which comprises the whole of Chapter 5, describes and maps 
the more clinical or practice based output of UK writers (1980-2003), which is 
not only professionally based, often in conferences, but for which the definition 
of the category used in the research has been made for the purposes of either 
treatment or administrative intervention. This presents a picture of the uneasy 
relationship between the clinical/welfarist version of emotional abuse and the 
administrative/legal one, to which the UK policy context is vital.  
 
The US research literature also forms a vital prelude to this next UK chapter. 
For, although it contains definitions of emotional abuse made for different, 
statistical purposes, it supplies an important pool of legitimating ‘scientific’ 
knowledge for the claims of the UK protagonists described in Chapter 5. For, 
just as UK administrative and legal developments in Child Protection followed 
closely their US equivalent, it appears that nothing which purports to be 
academically respectable is written on child abuse in the UK without much 
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citing of the US research literature. For these three different forms of the concept 
of emotional abuse: the medical/clinical, the medical/statistical and the 
administrative/legal, which started life as one, still depend on each other, not just 
for legitimation, but also for meaning.  
 
 
I. GESTATION AND BIRTH OF A CONCEPT 1960–1980  
 
The concept of emotional abuse was born on the back of baby battery or 
physical abuse, of which it was seen as a rare variant. What is traced here is the 
gradual expansion of the concept of child abuse from the narrow medical 
category of baby battering to physical abuse as a socio-medical category and one 
which was eventually flexible enough to expand, by ‘bracket creep’, to include 
other forms of abuse and neglect. 
 
The political acceptance of abuse as an ‘issue’ 
 
The social construction or political journey of child battery and non-accidental 
physical injury in the US has been very well documented, particularly by Jan 
Pfohl (Pfohl, 1977), Barbara Nelson (Nelson, 1984) and Ian Hacking (Hacking, 
1999). Nigel Parton has linked this story with the UK politics of Child Abuse 
(Parton, 1985), in particular emphasising the influence in the UK of Henry 
Kempe, author of the original ‘Battered Baby Syndrome’ paper, given to the 
American Association of Paediatrics in 1961 and later published by the 
prestigious American Medical Association (Kempe, et al, 1962). Kempe’s is an 
almost emblematic career in child protection: Director of the National Centre for 
the Investigation and Treatment of Child Abuse and Neglect, in Denver 
Colorado, where he is a paediatrician, founder of the International Society for 
the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect, which ran a series of large 
international congresses for professionals and academics, the first one in Geneva 
in 1976, first editor of the Journal of Child Abuse and Neglect (first edition 
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1977) and co-author, with Ray Helfer, of the child abuse classic, The Battered 
Child, which runs to 5 volumes currently. Both men are described by Anna 
Freud’s collaborator, Solnit, in the Foreword to the third edition, as 
‘international leaders in (the) crusade’ (Solnit in Helfer, et al, 1980: ix). Parton 
sees Kempe and Joan Court (Director of the NSPCC Battered Child Research 
Unit in the UK) as highly influential in the promotion of this concept as a social 
problem category in their respective countries. Certainly, the NSPCC followed 
Kempe’s lead, seeing the issue of abuse as a way of finding a new direction for 
an organisation which was being increasingly sidelined, as the state took on a 
bigger role in child welfare (Parton, 1985). Court and other NSPCC officials 
spent time training with Kempe in the US and the new child abuse treatment 
centre set up by the organisation in London was called Denver House (Parton, 
1985). 
 
Barbara Nelson also emphasises that the efforts of these individuals found a 
favourable ecological niche in the economic and social conditions of 1960s 
America and the UK. Both were prosperous, somewhat concerned with equality, 
favourable to spending on child welfare and beginning to be concerned about 
violence as a social problem. On the other hand, any more conservative 
resistance to spending – and this grew in the mid-seventies after the first world 
oil crisis – was pre-empted by the fact that child physical abuse was a narrow 
tight version of abuse: ‘baby battery’, a medical phenomenon, which was caused 
by individual pathology in parents. The backgrounding, at this time, of any 
social dimension, meant that it was not politically threatening, as, for example, 
talk of neglect might have been at this stage, raising, as it does, the spectre of 
child poverty (Nelson, 1984). US politicians, unmindful of any major resource 
implications, rushed with unprecedented haste to pass reporting legislation for 
the physical abuse of children in all the states of the union by 1968186, seeing 
this as a cheap way of establishing their moral worth before the next election – 
                                                 
186 In the USA the states are responsible for reporting laws which define child abuse and specify 
who is mandated to report it, whether to the courts or to the welfare services, and makes 
provision for the protective custody of children and the prosecution of abusers, if appropriate.  
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their public image much assisted by an intensive media campaign (Nelson, 
1984).  
 
UK politicians were a little less responsive to the campaigning of the NSPCC, 
even though this was supported by the medical establishment (the British 
Medical Association and its journal, the British Medical Journal, the BMJ, for 
example). Joan Court’s prolific writings on physical abuse in various welfare 
journals was not matched by any Local Authority social work writing on the 
same subject187 and, even though the (DHSS) produced its first official 
publication for Local Authority Social Services Departments (LASSDs), called 
‘The Battered Baby’, in 1970 (DHSS, 1970), officials there waited until 1974 
(by which time Joan Court had moved to the DHSS to join them), before 
producing their first official LASSDs guidance, Non Accidental Injury to 
Children (DHSS, 1974a). This was a year after the establishment of a paediatric-
led campaigning group of professionals, called the Tunbridge Wells Study 
Group, at an inaugural conference on non-accidental injury to children.188 It was 
also the year that the Maria Colwell enquiry became a political cause celebre 
(DHSS, 1974b). It was only after this landmark case that child physical abuse 
gained the momentum of public interest in the UK.189  
 
Inter-professional Aspects of Child Abuse  
 
                                                 
187 For a list of Court’s articles see Parton, N. (1985) The Politics of Child Abuse. London: 
Macmillan. Ch 3, Note 50: 213. 
188 See Tunbridge Wells Study Group. & Franklin, A. W. (1973) The Tunbridge Wells Study 
Group on Non-Accidental Injury to Children. London: TWSG. 
189 The Maria Colwell Enquiry took place near the end of 1973 and was the catalyst which 
alerted the British public, via the news media, to the dangers of physical abuse to children and 
the inadequacy of social workers in protecting them. Having been pilloried in the press, it is not 
surprising that in the next year, 1974, the number of Place of Safety Orders taken by LASSDs 
had increased by over 300% over the 1973 level. For an analysis of the issues of this crucial case 
see Nigel Parton’s account of what he calls ‘the catalyst for the rapid emergence of a “moral 
panic”’ Parton, N. (1985) The Politics of Child Abuse. London: Macmillan. Chapter 4: 97.  
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This narrow, tightly defined, medical version of abuse, the serious physical 
injury of babies, which was politically acceptable as a campaigning issue and 
seen as scientifically researchable, had met with a conjuncture of favourable 
circumstances in both countries, which had propelled it into the position of a 
social problem category. Not surprisingly, inter-professional relationships were 
dominated by this concurrent politicisation and medicalisation of child abuse in 
1961 – the defining moment of the period – but this period from 1960 to the 
early 1980s saw a gradual shift from the initial medical dominance of child 
abuse to a stretching of the medical frame to include psychological and social 
variables, and social workers, in the diagnosis and treatment of abuse. As 
administrative systems were set up in both countries designed to act on the 
additions to the law, the interplay of the medical, the legal, the social and the 
psychological , centred around the gradual transformation of a medical into a 
socio-medical phenomenon.  
 
Initially, social explanations of abuse by parents were excluded by the paediatric 
recruitment of psychiatric knowledge. Abusive acts by parents were not seen as 
part of some social or even interactional phenomenon, but as acts mechanically 
produced by a combination of personal, historical and psychiatric predisposing, 
and precipitating factors. The aaetiology was intra-psychic pathology, ‘unmet 
dependency needs’ and the like, rather than social or moral causes. The bid by 
sociologists (Gelles, 1979a; Straus et al, 1981) in the late 1970s for the inclusion 
of socio-economic stress as one of the main factors in the causal story was 
controversial. In an opening address to the influential Second International 
Congress on Child Abuse and Neglect in 1978, Kempe insisted that the high rate 
of abuse in army families, who were nevertheless financially secure, was a 
conclusive counter example (Kempe, 1979: xiii).  
 
What happened after Denver in the USA and Colwell in the UK was a more 
aggressive state intervention in family life, but, also, the gradual widening of the 
definitional frame. The victim category changed to include older children; the 
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effect of the abuse was not just the wound; the longer term sequelae were effects 
on behaviour and development; and the field of development studies burgeoned. 
What started off relating childhood to adult psychopathology began to look at 
childhood development in relation to family environment, though it was not until 
the beginning of the 1980s that the first study relating this development to actual 
abuse in a sample of maltreated children was embarked upon.190  
 
In both post-Denver USA and post-Colwell Britain, administrative reporting 
systems were set up. Statutory responsibility to investigate abuse and to 
intervene in family life lay with the LASSDS in the UK, and with the States’ 
child welfare services in the USA, invoking existing children’s law if necessary. 
For paediatricians wanting to maintain their ownership of this concept, the 
problem was to accommodate to the inevitable multi-professional cooperation it 
would involve. It was not so hard maintaining a hierarchically superior and 
distant relationship with the police and lawyers. In the UK, at least, these were 
relatively low profile in the inter-professional processes of the Child Protection 
System until the run-up to the Children Act, 1989, and the Cleveland crisis.191 
Just as baby battery was seen as affecting a child’s health and wellbeing, rather 
than his legal rights, so the invocation of the law was seen (even by child care 
lawyers, it would seem), as an addition to the main thrust of therapeutic or 
curative intervention. It was the state’s nastiest medicine rather than the final 
weapon in its armoury or punishment for the guilty (Parton, 1985). So the main 
problem for continued medical hegemony in this area was with the question of 
medical accommodation to the social: to both social explanations and social 
workers.  
 
                                                 
190 See Cicchetti, D. & Carlson, V. (1989) Child Maltreatment : Theory and Research on the 
Causes and Consequences of Child Abuse and Neglect. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. This is a summary of the first ten years or so of a longitudinal study of a large 
cohort of abused and non-abused children in up state New York, claiming to pick up the 
considerable developmental consequences of all forms of abuse.  
191 See Chapter 5. 
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While there was a sense in which this category widening was enlarging the 
medical empire, that is, paediatricians embracing the social and psychological 
within their own ambit, the social at least was fighting back. There was a strong 
strand of social work opinion – and social work in the UK, for instance, was at 
its most radical around 1980, at the time of the Barclay Report (Barclay/NISW, 
1982) – which resisted the pathologising medical tendency, as it borrowed its 
individualising explanations from psychiatry and later psychology. Some highly 
critical accounts of the psychological research were published (for example 
Gelles, 1979b). Opposing accounts invoked ‘different childrearing standards’ 
and a ‘culture of poverty’.192 While it was the medical profession, paediatrics 
and child psychiatry, who kept control of the multi-disciplinary committees 
which guided the administration of child abuse procedures, it was health visitors 
and social workers, in their formal investigations of paediatric referrals, and also 
the magistrates courts in their legal handling, who had the power to limit the 
extensiveness of the category of abuse, which was being much more rigorously 
applied from a paediatric point of view (Dingwall et al, 1983). 
 
Though it is not the case that any profession could be said to have achieved 
ownership of the concept of child abuse by 1980, from the point of view of the 
emergence of emotional abuse as a problem category in its own right, this 
emergence could be mapped onto the declining influence of a purely medical 
version of abuse. As will be seen, much of the research work on this concept, 
especially in the States, both on its causes and its consequences, is the product of 
psy statistics. However, it started out, in this period, as more psychiatrically-
based research on the causes of abuse, based on clinical samples. Meanwhile, as 
the local welfare services, in both countries, became involved in child abuse 
administration, it was the influence of social workers, psychodynamically 
trained as the technicians of family life, which set the initial medical and 
psychological understandings of the causes of physical abuse into a complex 
                                                 
192 See Dingwall, R., Eekelaar, J. & Murray, T. (1983) The Protection of Children : State 
Intervention and Family Life. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. for a discussion of what they call 
'cultural relativism'.. 
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web of intra-familial relationships. This was the context in which socio-
economic or purely material circumstances were psychologically or emotionally 
mediated. Gadually, these psychic or emotional factors, rather than the socio-
economic ones, came to dominate accounts of the relational networks. And this 
did not just occur in the causal story, but also in the analyses of consequences – 
professional understandings of how abuse, of any kind, could have such 
profound effects on children.  
 
The Emergence of Emotional Abuse 
 
It could be argued that emotional abuse as a problem category was born into the 
world in 1961 in the slip stream of the concept of baby battering. This social 
problem was like a noisy and showy sibling who grabbed all the attention of the 
world, whilst, silent and invisible, emotional abuse lurked shyly in the nest, 
making only fleeting outings with its siblings. In the literature it gets the odd 
showing, but, since, as Hacking suggests, the concept of child abuse, as it 
emerged then as a social problem category, was physical abuse (Hacking, 1999), 
the idea of emotional abuse, and by the same token, emotional neglect, with its 
psychological qualifier, was still a metaphor – as in the psychic wound – with 
Ryle’s message, ‘not abuse’, ‘not neglect’, attached. 193  
 
Though emotional abuse and neglect may have had metaphorical status, it was 
not the case that professionals, paediatricians, social workers and welfare 
administrators, were unacquainted with talk and writings that mentioned forms 
of abuse other than physical (although there was very little on any form until 
after 1962). They were particularly familiar with the concept of neglect, which 
was an old word in the world of the charitable organisations associated with 
child welfare. Indeed, it was a revived interest in the incidence of and services 
for ‘child abuse and neglect’ by the American Humane Society (the US 
equivalent of the NSPCC in the UK) and their review of this area in 1954, which 
                                                 
193 See the Introduction to this thesis. 
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first caught the interest of the US Children’s Bureau – a Government 
organisation and another institution looking for a role, which, flush with 
research money, then decided to fund the research of Henry Kempe (Nelson, 
1984). In particular, one result of this earlier research was a report by J. Mulford 
of the American Humane Association (Denver Branch, appropriately enough) 
called Emotional Neglect (Mulford, 1958). This was, possibly the first 
publication in the literature of professional child welfare in the USA that 
associated, in its title, some form of an inner life with direct harm from parents, 
be it neglectful or abusive.194 
 
As suggested above, thinking about child abuse, family relationships and 
professional intervention did begin to broaden, over the 1970s, from the narrow 
version of the early days of physical abuse. It is possible to trace ways in which 
the ground is being prepared for the outing of emotional abuse into the world by 
its recognition and adoption as a social problem category in its own right. The 
first way is via the change in how the concept of neglect was applied to families. 
All the other ways are reminiscent of the conceptual pathways in which psychic 
harm or trauma or shell shock in WWI emerged from the fact or notion of 
physical injury or harm (see Chapter 2). The second way, for example, is that of 
communications or events, registered at the level of perception, but affecting 
adversely and observably the state of the body, as in shell shock or nervous 
shock as it was first conceived by Erichsen or Page. No doubt both were 
mediated by some micro-organic processes in the nervous system. In the world 
of child welfare, the homologous condition would be Failure to Thrive in 
infants. The third way construes these mental events or negative acts of 
communication as causes or risk factors for, or in the appropriate medical 
language ‘prodromal’ to physical harm. The fourth states that negative acts of 
communication may be a psychological accompaniment of direct physical harm, 
a) act in concert with it, as in shell shock, or b) amplify it as in surgical shock. 
                                                 
194 There was, however, an earlier, untranslated book, Die Seelische Kindermisshandlung by G. 
V. Levetzow, published in 1934. 
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The long term harm from this combination is considered to be psychic rather 
than physical. Finally, there is the possibility that events at the level of 
perception may cause psychic harm, as in some versions of PTSD, ummediated 
by physical or bodily acts or harms.  
 
Below, the emergence of emotional abuse is related to each of these 
developments in turn, as they are traced in the early days of the child abuse 
literature, legislation and conference speeches – in particular the Second 
International Congress on Child Abuse and Neglect, which took place in London 
in 1978. This was attended by a large set of multinational delegates, claimed by 
its two founders to be 1,000 people from 35 different countries (Helfer et al, 
1980: 431). It seems to have been a key event in the history of early multi-
professional responses to child abuse. Most of the papers were given by 
professionals from the USA or UK and many of the players in the future 
development of emotional abuse in the UK were there, though none giving 
papers on that subject. The conference was introduced by Henry Kempe and 
summarised at the end by Dr Alfred White Franklin, a UK paediatrician and 
leader of the influential Tunbridge Wells Study Group, close to the DHSS 
(Franklin, 1979; Kempe, 1979). 
 
i) Emotional neglect 
Neglect is a significant concept in the long history in child welfare and was 
originally thought of mostly in terms of the physical wellbeing of the child. But, 
by the mid-1970s. it seems to have included, by consensus, some notion of 
emotional as well as physical deprivation. Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis 
describe a history of concern with the emotional life of children, centred in the 
child-psycho-analytic movement, which informed the practices of child 
guidance clinics, even before the Second World War. If in its early stages this 
concern was organised by childhood as the cradle of the adult psyche, after the 
war, the causation was reversed, in the sense that childhood wellbeing was seen 
more as a function of maternal actions, presence and emotional responsiveness. 
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In this socio-biological model of the family, often associated with 
‘Bowlbyism’,195 children were born into this world with a bundle of biological 
needs: for air, water, shelter reassurance and love, all placed in the same 
category and all of which a ‘good enough’ mother would naturally meet. Love 
was what mothers did, not what they communicated (which might be open to 
interpretation). One of the main proponents of the emotional needs of children 
was Mia Kellmer Pringle, a child psychotherapist (Pringle et al, 1975), and 
likewise Vera Falberg, who wrote some influential pamphlets for UK childcare 
practitioners, including some for the British Association of Adoption and 
Fostering in the early 1980s (Fahlberg, 1981a; Fahlberg, 1981b). It was in this 
area of childcare social work that the main concern about children’s emotional 
needs was felt – and still is.  
 
The growth of the fostering and adoption field in childcare was due mostly to a 
shift in the political and economic circumstances in both the US and the UK in 
the early 1970s. Post-war paternalism at its most expansive succumbed to a 
combination of fiscal rectitude and the pro-market ideology of the New Right. 
This meant that welfarist child care policies, whilst retaining the rhetoric, were 
struck both by the resulting need to ration, in the context of other competing 
claims on Local Authority budgets, together with a crusading commitment to 
tackling child physical abuse as a psychological problem of parents, rather than 
a problem of poverty. Particularly in Britain, after the Maria Colwell Inquiry, the 
policy stance of the LASSDs was more interventionist, but also less in favour of 
prevention and more targeted on ‘child rescue’ in cases of abuse. The academic 
and professional literature was, consequently, much more bound up with the 
pros and cons of the state as psychological parent and the question of how a 
child’s ‘attachment’ could be transferred from a natural to a foster parent with 
least damage (Fahlberg, 1981a). It therefore focussed more specifically on the 
emotional as well as the material needs of children. The correlative of this focus 
was a greater interest in cases where these emotional needs were thwarted. 
                                                 
195 See Chapters 6 and 7 of this dissertation. 
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These were cases of emotional neglect, which were no longer seen as ‘not real 
neglect’, but as a bona fide form – just as serious, or more so – than its physical 
equivalent.196  
  
By this time the category of neglect had not only expanded to include emotional 
deprivation, but the neglect of ‘Child Abuse and Neglect’ – the subject, by now, 
of numerous organisations publications and conferences – had acquired a 
somewhat different meaning. It would be fair to say that before 1962, neglect 
was a condition of parents, what they did, or rather failed to do to children. 
These were not acts for which parents would be prosecuted or children removed. 
This was the passive accompaniment of extreme poverty, drunkenness or 
abandonment. It was dealt with by welfare workers, both charitable and 
government social caseworkers, by hopeful support of the mother with material 
goods or psychodynamic casework – a process which Kempe described rather 
disparagingly as the ‘trickle down’ approach to child welfare, in his opening 
speech to the Second International Congress on Child Abuse and Neglect in 
1978 (Kempe, 1979: xi).  
 
By this stage, for Kempe, neglect had become, the effects of neglect, a state of 
deprivation and a medical and treatable condition of the child, an attitude which 
chimed well with the comparatively new rhetoric of children’ rights, which he 
also used. (The next year, 1979, was to be the first International Year of the 
Child). Though neglect had hardly featured in his first volume of the Battered 
Child (Helfer et al, 1968a), which was exclusively about physical injury, as were 
the first round of the reporting laws of all the state legislatures in the US (Helfer 
et al, 1968b: Appendix C :237), by the next volume, published in 1974, Kempe 
was writing of ‘Child Abuse and Neglect’ (Helfer et al, 1974) and neglect had 
made it into the reporting laws of most states, though only one, Kentucky, 
                                                 
196 There is little literature on the subject – an isolated article like Whiting, L. (1976) Defining 
Emotional Neglect: A Community Workshop Looks at Neglected Children. children today, 5, 2-
5. – but Barbara Nelson (Nelson, 1984) notes that following the passing of CAPTA in 1974, 
increasing numbers of children were being taken into custodial protection under the category of 
‘emotional neglect’. 
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mentions ‘emotional neglect’ specifically (Helfer et al, 1974: 212). So neglect 
had become legally actionable and in the 1980 (third) volume of The Battered 
Child there were even two pages attempting to define the concept of emotional 
neglect for lawyers (Cantwell, 1980: 192-194). So emotional neglect as an 
accepted part of neglect hardened to become, in theory at least, an actionable 
condition in the child, also called ‘emotional deprivation’ (for example, by 
Franklin in his summing up of the Second International Congress, 1978 
(Franklin, 1979: xvii)). And the line between emotional deprivation and 
emotional abuse, unlike the relatively clear distinction between physical abuse 
and neglect, has always been a fuzzy one, as Chapter 5 on definitions discusses. 
 
ii) Failure to thrive (FTT), or the somatic consequences of mental states. 
Non-organic failure to thrive is a medical diagnostic category, a condition in the 
child, in which failure to grow appears to have no organic, that is, physical 
reason; it is thought of as due not to ‘lack of calories’ but to ‘lack of love’ 
(Franklin, 1979: xvii). Known to paediatricians for centuries (Iwaniec, 1995) 
and brought out by Spitz’s studies of babies in German hospitals at the end of 
World War II (Spitz, 1945),197 it relates events at the level of perception to a 
physical state, as its other names, ‘deprivation dwarfism’ (Franklin, 1979: xvii) 
and psycho-social dwarfism (Kavanagh, 1982) make clear. The non-assaulting 
behaviour of parents leads to a physical state of the child which can be construed 
as an illness category and therefore as a harm. As such, with its physical, 
tangible and measurable presence, in the form of paediatric growth scales, it is 
more easy to pin down than the more general ‘emotional neglect’, both 
medically and legally. It accords well with the medical construction of abuse as 
a condition of the child, as in ‘non-accidental injury’. What is more, any 
monitoring of the child or intervention in the family hardly needs a legal 
justification. For, as it is largely concerned with the condition of neonates, it is 
treatable on medical grounds alone. And these are also the basis for any psycho-
                                                 
197 See also the work of Harry Hendrick on medical accommodation of to the idea that psycho-
social variables have measurable physical effects on babies and children. Hendrick, H. (2003) 
Child Welfare: Historical Dimensions, Contemporary Debate. Bristol: Policy Press.  
 195 
social intervention with parents who produce this syndrome, who are ‘treated’ 
on the unquestioned assumption that this is all part of the package in any good 
public health perinatal service (Kempe, 1979: xiv).  
 
As a medical category, FTT is a natural extension of the tight narrow category of 
physical abuse and the two paediatricians who introduce and summarise the 
Second International Congress in London in 1978 are very interested in it. There 
are several papers at this conference on the condition, though only one on 
emotional abuse (see below). Kempe, who has stuck very closely to the narrow 
physical interpretation of child abuse in the first volume of The Battered Child 
(1968) and of physical child abuse and neglect in the second volume (1973), 
announces here that he has come to the conclusion that there are, indeed, 
progressive steps in a society’s acceptance of child abuse: stage 1. denial; stage 
2. concentration on horrific injuries and gross neglect; stage 3. recognition of 
more run of the mill injuries and failure to thrive, ‘an example of passive abuse’ 
and, only after this stage is gone through comes stage 4., a recognition of 
emotional abuse and neglect. (Stage 5 is attention to child sexual abuse and stage 
6. is attention to the needs of all children) (Kempe, 1979: x, xi). So Kempe 
himself, having constructed a developmental story, thought that the acceptance 
of the FTT syndrome, as a social problem, was a vital stepping stone to seeing 
emotional abuse as such. FTT was included by some states of the Union in the 
second round of the reporting legislation, in place by 1973, without emotional 
abuse. When emotional abuse was first introduced as a registration category in 
the UK in LASSL(80) two years later, it was presented in tandem with FTT, 
almost as if it derived some legitimation from this proper diagnostic category 
(DHSS, 1980). It was, however, clearly differentiated from it, being specifically, 
the non-organic result of psycho-social circumstances ‘persistent ….neglect or 
rejection’, for example, which is measured in delay in behavioural or emotional 
development rather than lack of physical growth (DHSS, 1980). 
 
iii) Psychological risk factors for physical harm 
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Thanks to the influence of Kempe and Court, the professional response to the 
new social problem of baby battery in both the charitable and the governmental 
sector was a wish to take this problem on, not by wresting children from their 
parents but by preventing its recurrence through intensive treatment of children 
and families. So, after 1962, a series of child abuse prevention and treatment 
centres were established on the lines of Kempe’s National Centre in Denver, 
both in the US and the UK. In the latter, some, like Denver House in London 
were run by the NSPCC, others were specialist NHS centres, like Great Ormond 
Street Hospital for Children, in London, and the Park Hospital, in Oxford. These 
were family centres, where the child was certainly treated, but where abusive 
parents were also subjected, often on a residential basis, to intense 
psychotherapy, usually of a psychodynamic sort, combined with more 
behavioural modeling of good parenting and the encouragement and supervision 
of play with their children. A good example of this is the work of the Park 
Hospital in an account by Lynch et al, 1975.198 Dr Kit Ounsted was the senior 
Consultant there and Margaret Lynch his Senior Registrar. 
 
Here was much talk of post war Bowlbyesque notions of poor attachments, 
bonding problems, or, worse, failure (Lynch et al, 1977b). The same problems 
had been for decades the stuff of family life seen by social workers and Child 
Guidance clinics. But now these were subjected to a much more intensive 
intervention which was ‘preventative’ in a new way. Whilst in the ‘trickle down’ 
era all forms of what we now think of as abuse of children (as well as spouses 
and elders) were all part of a general pattern of behaviour in ‘chaotic families’ 
with ‘inadequate parents’, symptoms of poverty, addiction and a generally 
tenuous hold on material existence, after 1962 and the concentration of social 
focus on child battery, there was a flurry of research studies relating, 
statistically, the incidence of physical abuse with characteristics of family 
interaction, child or parent, but mostly in parent. These largely psychological 
                                                 
198 For a description and history of the Family Unit at the Park Hospital see Dingwall, R. (1987) 
Predicting Child Abuse and Neglect. In Child Abuse: Professional Practice and Public Policy 
(ed O. Stevenson). London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.: 51 Note 3.  
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characteristics were no longer just the symptoms of general chaos; they were 
now the predisposing or precipitating factors, the weak or strong risk factors, for 
physical abuse.199 The Park researchers ran one programme trying to identify 
risk factors in the perinatal period that might be predictive of later child battery 
(Lynch, 1976; Lynch et al, 1977a; Lynch, 1978; Lynch et al, 1982). This was 
not very successful from any rigorous point of view (Dingwall, 1987) but the 
practice of screening mothers of neonates for risk factors for child battery 
became an institution in the maternity units in Oxford.200 
 
As Bill Jordan the radical UK Social Work academic, rather disconsolately 
suggested, children who were ‘at risk’ used to be children who were ‘at risk’ of 
coming into care, but by the mid-seventies they were seen as ‘at risk’ from their 
parents. For uppermost in the articles emanating from these centres during the 
sixties and seventies was the assumption that these poor family relationships, in 
which parents, pathologically unable to give the nurturance to their children 
which their own childhood had lacked (due to their consequent ‘unmet 
dependency needs’ or just sheer ignorance of how it was done) and in which 
children, especially babies, failed to elicit the right emotional response from 
their parents, were a major cause of and one of the strongest risk factors for the 
physical abuse of children. This was certainly found in the research publications 
of the Consultants at the Park Hospital (Ounsted et al, 1974), where Dr Ounsted 
would quote, at ward rounds, his favourite lines from Horace: 
 
Smile at your mother, little boy, 
Because your life depends on it. (Personal communication) 
  
 
iv) Psychological accompaniments and effects of physical acts of abuse  
                                                 
199 For example, Baldwin, J. A. & Oliver, J. E. (1975) Epidemiology and Family 
Characteristics of Severely-Abused Children. British Journal of Social and Preventive Medicine, 
29, 205-221, Smith, S. (1975) The Battered Child Syndrome. London: Butterworth, Starr, R. H. 
(ed) (1982) Child Abuse Predictions: Policy Implications. Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger.  
200 This was institutionalised as “the Ounsted Round”, named after Dr Kit Ounsted, the 
paediatrician and director of the Park Hospital. 
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It is not surprising that with its new concentration on the condition of the child, 
professionals working in this preventative area, should become aware that events 
at the psycho-social or emotional level were not just risk factors for child 
battery, but that they were also one of its effects. As Frankin said in his 
Summing Up at the Second International Congress: 
 
Several strands run through the congress, perhaps the most important being 
the effects of abuse and neglect on child development, shown in delayed 
acquisition of language skills, in delayed emotional maturation, and, most 
strikingly in deprivation dwarfism….. 
 
‘The end result’, he continues, linking emotional factors as causes with 
emotional factors as effects, ‘may be abuse and neglect in the next generation’ 
(Franklin, 1979: xvii). 
 
These psycho-social circumstances also accompany physical injury, acting with 
it, possibly amplifying it. And it acts with it to produce not just physical harm, 
but also effects of a psychic kind. Franklin continues: 
 
We are agreed that physical abuse is always accompanied by emotional 
deprivation, and that, of the two, emotional damage lasts longer, brain 
damage, blindness and death excepted (Franklin, 1979: xvii).  
 
This is a common claim in the emotional abuse literature, though the last words 
are a chilling reminder of the less probable but, arguably, much worse, and 
certainly more arresting, outcomes attached to child battery.  
 
v) Emotional abuse unmediated 
From this position it was a small step to seeing the effects of these emotionally 
negative relationships between children and parents not just as neglectful, or as 
predictive of, or amplifying, physical abuse, but as abusive in their own right. 
Judith Trowell, Child and Family Psychiatrist at the Tavistock Clinic, described 
the thinking in the following way. Working as a young consultant at the NSPCC 
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centre, Denver House, she began to notice that, though the intense preventative 
approach could indeed stop the physical abuse of children, these same children 
did not necessarily ‘do well’ after the intervention – far from it. Of course, she 
could have attributed this to the long term sequelae of physical abuse, or to the 
sort of longer term emotional and psychological consequences of the 
deprivations that go with physical injury, suggested by Franklin. Her view was 
that, in the families she was seeing, hostile parent-child relationships were still 
actively harmful to the child, producing effects that had serious developmental 
consequences. These were not just the causes or the consequences of physical 
abuse, but since their consequences were just as serious, they were an abuse in 
their own right and thus could occur without the mediation of physical injury. 
She did not write this up until after 1980, but her article, entitled ‘The Emotional 
Abuse of Children’, published in 1983 in The Health Visitor, was the first on the 
subject in the UK (Trowell, 1983 and Interview, 2003–4). 
 
An Abuse in its Own Right 
 
Thus difficulties on a psychological and emotional level, from being the context 
in which physical abuse was embedded, became an abuse in its own right. And, 
clearly, Trowell was not alone in making this conceptual move. By the late 
1970s, in the US literature, the concept of emotional abuse itself made a few 
lone appearances. First, a single paper at The Second Annual Conference on 
Child Abuse and Neglect in 1977 by Lourie and Stephano, sponsored by the US 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Lourie et al, 1978) sets the tone 
for a clump of further articles on the concept’s definition: James Garbarino’s, 
‘The Elusive "Crime" of Emotional Abuse’, written just at the same time and 
later published in Kempe’s journal; Child Abuse and Neglect (Garbarino, 1978) 
followed by four other articles201. The International Congress too had a single 
                                                 
201 Dean, D. (1979) Emotional Abuse of Children. Children Today, 8 (4), 18-20.; Patterson, P. 
& Thompson, M. (1980) Emotional Abuse and Neglect: An Exercise in Definition. In The 
Maltreatment of the School-Aged Child (eds R. Volpe, M. Breston & J. Milton). Lexington, 
MASS: Lexington Books.; and later, Besharov, D. (1981) Toward Better Research on Child 
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paper on emotional abuse by Dermod McCarthy entitled ‘Antecedents and 
consequences of parental rejection: a theory of emotional abuse’ (McCarthy, 
1979), and in his opening address, as already described, Kempe announced the 
broadening of the abuse category to include a version of emotional abuse, which 
he defined as ‘seen in a child who is rejected, scapegoated, unloved and so 
emotionally deprived as to significantly interfere with the normal physical, 
intellectual and emotional growth and development’ (Cantwell, 1980; Kempe, 
1979: xi). He may well have been using material by Garbarino, whose article 
would have been submitted to his journal before the conference. Later, in the 
third (1980) volume of The Battered Child, and perhaps due to the influence of 
the more medically oriented Helfer, he certainly does not push emotional abuse. 
It gets two single page references in the index – the same as the first edition. 
And although he and Helfer suggest in the Preface that in view of the widening 
of the concept of child abuse, they were thinking of changing the name of their 
book to suggest a much wider coverage for other forms of abuse, the new 
additions in Part II of the book are: ‘interviewing techniques; physical findings; 
failure to thrive; child neglect; sexual abuse and abuse by burning (Kempe and 
Helfer, 1980: xiv). There is not a sign of emotional abuse.  
 
This ambivalence towards emotional abuse is also reflected in the US state 
reporting laws. By 1980, emotional abuse had crept into some states’ laws, most 
with custodial provision for protection of the child but few Legislative 
Directions involving law enforcement agencies. (Hence Garbarino’s use of 
inverted commas around the word ‘crime’.) In a 1997 survey of state laws 
(Hamarman et al, 2002) these still only numbered 20 states of the 51. And this 
was surprising as the Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act 
(CAPTA) produced, as early as 1974, a notably broad definition of child abuse 
for its time:  
                                                                                                                                                 
Abuse and Neglect: Making Definitional Issues an Explicit Methodological Concern. Child 
Abuse & Neglect, 5, 383-390. and Kavanagh, C. (1982) Emotional Abuse and Mental Injury: A 
Critique of the Concepts and a Recommendation for Practice. Journal of the American Academy 
of Child Psychiatry, 21, 171-177. 
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The physical or mental injury (my italics), sexual abuse, negligent treatment, 
or maltreatment of any child under the age of eighteen by a person who is 
responsible for the child’s welfare under circumstances which indicate the 
child’s health or welfare is harmed or threatened thereby (United States 
Code, 1974).202  
 
‘Mental injury’ was not a common term for emotional abuse, but this is 
undoubtedly what it meant, and has become, in more recent revisions of the 
act203. Perhaps the federal government’s lack of influence on the states was due 
to the fact that any public discussion of this legislation in the US stuck to the 
narrower definition of physical injury to avoid political controversy (Nelson. 
1984). 
 
Meanwhile, in the UK, emotional abuse was gaining more political recognition, 
due, in part, to this country’s more homogeneous political structure and due also, 
somewhat counter-intuitively, to the House of Commons Select Committee on 
Violence in the Family. This was convened originally in 1975 to consider 
‘violence in marriage’ and then reconvened in 1976, with its wider remit. Its first 
report called Violence to Children, published in mid-1977, with much 
corroborating research, states significantly that ‘violence against children is only 
part of a much larger problem of child abuse and neglect and how children 
should be brought up’ (House of Commons, 1977, quoted in Parton, 1985: 110). 
It emphasised the diversity of social causes of child abuse, including ‘stress, 
                                                 
202 United States Code 5106g (4) Public Law 93-247: S 1191. Title: 'An act to provide financial 
assistance for a demonstration programme for the prevention, identification and treatment of 
child abuse and neglect, to establish a National Centre on Child Abuse and Neglect and for other 
purposes'. 
With the passing of this act, sponsored by Walter Mondale, the federal government took the lead 
in the administration of child abuse prevention and treatment, providing the Centre to sponsor 
and monitor research and act as a clearing house for information, statistics etc The act allocated 
financial support to the states for administration and training in these areas, but this was only 
available to those which complied with all the act’s provisions. 
http://www.libraryindex.com/pages/1362/Child-Abuse-History-MODERN- AMERICA.html 
[accessed 10th December 2008]. 
203 In 1978, 1984, 1988, 1996 and 2003. 
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isolation bonding and unwanted pregnancies’ (Parton, 1985: 110) and the 
importance of prevention at every level, including that of the community.  
 
By mid-1978, the government had responded with a White Paper broadly 
accepting the Select Committee’s framing of child abuse as a wider and more 
general problem than physical injury alone and of their broadly preventative 
approach. The paper produced the caveat of budget constraints and hoped 
(vainly) that better prediction could concentrate preventative resources on a 
smaller group of children (House-of-Commons, 1978, quoted in Parton, 1985: 
111). The DHSS was clearly influenced by the Select Committee and also by the 
movement towards a wider definition of child abuse apparent in the US literature 
(and its smaller UK equivalent). It produced a draft circular to the Local 
Authorities, by the end of 1978, followed by the revised circular, LASSL (80), 
two years later. This, though it centrally addressed the question of rationalising 
the system of Child Abuse Registers across different local authorities, also 
recommended an enlarged abuse category in the following terms: 
 
Previous guidance stressed the importance of multi-disciplinary 
management of cases of non-accidental injury, that is, physical injury and 
extremes of deprivation and neglect. However, it is increasingly being 
recognised that the same requirements should be applied to children who 
suffer mental or emotional abuse. (DHSS, 1980: para 1.1) 
 
And these were minimum requirements of the Local Authorities in this 
modification of government guidance to statutory children’s law. 
 
The publication of the LASSL(80) circular did not create a huge public stir and 
even the social work weekly, Social Work Today, though it lead with the story 
by its staff reporter, Margaret Fogarty, spent only one short paragraph 
announcing that ‘emotionally battered children’ would now be included in the 
Local Authority child abuse registers. The rest of the article discussed the 
pressing question of the pros and cons of these controversial registers (Fogarty, 
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1980). Emotional abuse had arrived as an official social problem category in the 
UK, though this was hardly a fanfare. 
 
World Passing Within 
 
The making of emotional abuse as this, as yet, tiny social problem category, was 
a process which involved not only politicians, but the changing vision of their 
clinical and academic advisers on the social problem of child abuse, as they 
gradually shifted the locus of its consequences from the body, exclusively, to 
include some version of an internal territory to be explored. This change can be 
seen reflected in the movement of the DHSS publications on child maltreatment 
over the seventies, which went from The Battered Baby (DHSS, 1970), to Non 
Accidental Injury (DHSS, 1974), to the broader ‘child abuse’, which included 
other forms, including emotional abuse (DHSS, 1980).  
 
The shift in thinking was more complicated than this sounds, however, for it 
seemed to involve the loss of any influence that radical sociologists and social 
workers might have had on the general understanding of abuse. The House of 
Commons Select committee, in its investigation of violence in families, like 
Kempe and his collaborators who advised on the US federal legislation, became 
gradually aware that this physical violence sat in a whole complex of 
interpersonal difficulties. As Parton argues, the politicians saw violence as a 
social issue (Parton, 1985), as the result of stress, social isolation and unwanted 
pregnancies, rather than one of individual or even family pathology. 
Nevertheless, in the delicate economic situation at that time, neither they nor the 
DHSS had any traction on lack of social support, poverty, demographic or 
distributional factors. So they concentrated on observable social interaction 
which was psychologically mediated, as in ‘bonding failure’. As Kempe 
gradually expanded his consideration of the intrapsychic characteristics of 
abusers to include the interpersonal context, so the committee members, and the 
DHSS officials who responded to their report, reduced the social context to the 
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social psychological. And the gaze of both groups consequently turned inwards, 
not just to the hypothesised pathology of abusive parents, but to a psychological 
relationship and an abusive harm done to the inner life of the child.  
 
What the politicians and civil servants saw in this internal space is not quite 
clear. But the committee was well served by experts, as were the subsequent 
publications of the DHSS. And the second part of this chapter is an account of 
how some of these ‘experts’ in the academic psy sciences, in the USA after 
1980, developed out of the medical and administrative versions of emotional 
abuse a new, statistical version. Through this, they gained some form of access 
to the inner world of the child. And this, in its turn, made them much more 
aware of the psychological component of all forms of abuse.  
 
 
II. THE EMOTIONAL ABUSE LITERATURE AFTER 1980 – 
STATESIDE 
 
The US academic and professional literature on emotional abuse must be more 
profuse by a factor of fifty than its UK equivalent. It is also more technical in its 
language and approach, more embedded in mainstream psy professional and 
scientific journals, like the American Journal of Orthopsychiatry , more 
epidemiological and less oriented to the study of basic clinical and 
administrative identification and intervention – and the relationship between the 
two. One clear indication of this is a review of the content of research journals, 
whose editorial teams decide to devote whole issues to one subject of particular 
current and possible controversial interest, from time to time. The three special 
issues devoted to the exclusive study of emotional abuse, or psychological 
maltreatment (PMT), as it is more commonly known in the States, were in 
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psychological journals204 rather than in such specialist Child Protection journals 
as Child Abuse and Neglect (scion of Denver, Colorado). Likewise, in specialist 
books, like Kempe’and Helfer’s, The Battered Child, emotional abuse only 
achieves a whole chapter for itself in its 5th edition (Helfer et al, 1997). After 
1980, emotional abuse became a more general object of scientific study. 
 
Thus, although it is part of an academic exercise which is predicated on the, 
admittedly, political events in 1962 and their aftermath, with their consequences 
for the availability of research funding, research on emotional abuse as a socio-
medical category has to be seen, also, in the context of a broader psychological 
and psychiatric literature which has grown exponentially since the mid-sixties – 
a field of endeavour driven by the medicalisation of interpersonal relationships 
and the scientization of the soul (Hacking, 1995b), social panics about deviancy, 
professional projects and (lately) the forging of personal careers under academic 
audit and competition for research monies.  
 
In the comprehensive Psychinfo database the references appear in sections of 
roughly equal size. The first section of academic psy literature, mostly from the 
UK and USA covers the period 1872 to 1966; the next section the following 
eleven years; by the mid-nineties, one section covers three years but, after 2000, 
can only cover half a year. An emotional abuse search of the same database, also 
using the terms psychological abuse and psychological maltreatment, which 
seem to be used interchangeably in the US literature, not surprisingly, shows 
most of the characteristics of this broader context; in the first long section the 
book in German published in 1934 sits alone; and there is nothing more till after 
the USA reporting legislation, when the series of articles on definition, already 
mentioned in PART II of this chapter, appear around 1980. Although these 
efforts did not really make the concept much less elusive the attempt at 
definition was the necessary basis for the start of a positivistic research project 
                                                 
204 School Psychology Review. 16 (2). Bethesda MD: NASP.; American Psychologist. 1987 43 
(3) Washington DC: American Psychological Association. and Development and 
Psychopathology. 3 (01) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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and the literature then increased at about the rate of other literatures in the 
psychological field. 
 
This burgeoning literature in the database reveals the painful excavation by 
statistical instruments of more and more pathology in the world, more and more 
environmental causes (and, sadly, little corresponding increase in effective 
treatments). Information on all forms of abuse proliferated from the early 1980s, 
and the concept fragmented as the number of different forms increased. For 
example, the concept of ‘elder abuse’ which had been written into US reporting 
laws in 1978, soon after emotional abuse, broke up into the same forms as child 
abuse itself: physical, sexual and psychological and neglect, with the special 
addition of ‘financial/possession abuse’.205 Spouse or partner abuse also took the 
same basic multiplicity of forms (except neglect which implies relationships of 
dependency) and further articles attempted to relate each of these adult variants, 
for victim or perpetrator, to each of the childhood forms – with the causality 
running both ways round – in the ceaseless search for intergenerational cycles of 
violence or abuse, which seems to characterise the maltreatment literature.206 
 
 
 
                                                 
205 As with emotional abuse, definitions varied from state to state. See Wolf, R. S., Pillemer, K. 
A., Hotaling, G. T., Finkelhor, D., Kirkpatrick, J. T. & Straus, M. A. (1988) Intervention, 
Outcome, and Elder Abuse. In Coping with Family Violence: Research and Policy Perspectives., 
pp. 257-274. Thousand Oaks, CA US: Sage Publications, Inc. 
206 Here are some recent examples: Brendler, J. & Combrinck-Graham, L. (2006) A Model 
for Disrupting Cycles of Violence in Families with Young Children. In Children in Family 
Contexts: Perspectives on Treatment., pp. 433-455. New York, NY US: Guilford Press, Parkes, 
C. M., Stevenson, R. G. & Cox, G. R. (2008) Making and Breaking Cycles of Violence. In 
Perspectives on Violence and Violent Death., pp. 223-238. Amityville, NY US: Baywood 
Publishing Co, Petchkovsky, L., Cord-Udy, N. & Grant, L. (2007) A Post-Jungian Perspective 
on 55 Indigenous Suicides in Central Australia; Deadly Cycles of Diminished Resilience, 
Impaired Nurturance, Compromised Interiority; and Possibilities for Repair. AeJAMH 
(Australian e-Journal for the Advancement of Mental Health), 6, 1-14, Walsh, C. A., Ploeg, J., 
Lohfeld, L., Horne, J., MacMillan, H. & Lai, D. (2007) Violence across the Lifespan: 
Interconnections among Forms of Abuse as Described by Marginalized Canadian Elders and 
Their Care-Givers. British Journal of Social Work, 37, 491-514, Wijma, B., Thapar-
BjÃ¶rkert, S., HammarstrÃ¶m, N. C. & Swahnberg, K. (2007) Cycles of Abuse Nurtured by 
Concealment: A Clinical Report. Journal of Psychosomatic Obstetrics & Gynecology, 28, 155-
160. 
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Exploration and Measurement 
 
Much of the earlier research on causes and consequences of child abuse were 
being savaged in the literature (for a good summary, see Sheppard, 1982) and 
the 1980s saw attempts at a more sophisticated research design and 
methodology. With research on emotional abuse of children, the problem was to 
identify abused populations, in order to mine the data for causal factors, as well 
as to study it as, itself, a risk factor for adult disorder. With certain exceptions 
(for example, Claussen et al, 1991), there are few studies of groups of abused 
children. They are difficult to locate for ethical reasons, and even harder to study 
over a period of time. In practice, these are confined to a few large cohorts of 
children and families organised, at some expense, by major universities, with 
diverse funding, including grants from government agencies, the National 
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) and the National Centre on Child Abuse and 
Neglect (set up by CAPTA).207 Most of the research effort (especially for those, 
studying for research degrees, with limited resources) has centred on adult recall 
of abuse in childhood in more easily available research populations – generally, 
groups of adults in some way socially monitored. Apart from the self 
replenishing pool of college students, whose ‘dating behaviour’ is so much 
studied, subjects tend to be people on treatment or community programmes as 
well as those more completely institutionalised; that is small, usually racially 
defined, groups of the poor, the criminal, the addicted, the sick or the insane. 
 
 In the quest to operationalise this adult recall of childhood abuse, new scales, 
questionnaires, indices and inventories – and their acronyms – have been 
devised and, in the intricate world of family relationships and intra-psychic 
dynamics, everything is measured that can be measured. Here is just a selection 
of those which apply more or less directly to emotional abuse research: the 
                                                 
207 The first longitudinal study of a group of abused children for developmental consequences 
was started in the early eighties by Cicchetti, Carlson and Aber research group at the Harvard 
Child Maltreatment Project. The Minnesota Study of Parents and Children was instituted at 
about the same time. 
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Childhood Maltreatment Questionnaire (CMQ) and its Psychological 
Maltreatment (PMT) sub-category (Demare, 2001), the Comprehensive Child 
Maltreatment Scale (Higgins et al, 2000), Record of Maltreatment Experiences 
(ROME) (McGee et al, 1995), Attribution for Maltreatment Interview(AMI) 
(McGee, 1995), the Subtle and Overt Scale of Psychological Abuse (Jones et al, 
2005), the Childhood Trauma Interview (Fink et al, 1995), the Betrayal Trauma 
Inventory (BTI), the Brief Betrayal Trauma Survey (BBTS), and the Traumatic 
Guilt Inventory (TGI) (Draucker, 1995; Goldsmith, 2005; Shields et al, 2001), 
the Childhood Trauma Questionnaire, (Bernstein et al, 1994), Youth Self Report 
(Achenbach et al, 1987), the Youth Psychopathic Traits Inventory (van 
Baardewijk et al, 2008), The Impact of Event Scale (Horowitz et al, 1979), the 
clinician administered PTSD Scale – Child and Adolescent version (CAPS – 
CA), the Psychological Abuse Scale for Married Women (Stein, 1982), the 
Domination-Isolation Subscale of the Scale of Measurement of the 
Psychological Maltreatment of Women by their Male Partners (Tolman, 1989), 
the Inventory of Interpersonal Problems (Murphy et al, 2001), the Verbal 
Aggression and Violence Scales of the Conflict Tactics Scale (Archer, 1999; 
Straus, 1979; Straus et al, 1998), the Defence Style Questionnaire (DSQ) 
(Andrews et al, 1989), the Paediatric Emotional Distress Scale (Spilsbury et al, 
2005), the Childhood Stress Inventory (Marcil, 1996), the Dissociative 
Experience Scale (Carlson et al, 1993; Frischholz et al, 1991), the Behavioural 
Screening Questionnaire (Richman et al, 1971) and the famous Marlowe Crown 
Social Desirability Scale (White, 1981, for example). Each of these has a 
slightly new function but no longer identifies itself by its geographical location, 
as in older versions, such as the Tennessee Self Concept Scale (Deitche, 1959), 
the Texas Social Behaviour Inventory (Helmreich et al, 1974); the Hopkins 
Symptom Checklist (Derogatis, 1974) or the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Scale (Winne, 1951). 
 
Once measurements were established in the literature (that is, repeatedly used 
and cited, even if, psychometrically, their reliability over different research 
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populations did not turn out to be very high), it was possible to argue that 
research studies showed that emotional abuse or PMT had as much negative 
effect on a victim’s future as other forms of abuse – more, even (Kaplan et al, 
1999; McGee et al, 1997a; Mullen et al, 1996; Vissing et al, 1991). By the turn 
of this century, emotional abuse in childhood, rather like disorders of 
attachment, had been claimed as a risk factor for almost all pathologies and 
social problems, depending on the research population chosen: addiction and 
delinquency (Fraser, 2002; Moran et al, 2004), sexual problems (Ace et al, 
2007), depression (Ali, 2000; Maciejewski et al, 2006; Stuewig et al, 2005) and 
other forms of ‘negative affect’ (Chirichella-Besemer et al, 2008; Harper et al, 
2004), trait aggression (Garno et al, 2008) and general neuroticism (Karesh, 
1996), personality pathology (Bernstein et al, 1998), ‘erosion of identity’ 
(Hirigoyen, 2000), dyslexia (Anyanwu et al, 2001) and dissociative disorder 
(Sar et al, 2006), PTSD (Veach, 1996), anorexia and bulimia (Hodson et al, 
2006; Mazzeo et al, 2002; Witkiewitz et al, 2001), and schizophrenia (SchÃ¤fer 
et al, 2006). In addition, cycles of abuse also feature, as for example in a study 
of adult offspring of Holocaust Survivors, where PTSD and emotional abuse are 
seen as transmitted across the generations (Yehuda et al, 2001).  
 
Besides this, over time, as researchers reach for new angles, the limited set of 
available research populations are mined for more and more improbable 
dependent variables and their correlates. For instance, in the field of emotional 
abuse itself, it was possible to read in 1980, in an article entitled ‘Aggression 
against Cats, Dogs and People’, that – in a group of male psychiatric patients 
referred for cruelty to animals – paternal emotional unavailability was a strong 
risk factor for this behaviour (Felthous, 1980); whilst, by 2002, research on a 
population of incarcerated sex offenders suggested that emotional abuse, along 
with other forms of maltreatment in childhood, was a strong predictor of 
bestiality (Fleming et al, 2002). Further, in the same year, a population of female 
methadone maintenance treatment programme (MMTP) dropouts had their 
claims to emotional abuse in childhood – as measured on some version of the 
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Childhood Maltreatment Questionnaire (CMQ) – regressed against their current 
‘HIV risk behaviour’ (Kang et al, 2002). 
 
Lastly, by the millennium, a new problem has been discovered for 
psychometrics in the field of child abuse: the phenomenon of multiple type 
maltreatment (MTM) (Bryant et al, 1996; Higgins et al, 2001; Kinard, 1994; 
McGee et al, 1997b; Rossman et al, 1998), where respondents report more than 
one type of maltreatment as children. Whilst MTM was a phenomenon which 
did not show up so much on the few samples that there were of maltreated 
children ( where they were classified administratively, mostly under single 
categories), an interrogation of childhood memories by questionnaire allowed 
for all sorts of variations and combinations. The problem that this raised could 
be characterised as follows: unless effects are type specific, how can we know 
what are the consequences and causes of what? Further, the effects of each type 
may interact and be cumulative. We know that multi-type maltreatment is 
associated strongly with poor adjustment in adults, so this is likely. We cannot 
be sure, however, unless effects are isolated and interaction studied. It may even 
be that ‘poor adjustment in adults is the result of a third variable (for example, 
family dysfunction or other childhood stressors)’ [sic] (Higgins et al, 2000: 17). 
MTM is a challenge which calls for a redoubling of effort and more research.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
Trauma, Violence and Abuse208 
 
MTM may have presented a challenge for psychometrics but it was an acronym 
for a situation which any welfare professional would have recognised – and one 
of the many in which the neat categories of psychologists are hard to map onto 
the chaos of human relationships. However, as a result of psychologists’ 
attempts to do just that, the categories of abuse shifted somewhat over this 
period. Not only did emotional abuse or PMT grow in seriousness and claimed 
                                                 
 208 This is the title of a journal launched in 2000, Trauma, Violence, & Abuse. US: Sage 
Publications. 
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prevalence, but the category itself was suspected to be much more inclusive. 
Indeed, it was argued that psychological maltreatment, far from being an ‘also 
ran’, or even just an accompaniment to other forms of abuse, was integral to all 
forms and, indeed, lay at their very heart. This came about in two different ways, 
which are exemplified by the two major research teams in the US that directly 
and consistently address, over a long period, the issues of emotional abuse or 
psychological maltreatment.209 These two teams are led by the authors of the 
first two (edited) books on the subject since the couple of isolated volumes pre 
1960. Both of these were published in the late 1980s: The Psychologically 
Battered child by James Garbarino, Edna Guttman and John Wilson Seeley in 
1986 and The Psychological Maltreatment of Children and Youth by Marla 
Brassard, R. Germain and Stuart Hart in 1987. 
 
The team of Hart and Brassard210 secured a US federal government grant at the 
beginning of the 1980s from the US Department of Health and Human Services 
and National Centre on Child Abuse and Neglect, for ‘developing and validating 
operationally defined measures of emotional maltreatment’ (Hart et al, 1986; 
Hart et al, 1989), though these measures were not uncontroversial (Barnett et al, 
1991; Bell et al, 1973; McGee et al, 1991a).211 This work supported the First 
International Conference on the Psychological Abuse of Children and Youth at 
the Office for the Study of the Psychological Rights of the Child, Indiana 
University, where Hart was and is attached, and the editing of the conference 
proceedings by the team, later published as an edited book (Brassard et al, 
1987); it furnished the substance of articles published later in the decade, also 
into the 1990s, and inevitably formed the basis for the development of a rating 
                                                 
209 Although the work of developmental psychologists, like Dante Cicchetti or Robin McGee and 
their collaborators, touch on it considerably as part of child maltreatment in general. 
210 They are psychologists oriented to education: Hart is interested in the psychological rights of 
children and never moving from a base in Indiana University-Purdue University, and Brassard, 
at first, interested in child sexual abuse and in the way schools could address the affective and 
cognitive consequences of family difficulties, in general, and abuse, in particular. Brassard has 
been located in education departments and the child and family research centres of various East 
Coast colleges. 
211 See the special edition of Development and Psychopathology. 3 (01) Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
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scale, the PMRS (Brassard et al, 1993). During the 1990s they became the 
official lexicographers of the concept; no edited book on child abuse, of which 
there are many, has appeared without a chapter by them on PMT. They provided 
the PMT contribution to Volume 5 of The Battered Child (Brassard et al, 1997; 
Helfer et al, 1997), and to The APSAC (American Professional Society on the 
Abuse of Children) Handbook on Child Maltreatment (Hart et al, 2002; Hart et 
al, 1996). They have inaugurated the first volume of a new journal, Emotional 
Abuse, with a leading article, but also still continue separately with their own 
individual interests (Hart et. al, 1998).  
 
It is not surprising that it is Hart and Brassard whose research has received an 
official imprimatur. Their work is in the psychological mainstream, still seeing 
abuse as a problem of individual pathology, and PMT as one hitherto neglected 
form of it. It is a diagnostic category to be mined from intra-psychic and intra-
familial behaviour, always included in a swathe of abuse literature as the third or 
fourth type – the poor relation. Even after all their educational efforts, they are 
still describing emotional abuse or PMT as a ‘little known’ and ‘underused’ 
category in 2002 (Hart et al, 2002: 79) – although, according to a burgeoning 
epidemiological story, more potent in its effects than was originally thought. 
These two psychologists acknowledge the problem of MTM, but are not crudely 
mechanistic; they accept some interaction between these different abuse forms 
(Hart et al, 1991). Indeed, by the same year, they were so impressed by the 
epidemiologically revealed fact that PMT, in many instances, can accompany 
physical or sexual abuse, that they made another step in subscribing to the 
widely made claim (for example, Navarre, 1987) that, though it is little known 
and underused, ‘psychological maltreatment lies at the core of all abuse’ (Hart et 
al, 2002: 79).  
 
Whilst the progress of Hart and Brassard to this grand claim was somewhat 
linear, developing from the original perception of the paediatricians of physical 
abuse, set in a psycho-social matrix, the same claim was precisely the message 
 213 
of Garbarino’s first article on emotional abuse (Garbarino, 1978) and the 
constant theme through all his work. He and his various collaborators come at 
psychological maltreatment from a very different angle, introducing the notion 
of violence to that of psychological abuse. Whereas the UK parliamentary 
committees (described in the last section) saw violence as set in the psycho-
social relationships of the family and beyond, Garbarino saw psychological 
abuse set in a matrix of violence – interpersonal , intercommunity and 
international. He used PMT as the basic concept in a strong social critique: 
emotional abuse, no longer as a concept of positivist knowledge, but as a 
legitimater of powerful political claims. 
  
Garbarino is of a systemic or ecological persuasion, therefore concerned with 
child identities constructed by the social environment and with the socio- 
economic context of abusive parenting, ‘identifying sources of risk in the human 
ecology of the young child’ (Garbarino et al, 2000) and their appropriate social 
policy responses. His book, with its play on Kempe’s title,212 established that it 
is the psychological effects of adverse environments that are important – and not 
only the effects. Adverse environments have effects through psychological 
means also, through what they communicate (the social system is a 
communications system). Later, he coined the phrase: ‘the meaning is the 
message’ (Garbarino et al, 1997b: 101). Before the book, the most serious 
adversity seemed to be poverty – at least until he met his book collaborators. 
Apart from Janis Wilson Seeley, a young developmental psychologist (who 
became an educationalist at a US Mid-west community college), Edna Guttmann 
was an Israeli researcher, working on the treatment of delinquent youth in Israel 
(Eisikovits et al, 1987), who moved on to work on male violence to women 
(Eisikovits et al, 1993). After their book, it seems that violence rather than 
poverty began to define an adverse environment at all levels of context.  
 
                                                 
212 Garbarino, J., Guttmann, E. & Seeley, J. W. (1986b) The Psychologically Battered Child: 
Strategies for Identification, Assessment, and Intervention. 
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The title of the first article of a new collaboration with Nancy Dubrow, 
published in 1989, was ‘Living in the War Zone: Mothers and Children in a 
Public Housing Development’ (Dubrow et al, 1989). The partnership acquired 
another member in Kathleen Kostelney for an article called ‘What children can 
tell us about living in danger’, that drew on ‘the authors’ extensive fieldwork in 
five war zones’ (Garbarino et al, 1991: 276). Work on children in dangerous 
inner city environments progresses to research in war torn areas of the world, 
like Palestine (Kostelny et al, 1994) and the second becomes a metaphor for the 
first. Violent communities are ‘The American War Zone,’ (Garbarino, 1995) or 
‘The War Close to Home’ (Kostelny et al, 2001). Garbarino’s own war 
metaphors are less florid than those of his editors in their book, ‘Minefields in 
their Hearts; the Mental Health of Children in War and Communal Violence’ 
(Garbarino et al, 1996). In 1995, he introduced a new metaphor with his article, 
‘Growing up in a Toxic Society’ (Garbarino et al, 1997a; Garbarino et al, 1995), 
in which he medicalised its effects by unofficially extending the diagnostic 
category of PTSD, and, more precisely, its aetiological event from one violent 
shock to the lower level, cumulative effects of living in a violent environment – 
acute trauma gives way to chronic trauma, a sort of slow acting poison of the 
soul, as in the work of Breuer and Freud (Breuer et al, 1955 [1893-1895]; Breuer 
et al, 1956 [1893]). 
 
For Garbarino, the relationships of a child with a physically abusive parent or 
living in a context of marital violence are very much a small sub category of the 
wider interests of his ‘Biopsychosocial Approach’ (Garbarino et al, 2000: 76) 
and of the wider ‘battering’ environment or, as he entitles this article, ‘The 
Human Ecology of Early Risk’. These are all part of the growing literature of a 
Western liberal crisis about the pervasive culture of violence, an issue which the 
panic over violence to children did much to put on the map (Nelson, 1984). 
What is more, this has met another powerful interest, this time with a feminist 
impetus, and another burgeoning literature. Interpersonal violence (IPV), in 
partner, marital and dating relationships, with its new violence related journals 
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started up over the 1980s and 1990s.213 IPV, in partner and other relationships 
includes the sub-category of psychological maltreatment (psychological 
aggression or psychological violence) in all the research studies. This is not just 
the psychological effects of physical aggression, but verbal aggression as a form 
of violence.  
 
Just as emotional abuse, from 1980 onwards, made up an accepted part of what 
constitutes the notion of abuse, an abuse in its own right, it became, over the 
1990s, an accepted part of what constitutes the notion of violence. From being a 
concept which primarily referred to the use of physical force, violence migrates 
like trauma, via association and metaphor, to being the wounding force which 
accompanies shock and fear for the physical safety of self and others, as in shell-
shock or ‘railway spine’. From this it comes to be the force behind verbal 
assault, which may not be a one-off, but is just as likely to be an accumulation of 
smaller and subtler verbal attacks and cruelties over time. It is as if, having 
floated free of the body, invisible wounds becomes enmeshed again in 
                                                 
   213 For example, the Journal of Interpersonal Violence; Violence and Victims; Aggressive 
Behaviour; Aggression and Violent Behaviour: a Review Journal and Journal of Family 
Violence.; There was also an increasing literature over the nineties, in professional journals and 
at conferences, on the connection, statistical and clinical, between spouse abuse and child 
physical abuse: Appel, A. E. & Holden, G. W. (1998) The Co-Occurrence of Spouse and 
Physical Child Abuse: A Review and Appraisal. Journal of Family Psychology, 12, 578-599, 
Browne, K. D. & Hamilton, C. E. (1999) Police Recognition of the Links between Spouse 
Abuse and Child Abuse. Child Maltreatment, 4, 136-147, Nietzel, M. T., Susman, D. T., 
Bellack, A. S., Hersen, M. & Kazdin, A. E. (1990) Crime and Aggression/Child and Spouse 
Abuse. In International Handbook of Behavior Modification and Therapy (2nd Ed.). pp. 523-
545. New York, NY US: Plenum Press, Ross, S. M. (1996) Risk of Physical Abuse to Children 
of Spouse Abusing Parents. Child Abuse & Neglect, 20, 589-598.. By extension, the emotional 
effects of spouse abuse on children of the family also came to be seen as harmful, as in Hughes, 
H. M., Parkinson, D. & Vargo, M. (1989) Witnessing Spouse Abuse and Experiencing 
Physical Abuse: A "Double Whammy"? Journal of Family Violence, 4, 197-209., so that by the 
turn of the century, the accepted list of child abuses featuring in some epidemiological work on 
outcomes has been extended from four: physical, sexual, emotional abuse and neglect, to five. 
The new category is 'witnessing parental violence', seeFergusson, D. M. & Horwood, L. J. 
(1998) Exposure to Interparental Violence in Childhood and Psychosocial Adjustment in Young 
Adulthood. Child Abuse and Neglect, 22, 339-357, Henning, K., Leitenberg, H., Coffey, P. & 
Turner, T. (1996) Long-Term Psychological and Social Impact of Witnessing Physical Conflict 
between Parents. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 11, 35-51, Kilpatrick, K. L. & Williams, 
L. M. (1998) Potential Mediators of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Child Witnesses to 
Domestic Violence. Child Abuse & Neglect, 22, 319-330, Somer, E. & Braunstein, A. (1999) 
Are Children Exposed to Interparental Violence Being Psychological Maltreated? Aggression 
and Violent Behavior, 4, 449-456. 
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metaphors of physical force and a violence whose effect is trauma and 
developmental delay.  
 
Indeed, the concepts of trauma, violence and abuse became firmly married over 
this period, as a new journal of that name started in the year 2000 
demonstrates.214 Although the connubial glue may be a physical shock or 
assault, they are bedded in a psychological matrix. The story of emotional abuse 
has almost come full circle. For, as emotional abuse and trauma get together, as 
do attachment and trauma in Chapter 6, this underlines the possibility that 
invisible wounds are not just the consequences of harsh words, but also of 
physical and sexual assault. This time, however, it is not just seen as a 
psychological accompaniment to physical abuse. By the beginning of the new 
century, emotional abuse is claimed as the main, the more serious, the more 
lasting version of this problem category – the ‘core of all abuse’. This is an idea 
which was not confined to the US research literature, but much exercised the UK 
professional writers, in the next chapter.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
What has been described here in this bipartite presentation is, first, the 
emergence of the registration category of emotional abuse from the tumultuous 
history of child abuse as a social problem category. This calls on and has the 
characteristics of traditional social constructionist work, which looks at the 
making of a social problem category within the context of a politico-professional 
milieu of claims making by pressure groups and professional and research 
institutions, all within the constraints of particular socio-economic systems and 
political organisations, including local government. It presents emotional abuse 
as a very minor socio-political phenomenon, a breakaway from a larger 
category, both having, at that time, a predominantly medical/welfarist and 
                                                 
214 Trauma Violence and Abuse. New York, Sage Publications.  
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administrative/legal base. But what this social history also documents is how the 
gaze of child abuse experts gradually turned inwards. As the physical wounds on 
the body of the child became well documented and disseminated, and physical 
abuse was accepted as a political, administrative as well as clinical problem, 
then this hidden, and so more complex and challenging area seemed to offer 
opportunities for exploration. For, as the social context of physical abuse came 
under examination, and broader social considerations were eliminated from 
inquiry, so did the negative relationships that drove it and were its results. What 
other effects did these relationships have on a child, especially on that vital area 
called development? What were the internal harms that drove poor growth, 
unhappiness and anti-social behaviour? Attention gradually shifted to this 
invisible space and to a harm which, it was claimed, was just as serious – and 
potentially more so – than that which could be seen, or told. A new set of 
exploratory activities, new techniques and some new technicians addressed 
themselves to this inner space, although who it was who could claim the skills 
for this work was a moot point. 
 
The second part of this chapter has presented one example of this exploration. It 
has examined the career of emotional abuse, after 1980, as part of the booming 
psy literature phenomenon in the USA. The boom was less a product of clinical 
research and more of epidemiology and psy-statistics, in which inner wounds are 
identified for psychometric purposes, whose techniques are then used to study 
them. The hidden interior world of the child is teased out and the wound 
measured and scored, not by analytic, clinical, administrative or even common 
sense conversations, but by interview schedule and adult recall. Not only that. 
As its technicians search for new angles with new collaborators, the invisible 
wound begins to fragment. Its different causes are identified. These shift 
between subtle forms of denigration, fear from violence or watching loved ones 
in danger, and, at its margins, the category of emotional abuse is reunited with 
the concept of trauma. Now emotional abuse begins to be seen, not just as a 
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consequence of psychological aggression or distancing, but also the main and 
more serious result of bodily assault and injury, the core of all abuse. 
 
I have suggested at the start of this chapter that the category of emotional abuse 
bifurcated around the year 1980 and that the version of the wound produced by 
this US literature can be seen as a new form, which is not defined by 
administrative or clinical processes, but constructed in an academic environment 
which promotes epidemiological research. In this move to a somewhat different 
social context from that of the first, emergent form of emotional abuse described 
above, with different organisational imperatives, it expands and presents new 
opportunities for exploration and measurement and, free of administrative 
definitions, it presents to those with the appropriate techniques of visualisation 
its multifactorial relationships with other forms of abuse.  
 
The next chapter represents the other half of this bifurcation: the category 
constructed by the UK professional and academic literature on emotional abuse 
over the 1980s and 1990s. In the discourse of this (small) set of articles and 
books, ‘abuse’ is a registration category, or a clinical concept – that which ought 
to be registered or recognised as a source of need – a hybrid, with normative 
medico-welfarist origins and legal implications. Here, the exploration of a 
wounded interior is scarcely attended to. Rather, its presence is assumed. Its 
invisibility and lack of specific symptoms or cause drive the experts to 
concentrate on the problems of its description, for the purposes of recognition 
and appropriate medical and bureaucratic processing.  
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                                 CHAPTER 5: 
    EMOTIONAL ABUSE IN THE UK: A MAPPING 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The challenge of the US emotional abuse literature, of grand talk about violence 
and of political points swathed in military metaphor, has not been taken up in the 
UK equivalent. Garbarino, being first off the mark with writing on this form of 
abuse is ritually cited. But more citations go to Stewart Hart and his 
collaborators, whose work is more congruent with the ‘individual pathology 
model’ which prevails – and, given its organisation, has to prevail – in UK Child 
Protection. As noted, however, the model, in this UK context, does not produce 
the swathe of statistical research which is generated by well funded US 
university departments – even though, by the late 1990s, this research was more 
frequently referenced in DOH guidance and its other sundry publications, whose 
writers were aspiring to become more ‘evidence based’ (Ex Senior DOH 
Official, Interview). As I also noted, the UK literature is rooted in professional 
practice and, even for the medical diagnosticians and therapists, in the multi-
professional world of Child Protection decision taking. As a result, it is much 
more of a commentary on the workings of institutions other than the academic: 
national government and statute, local government, NHS treatment centres, now 
Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS) and, increasingly, more 
non-governmental child and adolescent centred services.  
 
There should be no doubt that, after the mid-1980s, this Child Protection system 
was completely dominated by the issue of child sexual abuse at all levels –
political and professional: in the academic, practitioner and self help literature; 
in DOH documents, and in awareness-raising and treatment training courses all 
across the professions. Although, by 1999, emotional abuse, as a registration 
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category, just exceeded the size of sexual abuse as a proportion of the whole, the 
latter still dominates the airwaves. The academic and professional literature on 
physical and sexual abuse produced in the UK, and even more in the USA, by 
far exceeds that on emotional abuse, which, in comparison, is minute. Its small 
size confirms one of its prevailing narratives, which is that the emotional abuse 
of children is a far more pressing social problem than is generally believed or 
recognised by public and practitioners alike – an assertion, of course, belied by 
the actual number of children registered.  
 
With its limited personnel, the progress of this category in the UK child 
emotional abuse literature is more easily traced and put into its political, social 
and discursive context. Part I of this chapter gives a brief summary of this 
context. Part II presents a short account of the literature, and Part III a mapping 
of the concept as it emerges in this body of work, over the course of the 1990s – 
the period of the category’s maximum rate of growth – to 2003215. It suggests 
that this version of emotional abuse indeed reflects the professional and 
institutional context in which it is produced. As a category, it is primarily 
organised by the registration process in Child Protection, a bureaucratic risk 
management system. But it is a hybrid, which, apart from its figurative freight, 
encapsulates both a welfarist, medically based strand, which primarily refers to 
the effects of abuse on child wellbeing, combined with a notion of what is 
healthy in developmental terms, and a more legalistic strand which refers to the 
cruel actions of parents or other adults, seen against a standard of what is 
socially acceptable. 
 
First, in this mapping, I tease out various definitions of emotional abuse, which 
involves much quoting of the US literature by UK writers in their attempts to pin 
down this elusive concept. I then look at the even more hazy question of its 
prevalence in the population, given the difficulties of definition and the 
                                                 
215 In this year and those following significant organisational changes were made in Child 
Protection and its relation to other children’s services. These are signalled in the text but cannot 
yet be evaluated. It may be a case of tout ça change... 
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uncertain processes by which such statistics are made. Third, I look at the 
making of Child Protection statistics in particular: how these relate to competing 
claims to the category’s definition, ownership of its administration or treatment 
and how these claims contribute to the inclusiveness of the concept. As with 
other versions of invisible wounds, like PTSD and nervous shock, the size of the 
category varies with what is included in accounts of the wound’s cause. 
 
 
I. THE UK CHILD PROTECTION CONTEXT 
 
From 1980–1989 
 
 Since the drama of the Maria Colwell Enquiry in 1973, which put child abuse 
on a public and political agenda in the UK and increased Emergency Protection 
Orders by over 300% in a year (Parton, 1985), 216 the state had become more 
interventionist as far as the safety of children was concerned. Furthermore, the 
promotion of CSA over the 1980, by feminists, survivor groups and then by 
government agencies, as a social problem of massive prevalence and importance 
not only marked a further widening and fragmentation of the abuse category, it 
also promoted this shift of multiprofessional resources and organisation onto the 
investigation of abuse, rather than on ‘working with problem families’, or what 
was later called ‘family support’.  
 
This marked discursive shift from a socio-medical to a socio-legal approach to 
Child Protection (Parton, 1991), occurred in a period dominated by the Jasmine 
Beckford Inquiry (Dingwall, 1986), the Cleveland crisis (Butler-Sloss, 1988; 
Campbell, 1988), and the preparation and passing of the new Children Act, 
                                                 
216 The first major DHSS funded research programme (DHSS (1985) Social Work Decisions in 
Childcare: Recent Research Findings and Their Implications. London: HMSO.) on the child 
welfare system run by the LASSDs made it clear that, whilst it had become harder in the 1980s 
for families under stress to access help and support, there was a much greater tendency to make 
compulsory interventions into family life. This resulted in the often haphazard and unplanned 
removal of children and the assumption of parental rights by the state involve in ‘child rescue.’ 
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1989. It was accompanied by the decline in the social policy of paternalistic 
welfarism and a rise in the language of individual rights and risk – all features of 
the wider, new right ideological context. Freedom for individual responsibility 
and enterprise in the private and civil spheres was to be maintained by vigilant 
and forceful policing at the boundaries. This strong law and order imperative 
was applied to those who assaulted or molested children – theirs or somebody 
else’s.  
 
Child Welfare politics in the 1980s were also taken up with the run-up to the 
Children Act, 1989, in a period of hard campaigning by many disparate groups 
(Parton, 1991: Chapter 2). These included the broadly socio-medical advisers to 
the preceding Short Report (House of Commons (HC 360), Social Services 
Committee., 1984). This was a review of child welfare in the UK which was 
supported by a raft of DHSS-funded research by social work academics, (DHSS, 
1985). It espoused traditional child welfare considerations, criticising the 
unplanned, inconsistent and sometimes arbitrary nature of social work child-care 
decisions and lamenting the departure from the preventative position of the 
Seebohm Report217, which established the LASSDs as the last plank of the post-
war Welfare State. There was also strong representation from pressure groups 
for parents’ rights, as well as the rights of children both to autonomy and 
protection.218  
 
The resulting document can be seen as a fudge of different interests or, 
alternatively, as cleverly designed to have broad appeal. It can also be seen as 
the last throw of a sort of crypto-paternalism within the DOH. What was written 
into the act was an ideal of child welfare that could not be met at the time of the 
                                                 
217 Seebohm-Committee (1968) Report of the Committee on Local Authority and Allied 
Personal Social Services, Cmnd 3703. 
218 .For example, the Family Rights Group and Justice for Children. See also the Children's 
Legal Centre. (1988) Child Abuse Procedures - the Child's Viewpoint : Policy Proposals from 
the Children's Legal Centre (2nd rev.ed. edn). London: Children's Legal Centre, Parents 
Against INjustice. (1986) A Response to Child Abuse : Working Together : A Draft Guide to 
Arrangement for Inter-Agency Co-Operation for the Protection of Children. Bishop's Stortford, 
Herts: Parents Against INjustice.  
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Act’s construction. This was the time when officials from the Child Care 
Division and the Social Services Inspectorate of the DHSS, according to one that 
I interviewed, ‘were not allowed to write about poverty under Thatcher’ nor 
officially address their concerns about the emergence of an underclass during 
these years. Indeed, they had ‘secret meetings’ (Ex Senior DOH official, 
interview). 
 
The Children Act 1989 was widely seen and described as a piece of legislation 
which not only pulled together and unified a set of disparate and fragmented 
pieces of legislation in the area of child welfare, in both public and private law, 
but which was also designed to clarify and shift fundamentally the relationship 
between the child, the family and the state. (Aldgate et al, 1996; DOH, 1989a). 
Basically, the welfare of the child was made paramount and his ‘wishes and 
feelings’ were to be taken into account in any decision made about his future 
(according to age). Apart from some dramatic changes in family law, the Act 
made two major provisions. First, the responsibility of the LASSDs for 
protecting children was enshrined in the Act in Section 47, though, in a way, 
much of the accompanying regulations to the Act concentrated on reducing the 
‘abusive’ and intrusive nature of the Child Protection procedures. Children were 
seen as having rights to protection from an overweening state, as well as from 
abusive adults (Parton,1991).  
 
The second crucial provision of the Act was to enshrine in a coherent legislative 
form provision for ensuring the welfare of children and the recommendations of 
the Short Report. Part 3 of the Act was devoted to making LASSDs statutorily 
responsible for the provision of services to ‘children in need’ – who were 
defined, somewhat tautologically, as ‘in need of local authority services’. These 
services were seen as voluntary and therefore ‘non-stigmatising.’ They were 
intended to cover a spectrum of children, from those who required protection at 
one end, to those who were disabled or in hospital at the other. Since Child 
Protection services were hardly voluntary or non stigmatising for parents, the 
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Act, in effect, established a conceptual dichotomy between, first, those children 
who were ‘likely to suffer significant harm’ and, second, those who were ‘likely 
to suffer significant impairment if their needs were not met’ – that is, those who 
were ‘at risk’ and those who were ‘in need’. From a purely welfarist point of 
view, there was not much difference in effect between significant harm and 
significant impairment (Brandon et al, 1996). Legally, the difference was an 
attribution to the actions of carers in the first case but not in the second. Thus, 
the first group of children was in the Child Protection system and the second was 
not. 
 
An actual dichotomy was established by the economic circumstances under 
which the Act was designed and passed. The Act was ‘budget neutral’ and, since 
the local authorities were by no means doing their duty by welfare cases under 
the old legislation, there was no way in which they were going to manage new 
duties in this area. Most of the LASSDs’ scarce funds were earmarked for child 
protection. An already expensive system of procedures was elaborated and 
enlarged after the Act, acquiring all the characteristics of a formal risk 
management system, bureaucratically managed, with layers of surveillance from 
the Social Services Inspectorate at the top, to the child and family below. A 
rigidly technical discourse about sampling, monitoring and risk differentials was 
applied to a world which was as turbulent as ever, and where psychopathy had 
just been added to poverty as the defining characteristic of its inhabitants. 
Professional survival for social workers and resources for clients meant 
reframing them as dangerous or at risk. 
 
1990–2003 
 
Child Protection during this period saw the regrouping of the traditional socio-
medical/welfare lobby, as the 1990s were dominated by an examination of the 
initial workings of the Children Act as well as by even more tightening Social 
Services budgets. The results of a raft of DOH-funded research on Social 
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Services decision-making under the new Act was published in 1995 (DOH, 
1995).219 Not surprisingly, given the financial difficulties of LASSDs, the 
traditional welfarist leanings of the largely social-work academics who 
conducted this research and its ideological nature (examining sets of decisions 
and procedures against some largely inexplicit notion of good practice), this 
work was highly critical of the Child Protection. Rather puzzlingly, Social 
Services Departments were criticised for investigating too many cases in 
proportion to the number of children registered (Gibbons et al, 1995)220 and of 
putting too much emphasis on the actual registration of children and not enough 
on service follow up (Farmer et al, 1995). Also, it was found that, either de facto 
or intentionally, the system seemed to have evolved in a way that required 
registration as a trigger for any services at all. The only ‘children in need’ being 
served, apart from the physically disabled and those with extreme learning 
difficulties, were those children ‘in need of Child Protection services’: that is, 
those children ‘at risk’ (DOH, 1995).  
 
The child welfare rhetoric amongst the knowledge makers and advisers to the 
DOH was that the system had to change (Aldgate et al, 1995). This was a 
difficult act for Social Services managers, since the dependence of services on 
registration was a self-fulfilling cycle, which, one would think, could only be 
broken with more funding. In the end, in response to pressure from central 
government, directives went out from County Hall to Area Offices requiring 
Children and Families Teams to reduce the number of children registered by 
substantial amounts. A system of financial incentives to support this form of 
management was installed. The threshold for registration was thus presumably 
                                                 
219 The funding of this research on professional procedures, rather than considerations of wider 
cultural issues involved in child abuse, such as intergenerational and gender power inequalities, 
is raised by some social policy academics as an inadequacy of government. There was also a 
consideration that this research did not look at the CP process from the point of view of the child 
and her desire for confidentiality. See Fawcett, B., Featherstone, B. & Goddard, J. (2004) 
Contemporary Childcare Policy and Practice. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
220 Something that would seem a matter of a priori policy judgement about the desired extent of 
investigation, given the width of the net needed to catch x number of cases, rather than research. 
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raised, as numbers on the register dropped by the end of the decade.221 This was 
seen as a cynical management ploy by those who had thought that the 
registration of a child was recognition of the fact that they were being abused. It 
was also a somewhat paradoxical result of what could originally be seen as a 
propaganda move of the welfarist lobby. It suggested that abuse was not 
something that could be recognised in the world, but was the movable result of 
local authority finances and administrative procedures.  
 
Along with this, however, in 1999 came ‘Quality Protects’, a five year plan to 
re-emphasise and develop family support services to children, with, at last, the 
funding to go with it – nearly £900 million over five years, initially (DOH, 
1998). This was twinned with the Framework for the Assessment of Children in 
Need (DOH, 2000) which instructed local authorities to change their initial and 
‘core’ assessment procedures to relate to need rather than risk, the latter being 
just be a sub-category. Following this, the discourse of Child Protection was to 
become less forensic and recoup its socio-medical leanings, as it homed in on 
the long-term consequences for child welfare and development of all types of 
abuse. 
 
It is not yet clear what the result of this has been. The new, resource-consuming 
assessment procedures are still (in 2008) bedding down in some LASSDs. There 
has been considerable high level organisational change, including the setting up 
of Integrated Children’s Services in the Local Authorities (DOH, 2004), under 
the Department for Education and Skills and the Government Green Paper, 
Every Child Matters (Her Majesty’s Government, 2003). This has introduced a 
more universal preventative approach to child welfare services and Local 
                                                 
221 By 2001, the general figure on the Child Abuse Registers were down by 11%. The DOH 
statistician attributes this to a slight re-jigging of the categories (DOH (2001a) Children and 
Young People on the Child Protection Registers. Year Ending 31st March 2001. England. 
London: Department of Health.), but the DOH report on the Children Act 2001, made to 
Parliament in June, 2002 attributes it to a shift in resources from the Child Protection system to 
children in need and child welfare generally ---- (2002) The Children Act Report 2001. London: 
HMSO. 
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Authority responsibilities.222 Nevertheless, the government response to the 
Laming Report on the death of Victoria Climbie (Lord Laming, 2003), published 
in the same year in the form of Keeping Children Safe (DOH; H.O.; DfES, 
2003), concentrates on the Child Protection system and emphasises the 
importance of a wider more contextualised assessment procedure; a less 
incident-driven response and one orientated to a plan of intervention rather than 
merely registration. So, it is argued, the conceptual dichotomy between child 
welfare in the form of ‘family support’ and Child Protection, though deplored, 
was kept alive by the 1995 research and reactions to its message (Fawcett et al, 
2004). Furthermore, the organisational dichotomy seems to be just as enshrined 
in the LA bureaucracy as it ever was.223  
 
Amid all this inter-professional complexity and tension, emotional abuse as a 
registration category has grown rapidly, at least proportionately – and is growing 
still. The preoccupation of all services about how to respond to CSA has 
subsided and panic has on the whole been replaced with more measured 
responses. But the prophecy of some who envisaged the 1990s as ‘the decade of 
emotional abuse’ did not come true. It grew quietly, as a problem category, 
whilst the media responded to scandals about organisational abuse, and to 
paedophilia in all its real and virtual manifestations. Still, it did increase 
substantially in relation to other categories, and the way in which the invisible 
wound of emotional abuse replaced the external bodily wounds of physical and 
sexual abuse as a major source of social concern in the UK registration of 
children at risk reflects the processes already described in the last chapter.  
 
                                                 
222 The Green Paper also introduces a new system for the collection, management and 
multiprofessional availability of data on all children about whom there is any professional 
concern. This prompted questions about civil liberties. See Gallagher, B. (2005) New 
Technology: Helping or Harming Children? Child Abuse Review, 14, 367-373 and Munro, E. & 
Parton, N. (2007) How Far Is England in the Process of Introducing a Mandatory Reporting 
System. Child Abuse Review, 16, 5-16. 
    223 For instance, in the organisational structure of most LASSDs, within the children's directorate, 
'safeguarding' and 'family support' are the work of different social work teams and their leaders. 
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It has been suggested elsewhere (Cawson et al, 2000b), that this change may 
have happened, in part, because of the increased prominence given to emotional 
abuse by DOH publications, in which emotional abuse is identified as an area of 
potential maltreatment along several different dimensions. Typical was a much 
used DOH guide to family assessment, published in 1988 to accompany the 
1989 Act and called The Comprehensive Assessment, (DOH, 1988). Similarly, 
the DOH summary of the 1995 research studies identifies a core problem of 
families ‘low on warmth and high on criticism’ as ‘a risk factor for adverse 
childhood experience’ (DOH, 1995: 54), whilst the Framework for the 
Assessment of Children in Need (DOH, 2000) goes further in identifying the 
importance to child development of an emotionally warm and secure home 
environment, and the dire consequences of its negative.224 However, these direct 
injunctions to social workers clearly found a very receptive audience and, since 
there was no great educational effort by the DOH on the subject of emotional 
abuse itself (Training Officer, Oxfordshire Social Services. Interview), it could 
be argued that there was a more subtle process in play. 
 
The 1988 guide, nicknamed ‘The Orange Book’, was to be used by them in 
assessing the social circumstance of children who were to be the subject of a 
Child Protection case conference. It was indeed ‘comprehensive’ and set the 
investigation of any likely abuse into a welter of questions eliciting the most 
intimate details of family life, with more emphasis on the psycho-social 
dimensions than the material ones. The family was cast as the crucible of 
psychological problems, both for the potential abuser and the abused (DOH, 
1988). This was reinforced by the re-emergence of a more welfarist slant to 
DOH preoccupations, with the programme of research published in 1995. In the 
1990s, the advisers to the DOH were still socialised in the sort of post-war 
‘therapeutic familialism’ that went with a largely psychoanalytic education for 
                                                 
224 This publication was known as 'The Orange Book' and was mainly notorious amongst social 
workers for the very detailed - some thought intrusive - information that it seemed to demand 
from families and the disproportionate length of time it took to administer all the questions. One 
Midlands social worker timed the whole interview at 96 hours (Allsopp and Stevenson, 1995). 
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social workers (Rose, 1999). Their welfarism may have included a concern for 
poverty and inequality, but since there was little they could do about that, their 
models for change, or at least for services, were centred on family tutelage and 
the management of psychological relationships. We should note here the 
resurgence of the popularity of attachment theory (discussed in Chapters 6 and 
7).  
 
The ‘family’ of ‘family support’ services to children ‘in need’ was being created 
as a psychological, not a sociological, entity and although the ‘support’ might be 
sometimes material or practical, it was certainly not financial. This point is 
underlined by a study by Ruth Sinclair (DOH, 2001b) of the ways in which 
social workers account for the needs of children in their caseload. Of a sample 
asked to choose the main causal category, 40% voted for ‘unstable family’ and 
not one ticked the ‘poverty and social disadvantage’ box – and this against a 
20% to 4% differential on a similar piece of research commissioned by the DOH 
only four years earlier (Sinclair et al, 1997). Abuse, as a cause of need, in both 
studies, came out at about 13% (DOH, 2001b). 
 
So, it is something of the same story as the last chapter. All forms of abuse are 
seen more and more within the context of a complex of ‘maladaptive’ psycho-
social relationships from which the social is gradually lost. What remains is 
interpersonal and intrapsychic. From seeing intra- and then inter-psychic factors 
as the causes of physical forms of abuse, it is a small step to identifying 
psychological consequences of psychological causes and hypothesising a harm 
in some interior site. In a way, social workers had less far to travel along this 
road than paediatricians, used to working on the body, or politicians, who saw 
violence as the product of sociopathy. Social workers have always had their eyes 
half-turned on some inner territory, though the skills they have to find their way 
there are a little second-hand. But, whereas earlier they might have seen only 
sadness, anxiety and confusion there, in the 1990s they began to see more 
clearly the definite and actionable outline of a wound.  
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What is more, this story seems to suggest that the consequent growth of 
emotional abuse, as a registration category for children at risk of significant 
harm, has been one result of the re-valorisation of welfarism in the DOH. It has 
played its part in an ongoing debate on the proper role of social services, or more 
specialist child welfare experts, in Child Protection and on the place of Child 
Protection procedures in the overall social policy for children and families. For 
the concept of emotional abuse sits, uncomfortably, in a site where two 
orthogonal systems overlap: first, a much promoted governmental policy to 
relieve children in need, (including those experiencing the psychological 
consequences of all forms of abuse for child wellbeing and development), and, 
second, a system for managing risk which is largely legalistic and administrative 
and remains so, even if its terminology continually changes over time. The rest 
of the chapter, on the UK emotional abuse literature, illustrates this tension, out 
of which emotional abuse emerged as a larger, more serious social problem 
category and one which is fundamental to all forms of abuse.  
 
 
II. DESCRIBING THE LITERATURE 
 
The Emotional Abuse Literature: 1980–2003 
 
Apart from Judith Trowell’s lone article, (Trowell, 1983), there is virtually no 
UK publication on emotional abuse from the 1980s through to the early 1990s, 
although some on failure to thrive (see below). Arnon Bentovim, the GOSH 
Child Psychiatrist, who is well known for his work on the identification and 
treatment of child sexual abuse, did write a paper on emotional abuse for the 
Third International Congress on Child Abuse and Neglect in 1980, but regrets 
not having published it in article form.225 No doubt this omission was explained 
by the fact that his writing on child sexual abuse at this time was extensive, and 
                                                 
225 Personal communication. 
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with the help of his colleague, Child Psychiatrist, Danya Glaser, Great Ormond 
Street Hospital (GOSH), was fast being established as a national centre of 
expertise in this area and, for social workers with difficult cases, the referral of 
choice. 
 
In fact, it was Danya Glaser, from GOSH, who became the ‘moral entrepreneur’ 
for emotional abuse in the 1990s, the promoter of ‘children’s emotional safety’ – 
the title of a paper she gave in a conference on Neglect in Ballymena, Northern 
Ireland in 1997. She is practiced at such promotion, having worked in this high 
profile way with sexual abuse and will take up other causes, including the 
training presentation of attachment theory for practitioners, especially its 
neurological aspects (see Chapter 7), having an ability to disentangle 
complicated ideas and write succinctly and simply for non-specialists. She 
published her first work on emotional abuse in 1993, in a book on clinical 
paediatrics, edited by Hobbes and Wynne, the Leeds paediatricians who 
achieved prominence in the Cleveland crisis (Glaser et al, 1993). Subsequently, 
she and two long-time collaborators, Margaret Lynch, ex-Park Hospital and now 
a consultant at Guy’s Hospital, and Vivien Prior, a researcher with Glaser at 
University College, University of London, were funded by the DOH to carry out 
a study for them on the registration process for emotional abuse in four Local 
Authorities in the South East of England (Glaser et al, 2001). This study was 
originally unpublished, although made available through the British Association 
for the Study and Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect (BASPCAN). This is 
the British version of ISPCAN and certainly the most important organisation of 
its kind in the country, its yearly conferences being the main meeting place for 
leading players in the field. Later, in 1997, its official journal, Child Abuse 
Review, one of whose editors happened to be Margaret Lynch, called for papers 
on emotional abuse for a special edition, whose first piece was by Glaser and 
Prior, describing their research (Glaser et al, 1997).   
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In the UK literature, this was the only special journal issue on the subject of 
emotional abuse. As already noted, unlike those in the US, it is grounded in the 
question of intervention and multi-professional relationships in the field of Child 
Protection (Browne et al, 1997). Not surprisingly, the composition of the 
contributors’ list is quite representative of the various professional and 
intellectual positions contributing to the emotional abuse literature in this 
country. Apart from Glaser, there is also Judith Trowell, by this time at the 
Tavistock Clinic, London, representing child psycho-analytic psychiatry and 
writing of the work of a family centre and the question of case description and 
registration (Trowell et al, 1997). There is another paediatric strand, that of 
failure to thrive, represented by Dorota Iwaniec, an academic in the Social Work 
Department at Queens University in Belfast (Iwaniec, 1997), who worked on 
FTT with Martin Herbert (see Chapter 7) and produced her own PHD on the 
subject at Leicester University in 1983 (Iwaniec, 1883). She placed this 
diagnosis in its emotional abuse context in the early 1990s, producing the second 
UK monograph on this subject in 1995, The Emotionally Abused and Neglected 
Child: Identification , Assessment and Intervention (Iwaniec, 1995). 
 
The social work or child welfare strand of emotional abuse is represented in the 
1997 volume of Child Abuse Review by June Thoburn’s research team, which 
again focuses on the registration process (Wilding et al, 1997). Thoburn 
represents the traditional quantitative research approach of the DHSS and DOH 
to Local Authority Child Protection processes, having contributed to both of the 
major government funded research efforts of the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. 
She has, however, not been much involved with the progress of the concept of 
emotional abuse and it was her fellow social work academic, Olive Stevenson, 
who wrote a contribution to the first volume of a new journal, Child and Family 
Social Work, entitled, ‘Emotional Abuse and Neglect: Time for a Reappraisal’, 
(Stevenson, 1996). Stevenson, trained at the LSE when Clare Winnicot was 
teaching for the social work programme, is a standard bearer of the traditional 
social work casework skills to be found in the pre-Seebohm Children and 
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Families’ departments of the Local Authority Personal Social Services. She is 
also a champion of social workers against increasing criticisms and attacks for 
incompetence in government enquiries (she herself was on the Maria Colwell 
Committee of Inquiry, writing a minority report), and was primarily concerned 
with emotional abuse through her interest in neglect and her sense that it was not 
given enough attention in child protection. The latter was stirred by her 
experiences on the Stephanie Fox Inquiry, the only official examination of the 
death of a child where extreme neglect was an issue. She finally published a 
book on the subject in 1998 (Stevenson, 1998).  
 
Apart from Doyle, another SW academic, who contributed a study on the 
prevalence of emotional abuse to the 1997 special issue of Child Abuse Review 
(Doyle, 1997a), the only other social work contribution to the development of 
the concept of emotional abuse is that of Kevin O’Hagan, a colleague of Iwaniec 
at Queen’s College, Belfast, who curiously mixes a great concern with its 
taxonomy with many years as a practitioner and a rich knowledge of relevant 
case material. In his book, Emotional and Psychological Abuse of Children 
published in 1993, he is determined to pin down the difference between these 
two phenomena (O’Hagan, 1993) He contributes a paper pursuing this 
difference to an ISPCAN European conference in Oslo in 1995, where 
Stevenson and Glaser, among others, debate the question vigorously (O’Hagan, 
1995).  
 
Generally, emotional abuse has not had a high profile at multi-professional 
conferences. Some papers on the subject at a BASPCAN conference in 1994 
influenced the setting up of a multi-professional project to identify, study and 
treat cases of emotional abuse in Nottinghamshire (Boulton et al, 2000). A paper 
at the 2003 BASPCAN conference, written by an Australian social work 
academic, based on an earlier book (Sheehan, 2001) was later published in the 
UK journal, Child Abuse and Neglect, on a study of the fate in the Victoria 
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family courts of cases where emotional abuse was registered (Sheehan, 2006).226 
However, since the special issue, the literature has remained sparse and spotty. 
There is further work on prevalence by an NSPCC team (Cawson et al, 2000a); 
an article by Cheryl Dance and Alan Rushton (2000) on the very poor outcomes 
for what they take to be ‘emotionally abused’ children in the care system (Dance 
et al, 2002); another article by Glaser in 2002; a community approach to 
emotional abuse intervention by a health visitor (Hancock, 1998); ‘The 
Emotional Abuse of Elite Child Athletes by their Coaches’ (Gervis et al, 2004) 
and a few articles by psychologists more in the US style: one exploring the 
potential of the Child Abuse and Trauma Scale (CATS) in measuring the impact 
of childhood emotional abuse (Kent et al, 1998) and two more by the same team 
on emotional abuse as a risk factor for eating disorders (Kent et al, 2000; Kent et 
al, 1999). Another explores the question of whether maternal hostility to a child, 
as measured on the much tested EE or expressed emotion scale (pioneered by 
Vaughn et al, 1976) is a ‘sensitive indicator of emotional maltreatment potential’ 
[sic] (Calam et al, 2002).  
 
The level of discussion of this form of child abuse at both conferences and in the 
UK professional and academic literature has by no means kept pace with its 
proportionate growth as a registration category in Child Protection. Perhaps this 
is because, as the next section will show, it is a concept which those who write 
about it claim to be elusive and hard to define. 
 
 
III. MAPPING THE TERRITORY 
 
Definitions of Emotional Abuse: Finding the Grid Reference 
                                                 
226 Research from Victoria, Australia (with a similar legal system) shows that emotional abuse is 
the hardest category to process legally as a simple abuse type registration, yet as an additional 
registration with another physical category, it makes care proceedings more likely to succeed. It 
is hard to make a case with just the sort of welfare evidence needed to support claims to 
emotional abuse. But hard evidence, incidents etc, can be subject to legal quibble and then the 
soft evidence of a child’s general emotional state may swing the case. 
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For these UK writers, academics and professional practitioners, the terrain 
around the emotional abuse of children is a very muddy field. The problem is 
where to find it. The term stands for a basketful of others, spreading out over the 
eclectic area of professional childcare talk, between which there are no clear 
boundaries: ‘emotional neglect’, ‘psychological deprivation’, ‘emotional 
withdrawal’, ‘psychological unavailability’, ‘emotional disturbance’, ‘mental 
injury’, ‘psychological torture or terror’ and ‘psychological maltreatment’. 
These are all examples given by Kevin O’Hagan in his book, mentioned above . 
His was the first UK monograph on this subject written after a decade in which 
the registration category of emotional abuse remained very small – under-used, 
he suggests, because practitioners find it hard to recognise. It is a ‘difficult, 
diffuse concept’ (Calam et al, 1989: 75, cited in O’Hagan, 1993: 20), or 
‘nebulous, because the outward signs are hazy, indistinct and obscure’ (Morgan, 
1987: cited in O’Hagan, 1993: 20). O’Hagan himself makes a heroic attempt to 
bring clarity to the field by pinning emotional abuse down to its adverse effect 
on child development and making a clear, though questionably helpful, 
distinction between emotional abuse which affects emotional development and 
psychological abuse which affects the psychological equivalent. After this, he 
resorts to a multiplicity of case examples, as do all the other authors of 
monographs in this field (O’ Hagan, 1993). 
  
This process of defining by pointing to examples is not necessarily an invalid 
procedure or a sign of defeat. Ian Hacking (1995) has suggested that most often 
when we try to define classes or concepts, or names for things, we proceed by 
way of finding prototypes for the thing in question. We do not, for instance, 
tease out the essential ‘birdness’ of a bird, but rather use an example, like a 
sparrow or an eagle, which is seen as typical; literally, a fine example of its kind. 
We place the eagle at the centre of a definitional field, in which some other, 
more deviant, kind, like an ostrich, would be placed at the extreme periphery, 
distinguished mostly by its obvious difference from the prototypes. If this is a 
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useful procedure in the defining of natural kinds, how much more useful in the 
defining of seemingly vague ideas in the social world. Nevertheless, the 
literature about emotional abuse is ‘scientific’ and so proceeds relentlessly the 
other way about. Every research or clinical paper on the subject is prefaced by 
an attempt at a stipulative (or persuasive) definition, usually lining up a whole 
range of preceding attempts and opting for the one which, with embellishments, 
seems most appropriate to the preoccupations of the writer. Thus, in exposition, 
the case studies are merely illustrations of what has already been decided upon, 
although they may have contributed implicitly to the decision.  
 
Nevertheless, in taking (literally) a more ‘bird’s eye view’ of the terrain of UK 
emotional abuse literature, the idea of the prototype is very useful in a different 
way: that is, in thinking about the place of emotional abuse within the wider 
category of abuse as a whole. Here, as Hacking has suggested, physical abuse 
and sexual abuse have been, and are, taken as the definitional prototypes of child 
abuse in general. In terms of his avian example, emotional abuse appears at first, 
at least, and in relation to the other two, to be rather like the flightless ostrich. It 
is easier to say what it does not resemble in the prototypes than what it 
essentially is: easier to define the boundaries of the space it occupies than to 
describe its detailed topography. But in exploring what it does resemble in the 
prototypes, it is possible to piece together a picture of its internal consistencies 
and contradictions. In doing this, one may discover, also, three different domains 
of usage in the building of a defining picture. The first is the figurative language 
of the vernacular with its emotive and persuasive definitions, which was 
addressed in Chapter 1 and not further investigated here. The second is the 
positivistic language of welfare science, which tries to locate this problem, 
through its indicators, in the real world of problems, technically defined, 
although, like all relatives of medical science concerned with health and 
wellbeing, it is entirely normative. The third acknowledges the socio-legal 
aspects of abuse and its relationship to varying legal and quasi-legal standards 
and administrative procedures.  
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i) The figurative domain:  
One reason why emotional abuse is so hard to pin down is that it refers to injury 
in an area of human identity which is largely understood in terms of metaphor 
and, particularly, figurative tropes of the body, as already noted. It occupies a 
space bounded on one side by assault of a physical and or sexual nature, leaving 
visible bodily signs or wounds, and on the other by more subtle seduction and 
misuse of power which is revealed in the telling. As Judith Trowell argues, in 
emotional abuse, ‘victims are unable or do not speak of the abuse; ‘symptoms’ 
are non-specific and there are no pathognomic findings on examination’ 
(Trowell et al, 1997: 358). If emotional abuse leaves a wound, it is invisible, 
inscribed on some site that we might call the inner life. Any non-specific 
behavioural symptoms could be read as an outward expression of this wounded 
inner state.  
 
ii) The domain of welfare science. 
Battery, murder and abuse all refer to both a deviant action and its effects. But in 
the official DOH lexicon of abuse definitions, on one side of the border, child 
physical abuse is defined as the wound, the physical effects of abuse; on the 
other side, child sexual abuse is defined by the deviant acts of a perpetrator. This 
is probably due to their origins, the first in paediatrics and radiology and the 
second in the more abstract power-based discourse of feminism. So the abuse 
prototypes, in their official definitions at least, fall either side of the ambiguous 
space that emotional abuse occupies. Child emotional abuse is officially defined 
as both effect and action; the wound inscribed on behaviour and development, 
rather than the body as such and the abusive behaviour defined, somewhat 
tautologically, as is appropriate to a legal document, in terms of its effects, as:  
 
The actual or likely adverse effect on behaviour and emotional 
development…caused by persistent or severe emotional ill-treatment or 
rejection (DOH, 1989b: 49). 
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This is not just an official partial-truism. Whilst authors in the research and 
clinical literature agree that the DOH definition is unhelpful, ambivalence about 
whether emotional abuse refers to a behaviour or its effects persists across this 
body of work. This may be partly due to competing traditions of research in 
which psychiatry has a long history of assessing ‘dangerousness’ in the 
perpetrators of crime, whereas the traditions of paediatrics, and then 
developmental psychology, are more obviously concerned with symptoms and 
growth patterns in its object – the child. While some writers give a set of 
definitions that focus on parental behaviour alone (Bailey et al, 1986; McGee et 
al, 1991a; McGee et al, 1991b), others (Iwaniec, 1995; Skuse, 1989, for 
example), as is appropriate to experts on failure to thrive, focus on the effects of 
parental behaviour on the child. Kavanagh (1982) focuses specifically on its 
physical effects in psychosocial dwarfism. However, these one-sided definitions 
create technical problems, since neither the parental behaviours nor their effects 
on children are highly predictive of or specific to emotional abuse (Aber et al, 
1981; Trowell et al, 1997). Therefore, emotional abuse cannot be reliably 
inferred from either set of indicators. Just as in the diagnosis of PTSD, the 
symptoms are made sense of by the aetiological event, so effects have to be 
linked to acts to gain specificity. Thus Garbarino and his colleagues produced a 
much quoted combination of these two as ‘a concerted attack on a child’s 
development of self and social competence’. This takes five forms – ‘rejecting 
… isolating … terrorising … ignoring … corrupting’ (Garbarino et al, 1986a). 
This list is somewhat similar to that of Hart and his colleagues (Brassar et al, 
1987), which is used by Doyle and extended by Glaser (Doyle, 1997a; Glaser, 
2002a; Glaser et al, 1997). 
 
These parental acts in emotional abuse definitions also distinguish themselves 
from those in the large boundary category of neglect, that is, essentially, acts of 
omission, and from those in its binary category of deliberate acts of cruelty, 
most clearly seen in the socio-legal category of sexual abuse. Again, emotional 
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abuse is seen by most writers cited as comprising both. In this welfarist 
definition, for example, emotional abuse consists of  
 
parental acts that thwart children’s basic emotional needs such as 
psychological safety, the need for a family environment free of extensive 
hostility and violence, the need for a stable and available caregiver and the 
need for self esteem (Barnett et al, 1991: 19).  
 
‘Thwarting’ needs is stronger than ‘not meeting’ them, but still neutral as to 
whether it is a hostile or neglectful act. Questions of criminal responsibility and 
intentionality are not relevant to welfare considerations, in so far as it 
pronounces on effects only – matters of damage to health and development. 
 
At the socio-legal level, it is partly because of their relation to the Criminal 
Justice System, that physical abuse and sexual abuse are defined officially, at 
least, as one-off acts, and are certainly investigated and thought about in relation 
to events which have already occurred. In contrast, Iwaniec and Glaser, for 
instance, insist that these emotionally abusive acts of parents should persist over 
time for them to be judged abusive (Glaser et al, 1997; Iwaniec, 1997). 
Otherwise, the definition is too inclusive of the odd lapse in parenting standards 
that may happen in the best of families. Such lapses are not allowed in 
perpetrators of physical injury and any, even remotely, sexual act with a minor 
may be processed as abusive. Emotional abuse is much more a matter of degree. 
Thus, Belsky, for example, asserts that it is important, in our attempts to 
measure the summative effects of rejection, terrorising and the rest, on 
development, not to ignore the immediate effects of such acts on a child’s 
mental state, and that causing pain and unhappiness in the short term is as 
important and as abusive as its long term behavioural effects (Belsky, 1991). 
However, there seems a consensus in the literature that the negative nature of 
emotional abuse is in some sense cumulative and should be defined in relation to 
its long term consequences. 
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Unlike physical or sexual abuse, which may be constituted by the one-off act 
discussed above – ‘an event’ (Glaser et al, 1997), the infliction of an injury, a 
molestation, or even the taking of a photograph – Glaser and Prior insist that 
emotional abuse refers to  
 
A relationship rather than an event. Such relationships constitute an 
heterogeneous collection of psychologically undesirable interactions or 
forms of ill treatment which are pervasive or characteristic of the parent-
child relationship. The relationship may be actually or potentially harmful to 
the child (Glaser et al, 1997: 315). 
 
Trowell, in the same volume, supports this view and emphasises the role of 
emotionally abused children’s ‘developmentally damaged’ behaviour in eliciting 
from parents, who might initially have been merely neglectful, negative and 
overtly hostile reactions. Thus, emotional abuse can be seen as not only 
cumulative but, potentially, growing exponentially, a system subject to positive 
feedback (Trowell et al, 1997). This more interactional approach towards abuse 
may reflect the part that systemic family therapy has played in the development 
of child psychiatry techniques and knowledge, but it also reflects similar 
descriptions of parent–child interaction by attachment theorists such as 
Crittenden and Ainsworth (Crittenden et al, 1989; Crittenden et al, 1991). These 
are thoroughly normative, unlike systems theory, and place responsibility firmly 
on poor parenting inscribed on a tabula rasa, the face of childhood innocence. It 
is the child that suffers from a poor relationship, not the parents, or if the parents 
do suffer, it is unimportant, because it is they who are responsible for the 
relationship and not the child. And this is the responsibility, Doyle (out of Hart 
and colleagues) reminds us, of all ‘parent figures, who are in a position of 
differential power that renders the child vulnerable’ (Doyle, 1997a: 331).  
 
Finally, we have noted that emotional abuse, unlike sexual abuse and many 
cases of physical abuse, is seldom, if ever, indicated by a single event and can be 
seen as the result of a relationship over time. What constitutes abuse is a 
quantitative rather than a qualitative matter. In this, it is much like physical 
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neglect, which it also resembles in the way that parental acts are not necessarily 
deliberately destructive but are to be judged by the effect that they have on the 
welfare of the child. In both cases, the problem, both practically and 
theoretically, is where to draw the line; where does poor or inadequate parenting 
end and abuse begin? 
 
iii) The socio-legal domain  
Unlike severe physical abuse and sexual abuse, which are criminal acts and are 
partly, at least, investigated and assessed forensically (though of course acts of 
excessive physical punishment are more socially contentious), the drawing of 
the line in emotional abuse implies ‘tutelary’ intervention in families rather than 
criminal prosecution (Donzelot, 1979) and is a judgement based, presumably, on 
the knowledge of welfare or child-care professionals. This knowledge is not only 
factual but normative, being not only expertise in child development and what is 
statistically normal, but also in what is normal because healthy and therefore 
‘acceptable’. The crucial question remains: ‘acceptable’ to whom? 
 
According to Doyle (1997), emotionally abusive behaviour consists of: 
 
Acts of omission and commission which are judged on the basis of a 
combination of community standards and professional expertise to be 
psychologically damaging. Such acts damage immediately or ultimately the 
behavioural, cognitive, affective, social and psychological functioning of the 
child (Doyle, 1997a: 331). 
 
This suggests two sorts of judgments – the one, clinical, based on notions of 
health, in this case mental health, and the second, moral or evaluative, based on 
‘community standards’ and more socio-legal considerations. It is not clear 
whether these standards relate to the acts per se, to unacceptable levels of 
damage or to their likelihood. However, this definition of emotional abuse is one 
of the few in this literature that acknowledges that some notion of social values 
and therefore contingency is implied in the term ‘abuse’.  
 
 242 
Further, it is claimed by Glaser and Prior that the word abuse implies action – 
not just an expression of values but a particular type of process: 
 
The abuse threshold is reached when the continued viability of the parent 
child relationship is regarded as unacceptable without attempted intervention 
(Glaser et al, 1997: 315-316). 
 
Crucially, a poor relationship becomes abusive at the point at which it cannot be 
allowed to go on without this ‘intervention’, which in a clinical context means 
treatment and, in the multi-professional world of Child Protection, means 
administrative and occasionally legal action as well. As we will see, however, 
Glaser is not entirely sure of its desirability in all cases (see below). 
 
Size Matters: the Prevalence of Emotional Abuse in the UK 
 
The above delineates three distinct sources of difficulty in definition. The first 
concerns the precise applicability of figurative understandings; the second the 
task of recognising emotional abuse when you see it, because of the vagueness 
of the behavioural indicators and their embeddedness in the interactional 
patterns of a relationship over time. The third acknowledges the cultural context 
in which terms like abuse are used, which suggests that different meanings and, 
indeed, different professional practices attach themselves to the clinical and the 
administrative versions, although often, in the definitions offered, the assumed 
cultural context is not made clear.  
 
In such presentations of a social problem category, attempts at definition are 
usually followed by estimates of prevalence. But with such a slippery concept, 
open to various interpretations, it would not be surprising that different claims 
are made about the spread of this phenomenon over the general population: to 
how many people this concept can be applied; what its location is in particular 
sections or classes; and its seriousness and importance as a social problem 
category. What is surprising is the level of unanimity on its under-representation 
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in the official figures, when how it is to be recognised and by whom is so 
contentious. 
 
Of course, as with any social behaviour which is a feature of the ‘private’ or 
family sphere, and certainly with all forms of abuse, there is a public rhetoric 
about ‘the dark figures’ - those instances that will not be picked up by official 
administrative procedures, nor be revealed in answer to prevalence study 
questionnaires; a suspicion that there is more of it about than meets the eye and a 
call for more professional vigilance, more knowledge and, of course, more 
research (O’Hagan 1993). Iwaniec writes about ‘a growing consensus among 
professionals that emotional maltreatment is more prevalent than was realised’ 
(Iwaniec, 1997: 370). Certainly, the only two UK prevalence studies of 
emotional abuse available to date show a greater proportional identification of 
this category in the general population than in the Child Protection statistics. 
These are interesting examples of their kind and, as ever, it is the application of 
the category which is contentious, because of the bifurcation of the requirements 
of scientific statistical research from those of administration, referred to above.  
 
The first study by Doyle, the social work academic, used a sample of 504 
students, an equal mix of mature people on access and in-service courses and 
young undergraduates, who answered a detailed questionnaire (Doyle, 1997a; 
Doyle, 1997b). Using as clear and careful a definition as is available (from 
Brassard et al, 1987; Hart et al, 1983), the subjects’ responses were scored 
against several different dimensions of the definition and these scores were 
checked by an independent judge, working professionally in child-protection, 
who used their responses to eliminate or exclude marginal cases. The child and 
family characteristics of this emotional abuse group was also checked out with a 
set of 112 Local Authority cases registered for emotional abuse, to which they 
appeared remarkably similar in major characteristics, so that a sort of negotiated 
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measure of ‘caseness’ was achieved.227 Of this sample, 29% were in the 
emotional abuse category; 14% in the physical abuse and 9% in sexual abuse 
categories (presumably also self reported). The size of the two latter categories 
are roughly similar to those from other earlier prevalence studies (Creighton et 
al, 1995; La Fontaine, 1990; Smith et al, 1995) which lends some credibility to 
size of the emotional abuse group. Also supporting these claims to caseness was 
the characteristics of the families involved and the style of parenting recalled, 
which matched those of the supplementary group of registered cases, as well as 
those of similar registered samples in other studies (for example, Glaser et 
al,1997; Trowell et al,1997).228  
 
The later NSPCC prevalence study (Cawson et al, 2000b) uses a ‘nationally 
representative sample’ of 2869 young adults, whose answers to questions about 
their childhoods were researcher-scored on a highly complex multidimensional 
system.229 Although dwelling at length on ‘the innate difficulties of definition, 
measurement and proof’ for emotional abuse, noting the extreme volatility of the 
figures in US studies (Friedrich et al, 1997) and the discrepancy in such studies 
between professional identification and self report (McGee, 1995), the report 
came up with estimates for all categories, more conservative than Doyle’s, with 
neglect, physical and emotional abuse all running at about 6% of the sample, 
while CSA was lower at about 3% (Cawson et al, 2000b).    
 
Either way, unsurprisingly, for both studies the numbers identified for the total 
population of the abused far exceeded the numbers of children registered. More 
surprisingly, the proportional relationships of the various categories of abuse and 
                                                 
For the concept of 'cosiness' see Brown, G. W. & Harris, T. (1978) Social Origins of 
Depression: A Study of Psychiatric Disorder in Women. London: Tavistock. 
228 For example, in the emotional abuse group families, on the whole, both parents, who were 
largely present, were involved in the abuse. The families showed significantly more socio-
economic problems: financial distress; parental mental health problems and alcohol abuse, than 
did the non-emotional abuse groups (supported by Glaser & Pryor, 1997). These are clearly not 
specific to emotional abuse, being, not surprisingly, 'risk factors' across the whole spectrum of 
abuse.  
229 Based on a combination of Hart’s and Garbarino’s multi-dimensional definitions augmented 
by the work of Bifulco and Moran (1998) on the links between child abuse and mental illness.  
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neglect are completely different from those in the official statistics, collected by 
the DOH from Local Authority registers starting in 1989. Far from being the 
largest category, or one of them, as presented here, in these classifications 
emotional abuse has always, until the turn of the century, been the smallest. It 
rose dramatically in the early 1990s from 4% to about 14% of the total and still 
grew, though more slowly, from 1995 to 1999, when, at 17%, it overtook CSA, 
which declined over this time from 24% to 15%. Neglect and physical abuse are 
the two largest categories, the first increasing from 30% to over 40% of the total 
from 1995-99 and the second reciprocally declining from 40% by about the 
same amount (DOH, 1999).  
  
Given the usual caveats about the difficulties of definition, the non-reproduction 
of the study, the sample sizes and, in the first case, at least, its questionable 
representation of the general population, the huge discrepancy in the proportions 
allocated to the various categories is still remarkable. The fact that it is 
emotional abuse that is so widely recalled but not so widely registered seems to 
require explanation. Technical aspects of the way that the Child Protection 
figures are collected may account for a small but not a major part of the 
discrepancy230 but not the major part, however. The possibility that cases 
referred to Social Services represent a different, less socio-economically 
privileged part of the population than average also cannot explain much of the 
discrepancy. The families of those scored as suffering emotional abuse in the 
prevalence studies do seem to have the same socio-economic characteristics as 
those of the supplementary cases and, on the face of it, this should imply a 
smaller proportion of emotional abuse in the general population, rather than a 
larger one. (Doyle, 1997)  
                                                 
230The DHSS (1988) Working Together document states that 'all abuse involves some emotional 
ill treatment; this category (emotional abuse) should be used where it is the main or sole form of 
abuse.' Otherwise the child is registered under some other category of abuse. When, in 1995, the 
DOH, in recognition of the frequent coexistence of emotional abuse with other forms of abuse 
and neglect, invited Local Authorities to resubmit that year’s figures for registration of emotional 
abuse as an equal category with some other form, this raised the figures for 1996 to 24% of total 
registrations for those 24 Local Authorities who chose to comply, taking it just above the 
numbers for sexual abuse but still nowhere near that for physical. 
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Of course, not even the most naïve realist would think that a prevalence study 
set against official data was comparing like with like, though these differences 
might be thought to operate for all categories of abuse claims. However, when 
the sources of difference are analysed it is possible that these have more 
influence on findings for categories which are vague and definition difficult. It is 
not just that recall is unreliable compared to some present assessment, or that 
self report may be more extravagant in these times of increasing interest in 
victimhood. On the contrary, all the research evidence suggests that 
professionals are more likely to classify certain behaviours as abusive, than 
victims or the general population (McGee, 1995). But first there is the important 
issue of saliency which causes major, though often unacknowledged, problems 
with any questionnaire data and also with its subsequent validation by 
professionals; these issues are recognised in an artificial way, because they are 
put high up on the agenda of respondents and experts alike by the research 
context and the well established volatility of the emotional abuse data supports 
this. These considerations would be even more influential for an experience 
which does not relate to an objectively verifiable event.  
 
Much more telling for the argument from uncertainty is the thought that putting 
someone in a category for research purposes only has consequences for the 
research; the discourse is scientific. The classification by registration of children 
and their families in the context of a multi-professional Case Conference in 
Child Protection, however, is an administrative and legal process which has 
enormous, powerful and potentially negative consequences for all the actors 
involved. The process of its negotiation is hardly scientific, but rather, it is 
claimed by some (Parton et al, 1997; Thorpe, 1994; Wattam, 1992), primarily 
political – an activity which has little to do with the filling in of a questionnaire. 
  
The Making of Child Protection Statistics 
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The making of Child Protection statistics over the 1990s is a multi-professional 
process which may also involve the community at large in the first stage of 
referral of a child. The Personal Social Services Department of the Local 
Authority is statutorily responsible for receiving and investigating concerns 
about the wellbeing of any child in its area and, indeed for the whole Child 
Protection process. Other agencies have a statutory duty to refer concerns about 
a child to Social Services (unlike in the USA where reporting is mandatory). On 
the whole, this duty is taken very seriously by all agencies involved with 
children and professional referrers may retain an active part in a case, or be 
drawn in at a later date where Social Services, as advised by the case conference, 
require.  
 
When a child is referred to Social Services, he/she becomes an eponymous case 
file which will start on a journey. This journey can be seen from different 
perspectives and is mapped in several distinct ways in the Child Protection 
literature. Generally, it is seen as a series of alternative pathways and gateways 
at certain decision nodes, in the form of a decision tree. The story goes 
something like this: Decision node 1– a private individual or an agency decides 
on the basis of available information whether to refer to Social Services or not. 
The branch not chosen is pruned out. DN2 – The Social Services Duty team (or 
short term Children and Families team) who receive the referral, might seek 
more information (consult the police, for instance) then decide, on the basis of 
what they know, whether to investigate or not. The ‘not’ branch, again, is 
pruned, unless other services are offered. DN 3 – on the basis of an investigation 
about which the police will be informed and in which they may participate, a 
decision is taken to call a multi-professional case conference to consider 
registration of the child as in need of protection. If the need for protection is 
thought urgent and imperative, the local Magistrates courts are involved in 
considering a court order for the immediate removal of a child from her family 
into local authority care. If neither of these, the branch is not necessarily pruned. 
The child and family may be offered certain services via referral to a long term 
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Children and Families team. Too often, it is claimed in Messages from Research, 
(DOH 1995), there is ruthless pruning here – no subsequent support for families 
investigated, who in terms of their characteristics or ‘needs’ should qualify. 
 
DN4 – the multi-professional Case Conference decides whether or not to register 
the child as having suffered or as likely to suffer significant harm (harm where a 
close caretaker is involved in its commission or lack of prevention). The 
conference is attended by the child, if of sufficient age, and her parents or 
significant others and by all the myriad professionals involved (by this time) 
with the key participants. It is serviced by the relevant Social Services 
department in terms of its chairing and reports, the key paper being a Risk 
Assessment compiled by the allocated short term Social Worker, on the basis of 
as much information as can be gleaned from families and involved professionals 
in the time available. This makes recommendations on the basis of evidence for 
what has happened to the child, her immediate safety and the best long term 
strategy for her protection. If it is decided not to register the child, again she may 
anyway be assigned some services, but not necessarily.  
 
The consequent pathways for the child after registration are multiple. For all 
registered cases the child should, rather than will, be allocated to a different 
social worker from a long term team. He/she will manage the case and 
coordinate the efforts of the multidisciplinary team, act as mouthpiece and agent 
for the child and work ‘in partnership’ with her parents.231 This social worker 
will also do a ‘Comprehensive Assessment’ of child and family, for which the 
bureaucratic requirements are enormous in terms of the number of questions 
specified and their detailed and personal nature. She may also request from other 
agencies more technical pieces of work in the assessment process. When this is 
ready, the conference will be recalled. On the basis of this assessment a 
Protection Plan will be formulated and its original decisions will be reviewed. 
Further review should happen every three months.   
                                                 
   231 Shortage of social workers, especially in the London boroughs, is a constant problem here.  
 249 
 
The differing natures of the Protection Plans constitute the different pathways 
for the child. The system is designed to bring down the level of risk to the child 
to an acceptable level, which would be achieved differently for different forms 
of abuse, in contexts presenting different threats to the child at different levels of 
likely realisation. A high level of seriousness is often constituted by what is seen 
as parental lack of cooperation or denial of a problem. At this level, the Local 
Authority might take an interim care order on a child, if not taken already, whilst 
preparing to apply to the Magistrates Court for a full care order, while looking 
after the child in foster accommodation or with extended family. At a lesser 
level, parents might be offered a combined package of services and monitoring 
by Social Services plus other specialist agencies, designed to address family 
problems and bring about sufficient change in the child’s social context to lessen 
risk. The procedures are designed to monitor the state of any child on the 
Register regularly, to respond swiftly to any deterioration, to aim for 
deregistration as soon as possible, and case closure when and if a satisfactory 
outcome is achieved. There is a horror of ‘case drift’ in the Social Services 
bureaucracy. This is not surprising, as the LASSDs supply figures for 
registration and deregistration, as well as numbers on the register, broken down 
by age, gender and registration category, to the relevant government department. 
These are then published and scrutinised for quality performance. 
 
The decision tree described above has been framed to present a bureaucratic 
model of the ‘if, then’ kind: if certain conditions are fulfilled the child goes into 
a particular category and certain procedures are triggered. What is implicit in 
this rendering are categories of risk. This is the way the process would have 
been viewed by Local Authority Child Protection Coordinators, or their 
equivalent, whose role it was to devise systems for surveillance and monitoring 
of risky situations for children, and systems for monitoring systems. This could 
easily be reframed in terms of categories of need, although this reframing might 
affect the level at which standards are placed and lines drawn. After 2000, this 
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happened, as a new system has been phased into the functioning of local 
authority children’s services (DOH, 2000). It extends assessment, in theory at 
least, to the needs of all children who cross the threshold of Social Services, and 
frames Child Protection interventions as just one service to children and, 
somewhat bizarrely, to parents as well.  
 
Much research on the Child Protection process (usually financed by DOH) is, as 
already noted, an evaluation along these two approaches to decision making, or 
some combination of the two, against an implicit model of ‘good practice’. But 
the framework of gateways and pathways may also tell an entirely different, 
more sociological story about the making of a ‘child protection career’. This 
becomes an interactional process, negotiated between child, family and 
professionals, whose case talk, writing and meetings can be seen as a process of 
situated reasoning, in which the moral worth of parents is continually assessed 
(Dingwall et al, 1983; Parton et al, 1997; Thorpe, 1994; Wattam, 1992). Rittner 
and Wodarski claim that the complexity of abusive situations in families 
requires an ecological approach to its assessment, occurring, as it does ‘within a 
milieu of family dysfunction, environmental stress and societal values relating to 
child rearing’ (Rittner et al, 1995: 45). But the logic of an ecological approach is 
that the assessors too are part of a complex ecology232 within which Child 
Protection statistics do not just describe or misdescribe the world, however 
complex. They are also made by it and make it; they are part of an intricate 
social process that has its own ‘rationality’ (Perrow, 1984). 
 
Pushing the Boundaries: The Statistics and Child Emotional Abuse as an 
official Problem Category. 
 
The Child Protection statistics for emotional abuse can be seen to embody all the 
complexity of their administration. Whilst they clearly grew over the 1990s, 
                                                 
232 This view is part of what Gregory Bateson called 'second-order cybernetics'. For a summary, 
see von Foerster, H. (1974) Cybernetics of Cybernetics. Urbana Illinois: University of Illinois. 
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which might be taken as some indication of a cultural shift, either within Social 
Services, or the society at large, or both, the predominant narrative in the 
professional and academic literature on this subject – what little there is of it – is 
that there is still the sort of large discrepancy between the proportions of the 
different sorts of abuse that prevail in the population at large, or even in the 
population of Social Services clients, and those revealed in the figures that were 
discussed above. The story is that emotional abuse as a social problem is under-
represented in the Child Protection statistics in comparison with other 
categories; that this is the fault of the administrative procedures and the decision 
making process, and that although this is a multi-professional process, it 
somehow reflects the inadequacy of social workers – a constant theme of all 
other professionals, Social Work academics and sometimes even Social Work 
managers.233  
 
The first part of the narrative is the positivistic one about all the difficulties with 
definition noted above, which means that social workers and other professionals 
(but mainly social workers) cannot recognise emotional abuse when they see it 
(Kaplan et al, 1999; O’Hagan, 1993). Next, a development of this account, more 
legalistic in flavour, is that since all the behavioural indicators are non-specific, 
even if ‘the emotional abuse inherent in the situation’ is not ‘missed’ (Trowell et 
al, 1997: 338), it is extremely hard to prove that developmental delays in 
children are ‘caused’ by particular parental behaviours, singly or in combination. 
This is the proof that will have to be shown if ‘significant harm’ is to be 
established in court. Lack of proof might presumably prevent a case conference 
from putting an official imprimatur on a suspected case of emotional abuse. (In 
most of the 1990s, at least, there are countervailing arguments here, mostly 
using the controversial assertion that, in most Local Authorities, registration of a 
                                                 
233 They cite poor training, overwork, youth and inexperience, high turnover, difficulty in 
recruiting. There are well trained competent social workers from the New World, but they do not 
understand the social context here and, anyway, do not stay for long, because they live only 
temporarily in the UK. (Social Work Manager and Academics. Interviews). 
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child is needed as a trigger to any services at all and that registration is generally 
over-used (DOH, 1995). 
 
The third, more prevalent narrative is that social workers or the Case Conference 
may recognise the characteristics of emotional abuse in a case under discussion, 
but not appreciate its seriously damaging nature in comparison with other forms 
of abuse and, therefore, not feel the necessity to register. This applies to 
emotional abuse when it exists on its own, or also where it co-exists with other 
forms for one child. Child physical abuse and child sexual abuse and even 
neglect are registered in preference. Circumstantial evidence for this is given in 
Trowell’s analysis of a group of children referred to a North London Family 
Centre for treatment, where few are registered for emotional abuse but the level 
of concern, expressed by referrers and staff of the centre alike, is about the 
emotional and developmental state of the sample children (Trowell et al, 1997). 
Glaser and Prior (1997), in their DOH sponsored study of the registration 
process in four Local Authorities in South East England, note a significant delay 
in the registration of their sample children for emotional abuse, 96% of them 
previously known to Social Services, which, they claim is only explained by 
some reluctance on the part of the Case Conference/ Social Services to register. 
They observe that in contrast to those cases of abuse which, definitionally, 
depend on the occurrence of a particular sort of ‘event’, where registration is 
prompt, the registration of emotional abuse seems to depend on a slow build up 
of, probably, non-specific concern . This contrasts interestingly with registration 
for neglect, a process in which it has been noticed that a long term symbiotic 
relationship between Social Services and these traditional ‘revolving door’ 
clients is precipitated, catastrophe like, into a more coercive interaction by ‘an 
incident’ – an event involving actual physical or sexual injury to the child, or 
indicating, at least, a high level of its probability (Allsopp et al, 1995; 
Stevenson, 1998).  
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What is apparent in the case accounts of a large sample of social workers, 
interviewed in 1994, is an implicit hierarchy in the administrative response to 
different forms of abuse, explicitly recognised in this statement by a Social 
Services manager: 
 
If we looked for emotional abuse we’d have half the country up Social 
Services. [So we look to see if children are] clean, well dressed, well fed, 
robust … the outward and visible sign of inward spiritual grace, if you 
like…. If the same children were to appear with runny noses and muddy 
ears, with wet underwear and dirty clothes and not having had breakfast etc 
etc, it starts to be a different ballgame [neglect]. But even then we sort of 
hang on in there. But if they’ve got a lump missing from the side of their 
head, or Mum’s boyfriend touched their bottom or something…. Its that bit 
which is very, very important’ (Allsopp et al, 1995: 42). 
 
It is this hierarchy which is implicitly recognised in the emotional abuse 
literature, in the constant injunction that emotional abuse should be allotted more 
importance in our concerns about the wellbeing of children. The claim is that 
emotional abuse and its effects are ‘as serious’ as (Glaser et al, 1997: 316) 
indeed ‘more damaging’ than (Iwaniec, 1995: 370; Trowell et al, 1997:358) than 
those of other forms of abuse. 
 
What is being asserted here? Is it just that physical, outward harm is more easy 
to prove (Trowell et al, 1997) and so more children are registered under this 
label; or is it that members of Case Conferences genuinely think that the harmful 
effects of emotional abuse on children are so much less than that of other forms? 
What is also implied, though not explicitly spelled out in the literature, is that 
these decisions are the outcome of a process which is coded in the language of 
risk – an approach heavily criticised in the Child Protection literature since the 
mid-1990s. A commonplace of the DOH research on the decision making 
process (DOH,1995) is that most of the time is taken up with establishing 
whether a particular event has occurred, in order to identify abuse, rather than, 
more desirably, discussing future plans for ensuring the welfare of the child 
(Farmer et al, 1995). This preoccupation may be for legal reasons, but it is also 
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because an incident of physical or sexual abuse is the best predictor of another 
occurrence, without intervention. It may also be seen as an indicator of what 
may be escalating violence or a build up of stress as the ‘critical path’ models 
have it (Lynch, 1976). Given the characterisation of emotional abuse as a long-
term relationship, the point in time of the intervention is not so crucial. As 
Glaser and Pryor , in their 1997 paper, point out, unless the intervention involves 
removing a child from her caretakers, any therapeutic plan can only be expected 
to make a difference to a child and family over the long haul. The situation does 
not threaten to deteriorate, catastrophe like, in the near future. It is the nearness 
of this future which may also be crucial to the different decisions taken for each 
form of abuse. According to the assumptions of welfare economics,234 however 
objectively equal the damage to the child in the different forms of abuse, the 
disutility of an event or outcome in the far future cannot be similar to that 
attached to an event which may be imminent – even if the process were entirely 
dominated by objective welfare considerations. But this is a system of risk 
management, in which the layers of surveillance and monitoring extend from the 
child and family, through Social Services management to the Social Services 
Inspectorate. With high levels of anxiety, accountability, and frequent turnover 
of jobs, it would be hardly surprising if the more imminent forms of harm had 
more saliency in the outcomes under consideration and the more predictable 
forms of abuse took precedence in the registration process.  
 
Category Confusion 
 
There is something strange about the logic of the claims of these academics and 
practitioners in the child welfare field, which extends across the medical, 
psychological and social work professions. In claiming the inadequacy of the 
registration process in recognising the extent of emotional abuse as compared 
with a, presumably, more accurate response to other forms of abuse, they are 
                                                 
234 In Welfare Economics it is assumed that economic agents have a “time preference”, so that, 
when thinking of future consumption they discount future income streams at a cumulative rate.   
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recognising that the production of this data is an entirely contingent process. Yet 
it is, at least partly, both on the basis of this data stream, and the concept of 
emotional abuse encapsulated in the government guidance of 1980, the 
ontologically subjective product of a human and highly fallible process, that 
much of their scientific, or social scientific research is based. Moreover, it is this 
research, through its enumeration of various behavioural indicators and family 
characteristics, or the way that self report questionnaires build up a threshold of 
‘seriousness’, which is used to identify emotional abuse as a problem in the real 
world which has an objective existence, independent of the official Child 
Protection category. 
 
Perhaps this is the confusion that underlies the assertion of the highly influential 
Child Psychiatrist, Danya Glaser, when she writes about the difficulties 
surrounding the interventions of the administrative processes in the psychiatric 
treatment approach to a case of emotional abuse: 
 
This paper … while advocating an early response to concerns suggesting 
emotional abuse, ... raises questions about the appropriateness of the 
immediate use of Child Protection procedures in the investigation and 
assessment of suspected emotional abuse. Alternative approaches are 
suggested which may not need to include police and Social Services in the 
early stages. The response to recognition of emotional abuse is more 
appropriately considered as working towards protection (Glaser et al, 1997: 
315). 
 
She follows the old medical line that registration and possibly court proceedings 
should be used as a last resort, its threat a therapeutic lever on the families she is 
treating – nasty medicine rather than a punishment. This approach is inimical to 
many social workers, who see the use of registration as a threat as, indeed, 
punitive. At the same time, they see it in bureaucratic mode and feel that 
registration is essentially descriptive; it should be used to register concern when 
abuse has been established; it is not there to be used strategically (Glaser et al, 
1997: 324). They might also see in her stance shades of the old Child Protection 
problem of doctors wishing to retain medical confidentiality. 
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They might nevertheless agree that emotional abuse is not appropriately 
processed by Social Services, as the social work manager quoted above. He 
envisaged a complete flooding of the system, which does not seem to have 
happened. This could be attributed to a common attitude among Social Services 
managers and has been attributed by the medical sector, including Glaser, to the 
requirements of the procedures themselves, which prevent official recognition 
(as detailed above). Thus, Glaser arrives at a contradictory position, or at least at 
a position of wanting it both ways. She complains that the administrative 
category is not inclusive enough, that social workers or case conferences are not 
sensitive enough to recognise the medical fact of emotional abuse when they see 
it, but that if they were to recognise it, it should remain a medical category, 
otherwise it would trigger all the procedures that she finds so unproductive and 
inconvenient. Either way, this is a bid for expansion: to keep the definition and 
management of emotional abuse out of the Child Protection system and in the 
hands of medical personnel, where the only limit on its growth as a medical 
category would be NHS rationing.  
 
In contrast, Olive Stevenson, described in Section II as a distinguished Social 
Work academic and one of the traditional welfarists mentioned above, also 
makes an expansionist claim in her keynote article in the first volume of a new 
journal, Child and Family Social Work, ( Stevenson, 1996),. Her opinion is that 
since the sequelae of all forms of abuse is emotional damage and developmental 
delay, techniques for managing emotional abuse should become the main feature 
of all Child Protection work. Such techniques should be informed by the sort of 
quasi-medical knowledge about children and families and their relationships 
which should be a major part of the knowledge base for the SW profession, 
since it is presumably they whom she envisages as doing the work. 
 
Yet, while the child psychiatrist and the welfarist social work academic are 
making widely different claims about the proper ownership of this category, they 
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are not disagreeing about the definition. Glaser lumps Child Protection social 
workers with the police in the context of the Child Protection procedures, whilst 
Stevenson claims wider concerns and skills for social workers, (who are not just 
bureaucrats and can therefore recognise problems of abuse independently of 
whether they do or should invoke the procedures). Such skills can still be used 
and indeed are necessary to a proper use of the procedures themselves. However, 
social workers largely share what Stevenson would consider the appropriate set 
of knowledges for making their judgements, which are broadly medical, or those 
related to child welfare. Stevenson supports the notion that the concept of 
emotional abuse, even for social workers, should be something other than an 
administrative category (Glaser et al, 1997; Stevenson, 1996). 
 
Category Inflation 
 
However, Stevenson, here, is also making another sort of expansionist claim 
which presents a further /different aspect of the questionable logic in the bids of 
emotional abuse academics for an equal or higher place in a hierarchy of 
‘seriousness’ for emotional abuse, as distinct from other forms. Her claim that 
the management of emotional abuse is the basis of all Child Protection work, 
because it is the consequence of all forms of abuse, amounts to a sort of curious 
‘categorical imperialism’ (pace Kant) that is widespread in the emotional abuse 
literature (from Garbarino, 1978, onwards). It seems to be the consensus, in the 
professional research and clinical literature of those disciplines which assess and 
treat abused children, that ‘whether the abuse of a child involves neglect, 
physical or sexual abuse, it is the emotional and psychological damage that 
generally leads to long term difficulties.’ Trowell, who reproduces here the 
message of Franklin twenty years earlier, also supports Stevenson when she 
continues, ‘increasingly the emotional and psychological sequelae of other types 
of abuse are recognised as the target for work’ (Trowell et al, 1997: 357). 
Iwaniec, in the same journal, goes further in establishing, as Trowell did in 
1983, that these sequelae are in fact emotional abuse in their own right, but, in 
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the contorted logic of the following piece of prose, it is also possible to detect 
that she is claiming something more:  
 
There is now a growing consensus among professionals that emotional 
maltreatment is more prevalent than was realised; it is at the core of all 
major forms of abuse; its impact is usually more damaging than the effects 
of physical and sexual abuse; and it requires special attention to disentangle 
emotional from physical acts of maltreatment (Iwaniec, 1997: 370).  
 
There is a subtle shift of definition here from emotional abuse or maltreatment 
as a category of abuse which comprises certain parental acts, which relate more 
specifically to certain developmental outcomes for the child, to one which refers 
more generally to ‘damage’ to some inner life, whatever the nature of the 
parental actions. The sequelae of all forms of abuse, emotional abuse becomes 
the ‘core’ of all abuse, following Hart. Although, at the same time, physical acts 
of maltreatment can still be ‘disentangled’ from the emotional, for the 
administrative purposes of registration say, they have also become emotional 
acts of maltreatment. Thus the set of all environmental causes of emotional harm 
is considerably widened, enlarging the category by many times. If emotional 
abuse is a concept which primarily refers to all ‘emotional and psychological 
damage’ inflicted by another, whether by physical or psychic assault, then it 
becomes a category which encompasses all other abuses, since they all have 
psychological sequelae.  
 
This extended category also helps to confirm emotional abuse’s ontological 
status in the objective world of welfare science, requiring the ‘special attention’ 
of experts in its recognition and treatment, because, however the wounds have 
been inflicted, the resulting harms are the ‘target of work’. It is a larger, more 
important and serious proposition, it is claimed, than the category of the 
emotional abuse of children in the Child Protection registration process, which, 
in contrast, is a mere construct of administrative and legal processes and their 
participants’ obsession with proof and ‘incidents’. 
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CONCLUSION   
 
These two chapters on the growth of emotional abuse as a registration category 
in child protection have much in common with the two preceding ones on PTSD 
and the law. There I identified different forms of life: the medical and 
psychological research extending to epidemiology; the medical-clinical and the 
administrative-legal. In these two chapters, I have identified other forms. First, 
the emergence in the context of USA and UK social policy of a problem 
category which had a primarily medical or socio-medical base, child physical 
abuse and emotional abuse as a rare variant. Second, the burgeoning of a 
research-based version of this phenomenon, using different forms of definition 
and identification, but still referred to as a source of knowledge by professionals 
and practitioners applying a very different category – ‘operational’ rather than 
‘statistical’. It was partly due to this research base of adult recollections of 
childhood, that psychological abuse began to be seen as such a pervasive and 
serious category of abuse and a core part of all forms of maltreatment. 
 
The present chapter has looked at the growth of the ‘operational’ form of this 
category to a similar form of pre-eminence in the legislative and organisational 
context of the UK after 1980. We have noted the shift of emphasis in the 
processing and understanding of abuse from a socio-medical, diagnostic, to a 
socio-legal, more forensic, formula and then possibly a re-emergence of the first, 
in a constant dialectic between a system ideal based on the administration of risk 
and one based on the administration of welfare. Further, the confusing nature of 
the concept’s profuse definitions in the emotional abuse literature has been 
identified, with conflicting claims to its correct application, as the category 
covers these two different domains: the medical-welfarist one and the 
administrative-legal one. It is argued that confusion arises at their interface, 
although the two systems for identifying and understanding this social problem 
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not only exist side by side, not only legitimate each other, but depend on each 
other for meaning – existence even. 
 
Out of this confusion and multiprofessional difference, the category of the 
emotional abuse of children has grown enormously, in the process of which it 
seems to have gone through certain phases: 1) as non-existent or only 
metaphorically abusive; 2) as an also ran to physical and sexual abuse, a cause 
or a consequence, part of the psychosocial context and still half metaphor, as 
described in Chapter 4; 3) as another, much less prevalent form of abuse than 
physical or sexual abuse, used for registration and existing along side these other 
two; 4) as a more prevalent and just as serious or more serious form of abuse 
than the latter; and lastly, 5) claimed to be prototypical of abuse in all its forms. 
With these claims, it moves from the periphery to the centre of the definitional 
field, where Garbarino always put it. Such an inclusive category is no longer the 
last of the litter. And no longer an ostrich, but an eagle. 
 
There is a difficulty here. This categorical eagle – emotional abuse as the long 
term developmental consequence of all forms of abuse – came into life and grew 
as a small legalistic registration category and grew quietly as such, though some 
claimed it as a class of damage to which the normal legal and administrative 
processes are not necessarily seen as appropriate (Glaser, 2002b; Glaser et al, 
1997). For, like neglect, its definition draws more from child welfare 
knowledge, including details of child development over the longer term; concern 
is not triggered by discrete observable parental (or other adult) actions, which 
may be prosecutable under the criminal justice system and the welfare 
consequences of being ‘in need’ or ‘at risk of abuse and neglect’ are not greatly 
different. It can be argued that the growth of social work interest in acting to 
promote the emotional wellbeing and development of children, including all 
those that are abused, owed much to the efforts of the DOH to shift the LASSDs 
after 1995 towards putting more scarce resources into long term child welfare. 
On the other hand, this ‘action’ seems to have taken the form of registering more 
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and more children under the Child Protection category of emotional abuse, still 
an administrative form of life, generating an ever increasing consumption of 
resources under a sovereign compulsory regime for the state’s intervention in 
family life, rather than any form of voluntary tutelage. This is something of a 
paradox and, perhaps, not what the welfarist authors of the Children Act 
intended. This eagle may be ready to fly, but it is still caged by a framework of 
legislation and a rigid, bureaucratic taxonomy of harm, which divides the mind 
from the body parts of children. 
 
More generally, this study of emotional abuse as a child registration category 
raises issues quite separate from those raised by PTSD and nervous shock, 
where the wound is seen as caused by horrifying events and by fear and shock. 
There, in a situation where memory is impaired, the problem is to identify 
invisible wounds with sufficient positivity for compensation to be claimed – and 
to allow for it to be paid without breaking the bank. Looking at the career of the 
concept of emotional abuse – naming something which happens over time as 
part of a human relationship – raises much of the analysis of invisible wounds in 
Chapter 1. That is, the location of the problem in psychological individualism as 
opposed to any wider sociological analysis in Section 3 and particularly the 
‘critique of the therapeutic turn’, described in Section 4. What has been traced in 
the present and the preceding chapter is a reproduction of this psychological and 
therapeutic turn at the local level. The emotional factors in abuse have gained 
official recognition through a process in which broad sociological explanations 
and consequences have been backgrounded and lost, as psychological 
explanations have been invoked and dominated the public understanding of 
abuse from 1961 onwards (Nelson, 1984). It is not surprising that the researchers 
and writers who specialise in the study of psychological or emotional abuse are 
claiming its ascendancy as ‘the core of all abuse’. The more intense the gaze on 
an inner territory, the more it is possible to see. 
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Not only that: this seemingly reductive narrative has particularly affected our 
perceptions of close family relations – a process which is described and much 
elaborated in the next two chapters on attachment theory. Here mother/child 
relationships, as seen through the prism of the wound, are not only confined to 
the psychological, but the psychological itself is grounded in nature and based in 
biological needs.  
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                              CHAPTER 6: 
        ATTACHMENT: AN ‘INTERNALISED 
   SOMETHING’ AND THE NATURAL WORLD 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
When reactive attachment disorder (RAD) was written into DSM IV in 1994, it 
joined a mounting number of other diagnoses of childhood in the canons of 
psychiatric medicine, including autism; attention deficit disorder (ADD) and 
attention deficit hyperactive disorder (ADHD); then most recently, bipolar 
disorder; and, of course, the depression being found in children in increasing 
quantity – much more of it about than was thought! 235 As a diagnostic category, 
(RAD), itself, is barely distinguishable from these other childhood conditions, 
since none have a specific set of symptoms.236 It is a diagnosis given to a small 
but resource- consuming group of children, whose seemingly intractable and 
troubled behaviour presages high levels of deviance in adolescent and adult 
populations. These may be delinquency, mental illness or substance abuse and 
the more extreme and dangerous disorders of personality. It is the subject of 
books whose titles speak for themselves. Here are some examples from the 
bibliography of the IACD, the Institute for Attachment and Child Development, 
Evergreen Colorado, Director Forrest Lien, (‘Saving Children, Saving Families, 
Saving Lives’): Broken Hearts; Wounded Minds, (Randolph, 2001),237 Broken 
                                                 
235 Horwitz, A. V. & Wakefield, J. C. (2007) The Loss of Sadness: How Psychiatry 
Transformed Normal Sorrow into Depressive Disorder. New York: Oxford University Press. 
236 Reactive Attachment Disorder is also a feature of DC10 F94.1, along with Disinhibited 
Attachment Disorder, a variation. 
http://www.who.int/classifications/apps/icd/icd10online/[accessed, 3rd January, 2009]. 
237 http://www.lizrandolph.com/rfrpublichtm.html [accessed 28th February, 2009]. 
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Spirits – Lost Souls (Ryan ebooks),238 Can This Child be Saved? (Cline, 1999), 
Children who Shock and Surprise (Randolph, 2002),239 First Steps in Parenting 
the Child Who Hurts (Archer, 1999a), High Risk Children without a Conscience 
(Magid, 1989), Life in the Trenches: Survival Tactics (IACD Manual),240 and, 
lastly, and most fundamentally, The Primal Wound (Verrier, 1993).241 These 
titles give us a clue to what distinguishes this disorder of childhood from others. 
It is a question of cause or origins. Their symptoms cannot be attributed to a 
genetic/organic disorder, as with the others. These children are wounded. They 
have suffered invisible wounds – emotional harm inflicted by a hostile 
environment in infancy. Just as in PTSD, it is the environmental aetiology which 
distinguishes this category from those with similar symptomatology but possibly 
organic origins. And this environment is not physical or social in its broadest 
sense; it is the close and intimate environment created by the people who are the 
infants’ main carers, who in most cases are their mothers. The wound is the 
internal effect of a poor relationship between mother and child. 
 
It might be thought that attachment disorders or difficulties are a less dramatic, 
widespread and media-targeted social problems than these other pathologies of 
childhood and certainly the language of attachment in its technical psychological 
sense has not entered into the vernacular in the way that descriptions like 
‘depressive’, ‘manic’, ‘autistic’ and ‘hyperactive’ have. Nevertheless, 
attachment problems have become part of the general diagnostic repertoire of 
the medical profession,242 for example. Although categories in attachment 
theory, other than RAD, do not map easily onto official psychiatric nosology and 
the diagnosis is less widely used in the UK than in the United States, attachment 
                                                 
238 http://ebooks.ebookmall.com/title/broken-spirits-lost-souls-ryan-ebooks.htm [accessed 28th 
February, 2009]. 
239 http://www.lizrandolph.com/rfrpublichtm.html [accessed 28th February, 2009]. 
240 http://www.instituteforattachment.org/index.php [accessed 28 February, 2009] . 
241 http://www.nancyverrier.com/ [accessed 28 February, 2009]. 
242 In the UK, from being the subject matter of the Family Doctor broadcasts of the 1950s,, 
attachment has made it back into Family Doctor advice, this time in a self-help book series of 
this name, published in conjunction with the BMA, as the basis for psychotherapy for stress 
sufferers. Wilkinson’s (2005) booklet on Stress boasts sales of 200,000. 
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is increasingly becoming the language of expertise among psy professionals in 
this country, and especially the technicians of the family. Not surprisingly, 
attachment theory is seen as particularly relevant to the troubles of childhood 
and their treatment, the subject of a myriad multiprofessional conferences and 
training days, especially in the area of fostering and adoption, and part now of 
the language of the UK family courts, the Department of Health and the DfES in 
their statuary requirements for the assessment of children and families in 
‘safeguarding’ procedures – children ‘at risk’ and children ‘in need’.243 
Attachment theory is used to inform a huge state and charity funded preventative 
initiative aimed at improving childcare in the early years, from the perinatal 
period onwards, in both the USA and the UK. It is the subject of a large network 
of informative and hortatory websites, encouraging mothers to do better and 
spelling out the dire consequences of failure. Lastly, it is used as a basis for 
therapy in a host of treatment organisations of varying degrees of orthodoxy. 
Anyone doubting the influence of attachment theory in the realm of therapy 
should note that the relatively well established Institute of Attachment and Child 
Development (IACD) in the USA reveals on its website that, in its own town of 
Evergreen, Colorado (population 9,216 in the 2000 census), there are at least 6 
clinics offering attachment therapy to families – one clinic for every 210 or so 
households with children!244 
 
The concept of attachment has been chosen as the subject of this chapter and the 
next partly because of this increasingly commanding position among 
professionals as a theory of psychic harm within the family, and partly because, 
as such, it is the most coherent and well researched theorisation of emotional 
abuse or emotional neglect that exists. It maps onto this category of child abuse 
in three different ways. First, although the theory was originally predicated on 
studies of sudden traumatic loss to the child of his main carer – often called 
                                                 
243 The term ‘Child Protection’ in the language of the DfES has recently given way to that of 
‘Safeguarding’, which, while lexically equivalent, is given more inclusive connotations in 
official writing. 
244 http://www.instituteforattachment.org [accessed 6 June, 2006]. 
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‘maternal deprivation’, the wound of attachment theory is less likely to be the 
result of any sudden occurrence. Rather, it is the result of cumulative events over 
time, as in Freud’s original summative version of trauma. Second, the way that 
the harm is done is ambiguous: it may be due to dangerous behaviour by the 
carer, often deliberate but not necessarily. It may also be due to inattention and 
emotional unavailability which results in a systematic failure to protect the child 
from a threatening environment. Essentially, it arises from a relationship in 
which fear is not managed. Third, the harm of attachment theory is less an 
invasive overwhelming of the inner world of the subject by aversive 
information, as for Freud, rather a more subtle distortion of its growth and 
development towards a state of mature self regulation, in which the complexities 
and dangers of the outside world can be faced with impunity.  
 
It is the spoiling of this developmental process, which underlies all thinking 
about the sequelae of emotional as well as other forms of abuse, and it is this 
that is theorised in the working out and adjustment of attachment theory over 
time. For the theory, though starting from an engagement with sad and 
delinquent children and their developmental psychopathology, has also become 
the dominant psychological theory of normal child development – or so it is 
claimed – and this normativity refers not to statistical frequency but to the ideal 
of health, desirability and goals of attainment. Since the 19th century, the 
undeniable growth of children has been freighted with tropes of non-
evolutionary development and progress to a better state – more differentiated, 
more knowing, more sophisticated and more civilised – making the child a 
repository of adult aspirations, as well as nostalgia for the promise of the past 
and a paradise lost (Steedman, 1995). If, as suggested in Chapter One, current 
formulations of trauma and abuse imply that, for the victim, history has taken a 
wrong turning, attachment as a theory of normal development describes how this 
might have happened, as well as what progress would have looked like, if 
promise had been fulfilled and history not been written another way.  
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So, whilst the last two chapters have outlined the career of emotional abuse 
largely as an administrative category, looking at its social context, connotations 
and consequences and not at its denotation or referend, the nature of the harm,245 
these next two chapters describe one particular journey into the interior. For they 
are the story of how, in a hypothesised inner life, a particular cognitive and 
affective site called attachment was created and established by a metaphor – 
within the American and British academies, the world of psy professionals, of 
parents and of governments. Furthermore, in line with the question of this thesis, 
it is an account of how this attachment space was initially carved out not as a 
psychic generator of normal healthy behaviour but as that which is associated 
with pathology and deviancy; and of how, even with its emergence as a standard 
for psychological health, it remained a space in danger of growing malformed or 
spoilt and leading to developmental deformation.  
 
Thus the story of emotional abuse turns from the issues of the definitions and 
inclusiveness of a category, looked at in the last four chapters, back to an 
investigation of one explanatory theory, attachment theory. This raises the old 
questions about the exact interior location and observability of psychological 
harms, together with the normality or pathology of those afflicted. Thus, these 
chapters are a threefold enquiry – a study of the theoretical development of a 
particular slice of inner life: first, seen through its questionable location and 
therefore its relationship to the ways it is made visible and knowable; second, 
viewed through the tension between statistical and clinical knowledge and, third, 
through the assumptions of the latter, which problematically relate what is 
abnormal to what is unnatural. It is the explicit engagement of invisible wounds 
with the natural world which comes more into play in this narrative. 
 
                                                 
245 This, within the language of the Child Protection bureaucracy is very largely taken for 
granted or assumed, knowledge of its meaning displayed by fluent discursive use For a similar 
analysis of a different area of meaning in welfare bureaucracies see Pithouse, A. (1987), Social 
Work: The Organisation of an Invisible Trade. Aldershot: Gower. 
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This chapter and the next are about the history of this theory from its birth in the 
UK at the end of the Second World War more or less to the present (2006), over 
a period when its professional status and popularity as a way of construing 
psychopathology and psychological harm to children in families waxed and 
waned with changes in social policy towards both families and academics. The 
story is divided very roughly into three periods, though, for narrative ease, some 
of the literature and references have been allowed to stray over the borders 
somewhat. The first period covers the ascendancy of the post-war welfare state, 
which can be said to start to decline in the early 1970s; the second stretches from 
the late 1970s until the late 1990s, during which time new-right thinking 
controlled policy; the state rolled back its frontiers; market disciplines were 
imposed by audit on academics (and many other public services) and policy 
aimed at the welfare of children became swamped by concerns about of child 
abuse. These two periods are the subject matter of this present chapter. The next 
chapter, covering the final period of unprecedented policy activism towards 
children and families by New Labour, takes us to the present day. Under this 
regime, as described in the last chapter on emotional abuse, notions of risk and 
need have become more psychological, as has its crucial ideology of children as 
social capital, and attachment theory has flourished in the psy professions and in 
the language of government regulations.  
 
What is presented here is an account of the various inscriptions on this interior 
site called attachment in an attempt to capture the fluctuations, the setbacks and 
the final flourishing of the theory which holds this abstract concept in place. 
This history also borrows something from the evolutionary tropes of its subject 
matter. It traces the developmental adaptation of attachment theory to social 
policy as its wider ecological environment and, within that, the niche of the 
American and, to a lesser extent, the British academies and their professional 
offshoots.246 This adaptive development makes for a theory of great complexity, 
                                                 
246 British attachment literature is much less profuse and has a more professional bias – in 
somewhat the same relationship as in the development of the emotional abuse literature. 
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methodological disputes and critiques which generate an ever increasing body of 
literature, to which it is impossible to do justice here. For clarity, I have tried to 
incorporate the major intellectual innovations into the narrative and explain 
briefly the theoretical and empirical issues involved, which are expanded in 
footnotes. To start with, I have produced an impressionistic sketch of attachment 
theory in the present – an overview of the literature, partly from the point of 
view of an academic specialist who sees the complexities of attachment theory 
and partly from that of an informed consumer of promotional websites or 
training days for psy professionals, where attachment is outlined as a coherent 
and straightforward narrative and a theory of seductive and deceptive simplicity. 
 
 
I. ATTACHMENT THEORY – A SKETCH  
 
This is a theory of child development which is indeed complex. It is described as 
‘systemic’, based as it is on the identification of a motivational and behavioural 
system, hypothesised as essential to the survival of the species in a period of 
evolutionary adaptedness. The goal of this system is not an object in the world, 
either fantasised or real, but rather an (initially) spatial, dyadic relationship, best 
described as the proximity of an infant to its main carer, under conditions of 
perceived danger. The infant’s proximity-seeking behaviour depends not, as in 
psychoanalytic drive theory, on a biological need innate to the infant, the sexual 
instinct, or the death wish, or the infant’s drive for food or sociality, as such, nor 
even simply on fear. Its cause is teleological: the aim, a complex infantile state 
in which fearful arousal is not only resolved by proximity, but in which a 
positive position of felt security is achieved as a basis for exploration and 
learning – also hypothesised as an essential human survival characteristic. In the 
face of exogenous danger to the mother/child system, the infant’s reflex-like 
attachment behaviours are triggered. The mother’s response determines how 
these behaviours develop, and so how the growing attachment, or affective bond, 
between mother and child, is felt, displayed and gradually conceptualised by the 
 270 
infant, as her cognitive faculties mature. This conceptualisation becomes an 
‘internal working model’ of caregiver behaviour and future affective 
relationships (Bowlby, 1953a: 62).  
 
The theory, at least in its broadest sense, reproduces Freud’s intuition that the 
initial relationship between mother and child is the developmental prototype for 
all further love relationships. But unlike much psychoanalytic thinking about 
human development as a process of individuation from parents and growing 
autonomy, attachment theory presents an essential paradox: that exploration, 
hence learning, cognitive growth and a sense of self in relation to the social and 
physical world, depend on the child’s sense of a ‘secure base’ (Ainsworth, 1969; 
Bowlby, 1988) with the parent. And, further, that secure, affective relationships 
throughout the rest of life are the basis for a well developed adaptive sense of 
self efficacy and independence.  
 
The core psychological and physiological assumption behind this theory is one 
of affective homeostasis or equilibrium for an organism, which needs a certain 
level of stimulus from the environment, but not too much. The organism’s 
arousal system should respond sensitively to external dangers and other stimuli, 
but return to normal levels when danger is past, at the risk of physical and 
mental disturbance and debilitation, as in Crile and Cannons’ decorticated cats in 
Chapter 2. This is essentially the normative notion of a harmony or balance 
between extremes essential to healthy functioning. So, as for trauma theory 
stemming from Freud, affect arousal in an organism is brought back to 
manageable levels by the mind/body’s regulatory system; maladaptive 
functioning stems from the failure of this system. Unlike traumatic stress, in 
which the system is overwhelmed by the quantity and quality of negative 
information, so that the cognitive/affective or neuro-endocrine system fails to 
self regulate (van der Kolk et al, 1996b), the infantile system is simply immature 
and cannot, by itself, regulate arousal at all, even from daily non- traumatic 
events. Thus, for the infant, affect regulation is a dyadic process, with arousal 
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controlled by the soothing, containing responses of a ‘sensitive’ mother, until the 
child matures psychologically and neurologically enough to achieve self 
regulation. An ‘insensitive’ mother will produce insecure attachments, or 
inefficient and maladaptive systems of regulation in the child, as these, through 
frequent use, become ‘hardwired’ into the infant’s neural structure. These 
maladaptive patterns may generalise over time to the child’s own ability to be a 
mother, to her own children’s psycho-physiological adaptations, to her own 
adult relationships, and to all kinds of anti-social, psychopathological and 
addictive behaviour, possibly for generations to come. A harm for life; a wound 
which, like stigmata, will not heal but persists over time. 
 
The awesome responsibilities of motherhood posited by this theory can be seen 
as one of a long line of ‘discourses of endangerment’ that have served to 
regulate the behaviour of women in the perinatal period (Brooks Gardner, 1994) 
and after, invoking as it does two different models for the wrong sort of mother. 
The first is one who fails to mediate and mitigate, at an immediate 
psycho/biological level, the more distal and possibly stressful influences of 
culture, community and socio-economic circumstances on the infant. The second 
is, herself, a source of uncertainty and danger. It is not surprising that attachment 
theory has become a part of the growing discourse about risk to children’s 
development from parental neglect or abuse – especially, but not just, of the 
emotional variety, where neglect and abuse are not necessarily 
distinguishable.247 There are now longitudinal studies of the negative effect of 
all forms of abuse and neglect on children’s attachment behaviour over time 
(Aber et al, 1989; Cicchetti et al, 1989; Cicchetti et al, 1998) and certain forms 
of insecure attachments are themselves claimed to be potent predictors of the 
abuse and neglect of the next generation (Egeland et al, 1983; Erickson et al, 
1985; Lyons-Ruth et al, 1991). Moreover, the wounding relationship of 
                                                 
247 Aber, J. L., Allen, J. P., Carlson, V. & Cicchetti, D. (1989) The Effects of Maltreatment on 
Development During Early Childhood: Recent Studies and Their Theoretical, Clinical, and 
Policy Implications. In Child Maltreatment: Theory and Research on the Causes and 
Consequences of Child Abuse and Neglect. (eds V. Carlson & D. Cicchetti), pp. 579-619. New 
York, NY US: Cambridge University Press. 
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attachment, though inter-subjective, is not theorised as a social phenomenon 
(Riley, 1983) but as some dislocation of a mother/child dyad, set deep in bodily 
instincts and phylogeny. The wound of attachment theory is, as much as any 
psychiatric version of psychopathology, embedded in an ontology of the natural, 
inscribed in biology. The mother is as much a creation of nature as the child. 
 
But herein lies another paradox. As Peter Fonagy points out, attachment theory 
presents an optimistic, typically romantic view of childhood, unlike the Kleinian 
vision of infancy plagued by the miseries of intrapsychic conflict – nasty and 
brutish (Grosskurth, 1987; Klein, 1932). It paints a picture of human nature’s 
essential goodness, full of potential, with the child ready to actualise the 
blueprint of his destiny, only compromised by maternal deficit (Fonagy, 2001). 
It posits an elaborate theory of psychological adaptedness, psychological well-
being having an absolute meaning, not unlike physical well-being (Hinde et al, 
1991: 61). It draws a convincing picture of the development of the harmonious 
personality, a contented, flexible person – one able to survive life’s vicissitudes, 
with the help of good, mutually supportive relationships in adulthood, both of a 
reproductive and heterogeneous kind. Here is a paragon for our times – 
especially since we have so recently rediscovered the goal of happiness as a 
social good!248 Yet it also draws a picture of a child with none of the strong 
innocence of the Romantic imagination, but completely vulnerable and at risk 
from a love relationship which is assumed to be primal to human development 
and a part of nature. It is as if the iconic mother/child pair of the Christian 
religion is not just freighted with forebodings of danger from the future sins of 
mankind, or from ‘the sins of the father’, which Hacking notes are the 
attributions of the sexual abuse narrative (Hacking, 1999), but from the 
unnatural backsliding of the very person who sits so serenely central to the 
picture. 
 
                                                 
248 See, Layard, R. (2007) Setting Happiness as a National Goal. Futurist, 41, 37-37. 
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What is more, the depressingly deterministic implications of this narrative are 
not, on the face of it, very promising as a legitimation of the disciplining of 
families through either state based tutelage or therapeutic intervention. What 
would be the point? It is an account of a system seemingly subject to positive 
feedback. If all mothers were psychologically ‘well adjusted’ and ‘lived their 
biology’, the system would tend to perfection and, since social and cultural 
factors seem irrelevant to the theory, we would all exist in a self reproducing 
biological paradise. But, once the apple was eaten, it would be downhill all the 
way for the human race.  
 
This simplistic version is not the end of the story, however, although its 
assumptions abound in much popular literature on attachment theory and on 
promotional websites. An alternative and, indeed, seemingly contradictory 
narrative runs right through the burgeoning attachment-based academic and 
professional psy literature. This literature, based on not altogether successful 
empirical research attempts to establish the stability and generalisability of early 
attachment experiences over time and social context, now promotes a more 
statistical, probabilistic version (Belsky, 1999a; Rutter et al, 1999b). It suggests 
that, whilst the attachment tie can still be seen, controversially, as a 
developmental prototype, grounded in phylogeny, our experience of social 
circumstances over a life may make a difference for good or ill to our ontogeny, 
to our psychological functioning and, indeed, to our biology. More importantly 
for the psy professions, by this argument, it is possible to intervene 
therapeutically with both children and adults, using methods designed to make 
insecure attachments more secure. This is not a ‘talking cure’. On the contrary, it 
seems to be some sort of corrective re-enactment of the biologically based 
emotional processes of infancy, with either a transformed parent, or a therapist 
as parent surrogate (Holmes, 2001).  
 
The neurological equivalent of this is the assertion that, in spite of the fact that 
the first eighteen months of life sees a rapid structuring of brain function in the 
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shedding of dendrites and the hard wiring of neural connections, especially 
between the limbic system (arousal) and the higher cortex (regulation), that fire 
together in the dyadic interaction of mother and child, yet the brain retains an 
astonishing amount of ‘plasticity’ all through life.249 The theme of a slow and 
painful restructuring of the mind and correlate brain runs right through body and 
psychoanalytic attachment based therapy today.  
 
So attachment theory presents a coin. On one side is a normative theory of 
mother/child interaction and its implications for normal adult relationships, and 
on the other is a theory of developmental psychopathology – the psychological 
result of a harmful relationship – couched in the language of psychiatric 
diagnosis and therapeutic cure. It is not so much that each side of the coin is 
defined by the absence of the other, but rather by its presence. When one side is 
up, its negative is always felt, in the first case threatening, in the second, holding 
out the fantasy of a protective shield against the harshness of the world. Thus, as 
Rose reminds us in his book, Governing the Soul (Rose, 1999), the development 
of attachment theory was part of a process in which normality in family 
relationships, though described as ‘natural’, was made to look fragile and easily 
lost – hence the need for constant maternal self-appraisal and expert scrutiny if 
the worst is not to happen. If it does happen, the resulting wound, whether due to 
carelessness, sadness or malevolence, can only be healed by professionals, 
whose ministrations call up the image of the ‘sensitive mother’ on the underside 
and what she would have done, if she had behaved as nature intended and 
prevented all this. 
 
 
II. ATTACHMENT, PERIOD I, 1945–1978: FALLING 
BETWEEN TWO STOOLS 
                                                 
249 For a definition of neural ‘plasticity’ see Cicchetti, D. & Curtis, W. (2006b) The Developing 
Brain and Neural Plasticity: Implications for Normality, Psychopathology, and Resilience. . In 
Developmental Psychopathology, Vol 2: Developmental Neuroscience (eds D. Cicchetti & D. J. 
Cohen), pp. 1-64. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley. 
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Maternal Deprivation 
 
As every account of attachment theory has pointed out, it was born in second 
World War Britain out of a marriage of psychoanalytic theory and ethology and 
developed under the transatlantic, intellectual partnership of John Bowlby, an 
English aristocrat, and Mary Ainsworth, his Canadian-born, US-based 
collaborator. Politically, at this time, the perennial problems of law and order 
and distributional inequity were mixed with wartime and post-war concern with 
the psychological health and morale of a nation in deep mourning, a place where 
many households had lost at least one member in the conflict. It was also a time 
when this interest in psychological health was transforming the way that the 
socialisation of its citizens was thought of. The ‘maladjusted’ child of the old 
pre-war child guidance clinics, whom the moralising project of socialisation had 
failed to reach, was giving way to the ‘maladaptive’ child, diagnosed as 
psychologically rather than morally unfitting (though the symptoms might look 
just the same), who might benefit from therapy rather than punishment. Juvenile 
justice, for example, began to take on a more reformative, rehabilitative stance, 
according to the best psychological principles. In this reframing, the moral 
character of children was superceded by their psychological welfare as an object 
of policy and their health needs were seen as relating not just to their growing 
bodies or moral sense, but to the development of some inner set of emotions and 
capacities (Rose, 1999). 
 
With this rewriting of children’s needs as psychological went a reframing of the 
family and its forms of regulation. It was still to be the agency of social 
reproduction and continuity, urged on by the new paternalistic welfare state, 
which was there to support parents and protect the welfare of its citizens from 
the worst excesses of the capitalist market.250 Pre-war forms of family tutelage 
                                                 
250 This enhanced socialisation was not to be achieved by any seismic social shifts, however. The 
basic social and economic hierarchies of the UK remained untouched by the redistribution of 
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were still provided by the juvenile courts and schools, plus charity workers and 
the beginnings of the social work profession (Donzelot, 1979) but now, also, 
there was a more exclusively psychological perception of the family creeping 
into the therapeutic repertoire of the psy professionals. This was a move towards 
what Donzelot calls ‘the management of images’, which he saw, in France at 
least, as a form of psychotherapy for the middle classes. In this, the family was 
transformed from being a moralising institution for the socialisation of children 
into a set of psychological relationships, which, if right and healthy, produced 
psychologically well adjusted children, but which also needed the constant 
vigilance and support of psy professionals in the form of a sort of ‘therapeutic 
familialism’ ((Donzelot, 1979; Rose, 1999).  
 
In the UK, this therapeutic approach to families extended across all classes, as 
the social workers in the newly professionalised Children and Families 
Departments of the Local Authorities were being trained in a technique called 
psychodynamic casework. Further, psychiatric social workers and psychiatrists, 
mostly of an analytic persuasion, presided in the ubiquitous child guidance 
clinics and public mental health services. Here, a somewhat more relations-
based psychoanalytic philosophy than the original Freudian and Kleinian 
orthodoxy was appearing – reflecting the influence of American theorists and, of 
course, John Bowlby. Attachment-based advice and interventions were, for over 
two decades after the war, part of this therapeutic familialism. 
  
In this gradual and crucial reframing of the way the child and family was 
thought of in public policy, the immediate social problem of the host of refugee 
children, who were living in war nurseries or were troublesome and failing to 
thrive in their new foster homes, provided a vital catalyst. The individual child 
had been subjected to a philanthropic and scientific (medical and psychological) 
scrutiny since the late 19th  century, under which he or she had been reinvented 
                                                                                                                                                 
income, health and education at the margins, as did the biologically based assumptions about the 
naturalness of gender, racial, sexual and age differences. 
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by techniques making measurable and visible their growth and change. They had 
also been the subject of the disciplinary gaze of the state through schooling and 
the Juvenile Courts, but this was the first time that the individual child suffering 
distress and loss had been subjected to systematic psycho-analytic observation 
outside the pathologising context of the Child Guidance clinic. It was the first 
time that the inner life of otherwise normal children – no mental illness or 
hereditary taint – was perceived to bear the marks of a negative emotion which 
affected their behaviour (Rose, 1999), producing the sort of ‘normal pathology’ 
discussed in Chapter 1 and 2. The immediate cause seemed obvious and 
undeniable: it was separation from their families and, most especially, the person 
who cared for them most – separation from their mother. 
 
John Bowlby, trained as a psychiatrist and analyst and with earlier voluntary 
experience working in schools for maladjusted children, followed by 
employment in ordinary child guidance clinics, had, by the end of the war, 
already come to the conclusion that it was early childhood experiences provided 
by parents, particularly their early loss to the child through death or separation, 
which were crucial in the development of neuroses and delinquency (Bowlby, 
1940; Bowlby, 1946). This was confirmed for him by his experience of 
observing these refugee children251 and later, with his assistants, those separated 
from parents by hospital admission. It began to be clear to him that the 
psychological wellbeing of children depended (naturally) on the continuity of a 
crucial, primary relationship with mothers or mother surrogates (Bowlby, 
1953b). 
 
In this post-war context, attachment theory did not start by presenting an account 
of the behaviour of mothers as the basis for healthy normative psychological 
pro-social development. Rather, it was an explanation of the growth of antisocial 
                                                 
251 Bowlby worked from the start of the War with other analysts on the Cambridge Evacuation 
Project, a report on evacuation for the Fabian Society. After the war, he was the compiler of the 
Report of the Expert Committee on Mental health of the WHO. He immediately applied this 
insight in an astute political operation in which he achieved some solution to the refugee 
problem and later improved the treatment of children in hospital. 
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or psycho-pathological behaviour over time, due to the more immediate and 
traumatic effects of bereavement and loss on children deprived of their mothers 
through death, hospitalisation or the demographics of war. Bowlby was still a 
(heterodox) member of the psycho-analytic community and, as a version of 
psychoanalysis, then in the ascendancy, his attachment theory provided an 
explanation of the devastating psychological effects of maternal deprivation. It 
gained some currency in the 1950s and 1960s, especially in the UK. Here it 
formed much of the basis for the spate of popular professional advice to mothers 
of young children,252 especially about the importance of constant maternal 
presence in children’s lives. This was at a time when, correlatively but not 
necessarily causally, women were moving from the war-time factories back into 
the home and were subjected to a barrage of pro-natalist propaganda, as well as 
exhortations about the proper conduct of motherhood, and warnings about 
deviation from the path (Riley, 1983).253  
 
As such, it also gained a foothold in criminology where the family role in 
socialisation was being added to physiological and individual psychological 
explanations of criminality by such as Edward Glover, the Freudian founder of 
the British Journal of Criminology in 1950 and later by Travis Hirschi, the US 
sociologist (Hirschi, 1969). It was influential in Social Work and Probation 
Officer training, where certain key ethological texts like Konrad Lorenz’s 
accounts of imprinting in birds (Lorenz, 1958) and descriptions of Harlow’s 
monkey experiments (Harlow, 1961; Harlow et al, 1958) were used to reinforce 
the human message. This message, couched in the language of attachment and 
security, though the theory was complex, had broad intuitive appeal. In the 
newly professional Local Authority Child Care Departments, it was used to 
reinforce traditional social casework practice under the injunction that families 
                                                 
252 Hugh Jolly in the ‘Family Doctor’ broadcasts, or Winnicot himself. 
253 Note Denise Riley’s (1983, Chapter 6) careful examination of the complex connection 
between theory, government propaganda and the position of women, where, she maintains, no 
directly causal relationship can be established. 
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in trouble should be kept together at all costs.254 Later, after child abuse hit the 
political agenda in the 1970s in the UK255and social policy towards children ‘at 
risk’ became more interventionist so that the state increasingly assumed the role 
of psychological parent, theories about the effects of maternal deprivation 
seemed to give at least some leverage on the awesome problem of taking a child 
out of its family of origin and supervising its future care in the fostering and 
adoption system or an institution. At worst, they illuminated the difficulties 
(Fahlberg et al, 1981).  
 
War in the Interior 
 
Whilst his initial theory about maternal loss was still influential in the applied 
psy professions, Bowlby’s own interest moved naturally from the consequences 
of this loss of an attachment figure to the nature and importance of the 
attachment relationship itself. From this, his detailed, many layered and complex 
theory of normal attachment began to evolve, although the first volume of his 
trilogy (Attachment and Loss) was not published until 1969. Also, the progress 
of this normative theory of ontogeny within the broad, complex and 
heterogeneous field of child psychological development and its knowledge 
workers was less rapid than his loss theory of delinquency and psychopathology 
among psy professionals. Bowlby was exploring an inner terrain which was 
already overrun by competing colonists. Educationalists, such as Cyril Burt, 
argued with Behaviourists; the British Psychoanalytic Association was split 
down the middle between Kleinians and Freudians – and Bowlby was caught in 
the crossfire.  
 
These disputes were not just about the nature of the landscape of the child’s 
internal world, they were also about how to get there. The right route was fought 
over by the research- based approach of the psychological sciences (either 
                                                 
254 This was a feature of the 1948 Children Act. 
255 After the report of the Maria Colwell enquiry, 1974. 
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behaviourist observation or statistical survey and analysis), producing 
potentially universal and verifiable, because measurable, truths, versus the 
practice based/clinical and individual insights of psycho-analysis, where 
behaviour was subject to elaborate theoretical interpretations, which were not 
necessarily verifiable and even, some thought, self fulfilling (Glover). Given 
different techniques of approach, accounts of what they found there were 
inevitably very different. Cyril Burt saw permanent and observable features of 
the landscape of characteristic types – he called them ‘traits’ – constantly formed 
by the internal energy source of biological drives. The Kleinians and the 
Freudians both found a stratified terrain, in which the hydraulic power of 
instincts had been repressed and diverted into a seething underground lake, from 
which neuroses constantly bubbled up. The ground above it was a layer of ego 
rock impacted under the force of a final super-ordinate laval crust. The two 
schools could never agree on how this was made and how long it took. For 
Kleinians, it was formed entirely by internal convulsions from the primordial 
moment of birth, in which love, hate, destructive phantasies, guilt, anxiety, 
desire and despair, all converging on the mother object, gradually resulted in 
instinctual repression and a rudimentary ego and superego. For Freudians, it was 
a slower process, more congruent with actual neurological maturation and 
cognition, in which the stratified formations are made by the external pressure of 
a patriarchal society and the social and cultural conditions of dependency on the 
libidinous instincts of the child. The behaviourists just attacked the explorers en 
route and did not visit the inner territory at all. 
 
Such conditions were not especially favourable to the staking out of an inner 
space called attachment, though in different ways it overlapped with these others 
and mediated some of their disputed polarities. It seemed to offer something for 
everybody, which is probably why, initially, it pleased nobody very much in 
either parent intellectual community – psycho-analysis or science – and the 
theory has always sat a little uncomfortably between the two. John Bowlby was 
accused of apostasy by certain members of the psychoanalytic establishment for 
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several reasons. First the ‘environmentalism’ of his theory was somewhat 
revolutionary in the context of British psychoanalytic community at the time,256 
dominated as it was by Anna Freud and Melanie Klein and a theory of object 
relations, in which the intrapsychic conflicts and representations of the infant 
were a great deal more important to its behaviour than actual experience (Klein, 
1932). Bowlby rejected this form of psychoanalytic ‘psychologism’ – the current 
psychoanalytic explanations of the infant’s libidinal tie to the mother (primary 
object sucking and clinging and craving for return to the womb). He wrote 
defiantly:  
 
Psycho-analysts, like the nurseryman, should study intensively, rigorously, 
and at first hand, the nature of the organism, the properties of the soil, and 
the interaction of the two (Bowlby, 1940: 2). 
 
It was, perhaps, a reflection of his own analysis with Joan Rivière, a friend of 
Melanie Klein, that Bowlby assumed that the ‘soil’ in which the childish 
organism grew was the inter-subjective context of mother and child – the 
Kleinian couple, rather than the Freudian threesome of the Oedipus Complex. 
 
Second, the actual inner space of the child in Bowlby’s theories was, some 
claim, surprisingly non-psychoanalytic in appearance, as much influenced by 
Piaget as Klein (Fonagy, 2001), although others (Bretherton et al, 1991, for 
example) maintain that it was influenced by Fairbairn and the Object Relations 
school (Fairbairn, 1952). As described, attachment behaviour was initially part 
of a two person system aimed at proximity. It did not need a theory of internal 
drives to explain it. What was built up internally in the attachment space, on the 
basis of the child’s attachment experience – and therefore the behaviour of the 
mother – was a learnt set of cognitions, a ‘working model’ of the attachment 
                                                 
256 There was much initial hostility to Bowlby and attachment theory from the psychoanalytic 
movement, although post Freudianism had taken a developmental turn with Margaret Mahler 
and ego psychologists, like Erickson, in US and Anna Freud, Joseph Sandler and the Bion-Klein 
School in Britain. 
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relationship. How it would work was based on how it was perceived to have 
worked, plus templates, scripts, narratives and all the furnishings of a cognitive 
space. This Internal Working Mode (IWM) was seen as developing at the time 
when infantile memory progressed from the representational to the semantic 
(about the age of two years), when the left side of the brain begins its 
developmental spurt. The IWM acted as a series of expectational filters to 
information from the outside world about the behaviour of attachment objects 
and it was also accompanied by a reciprocal model of the self as the expected 
object of responsive parental behaviours. This, Bowlby thought, generalised 
later to an evaluative model of the social world and the child’s own place within 
it (Bowlby, 1969; Bowlby, 1973; Bowlby, 1980). Of course, the processing of 
interpersonal information also invoked affective and motivational states within 
this inner space. These might include fantasies and desires not necessarily based 
on experience, as later attachment theorists pointed out. (Bretherton et al, 1985; 
Sroufe et al, 1977a).  
 
Third, the theory that Bowlby came up with to explain his observations was 
controversial. He turned to ethology or animal behaviourism for an explanatory 
hypothesis which rooted infant/parent relationships in a period of evolutionary 
adaptedness for the reproductive survival of the species. There, proximity 
seeking infantile behaviour was selected for because it was functional for this 
survival. This was not only anathema to psycho-analysts such as Winnicot, who 
saw it as intolerably mechanistic and crude, but it also did not please the 
psychological community, since ethological explanations of human behaviour 
seemed an alien and somewhat circular approach. On the scientific side, having 
seemingly rejected the individual clinical insights of psycho-analysis, Bowlby 
did not choose the statistical approaches employed in academic psychology at 
that time. He retained his clinical assumptions about what is healthy 
development, but located them at the distal evolutionary level – healthiness 
equals natural adaptedness – and he approached the inner life of the child 
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through the strictest methods of naturalistic observation, borrowed from animal 
behaviourism and incorporating the latest techniques of film and photography. 
 
A Strange Situation 
 
It was Mary Ainsworth who helped greatly to develop Bowlby’s theories, as 
well as these ethological techniques. Together with others of Bowlby’s 
collaborators at his research department in the Tavistock Clinic, she began a 
lifetime of rigorous empirical research by studying the effects of separation from 
their parents on hospitalized infants.257 However, like Bowlby, she turned from 
studying maternal deprivation to a study of a normal sample of Ugandan 
mothers and babies, when her husband’s work took her to that country in the 
1960s (Ainsworth, 1967). She later established herself in a major US university, 
moving as a Professor of Psychology to John Hopkins, to undertake the famous 
Baltimore Study in the 1970s. This was her home study of mother/baby 
behaviour over a sample of 26 mother/child dyads, with a subset also observed 
under laboratory-like conditions. 258  
 
Ainsworth also worked within the postulates of evolutionary biology, identifying 
and recording a range of infantile ‘attachment behaviours’, seemingly triggered 
by fear, understood as the infant seeking protection in the face of danger with 
her primary carer or ‘attachment’ figure (Bowlby, 1958) and hypothesised as 
‘genetically programmed’ and, ‘species characteristic’ (Ainsworth et al, 1974: 
100-101).259 She also elaborated what was known at this period of mother/child 
                                                 
257 James Robertson, who was already trained in child observation by working previously at the 
Anna Freud Centre, is generally thought to have influenced Ainsworth’s methods a great deal. 
See Robertson, J. (1953a) Some Responses of Young Children to Loss of Maternal Care. 
Nursing Care, 49, 382-386, (1953b) A Two-Year-Old Goes to Hospital [Film]. 
258 This study was relatively small and intended as a pilot.  
259 Attachment behaviours in the child are defined by Ainsworth and her colleagues as 
behaviours which promote proximity or contact (with the attachment figure). In the human infant 
these include active proximity – and contact seeking behaviours such as approaching, following, 
and clinging, and signalling behaviours such as smiling, crying and calling.’ These behaviours in 
the human infant, though more evident after the child is mobile appear in the new born child as 
‘a repertoire of reflex-like behaviours which promote the maintenance of physical contact, once 
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interactions (when looking at developmental child psychology within an 
interpersonal context was in its relative infancy), 260 hypothesising that  
 
Adults generally, despite a massive overlay of learned behaviours – are 
biased to respond to the species characteristic signals of an infant in ways 
that are also species characteristic, … that infant attachment behaviours are 
adapted to reciprocal maternal behaviours, that a mother responsive to infant 
signals is a salient feature of the environment of evolutionary adaptedness, 
and that unresponsive mothers may be viewed as the product of 
developmental anomalies and likely themselves to foster anomalous 
development in their infants. (Ainsworth et al, 1974: 101)  
 
Her attempt to pin down empirically and, indeed, more precisely, the varying 
patterns of attachment behaviour that she observed in the homes of her sample 
resulted in her famous ‘Strange Situation’ test, in which a subset of her 
Baltimore child sample were subjected to the increased and artificially produced 
stress of being put into a room with a stranger, with, and then without, their 
mothers. The mother/child reunions were crucially observed and the resulting 
behaviours classified into four types of attachment behaviours (Ainsworth et al, 
1978a; Ainsworth et al, 1978b).261 
 
It was in her explanation of these observed behaviours, as well as her pursuit of 
the concept of ‘anomalous development’ that Mary Ainsworth herself fell foul 
of the scientific community and was, after the Baltimore study, never funded 
again by any government or private research organisation, despite repeated 
applications (Main, 1999b). The first difficulty was her formulation of 
                                                                                                                                                 
it has been achieved.’ Ainsworth, M. D. & Bell, S. M. (1970) Attachment, Exploration, and 
Separation: Illustrated by the Behavior of One-Year-Olds in a Strange Situation. Child 
Development, 41, 49-67. 50. 
260 Here too she brought a psycho-analytic framework to bear in her emphasis on coding her 
respondents’ behaviour only as seen and interpreted within its interpersonal context; that is, it 
was given meaning as opposed to being mechanically observed and counted. Main, M. (1999b) 
Mary D. Salter Ainsworth: Tribute and Portrait. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 19, 682-736. 
261 In the Strange Situation classification, B children, classified as ‘Secure’ greeted their mother, 
often tearfully, on reunion, but were soon comforted and settled down to play again. A children, 
classified as ‘Insecure Avoidant’ took little notice of their mother’s departure or return and were 
thought to precociously downplay affective arousal; C children, classified as ‘Insecure, 
Ambivalent’ were highly aroused, hard to comfort, alternately seeking soothing and then 
rejecting their mother’s advances. The fourth category, D, contained children who were 
unclassifiable.  
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attachment as an internal psycho-dynamic, rather than a behavioural 
phenomenon. Like Bowlby, she theorised behaviours, seemingly triggered by 
fear, as displays of an ‘attachment’ – an affectional tie which one person forms 
between himself and another specific one; a tie which forms an early spatial 
relationship between them, endures over time and is the secure basis for the 
exploratory system to come into play – another hypothesised evolutionary 
necessity. Thus, attachment was a type of affective bond, a sense of security – or 
not – with the cognitive correlate of Bowlby’s ‘internal working model’ 
(Ainsworth et al, 1970; Bowlby, 1958; Bowlby, 1969). Reflecting on her 
intellectual influences, Ainsworth wrote in her book on Ugandan mothers and 
babies:  
 
Attachment is manifested through specific patterns of behaviour, but the 
patterns themselves do not constitute the attachment. Attachment is internal. 
This internalized something that we call attachment has aspects of feelings, 
memories, wishes, expectancies, and intentions, all of which ... serve as a 
kind of filter for the reception and interpretation of inter personal 
experience and as a kind of template, shaping the nature of outwardly 
observable response.(My italics) (Ainsworth, 1967: 429-430). 
 
‘A something’ inscribed on an inner space: she thought she had avoided the 
reifying tendencies of behavioural models or diagnostic processes by 
hypothesising an explanatory psychological construct which was essentially 
psychodynamic. Bowlby was, after all, still part of the psychoanalytic 
community and Ainsworth herself spent some years in psycho-analysis (Main, 
1999).  
 
Not surprisingly, she found herself, on the one hand, out of step with the 
growing fashion for behaviourism in academic psychology, in which behaviours 
were all a response to context and ‘the mind’ remained an unexplored black box 
and, on the other hand, differing radically from trait theory in which unchanging 
internal characteristics were inferred from particular sets of index behaviours, 
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whereas attachment behaviours might vary greatly over stage of development 
and social context.  
                        
Her attachment construct was also the basis for the way she saw and developed 
the notion of ‘anomalous development’, which, with her clinical training, was as 
interesting to her as normal development. Not only did attachment persist over 
time and, by implication, influence how future social interactions were 
experienced, but the variable responses of mothers did not alter it quantitatively 
(or in the number of particular behaviours it seemed to generate) but rather 
qualitatively. In other words, attachment behaviour was not extinguished by an 
unresponsive mother, but rather, different forms of adaptive behaviour were 
generated, depending on maternal response. Nor was this to be seen only along 
the dimension of security to insecurity. It was Ainsworth’s major work to 
classify the differences in the individual attachment behaviours in infants of 
eighteen months or so and, by implication this, ‘anomalous development’ into a 
set of three different forms. If group B were secure responses, then A and C, 
called insecure avoidant (A) and insecure ambivalent (C), were very different 
forms of insecurity (Ainsworth et al, 1978a; Ainsworth et al, 1978b). 
 
This method of classification of her sample was the second major difficulty with 
Ainsworth’s work, although the Strange Situation Test remains fundamental to 
the whole attachment project. There were obvious criticisms: the smallness of 
the laboratory sample; the assumption of the stability of these classifications for 
an individual over time (although some longer term follow up of the infant 
respondent groups suggests that this was reliable)262 and the relative simplicity 
of the psychological assumptions behind the experiment, which preclude any 
notion of normal conflictual patterns of behaviour in the children involved 
(Mahler, 1967).263 However, the most fundamental and telling feature of 
Ainsworth’s approach – as of Bowlby’s – is the assumption of the universality 
                                                 
262 See Part III of this chapter. 
263 See Mahler’s theories of infantile ambivalence as normative, described in Fonagy, P. (2001) 
Attachment Theory and Psychoanalysis. New York: Other Press.: 71-73. 
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of mother/child behaviour and the ignoring of cultural specificity (Burman, 
2008). This applies not only across different societies, but also across social 
groups and different socio-economic condition, across individual families and 
even individual idiosyncrasies. Research along the same lines in different 
countries did, in fact, give some strange results (Grossmann et al, 1981; 
Grossmann et al, 2005),264 which would not have been a problem if the origins 
of attachment theory in the observation of pathology had not imposed a 
normative typology.  
 
The majority of children in the Baltimore study fell into the B category: that is, 
the B category was the statistical norm. However, Ainsworth, with her clinical 
bias, also assumed it was the psychologically healthy outcome for all children 
because seemingly most adaptive under stress or in danger. Types A and C 
children may have adapted their behaviour to different versions of maternal 
response, but this was also seen as maladaptive in a wider social context, 
generating high levels of anxiety, overt in the case of C children and defensively 
suppressed in the case of the As.265 Crucially, as Main has pointed out (Main, 
1999b), Ainsworth was not just interested in the statistical norm and a theory 
which explained the patterns of normal development implied. She wanted to 
explain the behaviour of every child classified in her sample – an approach that 
Main describes as ‘clinical’ rather than ‘statistical’, and was also a bow to 
psychoanalysis’s emphasis on individual difference. It was therefore seen as 
eccentric by other psychologists (Main, 1999). Even Bowlby, on first hearing 
Ainsworth’s paper on the Strange Situation results thought her theory lacked 
parsimony (Main, 1999), although he later retracted.  
 
                                                 
264 The Grossmann results from the Biele cohort in North Germany showed the A (insecure 
avoidant) group as the largest group in their Strange Situation test. 
265 For example, in the case of children in the A category, their avoidance of the mother’s 
overtures on reunion were accounted for by Ainsworth as a ‘prodromal defence’ (Main, 1999b: 
19) against the maternal rejection which was observed in the naturalistic setting of the home. As 
Main points out, this is not mere behavioural classification, but the importing of a psychoanalytic 
theory in explanation (Main, 1999b). 
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However, it was not just at the level of psychological explanation, in which the 
clinical clashed with the statistical, that the normativity of Ainsworth’s 
individual difference theory foundered. A further undermining of attachment’s 
clinical approach came with a questioning of the imposition of a mental health 
paradigm on an evolutionary theory (Lamb et al, 1984). Ainsworth had based 
her normative classifications on this evolutionary underlay – that is on an 
assumption that the healthy interaction between type B mothers and children 
was also evolutionarily favoured or selected for and, therefore, that a particular 
environment of evolutionary adaptedness had prevailed at a crucial time in our 
phylogenetic history. In a way, Bowlby and Ainsworth could be seen to be 
trying to preserve the clinical assumptions of psychoanalysis, by grounding them 
in what seemed, on the face of it, a surer and more self-evident evolutionary 
science. Unfortunately, they made an assumption at the distal evolutionary level 
which was no more (or less) proven than their clinical assumptions at the level 
of individual ontogeny. For five years before the publication of the first volume 
of Bowlby’s Attachment and Loss trilogy, the theory of evolution (which had 
developed little since the days of Darwin) changed dramatically with the 
publication of a single paper by the biologist, William Hamilton, although its 
implications took time to work out (Hamilton, 1964). Bowlby was unaware of 
the dramatic change when he published.  
 
This paper attacked the hypothesised goal of attachment behaviour as species 
survival, strongly suggesting, on the basis of games theory, that evolution works 
at the level of the individual, not the species and, moreover, at the level of the 
individual gene. Consequently, it is not about species or individual survival, but 
about genetic replication as the ultimate target of natural selection (Hamilton, 
1964). This ‘selfish gene’ type of imperative266 might generate different optimal 
patterns of behaviour, not just in the infant, but also in the mother and the 
mating youth. An argument could seemingly be made out that all three of 
                                                 
266 For a popular explanation of Hamilton’s work, see Dawkins, R. (1989) The Selfish Gene. 
(2nd Edition). Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks. 
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Ainsworth’s classifications might be adaptive at the phylogenetic level to 
particular different environments of evolutionary adaptedness (EEAs). This also 
suggests that the internal space called attachment might not be understood in 
terms of its cognitive/affective content, models and the like, either normally 
secure or ‘anomalous’, but in terms of an adaptive capacity to generate 
ecologically appropriate attachment models, and their behavioural correlates, in 
response to the mother’s behaviour, which would be determined by a particular 
EEA and its socio-economic conditions (Belsky, 1999b; Belsky et al, 1991; 
Simpson, 1999).  
 
Whilst Bowlby recanted in the second version of the first volume of his trilogy 
(Bowlby, 1982), neither he nor Ainsworth or most of their intellectual heirs 
seem ever to have got to grips with what this meant for Ainsworth’s theory of 
individual difference, of the normativity of the ‘secure paradigm’, of the 
responsive mother as a salient feature of the EEA and of secure infantile 
attachment as ‘nature’s state of grace’. (Belsky, 1999: 144).267 Curiously, this 
development did not seem to be seen at the time, or since, as a major source of 
concern to attachment theorists.  
 
Whilst Jay Belsky later attacked founders of the theory and their followers for 
intertwining ‘evolutionary theory and mental health theory …in a way that 
violated the former while reifying the latter’ (Belsky, 1999), it was, in fact, an 
                                                 
267. In the middle level life cycle theory of Belsky, J., Steinberg, L. & Draper, P. (1991) 
Childhood Eperience, Interpersonal Development and Reproductive Strategy. An Evolutionary 
Theory of Socialization. Child development, 62, 647-670, Chisholm, J. S. (1996) The 
Evolutionary Ecology of Attachment Organisation. Human nature, 7, 1-38, it is assumed that 
human beings will have evolved to employ different ecologically appropriate strategies to solve 
problems related not only to survival and growth but also to mating over the life cycle. They 
specifically relate individual strange situation difference to differential mating strategies, 
generated in different EEAs, in which, by implication, parenting strategies will also differ. This 
also challenges the normative ideal of secure attachments, for if individual difference is 
accounted for at the level of phylogeny, as a universal, because selected for, capacity to generate 
ecologically appropriate attachment behaviour, rather than at the level of ontogeny and proximal 
explanations, then the assumption of secure patterns of attachment made by Bowlby and 
Ainsworth as ‘nature’s prototype’ cannot hold. Hinde, R. (1982) Attachment: Some Conceptual 
and Biological Issues. In The Place of Attachment in Human Behaviour (eds C. M. Parkes & J. 
Stevenson- Hinde). New York: Basic Books.. 
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attack on Ainsworth’s work at the psychological level, back in the 1970s, which 
the consensus in the literature seemed to feel as a heavier blow, historically 
marking the nadir of attachment theory. This was a critique by behaviourists, 
(Maccoby et al, 1972; Masters et al, 1974, for example) who argued that that 
they could find no stability over time or context in the index behaviours of the 
different forms of infantile attachment. Besides this, the more simplistic, 
maternal deprivation version of Bowlbyism was dealt a blow by an exhaustive 
empirical examination of the evidence by a UK psychiatrist and epidemiologist, 
Michael Rutter, in a book called Maternal Deprivation Revisited (Rutter, 1972). 
This academic setback occurred at much the same time as the place of 
attachment theory in the field of ‘therapeutic familialism’ was becoming more 
precarious, in response to several other factors. First, the importance of its sister 
psychoanalysis declined in psychiatry268 and was under attack as a form of 
intervention in the personal social services, as being time consuming, expensive 
and with dubious outcomes (Wootton, 1959). Second, social learning theory 
burgeoned as a theory of development and socialisation (Bandura, 1963; 
Bandura, 1977) academically and in the training of the psy professions and, 
third, behaviourism, or brief, task centred, quasi contractual work, became, at 
least in the text books (Reid et al, 1972; Reid et al, 1977; Reid et al, 1969), the 
intervention of choice in both probation and social work – congruent as it was 
with a growing managerialism and taylorisation of work in the helping 
professions (Cohen, 1985; Howe, 1992; Sheldon, 1978). From another angle, 
feminism too mounted a fierce critique of Bowlby’s theory and methods,269 
whilst radical social work increasingly emphasised the wider socio-economic 
and community, rather than close interpersonal, context, of their clients’ family 
problems.  
 
At this point attachment’s career as an internal site on which a wound could be 
inscribed looked a little bleak. Its two essential requirements, an internal space 
                                                 
268 See Chapter 2. 
269 For an account of criticisms of ‘Bowlbyism’ see Riley, D. (1983) War in the Nursery: 
Theories of the Child and Mother. London: Virago Press.: 106-108. 
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as an expression of a metaphor turned theoretical construct and a 
normal/abnormal dichotomy to define the presence of harm, both seemed 
problematic. Despite these setbacks, however, it was as an academic, mid-level 
theory of individual ontogeny, in which this cognitive/affective phenomenon 
called attachment is inscribed on an inner life, that this theory survived and 
eventually flourished, although the evolutionary basis of its mental health 
assumptions has never been very sure. Further, it was Ainsworth’s work on 
individual difference, this two pronged approach, this ‘clinical’ interest in 
understanding not just the development of the normal or ‘secure’ child, but also 
the mal-adaptive or ‘insecure’ forms of behaviour in the infant in the strange 
situation, which, although it was regarded with suspicion by many contemporary 
psychologists, formed much of the basis for the growth of the theory in the 
second period.  
 
Looking ahead in time, the nature of attachment as an internal site was to be 
established and the concept greatly elaborated and, second, a crucial 
development at an empirical level was to enhance its contribution to mental 
health theory, so that the uncertain evolutionary basis for its normative 
assumptions seemed not to matter. Ainsworth’s work was an elaboration and 
systematisation of Bowlby’s original work, which of course started as an 
explanation of the pathological at the ontological level. It was to become the 
dominant theory of normal child development flourishing in the psychology 
departments of North America, but, as a mental health paradigm, it also gained a 
foothold in departments of psychiatry, as the other side of the coin: attachment, 
as part of a theory of developmental psychopathology, held its own alongside. 
 
 
III. ATTACHMENT, PERIOD 2, 1978–1999: AN ACADEMIC 
WORK IN PROGRESS 
 
Background 
 292 
 
The 1970s were a decade of complex and contradictory change in the UK, 
shadowing earlier movements in the USA. Contractionary responses to the first 
oil crisis across the capitalist world effectively ended the post-war, Keynesian, 
full-employment consensus, creating a large army of the ‘structurally’ 
unemployed and changing gendered employment patterns into the future as 
effectively as feminism. It was this latter movement, starting in the UK at the 
beginning of the decade, which was the first to substantially question inequity 
based on biological assumptions of difference. Others followed, creating what 
have been called ‘new political movements’ together with the politics of injury 
as a new form of radicalism, which paradoxically relied on the idea of a state 
with strong legal powers to right these inequities (Brown, 1995). At the same 
time, the traditional anti-authoritarianism of the left passed to the radical right 
with the rise of the New Right movement over the 1970s. Emanating from the 
USA, where writers such as Charles Murray greatly influenced UK thinkers in 
the Conservative party and beyond,270 it culminated in the political success of 
Thatcherism in 1979 and the near dismantling of the traditional British Welfare 
State. Welfare dependency was out. Individual rights and responsibilities were 
in, and the family of public policy was yet again reconstructed. A newly 
responsible, autonomous family was to be the bastion of privacy between the 
individual and the state.  
 
Of course, the corollary of this large area of private responsibility was a 
powerful law and order initiative in the policing of its boundaries. In relation to 
the family, this came in the form of monitoring and intervention in cases of 
suspected child abuse. For the UK, the discovery of child abuse as a social 
problem of supreme importance also occurred in the 1970s, and dealt an equally 
powerful blow to therapeutic family work. Problematic children and families 
were increasingly scanned for risk, not for welfare considerations, and 
                                                 
270 For example, Sir Keith Joseph frequently quoted the views of Murray, summarised in 
Murray, C. (1990) The British Underclass. Public Interest, 4-28. 
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therapeutic resources were diverted to the investigation of allegations and the 
ensuring of physical safety. Any therapeutic work was justified as 
‘preventative’. 
 
In this atmosphere, it was not just attachment theory which seemed on the 
decline, but therapeutic familialism itself. Yet, as Rose (1989/1999) argues, from 
the point of view of his history of governmentality and the rise of the self 
governing soul under the advanced liberal state, this would have been a false 
assumption. He points out that these changes signalled not the demise but the 
triumph of the therapeutic framing of families. Whilst it meant that the psy 
professionals ideally made less therapeutic interventions, either coercively or 
voluntarily elicited, into the privacy of the family, this was a reflection of the 
fact that for the thirty years or so, the family had been reconstructed as a set of 
abstract psychological relationships, in which good parents had come to invest 
all their most precious hopes and anxieties. The family could be trusted to 
manage its own emotional economy… with, of course, the proviso that the psy 
professionals were never very far away, if actuality fell too far short of 
aspiration (Rose, 1989/99).  
 
Whilst elements of attachment theory were surely present in the self-regulating 
desires of parents – images of the sensitive and responsive mother and the secure 
child abound in the child care advice of the period271 – the late 1970s and 1980s 
marked a low point for attachment theory both in the academic literature and as 
a basis for any clinical work which was done on both sides of the Atlantic. The 
story of its survival and eventual turnaround is located in the USA, and not in 
the realm of professional practice but in a series of university psychology 
departments across the country. Here it was established by its followers as a 
viable part of a growing scientific enterprise which was also adaptive to the 
prevailing policy discourses, as it was to the more immediate demands of the psy 
                                                 
271 For example, Penelope Leach’s bestselling book, first published in 1977, Leach, P. (1994) 
Your Baby and Child: From Birth to Age Five. New York: Knopf. 
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knowledge industry. What is suggested here is that these latter produced a 
momentum for theory development which enabled attachment academics 
simultaneously to produce an increasingly well researched account of normative 
development, and also to theorise the psychological effects of abuse and to adapt 
to the prevailing language of risk. Progress was made both in policy arenas and 
in statistical medicine or epidemiology, the second of which came to dominate 
the attachment literature in the third period. 
 
Samples from the World of Science data base (see Appendix) show an 
astonishing growth in attachment-based publications, a near threefold increase 
from 1975 to 1978, (the year of Ainsworth’s book on her research), then an 
increase of 1,000% to 1999, (the year of another milestone publication).272 To 
some degree this was because, as with any psychological subject, it was part of 
the vast and exponentially growing literature for psy professionals and 
academics and an explosion of interest in child development and state funding 
for research to go with it. But even within a general growth in psychological and 
psychiatric literature, it also seemed to acquire more than proportionate 
importance and acceptance as a basis for the study of child development (‘the 
dominant paradigm’) and for intervention in individual and family lives. It 
acquired its own eponymous journal, Attachment and Human Development, in 
1999. Major psychological, psychiatric, psycho-analytic journals (and a social 
work journal in the third period) have all produced special issues on attachment 
theory as a way of understanding this development and its disorders and 
generating, it is claimed, effective psychotherapeutic interventions.273 Of course, 
this may reflect the perceived inadequacies of its rivals, as behaviourism failed 
to address intrapsychic and developmental processes. It was also the result of the 
work of a dedicated and close group of (mostly) US-based researchers which 
grew massively over time. They pushed the implications of the initial work of 
                                                 
272 Cassidy, J. & Shaver, P. R. (1999) Handbook of Attachment: Theory, Research, and 
Clinical Applications. New York, NY US: Guilford Press. 
273 Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1996 (and 2006), Monographs of the Society 
for Research in Child Development, (1985), Child Abuse and Neglect 22, (1998), Psychoanalytic 
Inquiry, (1999), Child Abuse Review, 1997, Infant Mental Health, 2001. 
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Bowlby and Ainsworth, with their encouragement, from a study of maternal 
deprivation to a study of normal infant/mother interaction. The thrust of the 
group’s research was to establish the empirical basis for a theory of development 
over the whole life cycle in which the early attachment bond is seen as the 
prototype for all subsequent close, affective and romantic relationships, 
including the relationship between therapist and patient. Further, in the 
maladaptive version, insecure attachments, are seen as a risk factor, at least, for 
all subsequent interpersonal difficulties and psycho-pathologies (Belsky, 1999a; 
Sroufe et al, 1999).  
  
A Family and its Theory                
What was the immediate academic ecology to which attachment theory had to 
adapt? It has to be said that in the USA, social conditions in the 1980s and 
1990s, in the form of academic and state interest in the child and family, growth 
in psychology departments and state funding for research – especially scientific 
research – all favoured its flourishing. Here, the original, egalitarian ideals of the 
Kennedy era, producing the war on poverty and the Headstart program, also 
extended to the founding of the National Institute for Child Health and 
Development (NICHD) by the president’s sister.274 Although this ‘elite 
liberalism’ was replaced by a more conservative contraction of welfare spending 
in the 1970s, it was also accompanied by a political determination to tackle child 
abuse or maltreatment and to provide a continued investment in mitigating the 
developmental consequences of poor parenting. The same institutions persisted, 
and the study of child development remained a funded endeavour in all 
subsequent administrations, with psychologists becoming more involved in 
politics in the 1990s (Phillips et al, 2007).  
                                                 
274 This joined the large and powerful National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) as a branch of 
the National Institute of Health of the US federal administration and was designed to investigate 
developmental disability in children by reference to programmes establishing normative patterns 
and behavioural and social factors in development, as well as to bio-medical factors.  
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Not only were conditions favourable for research in attachment and child 
development, but the nature of the theory itself and the social organisation of its 
knowledge workers within the academic community contributed to its survival – 
and reproductive fitness. As stated, the theory, as first conceived and constantly 
worked on by Bowlby, was a marriage of different approaches to the 
development of behaviour patterns in different individuals. It combined an 
explanation at the level of ultimate cause, in terms of their phylogenetic origins 
and evolutionary history, middle range causal accounts of ontology and the 
development of particular attachment styles and empirical studies of the 
proximal environmental conditions that trigger the attachment system. Thus, it is 
seen as a unique theory, one of broad coverage, as well as flexibility, with a 
potential for illuminating many different fields of academic endeavour, amongst 
which are evolutionary biology, developmental biology and ethology, 
developmental, cognitive, personality and social psychology, psychiatry, 
developmental psycho-pathology, neuro physiology and neuro-psychiatry and, 
lastly, several different forms of psychotherapy. Whilst it was suggested earlier 
that one reason for the theory’s decline is that its multifaceted nature pleased 
nobody at first, as the academic conjuncture changed, and administrative 
pressure on academics to keep up publication rates increased, it is possible that it 
became deeply attractive to many different mates.  
What is more, the relative success of attachment theory in thinking about the 
normal and pathological development of children cannot be separated from the 
efforts of the academic entrepreneurs who advanced the theory and its position 
in this area. One could say that not only did the theory survive and flourish in an 
increasingly favourable ecological niche, but that the agents of its reproduction 
displayed all the mutually supportive network and reproductive cooperation of a 
family. Looking at the academic attachment community from the outside, one 
sees, as with any such, a labyrinthine network of connections, but, since they all 
seem to stem from the intellectual collaboration of two people, the network has a 
decidedly dynastic appearance, with intellectual exogamy (and some real 
endogamy!), as well as rivalrous splits in the second and third generations. This 
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structure provided its members with the sense of continuity and belonging 
furnished by any family.  
As is appropriate, the various memoirs and tributes to Mary Ainsworth on her 
death in 1998 paint a picture of her as the perfectly responsive, nurturing mother 
to her group of graduate students, as Bowlby was their intellectual father on the 
other side of the Atlantic. The two wrote and exchanged ideas and articles 
frequently. Bowlby’s letters, written in a fine hand in green ink, were read out 
by Ainsworth to her assembled students and they would send him papers for his 
generous comments (Main, 1999). Ainsworth herself, on retirement from her 
professorship at the University of West Virginia, abandoned her own research 
and spent the rest of her considerable working life encouraging and supporting 
her own students and others in the development of her theories. They, with all 
the independence and resilience of the securely attached, went forth and peopled 
the psychology departments of North America, keeping in touch long distance 
(Main 1999). Karl and Karin Grossman of Regensburg University, who became 
Ainsworth’s academic foster children, recall pleasurable family reunions at the 
yearly Society for Research in Child Development meetings in the USA 
(Grossman et al. 1999).275  
These children were upwardly mobile in terms of the hierarchies of the academic 
establishment and, from the beginning, had no trouble attracting research 
funding from the NICHD or directly from NIMH, where they sometimes started 
their post-doctoral career as fellows. The collection of their work (with one or 
two notable exceptions, and some significant others) in the monumental 
Handbook of Attachment, edited by Jude Cassidy and Phil Shaver (Cassidy et al, 
1999), has something of the size and authority of a family bible. It is a testimony 
to the volume, breadth and depth of the output of Ainsworth’s original 
psychology students and their collaborators in developmental psychology and 
how the theory was expanded, first to make it relevant to others in neighbouring 
                                                 
275 For a list of Ainsworth’s students see Bretherton, I. (1991) The Roots and Growing Points of 
Attachment Theory. In Attachment across the Life Cycle. (eds C. M. Parkes, J. Stevenson-Hinde 
& P. Marris), pp. 9-32. New York, NY US: Tavistock/Routledge. 
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fields and ensure its continued academic reproduction, and second to re-establish 
its relevance to the changing policy conjuncture.  
In this task, the original theories of Bowlby and Ainsworth gave this new 
generation several problems. First was the power of the behaviourist attack 
which questioned the existence of this inner space on the basis of index 
behaviours. Second, was the problem of how this space could be observed and 
described clearly and its stability over time and dyadic context established 
empirically, when displayed within all the complex maturational, 
intergenerational and social processes that development allowed. Certainly, the 
the research data did not conclusively support this stability either within a 
lifetime, between generations or over different relationships (Fonagy 2001). 
Third, the clinical distinction between normality and pathology of the A, B and 
C classifications of the Strange Situation were a little controversial and blurred. 
The solutions found to these difficulties resulted in some important changes to 
how the inner space of attachment was understood and accessed, as described 
below.  
 
Attachment as an Organisational Construct 
 
It was Everett Waters who saved the attachment construct from the attack of the 
behaviourists. There is a consensus in the attachment literature that one of his 
most important papers was an answer to this critique of Ainsworth’s work. 
Written with Alan Sroufe, this restored attachment theory to academic 
respectability, taking on the so-called misunderstandings and misapplications of 
the theory by trait and social learning theorists, current at the time (Maccoby et 
al, 1972; Sroufe et al, 1977a). The critique reduced attachment to certain index 
behaviours, and, when these were not inter-correlated or stable over time, 
dismissed them as useless. Answering it was no easy task, given the complexity 
of infant/caregiver behaviours which are not specific to the attachment system. 
These could change over social context and over time with changing capacities, 
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an equally complex learning process and the intervention of many other social 
variables, including what is often referred to as ‘the ecology of the family.’276 
 
Sroufe and Waters re-emphasised Bowlby’s conception of attachment as a 
behavioural control system with informational inputs, following Ainsworth in 
moving the emphasis of the goal of the system from proximity towards 
exploration and therefore felt security. Thus the affective aspects of the 
attachment tie were said to mediate the informational inputs to the system, 
explaining the infant’s preferences for her caregiver under stress and accounting 
for the cumulative effects of repeated or long-term separation. They reaffirmed 
attachment as an organisational principle, embedded in a piece of social 
interaction, which was also embedded in its wider social context (Sroufe et al, 
1977a). Thus they restated that what Ainsworth knew she had observed and 
classified in her Baltimore sample was the qualitative functioning of the 
attachment system, which is ‘normatively integrative and flexibly adaptive’, 
rather than a quantitative behavioural phenomenon, which measured the strength 
of a drive or a trait (Ainsworth et al, 1978b). 
 
Strange Situations and the Importance of Naturalistic Observation 
 
Of all Ainsworth’s students, Waters was the one whose work seems most 
concerned with the respectability of attachment theory as science, with 
impeccable statistical method and methodology, the clarification of the 
theoretical constructs and the linking of theory to empirical observation (or 
validity). He did his best to keep the tradition of mother/infant observation alive 
with his Attachment Q Sort research (Posada et al, 1995; Vaughn et al, 1990; 
Waters et al, 1985), emphasising in a later paper that the observation, 
presumably over time, of ‘secure base behaviour’ in the naturalistic setting of 
the home was the ‘gold standard’ to which all other observational or 
                                                 
276 It would also be conceded that temperament or innate characteristics might make a difference 
to how the attachment bond is experienced by mother and child, though the two dimensions are 
not highly correlated. 
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questionnaire data in attachment research had to be tied (Waters, 2002). The 
trouble was that, in establishing stability over time and relationship, naturalistic 
observation had its limits. 
 
The fundamental task of Ainsworth’s students in restoring the credentials of 
attachment theory in the scientific community had been to confirm its empirical 
basis by replicating the (pilot) Baltimore study results on other, larger samples. 
They established its stability by extending the studies of mother/child interaction 
to an older age group. Mary Main set up new large-scale study and a flourishing 
centre for attachment research on the Berkeley campus of the University of 
California, where she revisited her sample and established a positive relationship 
between infantile attachment classifications and those at the age of six (Main et 
al, 1988). Her partner in this, Jude Cassidy, worked similarly on a five-way 
classification of strange situation reunions for a sample of kindergarten children 
in West Virginia with Bob Marvin (Cassidy et al, 1992); and the Grossmans 
(mentioned above) replicated the Baltimore study in Bielefeld in Germany, 
though finding less stability over time (Grossmann et al, 1981). But, for obvious 
reasons, there was a limit to what observation could show with older age groups, 
even if this was at all practical.  
 
A further difficulty was the inconvenient fact that research based on the ‘gold 
standard’ over all ages gave highly variable results and would continue to do so. 
As Peter Fonagy put it at the turn of the century, ‘observation alone has not 
yielded convincing results for a factor which mediates security over time and 
relationship.’ (Fonagy, 2001) Moreover, if Ainsworth’s experimental evocation 
of this inner space failed to generate consistent results, this implied one of three 
responses – or all. Either the means of accessing it via its effects should be 
changed, or the inner space, the theoretical construct itself, needed to be 
modified or, finally, the original empirical results needed to be carefully 
reworked.  
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The Adult Attachment Interview 
 
The way forward on a change of access was the first of Mary Main’s two major 
contributions to attachment theory, which took the theory back, nearer to 
psychoanalysis, as well as forward to its life cycle and intergenerational 
possibilities.277 In the empirical work on the mother/child dyad, there was a 
problem with showing a strong correlation between mothers’ observed 
responsiveness and the infants’ Strange Situation status. Also, establishing the 
attachment basis of this responsiveness in the mother by interview seemed 
impossible, as adult recall of attachment experiences in childhood is not 
necessarily stable or reliable. Main made a methodological move, in the title of 
her 1985 article with Nancy Kaplan and Jude Cassidy, ‘to the level of 
representation’. The move was, indeed, to the use of an interview schedule, but 
it was one with a difference. She did elicit an account of each mother’s own 
childhood (Main et al, 1985). However, this she interpreted and scored, not 
simplistically by its content, but by how this content related to its narrative style 
and, above all, its coherence, flexibility and the ability it revealed to reflect on 
the feelings and motives of self and others. She also noted the respondent’s 
cooperation with the interview process. She called this schedule the ‘Adult 
Attachment Interview’ (AAI) (George et al, 1985; Main, 1995). What she 
thought she had found access to was not the mother’s attachment status as such, 
but to her ‘state of mind with respect to attachment’ (Main, 1996: 240).  
 
Like Ainsworth, Main used a three/four way typology to classify her results, 
which Ainsworth was the first to notice mapped almost perfectly, both 
conceptually and empirically, onto her own Strange Situation classification of 
infant behaviour (Grossman et al, 1999).278 Of course, this was still grounded in 
Water’s ‘gold standard’ of mother child observation and there seemed to be 
                                                 
277 Main was and is perhaps the most important of Ainsworth’s students, having been, initially, 
an unwilling worker in her professor’s Baltimore study, because of the ‘apprenticeship’ system 
for PHD students at John Hopkins – she had wanted to study psycho-linguistics. 
278 The three AAI organised categories were ‘Secure /Autonomous’, ‘Insecure/Dismissive’ and 
‘Insecure/ Preoccupied’. 
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some correlation between the maternal ‘state of mind with respect to 
attachment’, as revealed by Main’s interpretation of the Adult Attachment 
Interview, and the observed responsiveness of the mothers in her sample. This 
pinpointed some of Ainsworth’s ‘developmental anomalies’ that produced 
‘unresponsive mothers;’ the connection was not sufficiently strong, however, to 
explain the powerful, almost dramatic association she found between maternal 
AAI score and the attachment classification of the infant, even when taken 
before its birth – nor has it been shown to be stronger by further future research 
((Hesse et al, 1999; Pederson et al, 1998). The AAI itself has proved to be 
robust over time and independent of the obvious mediating variables, such as IQ 
and discursive style. Its strongly, quite unusually predictive results, in terms of 
the Strange Situation behaviour of the infant, had been reproduced in at least 
fourteen other studies by 1995 (Van Ijzendoorn, 1995).  
This impressive predictive power of the AAI ensured its success as a measure. It 
was extended to teenagers and even down to articulate six year olds in the Child 
Attachment Interview (Target et al, 2003). What is more, it joined the Strange 
Situation classification as the main plank of attachment research and enabled it 
to branch out from mother/child observation in a number of ways. Crucially, 
attachment theory joined most other heavily researched versions of 
psychological difficulty, psychopathology, abuse, violence and the rest, as 
having a life cycle and intergenerational aspect, making it a powerful framework 
for thinking about social policy towards the family. Since connections or 
causality across the dyad and across time remained something of a mystery, this 
was even more fertile ground for the growth of the funded psychological 
research, in both developmental, affective and cognitive psychology (Fonagy, 
2001). 
 
‘From Your Mother’s Arms to your Lover’s Arms’279 
                                                 
279 See Waters, T. (2004) Learning to Love: From Your Mother's Arms to Your Lover's Arms. 
The Medium (Voice of the University of Toronto), 30 (19), 1-4. 
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The discourse analysis of the AAI might be seen as an even more 
methodologically dubious venture than the interpretation of the Strange 
Situation test, from a strictly scientific point of view. Main called it her attempt 
to ‘surprise the unconscious’ (George et al, 1985; Main, 1991: 141), to come 
across the inner life by stealth – open as it is to the subjectivity of a meaning 
giving and appraising observer, and to the ins and outs of an elaborate 
cognitive/affective theory of mind, set out in her key article on metacognition 
(Main 1991). However, this move to the interrogation of adults opened the way 
for another methodological addition to the techniques used to explore the 
attachment space, this time in the form of a straightforward Adult Attachment 
Style self report questionnaire which elicited information, not on the past but on 
the respondents’ current romantic relationships. It was more in line with a 
schedule from positivistic psychology than the AAI and was imported from the 
study of adult relationships in personality and social psychology, where Phil 
Shaver was one of the first and most prolific psychologists to apply attachment 
theory to ‘adult pair bonding’. His acceptance into the attachment family was 
crowned with joint authorship of the Attachment Handbook (Cassidy et al, 1999) 
and proved to be another significant step in the development of attachment 
theory, its applications and attractiveness as an area of enquiry.  
Its methodological contribution to the field was most appealing, however, 
especially to research students. Studies in the area of adult attachments could 
float free of Water’s ‘gold standard’ of naturalistic secure-base observation, or 
the AAI interview which was still validated by the latter. Questionnaire data of a 
self report variety280 was possibly not more reliable, but a great deal easier to 
administer and interpret. This was partly due to the way that the use of the AAI 
was organised. Perhaps as a reflection on the reliability of the AAI method and 
its interpretive nature, all researchers who employ it have to undergo an 
                                                 
280 Except for one study, airport based, of parting couples by Fraley and Shaver, initially entitled    
‘I'm Leaving on a Jet Plane’, Fraley, R. C. & Shaver, P. R. (1998) Airport Separations: A 
Naturalistic Study of Adult Attachment Dynamics in Separating Couples. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 75, 1198-1212. 
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expensive training from a strictly controlled list of licensed trainers. The 
schedules and procedures were and are still kept in the form of unpublished 
papers in the Berkeley campus of the University of California (George et al, 
1984; George et al, 1985; George et al, 1996).  
 
Of course, Adult Attachment-Style (AAS) self-report questionnaires clearly 
occupy a separate domain from the AAI, pinned as this is to predicting observed 
infantile security and reflecting metacognitive processes, which can be seen as 
relating to the unconscious and thus approaching more closely to attachment’s 
psychoanalytic roots. They measure different things , although they do share 
certain underlying constructs essential to attachment theory, especially the 
capacity to rely on attachment figures in times of need and to provide care 
(Shaver et al, 2000). They also refer to different behavioural systems or 
attachment orientations, between which, despite initial claims (Hazan et al, 
1987), according to Chris Fraley, the ‘source and degree of overlap … remains 
controversial.’281  
 
Meanwhile, for those interested in epidemiology, the AAS and its extensions 
were a great step forward. What the AAS provides is relative ease of research. 
Attachment scoring on two dimensions, instead of categorisation, at both the 
adult and the infant level provides a more usable, statistical version of the old 
system of classification; the schedules are straightforward and available to all 
(Brennan et al, 1998).282 That slice of inner life called attachment was no longer 
an area of complex affective and cognitive processes only amenable to 
technicians of the dynamic and their trainees; it was now amenable to study by 
anyone through a simple questionnaire. What is more, this change seems to have 
been accepted by the specialists. Despite the strict control of AAI use, Mary 
                                                 
281 www.psych.uiuc.edu/~rcfraley/attachment.htm. [accessed 5th December, 2006] 
282 In terms of the mapping of patterns between the two dyads, the measurement of individual 
difference in adult intimate relations, scores attachment style along two dimensions, those of 
high/low anxiety and high/low avoidance. For a review of Adult Attachment Style measures, see 
Crowell, J. A., Fraley, R. C., Shaver, P. R. & Cassidy, J. (1999) Measurement of Individual 
Differences in Adolescent and Adult Attachment. In Handbook of Attachment: Theory, 
Research, and Clinical Applications., pp. 434-465. New York, NY US: Guilford Press.  
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Main herself in an epilogue to the Handbook looked forward to the possibility of 
merging the different adult attachment schedules, or at least to the use of both 
together in a coordinated form (Main, 1999).  
 
From Content to Capacity: the Internal Working Model 
 
Main’s move to metacognition also opened the way to dealing with the 
modification of another crucial piece of the theory: Bowlby’s Internal Working 
Model (IWM). This cognitive model was seen to structure the attachment 
control system, and perhaps to account for the persistence of the secure base 
phenomenon for any dyad over time and between generations, as well as the 
possibility of its generalisation by an individual to other important affective 
relationships. Such a model is obviously open to endless elaboration and 
reformulation, especially about the way that affect and arousal mediate the 
availability of attachment information, as well as being part of it. It has indeed 
been criticised as a theory of such generality that it can explain anything (Belsky 
et al, 1994; Hinde et al, 1988; Rutter et al, 1999a; Thompson et al, 2003); 
Hinde, 1988; Belsky and Cassidy, 1994; Rutter and O’Connor, 1999 and 
Thompson and Raikes, 2003). The reformulation of this model required by the 
empirical research data was also tackled by Ainsworth’s students and their 
collaborators (Bretherton et al, 1991; Bretherton et al, 1999; Main, 1991; Main 
et al, 1985; Sroufe, 1996). It is seen, in its revised metacognitive form, as in the 
domain of the AAI, not as cognitive or affective content of the mind – templates 
narratives, scripts and the like – but as the capacity for coherence of discourse, 
reflexivity and empathetic evocation for the thoughts and feelings of others. 
Using this revised version of an inner space, current research seems to indicate a 
connection between infantile security and its adult forms and between maternal 
security and the attachment classification of infants.283 
                                                 
283 For an elaboration of this IWM and supportive research see Fonagy (2001). 
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The emphasis on mental capacities, privileged structural models of 
psychological functioning and, thus, opened the way for two further lines of 
development in the third period. First was a re-engagement with psychoanalysis, 
which is Peter Fonagy’s project, and second, an increasing interest in the way 
such models are mirrored in neurophysiology by structural models of brain 
development, in which neural connections of increasing complexity are made 
and maintained in interpersonal communication (Siegel, 2001). 
 
Attachment and Psychopathology: or D is for Danger 
 
It is in the epidemiology of psychopathology that Main’s work in Berkeley had 
one more crucial developmental outcome for attachment theory, also built on its 
life-cycle implications, and bringing it right into line with the mainstream policy 
preoccupation with child abuse, its intergenerational predictors and 
consequences. She re-examined the classification of children in Ainsworth’s 
original Strange Situation test. As in Baltimore, roughly 13% of her Berkeley 
study sample did not fit Ainsworth’s three-way classification and fell into the 
dustbin category that was called ‘unclassifiable’ in the earlier study (Ainsworth 
et al, 1978b). Main and collaborators pushed Ainsworth’s clinical interest in 
individual difference further, by studying these unclassified children in detail, 
following her sample up at the age of 6 years and finding the category size 
stable. She classified these children as Type D: their behaviour in their natural 
surroundings and in the Strange Situation test was described as disorganised, 
unpredictable and signifying confusion and disorientation (Main et al, 1986). At 
first, she interpreted their mothers’ AAIs as tending to show ‘unresolved’ 
mourning for an attachment figure, ‘or some other traumatic experience’ (Main 
et al, 1990b). Later, in a key article in 1990, she and Eric Hesse famously linked 
disorganised attachments in infants to ‘frightened or frightening caregiving,’ in 
which children, in the second case, were faced with the dilemma of fearing the 
figure whom they wished to approach for comfort in times of distress, or worse, 
saw the attachment figure as the cause of the fear (Main et al, 1990a).  
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Subsequently, the emphasis of attachment research shifted from child 
observation to the implications of the theory for child and adult 
psychopathology. There is some suggestion in the literature that the Type A 
classification is associated with internalised problems – anorexia, depression, 
‘disorders of inhibition or compulsion’ – and Type C with ‘acting out’ problems, 
acute anxiety, behaviour disorders, obsessional behaviour and the like 
(Crittenden et al, 2000: 244). Further, Pat Crittenden has now produced a 
‘Dynamic Maturational Model’ of attachment based behaviour in adults which 
encompasses all forms of psychopathology within the original three-way 
classification (Crittenden et al, 2000). However, it is, crucially, the Type D 
classification, rather than the two other insecure categories, avoidant and 
resistant, that was shown over a series of epidemiological studies in the 1990s 
robustly to predict psychopathology in later childhood and adulthood (Carlson, 
1998; Lyons-Ruth et al, 1993; Lyons-Ruth et al, 1996a; Lyons-Ruth et al, 
1999a; Lyons-Ruth et al, 1999b; Lyons-Ruth et al, 1991; Lyons-Ruth et al, 
1996b; Ogawa et al, 1997).284 Disorganisation in childhood is especially 
associated with the diagnosis of attachment disorder, as described in the children 
we met at the start of this chapter. It is also predictive of psychosis (Dozier et al, 
1999), dissociation (Liotti, 1992; Main et al, 1996), and severe personality 
disorder in adults (Fonagy et al, 2000). Empirically, it provides much stronger 
continuity over time, generation, and dyadic relations, than other attachment 
classifications. Not only has it increasingly become the focus for attachment 
research, it dominates treatment-oriented thinking about attachment also 
(Holmes, 2001). For it strongly predicts the most problematic diagnostic 
categories, socially, in the regulation of the dangerous and the criminally insane. 
 
                                                 
284 Although there is a body of literature, which suggests a concurrent correlation with 
disorganisation and psychological disturbance, it is less reliable because of the problems of cross 
contamination of the data, and especially relating attachment problems to specific diagnoses, 
where the presence of co-morbidity is ever a problem Greenberg, M. T., Cassidy, J. & Shaver, 
P. R. (1999) Attachment and Psychopathology in Childhood. In Handbook of Attachment: 
Theory, Research, and Clinical Applications. pp. 469-496. New York, NY US: Guilford Press. 
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With this development, attachment theory began to spread from the psychology 
departments of North America and Britain and into the psychiatric and 
psychotherapeutic clinics, to be described in the next chapter. What is more, 
Type D classification has become almost uniquely applied to those whose 
attachment figures were not only unresponsive to the danger of their children, 
but its actual source, that is, to the subjects of parental maltreatment. It 
consequently spread further to Welfare services in the USA and the UK, 
especially those dealing with the fostering and adoption of children whose 
infancy had been blighted by parental abuse or mental illness. A type D 
attachment, generating disorganised behaviour, is, par excellence, the 
psychological and invisible site of a wound, whether there are also outer wounds 
or not.  
 
Further, attachment theorising has been taken over, in this area, by the culturally 
dominant language of danger and risk, of which Pat Crittenden (now a professor 
at the Family Relations Institute, University of Florida) is a prime user. She 
writes of her ‘Dynamic Maturational Model of Attachment, tied to risk 
assessment and treatment,’ as ‘particularly relevant to individuals who are in at-
risk situations, have been exposed to danger, display disturbed or mal-adaptive 
behaviour, or are diagnosed as having a psychiatric disorder.’285 The theory that 
it employs is based on the maturational development of ‘individual strategies for 
dealing with endangerment’ and the therapy this implies enhances the quality of 
life for ‘endangered, endangering, and vulnerable humans.’  
 
Besides this, these ‘internal somethings’ called attachments are reified in DOH 
publications, as they became ‘faulty’ or ‘damaged’ (Cleaver et al, 1999: 58, 76 
and 65). Then the language is further ratcheted up, during the 1990s, by a strand 
of psychiatric and neuro-psychiatric literature on the effects of maltreatment on 
the neuro-endocrine system: diurnally early high levels of cortisol found in type 
                                                 
285 http://www.patcrittenden.com/Attach_and_Psychopathology.html– Overview of Course on 
Attachment and Psychopathology [accessed 23 January 2009]. 
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D children are thought to have a destructive effect on the body’s stress 
regulatory system.286 Thus, Bruce Perry’s article on the effects of maltreatment 
on the brain is entitled ‘Incubated in Terror’ (Perry et al, 1997) and Allan Schore 
writes of ‘traumatic relations’ and ‘traumatic attachments’ (Schore, 2001b). In 
the discovery of Type D, trauma and attachment join forces, as did violence and 
emotional abuse in Chapter 4, as an attachment seems to take on the 
characteristics of its threatening or destructive environment. Also, psychological 
harm is thought to be caused to the infant, not just, as in trauma, because of 
excessive fear itself, not just, as in the original attachment theory, because of the 
unavailability or unresponsiveness of the mother in the face of an exogenous 
threat to the mother/child system but - worse than that – by a threat from the 
very person the child would go to for protection; an endogenous hazard – an 
abusive mother – danger in the very heart of the family. 
The Rats of NIMH: a Postscript287 
 
This theoretical elaboration of an internal psychological space called attachment 
as a response to attacks by behaviourists, and the necessity to validate empirical 
results, dominated mainstream attachment research during this period. It had its 
critics who deplored this drift from Bowlby’s so-called environmentalism 
towards a more psychoanalytic psychologism. A small space was allowed in the 
Handbook (Cassidy et al, 1999) for an even more extreme critique of attachment 
as primarily a psychological construct. The challenge was based on a more 
detailed examination of animal behaviour, appealing to the biologism of 
attachment theory, which had in its inception been based on evolutionary 
explanations of cross species instinctive behaviour and not much examined at 
                                                 
286 This is found among Romanian orphans who are emblematic of this group of children and the 
subject of much psychological and neurophysiological research. See Rutter, M., Beckett, C., 
Castle, J., Colvert, E., Kreppner, J., Mehta, M., Stevens, S. & Sonuga-Barke, E. (2007) 
Effects of Profound Early Institutional Deprivation: An Overview of Findings from a UK 
Longitudinal Study of Romanian Adoptees. European Journal of Developmental Psychology, 4, 
332-350. 
287 With apologies to Robert O’Brien, author of the classic children’s story, Mrs Frisby and the 
Rats of NIMH. 
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that time (Polan et al, 1999; Suomi et al, 1999). The concept of attachment was 
not the monopoly of the psychological department. 
The work in ethology or developmental biology over the 1990s, particularly by 
Myron Hofer and Steve Suomi, whose subjects are rats and rhesus monkeys 
respectively, not only confirmed cross species continuity of attachment 
behaviour, which was just assumed by Bowlby. In studying and elaborating it, 
they also challenged the ‘circular’ notion of attachment as a theoretical concept, 
used as a psychoanalytic or organisational construct to explain certain universal 
forms of behaviour – from which it is also inferred. This concept, they claimed, 
is merely a metaphor. Alternatively, they located attachment deep in the sensory 
experiences of its mother for the foetus and neonate in the relevant species. For 
example, it was through tactile, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and visual 
experiences that the fundamental physiological regulation of the rat pup was 
achieved (Kraemer, 1992 and Hofer,1995). The distress of the pup at the loss of 
its mother was not an invisible wound but the physical discomfort caused by the 
loss of these regulatory processes, rather than any process which is symbolically 
mediated (Hofer, 1996; Polan et al, 1999).  
Attachment as a physiological regulator enlarged its scope from being confined 
to a protective system for the management of fear to other aspects of the 
mother/child relationship. As Main pointed out in her epilogue to the Handbook 
(Main, 1999a), this work indicates that Bowlby had actually underestimated the 
ultimate importance of mother-infant interactions, in the sense that they are not 
only effective in protecting the infant from external dangers (‘the outer ring’, as 
it were), but in actually promoting life. They also regulate independent internal 
homeostatic systems, temperature, hunger etc, as well as arousal, even pre-
natally. She quotes a recent review of neuro-physiological experiments on 
monkeys (Amini et al, 1996): 
The nervous system of social mammals is constituted by a number of open 
homeostatic loops which require external input from other social mammals 
for internal homeostasis to be maintained. The manner in which this input is 
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achieved is through social contact and bio-behavioural synchrony attained 
with attachment figures…. In this view, then, the attachment relationship is 
postulated to be a crucial organising regulator of normal neurophysiology 
for social mammals (cited in Main, 1999a: 866-867). 
In defence of her own work, however, Main is also careful to note, 
incontrovertibly, that what actually constitutes ‘attachment’ is ‘a matter of 
semantics’ (1999: 866). She might have added that the equation of ‘social’ with 
‘ventral’ contact between mother and child – human or rat – might also have its 
semantic problems (Burman, 2008). It can be argued that this move is not 
necessarily reductionistic, however; it elaborates and extends the biological basis 
of sociality that Bowlby and Ainsworth had always assumed. As Fonagy points 
out, Hofer’s work on the cross species basis for attachment does not preclude the 
development, in the human case, of the highly complex, flexible and reflexive 
mental life of the new IWM, described above. Indeed, it is the basis for its 
dyadic creation (Fonagy 2001). Consequently, the loss of this relationship is not 
a just damage to an inner space, which is reactive to extreme distress or fear, 
however prolonged, as in disorganisation and psycho-pathology literature. It is, 
also, the loss of a homeostatic regulator with the consequent dislocation of the 
infant from the pathway of emotional and cognitive development it supports. It 
is the loss of the opportunity for human sociality, as it was meant to be. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has offered an account of the way in which one theoretical 
construct, a metaphor for a close dyadic relationship, was inscribed on the inner 
life of an infant and seen to organise his behaviour in a way which would affect 
his negotiation of social relationships far into the future. It was a theory of how 
this ‘internalised something’ might be shaped by a mother figure into producing 
adaptive or maladaptive behaviour which might presage healthy-normal, or 
unhealthy-abnormal outcomes for the child in adulthood. The emergence of the 
theory has been set briefly in its historical, policy, academic, social and even 
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interpersonal environment, which was divided into two periods. The first covers 
the post-war work of John Bowlby, the birth of the theory out of a cross between 
psychoanalysis and evolutionary theory, and its development by Mary 
Ainsworth. The second covers the work of Ainsworth’s students in establishing 
the theory within the North American academy. 
 
This history, in both periods, has been dominated by three different themes. The 
first is the slightly uncertain relationship of this hypothesised inner space, called 
attachment, to the various ways in which it can be observed or measured, and 
how its nature has been adjusted over time accordingly, as the stringency or 
complexity of the measurement requirements have been heightened and then 
relaxed. The second theme is the theory’s clinical assumptions. I have noted that 
a strong theory of normative development and secure attachment behaviour 
arose from an initial study of conditions determining pathology, or the wounding 
or dislocation of this inner state. This normal space is still envisaged by its 
difference from the pathological, however. And these two theories, of the normal 
and the pathological, therefore developed side by side, although by the end of 
the time frame of this chapter, the pathological had outstripped the normative in 
one of the most powerful developments of attachment theory. This was the 
theorisation of the psychological and thus developmental consequences of all 
forms of child maltreatment – in the words of the book title with which this 
chapter started, ‘The Primal Wound.’  
 
The third theme is the problematic grounding of the theory’s clinical 
assumptions about infantile behaviour and its inner correlates in a theory of 
evolutionary adaptedness, so that what is normal and desirable becomes 
‘natural’ and what is pathological is maladaptive. In the first period, this seemed 
to sit uncomfortably with developments in evolutionary theory, but was 
developed in the second period in an examination of cross species attachment 
behaviour in which the attachment concept is extended to describe physiological 
regulation in nursing dyads, as its biological base. This signals forward to 
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developments described in Chapter 7 in which the neuro-physiological basis of 
infant sociality is increasingly emphasised in academic and professional research 
and therapy, as ‘the social’ seems to acquire a whole new meaning. 
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                           CHAPTER 7: 
                RISK AND RESILIENCE: 
      ATTACHMENT AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The development of attachment as a theorisation of emotional abuse and neglect 
and its psychopathological consequences has meant a dramatic revival in its 
fortunes. The previous chapter showed how it provides some handle on the way 
this problem presents itself to psy professionals for their understanding and 
intervention. However, attachment theory has not just been institutionalised in 
psychology and psychiatry departments of universities across the USA and, to a 
lesser extent, the UK over the 1990s. At the turn of the century, it is also subject 
to a promotional diaspora across an array of organisations throughout the 
anglophone world, Israel, Spain and South America. These are aimed at parents; 
at professionals working with children and at governments administering their 
welfare. What is more, it seems that it is not just this theorising of abusive, and 
by implication, of course, the non- abusive, normal sort of parenting, which 
seems to fit with current social preoccupations and government agendas. It is 
also in the way that normal parenting has been talked up as being predictive, 
with a high level of certainty, of emotionally well regulated individuals who are 
in some way protected from temptations to deviancy and the debilitating stress 
of risk society. In the language of wounds, it is part of the making of a shield or 
a carapace around the individual against the excesses of the social environment.  
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Besides this, the protection against socio-economic stressors or predispositions 
to deviancy are more and more seen as emergent from complicated statistical 
models, where correlations are privileged over intricate causal connections 
located in a psychological space. Whilst these causal theories developed in 
complexity over the second period, in this third, they can be seen to decline in 
importance and what is increasingly developed in the programmatic rhetoric of 
certain writers on attachment are hypotheses, not so much at a psychological 
level, but at the level of the brain and the neuro-endocrine system – inscribed in 
a biological as well as a psychological space. And this space has been 
increasingly theorised over the 1990s in the heavily funded academic research 
project of neurophysiology. Attachment theory was only marginally involved in 
this growth, but it is a development to which its ideology of natural healthiness 
is eminently adapted and where enthusiasm among parents and professionals for 
neurological versions of childcare and therapy is marked. Thus, in this period, 
attachment theory becomes more complicated and multifaceted than ever. It was 
suggested in the last section that it was the complexity and flexibility of 
attachment as an academic theory which allowed its flourishing in the US 
psychological academy. In this section, we suggest that it was this same 
flexibility which allowed its flourishing in the complex policy environment 
created by New Labour in the UK at the turn of the century. 
 
The policy conjuncture around this third phase of attachment theory’s history is 
complicated by the UK government’s recent attempt at a ‘third way’ between 
post-war paternalism and the seeming realities of the global market to which the 
New Right had exposed the national socio-economic system. Besides this, the 
decline of Thatcherism and the electoral victory of the Labour party in 1997 saw 
so much legislation and organisational change directed towards the agencies of 
childcare and education, both private and public, that the results continue to be 
somewhat confusing. There are, however, certain clear, broad changes. First, this 
is the most extreme level of policy activism towards children by any UK 
government and, while much of the New Right rhetoric about the limits of the 
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state, about individualism and the strengthening civil society has remained, this 
seems to have involved, paradoxically, a dramatic spread in the disciplinary role 
of the state under a rationale of partnership, the mixed economy of care and its 
audit and regulation. The second change is that, whilst children have always 
been of social interest as adults-in-the-making – as ‘becomings’ rather than 
‘beings’ – no government before has made this ‘social investment’ attitude to 
children so explicit in policy terms (Esping-Andersen, 2002; Giddens, 1998).  
 
Third, in its Third Way ideology, the New Labour government has produced 
something of a contrast to the social policy behind the post-war welfare state. 
The consensus in the social policy literature is that, while the optimistic 
narrative of the post-war Labour government was about protecting individuals 
and families from the inevitable inequities of a market system of increasing 
international connectedness, the discourse of New Labour is about the 
affordances of the market, supporting individuals to integrate flexibly into its 
processes and opportunities. It is in this way, supporting people in work and in 
enterprise, that it tries to fight poverty, rather than by straightforward 
redistribution of income. It is the potential of children as economic participants, 
as well as citizens, which is to be protected, nurtured and realised – both by 
parents and other socialising institutions, in partnership with the state. Moreover, 
this is especially true for those groups of children selectively targeted by policy 
as being at risk of economic or social exclusion. These are young offenders; 
poor children on sink estates; the ‘looked after’ or the abused, those whose 
excluded state constitutes most risk to economic production as well as social 
reproduction. Such an ambitious project has required an intense programme of 
both tutelage for wayward parents and training for children in transferable social 
and IT skills and, most important, in the necessary condition for success – the 
robust capacity for emotional self management.  
 
Fourth, and as a consequence, mental illness has been cast, recently, as a 
mounting social problem or crisis both in the USA and in the UK, and not only 
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in its knock-on effects on delinquency and dangerousness. As the diagnosis of 
depression is undergoing a meteoric career of expansion,288 it is the effects, in 
social as well as economic costs, of perennial unhappiness on parenting, 
employment and ‘quality of life’ in general (and on childhood in particular) that 
causes concern. In the language of the new economics of positive thinking (see, 
e.g., Layard 2008), individual happiness has become not just a capital good for 
the investment state, but also a consumption good for its citizens. 
 
A fifth aspect of social policy under New Labour, according to John Clarke 
(2004), is that, in spite of the new political movements, which still provide a 
countervailing impetus in the form of identity politics, the old biologisms of 
post-war social policy seem to have persisted into the turn of the century. 
Difference is still largely perceived as having a natural rather than social basis or 
construction, which means that many hierarchies based on race, gender or sex 
are still implicit in social policy as naturae rerum. Individuals and families are 
still implicitly treated as the biological, atomistic units of consumption and 
enterprise in a market which is as much a feature of the natural world as the 
Great Lakes. Families, in their composition are also, like individuals, implicitly 
psycho-biological phenomena, private arrangements, shielding their members 
from wider socio-cultural structures, in whose politics they do not partake –
’havens in a heartless world’.  
 
Clarke also suggests a new biologism for the turn of the century, ‘practising 
under the sign of the gene’ (Clarke, 2004: 63). Whilst there is, as yet, little sign 
of this new biologism, in the form of the genome project, in the discourse of 
social policy makers, its structural effects at the academic level is profoundly 
felt in the funding and growth of the biological and human sciences compared to 
                                                 
288 Over the 1980s and 1990s, ‘the depressed mother’ hit the research agendas of those interested 
in child welfare. See particularly the work of Lyn Murray and Alan Stein, whilst ‘depressed young 
men on disability benefit’, were a feature of the new century and New Labour’s bid to combat 
poverty through work. (See The Layard Report, 2000.) Finally and inevitably ‘depression’ has 
been found in children in quantity – much more of it about than was thought! – and joined the 
mounting number of other diagnoses of childhood mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. 
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the social sciences. This is certainly felt in the relatively confined world of 
attachment theory and child development in the form of new knowledge and 
expertise at the level of the brain and the neuro-endocrine system. Equally 
influential is policy interest in psychological explanations of delinquency,289 
disturbance in the population, and in the optimal emotional development of 
children. Such concerns all ultimately relate to the goal of integration into the 
global market for all citizens, as the policy goals of New Labour are reflected 
nicely in attachment theory as a double-sided coin.  
 
Attachment, by the turn of the century, is primarily an account of the way in 
which invisible wounds are inflicted by the wrong sort of mother and its 
research suggests what forms these wounds might take in the way of 
pathological outcomes, Second, however, it also suggests how the right sort of 
mother might mitigate or protect against a wounding environment, and, third, it 
attempts the question of where the wound is sited. All these inquiries are set in a 
theory which exemplifies the tenacious hold of the old biologisms in our way of 
thinking about children and families. As suggested, these three issues are not just 
exemplified in the way that academic attachment literature has developed since 
the turn of the century. The use of the language of attachment has spread 
significantly from its low point in the 1970s and early 1980s to become an 
established part of the professional and state sponsored repertoire of responses to 
psychological harm at all levels of ‘prevention’. 
 
What follows is a sketch of current attachment based literature, and its 
application in the world of the psy professionals, based on the three issues 
above, and arranged therefore into three parts: the first part comprises 
attachment as a theory of developmental psychopathology as well as a theory of 
therapeutic intervention, covering the perpetual political obsession with law and 
                                                 
289 Note the resurgence of these theories plus their intergenerational and geographical 
enhancement in government 'social exclusion' thinking. 
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order and hence delinquency prevention290 and treatment, as well as the 
recognition of mental ill health as a bar to communal wealth and well being. The 
second relates to attachment as a theory of stress mediation and its possibilities 
for self regulation and resilience in the developing individual; the third looks at 
the relationship of attachment theory to the burgeoning of biological science as a 
research enterprise of wealth and power. In the case of attachment theory, this 
new biologism is confined to the development of the neurophysiology of the 
emotions in the 1990s, ‘the decade of the brain’ – an enormous subject of great 
complexity which can only be touched on here. This tripartite presentation is 
prefaced, below, by a brief description of the organisational structure of the 
attachment world. 
 
ATTACHMENT RESEARCH AND ITS APPLICATION IN 
THE PRESENT 
Organisational Growth 
 
Since the burst of attachment research activity in the 1990s, the basic work of 
Ainsworth’s students and their associates has been continued and widened by 
the next generation into the new areas already touched upon. A summary of the 
attachment literature, produced, in the year 2006, by a search of the World Of 
Science [WOS] data base (see Appendix), gives some indication of the way the 
range of application of the theory has broadened.291 The provenance of the 
articles in the sample shows an even spread of university psychology 
departments, right across the USA (and a scattering from the UK– by Peter 
Fonagy, for example), as Ainsworth’s trainees from the Universities of 
Maryland and West Virginia have colonised other academic locations and 
                                                 
290 That is, prevention at a secondary of tertiary level. 
291 A search was run for all articles or book sections with 'attachment' in the abstract. The results 
were then further broken down by author and author's academic base. Besides this information 
on the social organisation of the 'attachment world' comes from the internet, using Google as a 
search engine and from some participant observation.  
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produced their own trainees or enthused co-workers with the attachment 
message. Typically, in the States these clusters of attachment theorists form 
‘Attachment Laboratories’, as at the University of New York, Stonybrook 
(SUNY); or the Adult Attachment Laboratories at Davis and the University of 
Massachusets; and the Attachment, Personality and Emotion Lab at the 
University of Illinois. Each has its own collaborators and research staff working 
on joint research projects.292 More important for the spread of attachment theory 
beyond academic bounds is the recent proselytising work of some of the major 
departments which have set up organisations to liaise with and train psy 
professionals interested in the relevance of attachment theory to intervention 
with children, families and adults. For example, there is The New York 
Attachment Consortium, a project of an independent charity, The Centre for 
Mental Health Promotion, which brings together the work of four New York 
based universities including SUNY and the Yale Child Study Centre, and is run 
by the SUNY-based Ainsworth undergraduate student, Everett Bell Waters.  
 
Emanating from all these centres, on both sides of the Atlantic, internet 
information seems to be an endless source of attachment material, not just on the 
theory but on attachment based advice to parents and on the availability of 
                                                 
292 There is a similar organisation at the University of Leiden, Netherlands where van 
IJzendoorn, an early Attachment theorist is still professor and in the University of Regensburg, 
Germany, home university of the Grossmans. The research effort also continues in the UK 
although the only equivalents to the US clusters are in the University of East Anglia, in the 
Social Work Department and therefore not involved in frontline research, and in the 
Psychoanalysis sub department of the UCL Psychology Department, where Peter Fonagy is 
professor and where he and Howard and Miriam Steele hold joint appointment with the Anna 
Freud Centre; in the Dept of Psychology at Birkbeck College, London University where Jay 
Belsky, a distinguished child development academic of US provenance, runs the Institute for the 
Study of Children, Families and Social Issues and was recently engaged on an evaluation of 
Surestart for the DfES and The Winnicot (sic) Research Unit at Reading University School of 
Psychology and Clinical Language Science, where Lyn Murray works on the attachment 
implications of maternal depression. Otherwise, the Attachment field tends to contain lone, 
though vocal, representatives within a department: Alan Stein in the Department of Psychiatry at 
the University of Oxford; Elizabeth Meins in the Psychology Department at the University of 
Durham, for example, or a scattering of more clinically based individuals, Felicity de Zulueta at 
the Maudsley, Danya Glazer at GOS and UCL; Judith Trowell, who moved from the Tavistock 
Clinic to the Birmingham Health Authority; Jeremy Holmes in the Department of Psychiatry, 
North Devon District Hospital, Barnstable; Jonathon Green and John Byng Hall at the Institute 
of Family Therapy – all figures that might be expected to appear and lecture at the numerous 
international conferences on attachment theory and on its therapeutic applications. 
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treatment, should the worst happen. Furthermore, attachment therapy centres, 
many of a private nature, have sprung up mostly across the USA.. These variable 
websites, although they invariably claim to be ‘evidence based’, show a broad 
spectrum of ways in which attachment theory is presented, from those close to 
the academic source of the theory who present themselves as strictly in the 
‘Bowlby and Ainsworth tradition’ (henceforth known as the BAT) and those 
which are more demotic and proselytising. For example, the institutions range 
from the International Attachment Network (IAN)293 – part of the BAT, 
originally founded in the UK, with offices now in London, Barcelona and 
Washington and publisher of the already mentioned journal, Attachment and 
Human Development, to the Buenos Aries based website of the Attachment 
Research Centre, to the US based personality research.org/attachment.html 
‘Great Ideas in Personality’ or even to the Kansas Attachment Centre… which 
seems to have a staff of one.294 
 
All these organisations present a range of therapeutic approaches, for, of course, 
there is also therapy in the BAT. For example, there is relations-based 
psychoanalytic therapy, in which attachment theory is used to inform principles 
and practice, as in the very respectable IAN member; the Centre for Attachment-
based Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, established for over ten years, at John 
Bowlby House in Spitalfields, London; or the more recently founded Institute of 
Child Mental Health, also in London, which is a centre for ‘integrative therapy’ 
for children. It specialises in running courses for child therapists and child care 
professionals on the latest findings in the neuro-physiology of the emotions. This 
is a little further along the respectability spectrum, as it touches on the middle 
                                                 
293The IAN was typically set up at a time when Attachment Theory was in its nadir to 
promulgate information on research as the ‘Bowlby/Ainsworth Tradition’ and promote its use in 
the fields of psycho-therapy and the ‘caring professions’ through providing bibliographies and 
internet links, training courses and ‘opportunities foe networking’ among its members – both 
invidiuals and institutions. The Attachment and Human Development Center, Washington 
School of Psychiatry, a member of IAN, is also a conservative institution in the attachment field, 
seeking to promote academic exchange and engage the local therapeutic services in buying 
courses, to ‘guide preventive efforts in the community’ and ‘inform public policy that addresses 
children's emotional needs'. 
294 www.ksattach.us/attachmenttherapy.htm [accessed 20th Jnanuary 2007]. 
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ground of therapies for children and families with diagnoses. Of these, the 
Dyadic Developmental Therapy purveyed by Daniel Hughes in the USA and 
practised by himself and disciples295 is typical, and seen as less extreme than 
Attachment Therapy and those organisations devoted to training and treating by 
its radical principles. Like the IACD mentioned in the introduction, the latter are 
also most abundant in the USA, and could be said to provide somewhat 
simplistic diagnostic and therapeutic solutions to attachment difficulties. 
 
However, attachment-based therapy and training is not just a feature of private 
health provision on either side of the Atlantic. In Britain, the use of attachment 
theory in the NHS may be a highly variable phenomenon, dependent on 
professional discretion296 but it is now well established as part of a State 
legitimated and promoted knowledge base about children and families, which is 
to be used by all professionals when assessing them for service provision (see 
below). It is therefore not surprising that it is also entrenched in handbooks, such 
as the series produced by the British Psychological society and written by Martin 
Herbert297 (Parent, Adolescent and Child Training Skills (Herbert, 1996)) and in 
training courses for social workers at certification and degree level and also at 
the level of post qualifying certificates in Child Protection as part of Child 
Development Modules. Attachment is one of the few theories that seem to 
provide a framework for intervention in childcare issues. (See Daniels et al., 
1997, on the use of attachment theory in a pilot post qualifying course in the 
Universities of Dundee and Dublin.) In addition, the Social Work Department in 
UEA has a Centre for Attachment Studies in the UK where it provides courses at 
all levels, for students and LASSDs. David Howe, its director and author of at 
                                                 
295 For example, Dr Arthur Becker Weidmann at the Center for Family Development, Western 
New York. 
296 It is hard to find instances of the diagnosis of RAD being used in the NHS. For instance a 
report on the metal health of children and young people published by the Office of National 
Statistics in 2004 did not use this classification. 
http://www.ic.nhs.uk/webfiles/publications/mentalhealth04/MentalHealthChildrenYoungPeople3
10805_PDF.pdf [accessed 20th Feb. 2009] 
297 Martin Herbert of the University of Leicester is one of the few psychologists who has 
consistently produced well respected work on intervention for Social Workers. 
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least two books on the subject, has observed social workers’ enthusiasm for this 
approach and hunger for a coherent framework to underpin their work 
(Interview).  
 
Besides official social work education and training, there are a plethora of 
lecture programmes and conference papers on attachment theory and therapeutic 
practice, provided by individuals affiliated to or bought in by non-governmental 
organisations and subscribed to by an array of different psy professionals. Their 
success is no doubt assisted by the fact that the whole attachment field is 
populated by charismatic speakers on both sides of the Atlantic.298 The UK 
speakers tend to be more academic and less proselytising in style, contrasting 
with the arresting and high-tech presentation of a series of ‘roadshows’ from the 
USA. For example, Pat Crittenden, from the University of Miami – another 
Ainsworth graduate student – does conference lectures and training tours in the 
UK, for the NSPCC among others (Robson et al, 2001). Allan Schore, a 
psychoanalyst on the clinical faculty of the Department of Psychiatry, UCLA 
and a particularly popular speaker, appears to lecture in Britain at least three 
times a year. Like Bruce Perry (hospital based in Houston Texas) and Daniel 
Siegel, (part-based at UCLA), Schore is promoting the neuro-physiological 
approach to attachment; all three are less research-based academics with more 
clinical, media and government recognition. Finally, perhaps the major promoter 
of attachment theory is Sir Richard Bowlby, son of John Bowlby, who, after 
working for thirty years in the UK as a scientific photographer, retired in 1999 
and has taken to studying and lecturing on his father’s work. He has already 
written a biography of Bowlby Senior and made a teaching video on attachment 
theory and its application. Not surprisingly, he features as keynote speaker at 
                                                 
298 A recent example of this phenomenon in the UK would be the programme for 2006 of the 
Centre for Child Mental Health, founded by Margot Sunderland, which included ‘Awakening 
Attachment Needs in Troubled Children and Adults’, featuring Richard Bowlby, Jeremy 
Holmes, Karl Brisch, Dan Hughes and Sunderland herself. These were all practitioners, except 
Bowlby, and also all authors of influential books. Holmes and Sunderland are the nearest thing 
to attachment gurus in the UK. 
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conferences and training days on this subject, an emblematic reminder of its 
origins.299  
 
Attachment as a theory of Developmental Psychopathology 
 
Compared to the vibrant world of professional attachment therapy and training, 
the academic attachment scene has faded a little. It is not that the literature is 
waning in quantity. On the contrary, it is multiplying exponentially. But one 
glance at the World of Science [WOS] sample, mentioned above, gives an 
eloquent picture of how attachment theory has changed. There are very few 
articles in this sample developing the theoretical nature of the internal 
psychological attachment construct or its life cycle implications; these seem to 
be well accepted, as is the use of self report questionnaire data. Moreover, with 
this methodological tool well established in the field, studies of the effects of 
attachment styles, particularly in adults, are pushed into new areas. At the same 
time, the original technical evolutionary definition of the term, as relating to a 
particular set of behavioural systems, primarily in infancy, is becoming 
somewhat diluted.  
 
Our first governmental concern is most clearly addressed: by far the majority of 
the articles are concerned with the development of individual psychopathology 
and/or delinquency in relation to attachment insecurity or disorganisation. 
However, the more totalising, theoretical accounts of attachment insecurity as 
the developmental source of all psychiatric diagnoses (for example Crittenden, 
2000) are mostly missing – and the literature is criticised for this lack of theory 
                                                 
299 For example, at a 2004 conference of the Association of University and College Counselling, 
the already cited 2006 conference at the Institute of Child Mental Health, of which he is now 
President. He is also Chair of the Trustees of CAPP, chaired their 2005 John Bowlby Memorial 
Conference and gave a talk at their Centenary John Bowlby Memorial Conference in 2007. His 
name also pops up on the websites of various US organisations, strictly in the Bowlby and 
Ainsworth Tradition, where he has visited – for instance, the Circle of Security Project at 
Spokane, Marycliff and the New York Attachment Consortium, which promotes his training 
video and the video of an interview he gave the organisers. 
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(Raikes et al, 2005). What prevails is the language of epidemiology, in which 
questionnaire-based assessments of attachment status for captive samples, of all 
age cohorts, are regressed against a series of outcomes. Low attachment score, 
seen as a psychosocial variable, has become a risk factor for whatever disastrous 
outcome of an individual or social nature the researcher is investigating. It is not 
surprising that insecure attachment styles, as a measure of dyadic, and then 
individual, affect regulation, are discovered to be predisposing factors for both 
‘internalising’ as well as ‘externalising’ psychiatric problems (Moss et al, 2006; 
Ronnlund et al, 2006). These include depression (Eberhart et al, 2006; Murray et 
al, 2006), anxiety (Bogels et al, 2006; van Brakel et al, 2006), anorexia (Troisi 
et al, 2006; Zachrisson et al, 2006), bulimia (Elgin et al, 2006; Ferguson, 2006), 
obsessive compulsive disorder (Aaronson et al, 2006; Nuckolls, 2006), 
psychosis (Berry et al, 2006; Onnis et al, 2006) and, most significantly, 
borderline personality disorder (Chessick, 2006; Minzenberg et al, 2006), as 
well as more general behavioural problems such as bullying and violence 
amongst adolescents (Banyard et al, 2006; Marini et al, 2006) or substance 
abuse (Brook, 2006; Kotov, 2006). What is more, in many such studies, low 
attachment score is only one risk factor among several that may influence the 
result independently or interact in complex ways over a life.  
 
In this way, attachment theory has become part of the growing discipline of 
developmental psychopathology, the eponymous journal of which was founded 
in the early 1990s, edited by Dante Cicchetti of Rochester University, a major 
academic in this field. The journal generally features a systems model of 
development towards psychopathy in which human intrapsychic processes at 
different levels of analysis interact, within the constraints of gene expression, 
with environmental variables, also at different levels (family v. wider culture 
etc), and all with multiple feedback loops. The developmental nature of the 
model brings an added complication as it incorporates the notion of 
developmental pathways, dynamic processes in which development at time t is 
dependent on development at time t-1, so that if the model is to be fully 
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specified, it needs to capture the drivers of change over time, that is, ‘course and 
cause’ (Cicchetti et al, 2000: 259). In such a model, which arose out of earlier 
epidemiological studies of the relationship of schizophrenia to various 
hypothesised causes (Rutter et al, 1984; Sameroff et al, 2000), individual 
variables such as attachment score are subject to ‘multifinality’, or being a risk 
factor for many pathological outcomes, as well as ‘equifinality’, in which 
several different risk factors may increase the likelihood of one outcome (Rutter 
et al, 2000).  
 
Cicchetti’s account of the effects of child maltreatment on development 
encapsulates this multifaceted approach: 
 
Child maltreatment may represent one of the greatest failures of the 
environment to offer opportunities to foster normal developmental processes 
(Cicchetti and Lynch, 1995). In contrast to what occurs in response to an 
average expectable environment, the ecological, social, biological and 
psychological conditions that are associated with maltreatment, set in 
motion a probabilistic path of epigenesis for maltreated children 
characterised by an increased likelihood of failure and disruption in the 
successful resolution of the major stage salient issues of development, 
resulting in grave implications for functioning across the life-span…. These 
repeated developmental disruptions in the formation of secure attachment 
relationships; an autonomous, integrated, and coherent self-system; effective 
peer relations; and successful adaptation to school create a profile of 
relatively enduring vulnerability factors that increase the probability of the 
emergence of maladaptation and psychopathology as negative transactions 
between the child and the environment continue (Cicchetti et al, 2007: 168).  
 
Thus a low attachment score as a consequence of abuse and neglect and 
representative of some inner cognitive/affective state becomes just one 
vulnerability factor for a poor outcome. In this way, attachment theory itself as 
an explanation for development in which the attachment construct is no longer 
the driver for behaviour and behaviour change. 
 
As a research approach which uses a model designed to reflect the complexities 
of actual human development in statistical form, much writing in this area is 
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programmatic as well as descriptive of pieces of current research. Although 
these latter each add to the general picture as informational inputs to the model, 
they are, in sum and at present, inadequate to reflect the systemic nature of a 
process in which everything is seen to depend on everything else – let alone one 
which can be so punctuated and the small parts so dissected that the causal 
mechanisms over time underlying each relationship are known and their effects 
measured. 
 
Cicchetti, Toth and Lynch and wrote, as early as 1995 a long article called 
Bowlby’s Dream has come Full Circle, in which they celebrated the fact that 
Bowlby’s original attachment theory, as an account of the causes of 
psychopathology, had been revived, after attachment had become for some time 
predominantly an account of normative child development (Cicchetti et al, 
1995). But Bowlby was a clinician, with a clinical theory, and might have found 
the Developmental Psychopathology programme a little disappointing. He may 
have thought, as some others, that the theoretical development of this internal 
space called attachment has been attended to, recently, a lot less than the 
refinement of statistical method (Pollak, 2005). For this produces a general 
systems model whose relationships may be suggestive in terms of preventative 
state policy but is certainly not directly helpful therapeutically. Here, some sort 
of relatively simple guiding theory of the mechanisms of development and 
change is necessary, which cannot necessarily wait for the statistical elaboration 
of a highly complex approach to pathology.  
 
However, another glance at the WOS sample shows other sources for the 
necessary clinical theory. It is, paradoxically, provided by attachment as 
normative development and a basis for the affective content of human 
relationships over a lifetime. In a small number of the articles in the sample, 
cognitive, developmental, personality and social psychologists all present 
detailed studies of human emotional/social functioning. These cross all ages and 
social environments, extending from the home, to schools (Johnson et al, 2006; 
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Morris-Rothschild et al, 2006), to groups (Booth-LaForce et al, 2006; Roccas et 
al, 2006), to prisons (Bogaerts et al, 2006; Gopfert et al, 2006), to the workplace 
(Rioux, 2006) and to whole communities (Brehm et al, 2006; Tigges, 2006), in 
the context of attachment relationships or styles. Attachment, it seems, can be 
transferred to place as well as to people, as a burgeoning geographical, planning 
literature theorises the emotional dimension of people’s lifestyle and location 
choices (Alegre et al, 2006; Molcar, 2006; Sivaramakrishnan et al, 2006). The 
theory is inevitably used to illuminate romantic, dating or spouse relationships 
(Balon, 2006; Sibley et al, 2006) and their difficulties (Cohen, 2006; Frey et al, 
2006), including marital violence and breakdown (Bartholomew et al, 2006; 
Schwartz et al, 2006). Most important for intervention, as an account of affect, it 
is also seen as a way of enlightening the relationship between psychotherapist 
and patient: a reframing of the traditional psychodynamics of transference and 
counter-transference, with more emphasis on nurturance and the containment by 
the therapist, as attachment figure, of the most disturbed excesses of her client 
(Shine, 2006; Shorey et al, 2006; Steckley, 2006).300 Crucially, it is presented as 
a more hopeful means of engaging those with severe personality disorders 
(notoriously difficult) in the process of treatment (Fonagy et al, 2006; Levy et 
al, 2006; Wang et al, 2006). For what attachment’s theorising of affect 
development suggests, both neuro-physiologically and psychologically, is a form 
of therapy that is different from the pharmacology of conventional psychiatry or 
the psycho-analytic talking cure, although it may have piqued the curiosity of 
psychoanalytic practitioners. Here, theories about the vital developmental 
importance of the emotional right brain and its implicit non-verbal 
communication function come into play, in an approach to therapy in which the 
nature of the emotional relationship between therapist and patient is paramount. 
Further, it is claimed, this can form the basis for a later coherence in a patient’s 
formerly confused and disorganised accounts of attachment experiences, without 
ever addressing these at all (Holmes, 2001). It is not surprising that this form of 
attachment theory suggests a similarly non-verbal affective type for children, 
                                                 
300 It is also used, though less widely, to inform CBT with an affective dimension.  
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sometimes based on play, as in the ‘Theraplay’ method. This helps family 
relations through ‘attachment-based play’301 sometimes based on re-enactment 
of the mother-child relationship at a more profound emotional level.  
 
It is clear that any theory which offers therapy for these extreme behavioural 
conditions of childhood and their adult manifestations in the form of personality 
disorders, psychoses and dangerousness, must be of great interest to childcare as 
well as mental health specialists. It is also evident that attachment theory has 
much to say about the ontogenesis of the depressive personality as the insecure 
resistant infant, as well as the developmental aaetiology of some of the more 
extreme and dangerous disorders of personality in adulthood as the result of 
attachment disorganisation. However, it is on childhood that much popular, 
professional and governmental concern is concentrated. For example, 
information on ‘attachment difficulties’ tends to appear generally in the ‘Parents 
and Children’ section of medical advice websites. Although there are only a few 
articles in the 2006 literature sample on attachment disorder, or problems, and 
attachment-based therapy specifically for children (Cicchetti et al, 2006c; 
Hoffman et al, 2006), this is where professional effort is concentrated, especially 
on the policy targeted group of ‘Looked After Children’ (Howe, 2006a; Steele et 
al, 2006). It appears that many of these children with difficulties seem to have 
acquired the psychiatric diagnosis of AD or RAD (as described in the 
introduction to this chapter), and amongst these, children who are fostered and 
adopted are highly over represented, as are specialist organisations like The Post 
Adoption Centre in the UK, the Adoptive Family Counselling Centre or the 
Parents Network for the Post- Institutionalised Child, in the USA.  
 
The area around AD and attachment therapy seems a confusing one from the 
output of attachment websites. This disorder is sometimes described as rare, 
compared with other psychiatric disorders, at approximately 3-4% of the 
                                                 
301 See the work of Phyllis Booth, founder of the Theraplay Institute, USA, promoting a method 
‘used successfully for over 35 years’ to help children and families.  
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population (Niels Peter Rygaard)302 or sometimes as prevalent at ‘over 60% of 
children in foster care and adoption’ (Kim Cross on the Kansas Attachment 
Centre website).303 It seems it is also a disorder which needs highly expert 
diagnosis,304 so as not to confuse the RAD child with the ADD and/or the 
ADHD child or the autistic child. Above all, it must be distinguished from ‘the 
bi-polar child’ – a phenomenon which, it is claimed in a book for parents, is 
much more common than ever imagined (Papolos, 2002). It is claimed in the 
promotional literature of a course run by the Post Adoption Centre 2004/5 
(called ‘Working with Severe Attachment Difficulties (AD)’), that these 
disorders ‘present very specific issues which require very specific intervention 
and parenting’.305 But this intervention seems like an almost impossible task 
when the specificity of AD is so illusive. The Cascade Centre for Family 
Growth, Orem Utah, for example, listed, under its client group of ‘children with 
severe behavioural disorders and issues’, the following problems:  
 
Reactive Attachment Disorder, Oppositional Defiant Disorder, Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Attention Deficit 
Disorder, Intermittent Explosive Disorder (sic!) Autism, Down’s Syndrome, 
learning disabilities, brain injury, childhood depression, addictions, 
significant developmental delays, intellectual deficits, childhood violence, 
anxiety disorders, and other serious difficulties of childhood. 306 
 
Few of these have a discrete set of specific symptoms, yet all of these, the 
Cascade Centre claims to tackle by ‘attachment therapy’ – ‘helping children and 
parents develop strong attachments and bonds’.307 
 
                                                 
302 www.attachmentdisorder.net [accessed 23rd January 2007]. 
303 www.ksattach.us/attachmenttherapy.htm [accessed 23rd January 2007]. 
304 Report of the APSAC Task Force on Attachment Therapy, Reactive Attachment Disorder, 
and Attachment Problems (APSAC, 2006). 
305 http://www.postadoptioncentre.org.uk/Docs/reports/Annual%20Report%202005.pdf 
[accessed, 20th January 2007]. 
306 The Cascade Centre is now closed, following litigation. 
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/1,5143,635191573,00.html [accessed 3rd May, 2008]. 
307 Ibid. 
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It would be a reasonable inference from the attachment research literature, which 
sees attachment problems as a risk factor for a wide spread of non-specific 
maladaptive behaviour, that these, at least, should be treated by a specific 
procedure called ‘attachment therapy ‘. However, what this is, exactly, seems 
also ‘non-specific’ – hard to pin down. The Institute for Attachment and Child 
Development (IACD) website describes this therapy as ‘a unique synthesis of 
many different techniques’ – with interventions ranging from ‘individual 
psychotherapy to body work and includes family therapy, biofeedback, 
neurotherapy, quantitative EEG, massage, movement therapies, alpha theta 
training and acupressure’ – the whole gamut.308 However, this synthesis appears 
to be specific to the idiosyncrasies of the particular institution involved. For 
example, a compendium of methods from a UK run organisation called Keys 
(described below), claiming to practice attachment therapy, differs markedly 
from the above. It advertises the practices of regression and ‘physical holding’ 
(Keys’ quotation marks, not mine) and ‘alongside holding, psycho-dynamic play 
and art therapy, drama, sand tray work and creative arts therapies that include 
time lines, memory journeys and life story work, clinical hypnotherapy, 
counseling, psychotherapy and EMDR (Eye Movement Desensitisation 
Reprocessing)’.309 As the IACD website explains, attachment therapy techniques 
are ‘rooted in an understanding of neurobiological factors; the function of 
memory; the effects of trauma, grief and loss; and the critical importance of 
attachment to the healthy development of a child’ – an ‘understanding’ which is 
the source of a wide spectrum of therapeutic approaches.  
 
One practice that these different versions of attachment therapy do have in 
common, is encouraging parents to hold their child, sometimes for long periods, 
sometimes against their will, sometimes under a blanket in a process of 
‘rebirthing’. Most mainstream psychiatric and psychotherapy professionals are 
careful to dissociate themselves from this approach to therapy, after the horrible 
                                                 
308 http://www.instituteforattachment.org/clinsvc.htm [accessed 2oth Jan 2007]. 
309 www.Keys-attachment-centre.co.uk. 
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death from suffocation of ten-year-year old Candace Newmaker in a clinic in 
Evergreen, Colorado, USA, under such therapeutic ministrations. The case 
became a cause célèbre in the US and the subject of an investigation and report 
by the influential American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children 
(APSAC).310 It also triggered the laying out of practice guidelines by the 
American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry in 2005, which 
prompted disclaimers on the websites of most organisations offering this type of 
therapy.311 Nevertheless, a more careful and modified form was distinguished by 
the IACD Director, Forrest Lien, as ‘humanistic attachment therapy’ (my 
italics). It recommends complete avoidance of rebirthing and ‘holding’ only with 
the child’s consent in an ‘across the lap, developmentally appropriate nurturing 
posture,’ and is still extensively offered in the USA.312  
 
In the UK, where the diagnostic category of AD seems a little less widely used 
among psy professionals, there is at least one private organisation, Keys, 
mentioned above, advertising ‘intrusive, inclusive and pioneering’ methods, 
straight from the USA, practiced in home-based therapy, or in a series of private 
children’s homes313 and a couple of boarding (DfES approved) schools. This 
organisation has been legitimated by a positive evaluation of its methods by the 
Social Work Department in Lancaster University, posted on its website, along 
with a publication list for its Director, Sheila Fearnley. Two articles in 
mainstream journals314 are included, one of which is on the recognition and 
                                                 
310 Section 2. a. of the APSAC task force’s recommendations reads: 
Treatment techniques or attachment parenting techniques involving physical coercion, 
psychologically or physically enforced holding, physical restraint, physical domination, 
provoked catharsis, ventilation of rage, age regression, humiliation, withholding or forcing 
food or water intake, prolonged social isolation, or assuming exaggerated levels of control 
or domination over a child are contraindicated because of risk of harm and absence of 
proven benefit and should not be used. 
311 The website of ATTACh, Lake Villa Illinois, for example, whose president, Todd Nichols, 
was able to give evidence to the APSAC taskforce, address a related conference and give 
feedback on draft papers. 
312 http://www.instituteforattachment.org/articles/article_61.htm [accessed 10th March, 2007]. 
313 Keys functions in conjunction with North West Fostering, an agency which claims local 
Social Services Children and Families Departments among its service purchasers. www.Keys-
attachment-centre.co.uk [accessed, 17th may 2007]. 
314 Fostering and Adoption and Clinical child Psychology and Psychiatry respectively. 
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treatment of attachment disorders, written jointly with David Howe. A professor 
of SW at UEA, he is a prolific and much admired disseminator of attachment 
theory, adoption, and fostering in general in the UK and also wrote an 
introduction to the Lancaster University report (Howe et al, 1999; Howe et al, 
2003). 
 
‘Security in an Insecure World’ 
 
The statistical approach of much of the attachment literature in the 2006 WOS 
sample also addresses the second concern of government identified here. It takes 
us directly into the world of risk and risk management, where it not only uses the 
concept of risk factors for a particular harmful outcome, but also throws up the 
idea of ‘anti-risk factors’ which can mediate favourably the effect of risk, 
creating what has come to be known as ‘resilience’ in this literature. This is the 
other aspect of attachment theory which is important to social policy. As the 
dominant paradigm of developmental psychology, attachment theory, it is 
claimed, gives the fullest and most coherent account of affective development 
that exists. It is an account of the successful creation, in the intimate context of 
maternal care, of positively healthy, psychologically strong individuals, who can 
survive the worst excesses of a hostile economic or cultural climate. Further, 
attachment has also become a theory of stress mediation; a significant group of 
the 2006 sample give accounts of various ways in which this is shown to 
happen. Attachment security mediates coping in general (Fivush et al, 2006), 
maternal adjustment to childbirth, including post-natal depression (McMahon et 
al, 2006), the care of a disabled child (Howe, 2006b; Steinberg et al, 2006), 
including blindness (Adenzato et al, 2006), the progression of dementia in old 
age (Browne et al, 2006; Dupart, 2006), diabetes (Ciechanowski et al, 2006a; 
Ciechanowski et al, 2006b) and other somatoform problems including cancer 
(Farge, 2006; Hamama-Raz et al, 2006) and acute and chronic pain 
(McWilliams, 2006; Meredith et al, 2006a; Meredith et al, 2006b). Most 
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importantly for our current social preoccupations, it seems to mediate the effects 
on the individual of trauma and ‘terror’ plus the severity of PTSD. (For instance, 
‘Attachment and psychological adaptation in high exposure survivors of the 
September 11th attack on the World Trade Centre’ (Fraley et al, 2006) and 
‘PTSD reactions among children with learning disabilities, exposed to terror 
attacks’ (Finzi-Dottan et al, 2006). As such, this is a theory which can inform 
political policy in relation to both children and their adult selves, of a 
preventative as well as a protective kind. The homologies between affective, 
physiological and political regulation do not need to be pointed out and neither 
do the links between psychological and state security. 
 
In summary: we can see that there are three sorts of risks which go with the 
wrong sort of mother. The first (as suggested in the last section) is an 
ontogenetic risk; the likelihood of developing as a psycho-social deviant directly 
because of the inadequacy or worse of your most intimate social (and biological) 
relationship. The second is a risk due to a failure of this relationship with its 
ontogenetic inadequacy to minimise vulnerability to wider socio-economic 
adversity, which might have very much the same result – a risk of a lack of 
psychological protection. The third is, of course, the risk to society of this very 
result – resource consuming anti-social behaviour. Distress or deviancy, the 
newer problems of poor economic performance and political discontent, and the 
perennial problem of internal law and order are much as they ever were from the 
19th  century onwards. Take the websites of two preventative parent support 
organisations, the UK PIPPIN and the US Marycliff institute in Maryland, 
linked to Surestart and Headstart respectively, and definitely in the BAT:315 The 
                                                 
315 PIPPIN (Parents in Partnership – Parent Infant Network) is a UK national charity with 
established links to the IAN, government and other major charities, including Sure Start. Its aim 
is ‘to improve the emotional health of families’ during the perinatal period, by supplementing 
existing ‘traditional parent craft’ classes across the UK, which concentrate too much on the ‘nuts 
and bolts’ of childbirth and care. The Marycliff Institute, Spokane, USA, ran apparently 
successful attachment based training groups with parents, using a teaching heuristic called Circle 
of Security, which attracted the notice of the Director of the Headstart programmes for the 
county, and prompted, in the late 1990s, a federal grant for a three year research programme 
called ‘Attachment-based Interventions In Headstart Child-Parent Dyads.’ It was headed by Bob 
Marvin, still of the University of Virginia and one of Ainsworth’s original research assistants 
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English version, PIPPIN, emphasises ‘the heavy cost attached to children who 
are not securely attached, both in human and financial terms, to their families, 
social services, schools, healthcare and sometimes the prison service.’316 The 
USA based Circle of Security is more floridly explicit: in an article on its 
Spokane website, entitled ‘Changing History one Baby at a Time. Therapists 
Attempt to Resurrect Parents’ Ancient Wisdom,’ Larry Shook (2001) writes: 
‘Mounting evidence clearly implicates inadequate early care-giving as a root 
cause of exploding prison populations, teenage pregnancy, runaway divorce 
rates, drug abuse....’ Apart from paedophilia and gun crime, he gives us a 
complete compendium of our social fears.317  
 
All these grave risks and threats underlie the enormous governmental 
programme aimed at prevention via the advising and encouragement of parents 
in the art or ‘science’318 of child rearing. The message of these much-used parent 
support organisations and their websites, parent training programmes and parent 
support groups is implicitly setting up a standard for parenting, guiding all the 
anxieties and aspirations which attend this state into a desire for the attributes of 
responsiveness, sensitivity, ‘mind mindedness’ and much more, which 
attachment theory promotes. This is a standard to be maintained against the 
threat of the worst, if there is too much slippage.  
 
The Spokane website’s atavistic appeal to parents’ ‘ancient wisdom’ 
nostalgically evokes behaviour presumably thought to have developed in a 
period of evolutionary adaptedness. Other websites straightforwardly appeal to a 
simpler utopian state in which parents just do what comes naturally, evoking a 
close, private and tactile way of life just a little suggestive of Hofer’s rats in their 
                                                                                                                                                 
and oldest friends. Marvin, R., Cooper, G., Hoffman, K. & Powell, B. (2002) The Circle of 
Security Project: Attachment-Based Intervention with Caregiver-Pre-School Child Dyads. 
Attachment & Human Development, 4, 107-124. 
316 www.pippin.org.uk [accessed, 15January, 2007]. 
317 http://www.circleofsecurity.org/docs/Shook%20-%20Local%20Planet%20Handout.pdf :1. 
318 See The Science of Parenting by Margot Sunderland (2008). DK Publishing. 
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nest. The Association of Infant Massage,319 for example, sponsored by Richard 
Bowlby (Bowlby’s son), is part of a flourishing infant massage movement. 
There are many others: Attachment Parenting International (logo, ‘Peaceful 
Parenting for a peaceful world’) is a very popular site, decidedly not given the 
IAN stamp of approval for its much more extreme invocation of nature in the 
parenting process. Apart from the high level of parental availability and 
emotional responsiveness, to be expected from any attachment based 
programme, this organisation, with its network of parenting support groups, 
recommends the importance of ‘nurturing touch’, skin to skin contact between 
parent and child; ‘baby wearing ‘ and the ‘Tummy 2 Tummy’ carrying of 
infants, as well as the controversial practice of co-sleeping and night-time 
breastfeeding (naturally!) in bed. To facilitate all this, there is a website link to 
Bella Baby, a commercial seller of baby care and nursing products, for mail 
order of the Nurse-N-Glow pillow, winner of the 2005 Juvenile Products 
Manufacturers Association Innovation Award. Ancient wisdom, new 
technology…. and clearly, ancient wisdom, let alone natural instincts, are not 
quite enough, as the website offers a formidable bibliography of self-help books, 
videos and DVDs for parents, leaders, professionals and group libraries.320  
 
Attachment parenting as a standard is not only sold on a myriad private, 
although often partially state funded, sponsored or regulated websites. It is 
promoted further by the official regulatory writings of government agencies, if 
                                                 
319 Baby massaging is also promoted by the International Association of Infant Massage, which 
trains parent trainers. This organization has participated in research by Vivette Glover of UCL 
(Onozawa et al. 2001), into the positive effects of baby massage on infant/mother relations in 
cases of maternal depression. Its work is endorsed by Glover herself, Dan Hughes and Richard 
Bowlby among others.  
320 This random selection of titles exemplifies its main principles: The Natural child: parenting 
from the Heart (Jan Hunt, 2001); Why Love Matters: How Affection Shapes A Baby’s Brain (Sue 
Gerhardt, 2004); Connection Parenting: Parenting Through Connections, Instead of Coercion, 
Through Love Instead of Fear (Leo Pam, 2005); Listening to your Baby: A New Approach to 
Parenting Your Newborn (Jay Gordon MD, 2002); The Vital Touch: How Intimate Contact With 
your Baby Leads To Happier Healthier Development (Sharon Heller, 1997); Three in a Bed: The 
Benefits of Sharing Your Bed With Your Baby (Deborah Jackson, 1999); Being There: The 
Benefits of a Stay-at-Home Parent (Isabelle Fox, 1996); Home by choice: Raising Emotionally 
Secure children in an Insecure world (Brenda Hunter 2000); Every Child’s Birthright: In 
Defence of Mothering (Selma Fraiberg, 1977). 
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not in legislation itself. In the UK, for example, DOH publications moved to a 
more academic research-oriented format, ‘evidence based’, in the late 1990s. 
Thus, a much quoted and referenced DOH publication (Cleaver et al, 1999) 
introduced the notion of faulty or damaged attachments into official publications 
as an indicator of developmental harm.321 Further, in the publication of the DOH 
manual, Assessing Children in Need and Their Families (DOH, 2000), Jane 
Aldgate and her colleague in the Health and Social Care Department at the open 
University, Wendy Rose,322 made sure that their introductory Chapter to 
‘Practice Guidance’ started with the importance to such assessment323 of ‘paying 
attention to attachment for all children, irrespective of their age’. Indeed, 
‘attachment to caregiver’ is scheduled as the first of four ‘developmental tasks’ 
for the pre-school infant (DOH, 2000a). The accompanying Framework for the 
Assessment of Children in Need and their Families (DOH, 2000b) does little in 
spelling out how this is to be done (Reder et al, 2001). Its successor, the 
Common Assessment Framework (DOH;DfES, 2006) is just as vague.324 
However, the training for professionals to accompany these assessment 
frameworks was bought in by the DOH and then the DfES from a private 
organisation run by Arnon Bentovim, the distinguished Child Psychiatrist from 
GOSH. This was called Child and Family Training, although known in the trade 
as ‘Arnon’s Roadshow’. This does have a programme that addresses some 
qualitative rating of a child’s attachments as one of many dimensions of 
observation and questionnaire recording. It has also, lately, introduced into its 
                                                 
321 See Chapter 6. 
322 Rose was previously Assistant Chief Inspector (Children' Services) at the DOH and the co-
ordintator of the 'needs assessment' materials. 
323 Aldgate et al and Wendy Rose were all trained as Social Workers at a time when 
psychoanalytic approaches to child problems was still prevalent – before behaviourism and then 
SLT and CBT dominated training programs – and their academic interests in adoption and 
fostering maintained their interest in this theory as a way of understanding and working, in the 
long term, with children who have been the victims of abuse, that is in the Child Care system, 
after the Child Protection system had finished with them. 
324 This is partly because DOH and DfES publications have concentrated on assessment of 
families by Social Services Departments. Their statutory duty is to establish a child’s present and 
future need, the present functioning of their parent figures and, sometimes, the level of harm the 
child has sustained in its present environment. A widely voiced criticism is that little training is 
given in what to do once the assessment is made.  
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services another training programme for the administration of a new ‘evidence 
based’, ‘research derived interview’ to refine assessment of the attachment style 
of prospective foster and adoptive parents for SW practitioners, or guardians etc 
(the ASI-AF).325 The DfES is a good customer for the output of attachment 
based research. 
 
A spin off of this official adoption of attachment as an assessment dimension is 
that the language of attachment is also now universally used in the English 
Family Courts – part of a standard against which the suitability of parents to care 
for their children is measured, although there is some doubt as to whether this is 
a technically accurate or rather a devalued language, with a ‘loss of specificity.’ 
For example, Reder and Duncan, suggest that when family solicitors request an 
assessment of a child’s attachment to a parent from a professional expert, they 
are more interested in the overall parent/child relationship, its emotional warmth, 
and the child’s trust and sense of security, which depends as much on current 
parental practices, as on the past (Reder et al, 2001). Writing in the same year, 
Bacon and Richardson thought that the courts looked on attachment 
‘simplistically, as a protective factor’ when judging the appropriateness of 
parental care, but that, thanks to ‘expert witnesses’, ‘the courts are now coming 
to recognise that abuse by attachment figures can be particularly damaging. The 
rationale and methodology for assessing attachment has therefore assumed 
increasing significance’ (Bacon et al, 2001). 
 
The Emotional Right Brain 
 
The old biologisms permeate much of this more recent literature, in the sense 
that the assumption of a protective private interpersonal relationship still 
remains. It is a natural limit which is not permeated by the social and political 
forces from outside, especially in the idea underlying papers on attachment 
                                                 
325 Developed in Conjunction with the Lifespan Research Group, Royal Holloway College, 
University of London. http://www.childandfamilytraining.org.uk/attachmentstyleint.html 
[accessed 18th July, 2007] 
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security as a buffer against stress. In terms of the new biologisms, there are a 
surprisingly few papers in our WOS sample on the neurophysiology of the 
emotions and the physiological ways of understanding the attachment process. 
Such a gap reflects the state of play at the end of the 1990s, (dubbed by 
President George Bush senior as ‘the decade of the brain’), when the Attachment 
Handbook contained a negligible number of articles of this type.326 However, 
Mary Main’s epilogue on the ways forward for attachment theory tentatively 
acknowledges the contribution of neurophysiology and brain science to the study 
of attachment, and thinks it may possibly have future potential. Indeed, this 
rapidly developing field is referred to, if only briefly and with careful caveats 
(but also with increasing frequency), in most current attachment based articles. It 
is seen as, potentially, providing empirical back up and hard scientific 
legitimation of the theorised mother-child interaction at the level of the brain and 
the neuro-endocrine system, which is further claimed by some as the origin and 
site of what is metaphorically called the attachment bond (Polan et al. 1999; 
Hofer, 1995). This new ‘scientific’ support is held to contribute greatly to the 
elaboration of the questionable connection made by Bowlby and Ainsworth 
between what is psychologically normal and healthy with what is natural. 
Before, they invoked nature at a distal evolutionary level to account for the 
assumed genetic programming behind the development of secure/insecure 
infantile attachment behaviour, the immediate causal mechanisms being seen as 
psychological. Now, in the new marriage of attachment theory with 
neurophysiology, biology accounts for behaviour at the same level as the 
psychological, also manifest in an experimental context, through neuro-
physiological measurement rather than behavioural observation. The pressing 
question is: whether biology is or should be privileged as an account of the 
causal mechanisms whereby an intimate environment can create the 
developmental trajectory for a child, with effects that last over a lifetime.  
                                                 
326 Apart from the Suomi and Hofer articles referred to in Chapter 6, there is just one by Fox 
Fox, N. A., Card, J. A., Cassidy, J. & Shaver, P. R. (1999) Psychophysiological Measures in 
the Study of Attachment. In Handbook of Attachment: Theory, Research, and Clinical 
Applications., pp. 226-245. New York, NY US: Guilford Press. 
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There was always a tension between the ethological and psychodynamic origins 
of attachment, and this question highlights the difficulty of the theory with the 
status of the inner space on which the different forms of attachment are 
inscribed. For this dissertation, the interesting consideration is, first, whether this 
new neurological angle on attachment has caused the internal and essentially 
psychodynamic or affective/cognitive site called attachment to revert to a 
metaphor or an epiphenomenon on a biological base, which is now open to more 
direct, more scientific observation. Or, second, is the study of neuro-
physiological processes simply a new way of envisaging activity in this internal 
space, supplementing the old methods of ‘gold standard’ behavioural 
observation and the self report on cognitive and emotional behaviour summoned 
by questionnaire? Has the ‘gold standard’ moved to careful observation of just 
another form of behaviour – what the brain does – this time written into myriad 
neural networks, in which a version of an inner life can be read and its wounds 
registered?  
This is a question which the denizens of the US and UK developmental 
psychology departments seem to be approaching with some caution. All would 
agree that the approach has certain seemingly incontrovertible foundations based 
on the great strides made in brain science over the 1990s, and driven by 
advances in techniques of psycho-physiological measurement and functional 
mapping of the brain – EEG, PET and fMRI.327 In particular, in the discourse of 
attachment writers, certain incontrovertible ‘findings,’ which strongly link 
neurophysiology to attachment theory, are acknowledged. The first is the 
development of a brain science which allows for a theory of human behaviour as 
driven by an affective as well as a cognitive space. This was the emergence in 
the academy of a subject called affective neuroscience, the title of whose 
                                                 
327 The techniques of psycho-physiological measurement of cognitive and affective processes in 
the individual are measuring heart rate (HR); blood and urine cortisol levels; an 
electroencephalogram (EEG), recording elecrical activity in the brain; functional magnetic 
resonance imaging for mapping brain activity and positron emission tomgraphy (PET) which 
provides a three dimensional brain map. See Fox, referenced above, for a careful description of 
the uses and the limits of these measures. 
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landmark book by Antony Damasio, published in 1994, Descartes’ Error, 
speaks for itself (Damasio, 1994). The aim of its practitioners, notably Damasio 
himself, Jaak Panksepp in the USA and Mark Solms, in the UK, is to reverse the 
bias of neuroscience toward cognition or linguistic brain activity (seen as largely 
left hemisphere) by mapping the emotional brain (right hemisphere) and also by 
investigating the unconscious functioning of the mammalian brain (the limbic 
system and the brain stem) and their relationship to the later acquired (human) 
cortical regions. All this has reversed the ‘cortico-centric’ nature of neuroscience 
and emphasised the importance of the early years of infancy which witness the 
rapid maturation of the right brain (Panksepp, 1998; Solms et al, 2002b).  
The second finding is the empirically established plasticity of the brain, which 
allows for the relational development of the maturing neuro-physiological 
system. Such knowledge changes the old perception that development is an 
interaction between a fully formed genetically programmed brain (biology) and 
its relational environment (society). As in attachment theory, the biological and 
the social (interpreted a certain way) are seen as becoming indistinguishable. 
The development of brain structure, functioning and organisation not only 
affects, but is affected by, experience, which produces changes in patterns of 
neuronal and synaptic connections. So, the partially random nature of gene 
expression in experience-independent maturational processes (Rutter et al, 2000) 
is modified by experience-expectant processes of neural pruning within specific 
maturational period (as in the first 18 months of life, or in early adolescence). 
Equally, experience-dependent processes of synapto-genesis respond to new 
environmental information, in which the individual brain is seen as self 
organising in a unique fashion (Cicchetti et al, 2006b). All of these processes are 
thought to interact and differentially affect how each individual develops. Thus, 
for example, the cyto-architecture of the cerebral cortex is shaped by genetics 
and the environment, in a process in which cortico-genesis should be seen as a 
process of self organisation guided by self regulatory mechanisms (Cicchetti et 
al, 2006b).  
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Third, most research to date has been conducted on animals, for obvious 
reasons, and on people with already established brain damage or neuronal 
malfunction. More valuable to the studies of neuro-plasticity, the population of 
abused but otherwise normal children has presented itself as a perfect source of 
subjects for a growing number of research studies which suggest that early 
experience of maltreatment or trauma has particular neurological effects, 
especially on the neuro-endocrine system. These are said to cause disruptions in 
basic homeostatic and regulatory processes essential to the maintenance of 
optimal physical and mental health. Specifically, variations in maternal care 
have been found to alter the expression of genes whose function is to regulate 
behavioural and endocrine responses to stress and to modify synapto-genesis in 
the hippocampus, as well as to influence the responsivity of the hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis to later life stressors (Levine, 1994; Meaney, 2001) 
cited in (Cicchetti et al, 2007: 169). It seems to be accepted that the wounds 
inflicted by maltreatment can be observed experimentally, through neuro-
imaging or physiological measurement. 
Based on this foundation, the discipline of developmental psychopathology has 
opted for the first alternative in answer to our question about the status of 
neurophysiology as the basis of observed behaviour. Not surprisingly, it has 
embraced a neurological approach to human psychological problems as part of 
its interdisciplinary approach to risk and resilience in child and adult 
development. Lip-service is paid to systems theory, in which, Cicchetti writes, 
‘ideally, investigations must direct their energies toward an examination of 
multiple levels of analysis within the same individual [sic]’ (Cicchetti et al, 
2005: 570). These ‘multiple levels’ are, in theory, all variables in a complex 
cybernetic model of development, in which social, cognitive, affective and 
neurological processes all co-evolve in some sort of holistic relationship. 
Nevertheless, the language of later articles and special editions of 
Developmental Psychopathology (for example, Cicchetti et al, 2006a; 2005) on 
the contribution of affective neuroscience to its academic and policy project 
subtly changes. The psychological level joins the social in becoming 
 343 
‘psychological and social experience’; that which mediates external information 
and transforms it into experiential input into the self organising brain (Cicchetti 
et al, 2006b). The brain is the biological base, the driver of behaviour and 
behavioural change, which in its environmental adaptedness provides the 
explanatory or causal mechanism through which this experience is internalised 
and structured into persistent, programmed responses to external stimulus over 
time (Cicchetti et al, 2006b; Pollak, 2005). So any internal psychological space 
merely mediates the brain’s co-evolution with its environment and, in this 
construction, the basic organising locus of attachment behaviour has moved to a 
biological site.  
 
Perhaps this is why mainstream attachment theorists seem not to have embraced 
neurological insights wholeheartedly – and this, despite Hofer’s work, described 
in the last chapter, as well as Alan Sroufe’s reconfiguration of attachment theory 
as a theory of affect regulation (Sroufe, 1996), which opened up the subject to 
neuro-physiological inputs (mostly, as above, from animal research) as well as 
their socio-behavioural or psychological correlates (Cassidy et al, 1999). For, in 
such works, the neuro chemistry of arousal and its regulation seems fairly 
uncontroversial, even if measurement is not without its set of methodological 
problems.328 Significantly, Mary Main in her epilogue to the Handbook has 
cautiously opted for our second version of the relationship of neurophysiology to 
attachment theory as just one more means of observing the effects of a form of 
inner life, which may, or may not, yield interesting new information (Main, 
1999a).  
In this article, what Main was specifically interested in accessing and observing 
was the workings of the dynamic unconscious, just as she had been in the 
construction and interpretation of the AAI, years earlier. The question was, with 
this new source of information, could she examine what appeared to be the 
dynamic mechanisms of defence and repression? This concerned the behaviour 
                                                 
328 For these see Fox (1999). 
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in the individual difference tests that she and her colleagues had interpreted 
psycho-dynamically as forming a defence – behaviour avoidant of emotional 
expression in the Strange Situation test (what Bowlby called ‘repression in the 
making’ (Bowlby 1969/1982)) – and, also, an inability to recall or unwillingness 
to address (by implication) negative events in childhood in AAI interviews. 
Could such behaviour be shown, by dissonant measurements of emotional 
arousal or brain functioning, to be indeed repression? Alternatively, in the latter 
case at least, could they be shown to be due to failures of memory because of 
impaired neural function – in other words, perhaps not repression at all? 
Likewise, could such impairments be correlated with the interview scripts of 
those of a disorganised classification, showing narrative incoherence and 
confusion? 
The answers she finds in the research data are not altogether clear (Main, 1999). 
Experiments using readings of Strange Situation infants’ cortisol levels show 
only that those infants that appear stressed in this situation – distressed, 
confused, and so on, as in the group of disorganised children – have higher post 
session cortisol readings. Since cortisol is known as the ‘stress hormone’ it 
would be hardly surprising. Avoidant children (in some experiments) appear to 
have the lowest cortisol levels, although raised heart rate (Sroufe et al, 1977b), 
so the assumption has to be that they do precociously down-regulate arousal – 
although whether this should strictly be defined as defence is another matter. In 
the case of the AAI and memory difficulties, these were shown by existing 
research to be more likely, also, in disorganized (D) respondents, often those 
who have been abused (Nelson et al, 1998). For example, loss of working 
memory may be due to damage to the prefrontal region because of long term 
stress and raised cortisol levels. 329  
                                                 
329 These findings also suggest behaviour consistent with the preoccupied category of the AAI, in 
extreme form associated with borderline personality disorder; a shrinkage of the hippocampus 
(as in war veterans with PTSD found to experience an 8% loss); possible modification of the 
amygdala, that part of the limbic system associated with unmediated fear and fear learning and 
with modulating the strength and storage of emotional memories, through early frightening 
experiences. Bremner, J. D., Randall, P., Scott, T. M., Bronen, R. A., Seibyl, J. P., 
Southwick, S. M., Delaney, R. C., McCarthy, G., Charney, D. S. & Innis, R. B. (1995) MRI-
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Main also wonders whether differential asymmetry in the activity of brain 
hemispheres, found in infants and also adult respondents tested with EEG for 
temperamental difference,330 might account for some differences in the ability to 
recall negative attachment related events of those in the avoidant/dismissive AAI 
category. First, she speculatively equates left brain asymmetry with the 
dismissing adult. She states firmly that she abjures what she calls the 
‘dichotomania’ of the past, when the hemispheres were crudely associated with 
rational logical thought for the left, as opposed to intuition and emotion for the 
right (Main, 1999a: 873) and she also mentions studies that emphasise what the 
two halves share, plus the general integration of the system at a high level of 
complex interconnectedness via the corpus callosum. But, with this caveat, she 
calls on some current research which reinstates some hemispheric differences. 
She notes the conclusion of a review article by Springer and Deustch of a raft of 
relevant research that ‘the best working hypothesis is that the left side of the 
brain typically subserves positive emotions whereas the right side typically 
subserves negative emotions ‘ (Main, 1999a: 674; Springer et al, 1997). It is a 
picture which suggests to her the dismissive versus the preoccupied AAI as left 
versus right dominant. Moreover, the right side of the brain is also connected to 
differential memory process, with the retrieval, rather than the encoding (left 
side work) of episodic (personal) memory, in the right prefrontal cortex 
(Wheeler et al, 1997), and with the autonoeic process of narrating the self – all 
suggestive of poorer memory retrieval in a left dominant dismissive AAI script, 
rather than a dynamic defence.  
All this is speculative however, and may, according to Main,  
Yield no more than an interesting instance of cartography ... and the import 
of such work for the understanding and change of human cognition, feeling 
and intentionality may not exceed that of the original behavioural 
observations (including the SS test and the AAI). That is, finding 
                                                                                                                                                 
Based Measurement of Hippocampal Volume in Patients with Combat-Related Posttraumatic-
Stress-Disorder. American Journal of Psychiatry, 152, 973-981. 
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neurological correlates to already mapped behavioural and discourse 
patterns may or may not provide additional insights into mechanisms and 
leverage points for clinical intervention. (Main, 1999a: 856) 
Certainly, given the agreed plasticity of the brain and the ‘use it or lose it’ rule 
for brain growth and development, there are some chicken and egg problems 
with causality here.  
 
Main may have been wise in saying in 1999 that, as yet, neuro-science may 
contribute no more to attachment theory than can be gleaned from psychological 
techniques of observation and interview schedules. Allan Schore, however, a 
leading and prolific proponent of the neurological approach to psychological 
health and wellbeing seems to have no such doubts. He is the academic who has 
done most to connect affective neuroscience to attachment theory and to 
communicate his approach to therapeutic practitioners (though his part in the 
BAT is questionable). Not only does he make connections between the 
researchers and the professional players but also, in a way, mediates the 
distinction between the first and second versions of attachment’s relationship to 
neurobiology and the status of the inner life. As a UCLA based psycho-therapist, 
he still identifies with the psychoanalytic world, but, less cautious than Mary 
Main, he simply equates the Freudian inner world of the split self, id, ego and 
super ego, with the structure of the brain. In Schore’s writing and lectures, the 
Freudian unconscious simply is what he calls the emotional right brain, as both 
function the same way in laying down the child’s earliest experiences of his 
environment in an unconscious form which will influence all his subsequent 
psychology and behaviour. He has written in a neuro-psychoanalytic journal on 
the developmental neurobiology of attachment:  
 
I have proposed that the vitally important attachment experiences of infancy 
are stored in the early maturing right hemisphere and that for the rest of the 
life-span unconscious working models of the attachment relationship encode 
strategies of affect regulation for coping with stress, especially interpersonal 
stress…. (Schore, 1999: 50)  
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The Freudian unconscious can be mapped, it seems, and its dysfunctional 
aspects made visible. What is more, the life-span effects of the stored attachment 
experiences seem to signal a return to a form of determinism (Schore, 1994; 
Schore, 2000; Schore, 2005). 
 
Besides this, Schore produces a curious reversal of the roles and status of the 
conscious ego, which negotiates with the external social world of the individual 
and is amenable to psychological study through observation and self report, and 
the unconscious id, which is only to be glimpsed in the esoteric interpretations of 
the psychoanalytic couch. If the right brain is the id, then the left brain is cast as 
the ego in a process in which not only does ‘dichotomania’ seem to have re-
emerged, but the totemic language of left brain/right brain seems structured on a 
set of highly evaluative binary oppositions. Panksepp himself talks about ‘the 
emotionally deeper, more sincere right brain’ and the following list, gleaned 
from Schore’s writings, gives the feeling that Descartes’ error has been 
somewhat overcorrected: 
 
Good                                              Bad 
Right brain                                     Left brain 
More connected to the body          Less connected to the body 
Deeper                                           Higher control 
Animal brain                                 Human brain 
Ancient                                          More evolved 
Emotional                                      Rational 
Non-linear                                      Linear 
Non-verbal                                     Semantic 
Implicit                                          Explicit 
Sincere                                           Insincere 
Authentic                                       Inauthentic 
Spiritual                                         Temporal 
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and so on (Schore, 1994; Schore, 2001a). There is something deeply puzzling 
about this line-up. It is as if his elision of mind and brain creates a set of 
paradoxes. It seems to suggest, for example that the left brain, associated with 
conscious knowledge, language and therefore culture, is not to be trusted as an 
object of scientific observation. Meanwhile, the emotional right brain is more 
natural, more real and more authentic, less contaminated by the tricky 
enlightenment world of language and reason and is, therefore, more amenable to 
observation and study by a natural science, whose epistemology is totally alien 
to it. 
 
What is more, an upside-down version of the super-ego also seems to emerge in 
Schore’s work. His most powerful, attachment related point is that in the first 
two or three years of life, when the right brain experiences an exceptional 
growth spurt, ‘reciprocal affective transactions within the mother-infant dyadic 
system are influential in its emerging structure’ (Schore, 1999: 51). This is 
incontrovertible; no developmental biologist or neuro-scientist would disagree. 
But having emphasised the deepness, sincerity and authenticity of a right brain 
unencumbered by language and culture, he goes on to claim that interactive 
affect-regulating events, ‘right hemisphere to right hemisphere affective 
transactions between mother and infant’ (Schore 1994), act as a mechanism for 
the ‘social construction of the human brain’ (my italics). This reference to the 
social is puzzling until it is made clear that, again, that social is just interactive, 
and not even person on person, but ‘a relationship with another self, another 
brain’ (Schore, 1999: 51).  
 
What begins to be suggested is that out of the neural connections and hormonal 
systems which subserve affective ties between people, a new version of the 
social and indeed, the spiritual and the moral, is emerging. Decidedly not 
Freud’s version of the super-ego, not culture specific but universal, not 
reflecting socio-economic structures, complex social codes, or moral 
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imperatives, but grounded in the biological need of the individual for emotional 
congress with others. 
 
This is reflected in the new position in social policy that neurobiology is 
tentatively acquiring. The right brain to right brain emotional ties of mother and 
child are being expanded. This new message about community and thence 
society is emerging from the communications between the neurobiological 
research academy and the wider world of therapeutic professionals and 
organisations of social and political influence. For example, we learn from an 
interview given by Dr Dan Siegel soon after the publication of his latest book, 
Toward a Neurobiology of Interpersonal Experience, in 2007,331 that 
neurobiology has been ‘of interest to and utilised by a number of organisations, 
including the Council on Technology and the Individual, the Sundance Institute, 
numerous psychiatry departments worldwide, the US Department of Justice and 
the Vatican’.332 Alan Schore, himself was a driving force in the production of 
the 2003 report of the Commission on Children at Risk (produced by 33 research 
scientists and jointly sponsored by the Dartmouth Medical School, the Institute 
for American Values and the YMCA of the USA). It goes by the title, 
Hardwired to Connect: The New Scientific Case for Authoritative Communities 
– groups, religious or secular, devoted to transmitting a model of the moral 
life.333 The thrust of the report is a recognition of the mounting crisis of poor 
child mental health, to alleviate which drugs may be ‘necessary’ but insufficient. 
Here, by implication, families are also deemed inadequate, so that the wider 
social environment has to be more favourable to mental health and healing. The 
child is biologically primed to make affective relationships with others: ‘our 
brains are physically wired to develop in tandem with another’s’.334 The bio-
hemistry of connection, in the production of the hormone oxytocin in moments 
                                                 
331 http://www.MentalHelp.net [accessed, 12th December, 2007]. 
332 http://www.mentalhelp.net [accessed, 10th December 2007]. 
333http://www.Townhall.com [accessed, 11th November, 2007]. 
334 Schore, quoted by conservative journalist, George Will. 
http://townhall.com/columnists/GeorgeWill/2003/09/21/hardwired_to_connect:1 [accessed, 11th 
Novemeber, 2007]. 
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of physical and emotional intimacy, promotes bonding in females and lowers 
male testosterone production, enhancing cooperative as opposed to violent 
behaviour. What is more, in a startlingly associative leap, this biological need 
for emotional connection is taken to imply a ‘natural need for moral and spiritual 
meaning’ only to be afforded by a supportive and containing community (ibid.). 
The biological relationship of the nursing dyad can be extended to infinity. 
Mother’s milk is the new Coca Cola! 
 
Of course there are a whole range of questions in this area which remain to be 
answered – if they ever could be. For example, how research on animal brains 
can be applied to human brains (especially in the context of a theory of 
evolution!) How are animals, let alone humans, isolated from the experimental 
context? How do the not uncontroversial techniques and methodological 
problems of rendering brain activity into visual information intervene between 
what is being studied and what is read? This is a particularly difficult question, 
given the much vaunted complexity of the brain and the imperative emphasised 
by Jaak Panksepp to avoid ‘the neo-phrenological slip’ of considering selected 
regions as providers of large scale functions.335 Moreover, how the study of 
brain relates to mind and to consciousness, how subcortical or unconscious brain 
activity relate to Freud’s dynamic unconscious, whether emotional neuro-
science can ever be a continuation of Freud’s original neuro-scientific project 
are all matters of lively and sometimes acrimonious debate in a new field called 
neuro-psychoanalysis, where psychoanalysis and brain science meet in a sort of 
monistic version of self, seen from two different perspectives, subject and object 
(Solms et al, 2002a). This is already institutionalised in a series of conferences 
and a learned journal, established at the turn of the 21st century.336 
 
It should be noted that although attachment academics may proceed with some 
caution in incorporating the contributions of brain science in their work, this has 
                                                 
335 http://ntp.neuroscience.wisc.edu/students/student-art/panksepp6p108.pdf [accessed 14th 
December, 2008]. 
336 http://www.neuro-psa.org.uk/npsa/ [accessed 21st December, 2008]. 
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not damped a growing enthusiasm for neuro-physiological explanations of 
attachment behaviour. They inform an increasingly large part of advice to 
parents and professional training days – hence Alan Schore’s successful lectures. 
For example, Quolkids, a flourishing Australian internet site for information on 
childcare (20,000 hits every month) has produced a summary of the key findings 
of ‘Infant Brain Research’ for parents.337 In the parental guidance rubric, two 
influential texts have been adopted by other sites: the first is an unpretentious 
paperback called Love Matters: How Affection shapes a Baby’s Brain (Gerhardt, 
2004); the second a large glossy manual called The Science of Parenting, well 
illustrated with colourful cerebral mappings and chapter headings such as, 
‘Parenting your Child’s Brain’. The latter, a BMA prize-winning book, is by 
Margot Sunderland, founder of the Centre for Child Mental Health in London, 
who has been mentored by Jaak Panksepp over a number of years (Sunderland, 
2008). She is also influential in giving and organising training in this field – 
significantly, for professionals and parents in the fostering and adoption system, 
where many of the severely disordered children mentioned in our introduction 
can be found. For example, she talked at The Post Adoption Centre on ‘The 
Impact of Abuse and Neglect on the Brain ‘ (May 2005 and ) and Adoption UK 
on ‘The Science of Attachment and Trauma: Latest Brain Research and Practical 
Parenting Strategies’ (in October 2007). What is more, after the Tavistock 
Clinic’s annual Fostering and Adoption Conference in November 2006 (for both 
professionals and parents), interest in the subject was such that the US speaker 
on the findings from brain development research for the aftermath of abuse and 
neglect was invited back, by popular request, to give a further workshop. 
 
Like Main, we might puzzle about what this new neuro-physiological layer of 
information adds to our knowledge about these severely disordered children, 
whom we met in the introduction to Chapter 5. What might it tell those who care 
for them that they do not know already? An obvious speculation, at a functional 
or therapeutic level, would be that the invoking of psycho-pathology or wounds 
                                                 
337 http://www.quolkids.com/default.asp [accessed, 3rd December,2007]. 
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that are invisible often shades into questions of desire, will and moral 
accountability. On the other hand, psychological harm that is visible, so 
unambiguously ensconced in medical discourse, legitimates behaviour as 
symptoms of illness and liberates the players from the problem of blame. But 
then why does the evidence from psychological and much psychiatric medicine 
no longer seem quite scientific enough to explain our wounds and their 
treatment? Why does bio-medical information seem so much more convincing 
as we think about ourselves and our suffering? Can it be that the evidence of the 
confessional is entirely devalued; that expertise in interpretation is suspicious, 
and that the authentic voice is somehow deceptive, as in the work of Alan 
Schore, cited above? Is it the case that, more and more, direct vision is the 
preferred register once again, that the use of metaphor has slipped away, and that 
the making of our wounds visible is the only way to understand them – and 
ourselves? 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We have examined here the history of one form of harm to an inner life; the 
variable ways in which this inner space has been thought to be made manifest, 
and, in particular, its hypothesised relationship to the natural world. This chapter 
has looked at the more statistical, less theoretical elaboration of the theory in 
which the discourse of risk and resilience has become predominant and the 
nature of the theoretical construct of attachment more or less taken for granted, 
until challenged by the further development of ethology and affective 
neuroscience. It has further been suggested that this history has an evolutionary 
flavour, as the theory which holds this harm in place has developed, adapted to 
the ecology of the academic and professional environments, and to the 
prevailing social policy conjuncture.  
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What has been described here is the advancement of a theory in terms of 
publications (implying university posts and preferment for its promulgators) and 
its promotion in non-academic, preventative and therapeutic circles. This is 
partly a development of a set of ideas, first, within the dialectic of a disputatious 
but also strategically cooperative academic context and, second, within a wider 
culture which has become imbued with questions about developmental 
psychology and psychopathology, the developmental sequelae of child abuse 
and, above all, about the self in therapy. At the same time, the state and its 
agencies have become increasingly willing to fund research and preventative 
public interventions in this area. In this chapter I have further argued that the 
flexible nature of the theory and its hydra-like aspect as a theory of normative 
and pathological development has fitted well with the complicated policies of 
New Labour. Within this governmental framework, traditional concerns about 
law and order and poverty and new concerns about the rise of mental illness in 
the population are all tackled under the umbrella of prevention and the 
promotion of psychological health and strength as necessary for citizens to 
engage successfully in the global economy.  
 
Specifically, it has been argued here that 1) attachment theory has 
accommodated to current concerns about risk, security and the regulation of 
dangerous individuals. 2), alternatively, it has accomodated to the needs of neo-
liberal political organisation for the development of individual citizens as self 
regulating entities, able to work flexibly in the context of an unrestrained global 
capitalism; mental health is therefore deemed to be of paramount importance to 
performance and contentment, itself a necessary base for political stability. 3) 
All these issues have been approached statistically rather than theoretically, in 
line with the direction of academic research effort and money has been directed 
towards theories and professional interventions which have empirically testable 
outcomes, distinguishing attachment theory from more conventional 
psychoanalytic approaches to child development. 4) This approach has led to the 
rapid development of the techniques of the neurosciences in which the 
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burgeoning neurological version of the theory might be said to have emphasised 
its tendency to determinism and its construction of motherhood, and, by 
extension, of community, co-operation and social life in general, as expression 
of a force of nature.  
 
This latter seems destined to replace evolutionary biology as the theory directly 
underpinning attachment’s clinical assumptions. What is more, whilst 
evolutionary biology was used by Bowlby and Ainsworth to complement their 
dynamic, cognitive affective construct, this new biologism seems to merge with 
it (or take it over?). For the clear line between the biological and the social, 
nature and culture, is disappearing. There is a case being made for the invisible 
wounds of insecure and disorganised attachment becoming, at least in principle, 
completely visible. There will be no more problems with their interiority, their 
inaccessability, their lack of definition and subjectivity. The affective life of the 
human ‘interior’ melds with the life of the emotional and mammalian brain and 
is amenable to the observational techniques of a heavily funded biological 
science. 
 
 
EPILOGUE 
 
The statistical and neurobiological developments in attachment theory may seem 
a little remote from the original work of John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth, who 
were clinicians and technicians of an inner space. Nevertheless, although 
Bowlby’s son, Richard, has become a sort of mascot for attachment based 
organisations in the BAT, it is still his father and his father’s US collaborator, 
whose names are constantly invoked in both academic and more popular 
contexts, and not just with nostalgia. As the range of their theory has spread and 
its influence increased, these two, of all the attachment theorists there now are, 
still have enormous iconic power. Citations of their key articles in academic 
journals have increased a thousand fold over the years. There are few attachment 
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websites where the words of one or both are not called on for information and 
legitimation. More importantly for a theory in which our representational, pre-
linguistic worlds play such a key part, their images abound. For example, the 
same photograph of John Bowlby is the logo for both the IAN and the CAPP, 
whilst Pat Crittenden’s Miami University Website shows her with her mentor 
Mary Ainsworth. The website of SUNY or the New York Attachment 
consortium, which appears to be the repository of personal information on the 
pair and self-appointed keeper of the Bowlby/Ainsworth family photographs and 
documents, publishes lists of their academic honours and tributes to them both 
from key students, including the information that two mountains in Tajikistan 
have been named after them – Mount John Bowlby and Peak Mary Ainsworth. 
In its home-page logo, images of Bowlby and Ainsworth are superimposed on 
either side of the three SUNY protagonists – Everett Waters, his wife, Harriet, 
and Judith Crowell, his other collaborator – all standing, as it were, among a 
scattering of giraffe and chimpanzees – these two heights of human attainment 
and their inheritors, grounded, appropriately, in the natural world. 
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                       CONCLUDING CHAPTER 
 
 
This thesis has been an exercise in what Foucault called ‘historical ontology’. It has 
tracked the development over time of the idea of an invisible wound into the 
massive academic professional and administrative apparatus of the psy, operating 
variously in different countries and in different regimes of truth. I have looked at 
some of the ways in which a psychic interior has been explored and at the emerging 
knowledges that have brought this problem category of psychic harm into being; 
that have made it culturally prevalent in the anglophone world at the turn of the 
century and a powerful legitimation of claims to injury.  
 
In my presentation of these narratives of internal exploration and their implications, 
I have tried to maintain a neutral and distanced stance. I have not been writing a 
social critique. Of course, since I am a product of my historical circumstances, I 
will have my prejudices, which may have crept out unintentionally. I confess to a 
strong sympathy with the critique of psychological individualism presented in 
Chapter 1 and some deep misgivings at the therapeutic turn our lives have taken. I 
think that the more that a form of knowledge of subjects reaches into individual 
memory and desire, the more it is constitutive of identity, and so the more 
oppressive it is. But, true to my Foucauldian brief, I am also aware that, to hold this 
view, I am conjuring up some enlightenment individual who has negative rights to 
privacy, freedom from interference and the rest – a scion of Western liberalism and 
just another constituted identity. Besides, no-one is interfering with our liberally 
defined freedom here. The new subjectivities of the psychological, the therapeutic 
and the affective turn, though convenient to self government in a neo-liberal state, 
have not been imposed on us. How could they be? They are the ways we choose to 
see ourselves. And the discourse of the wound with its rhetoric of psychic damage, 
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scarring, developmental dislocation and healing is just part of the construction of 
selves at the start of the 21st century. 
 
Not a social critique, my method has been genealogical, mapping the discursive, 
social and political conditions which gave rise to this wound category as used in the 
present. As a writing of a history of the present, it traces the ancestors of this idea 
and presents it as dependent on what went before, arising from historical 
conditions. In this way, it suggests a time when such ideas were not prevalent or 
even thought and, so, the possibility that they might never have come into 
existence. In the words of Nikolas Rose, quoted at the end of my Introductory 
Chapter, it ‘destabilises’ or ‘de-fatalises’ the present (Rose, 1999). As a method 
which only investigates the ancestors of a particular present, it does not consider all 
the other presents that are, or might have been, and all their would be progenitors. It 
presents neither a full picture of our present nor our past. Nor is it meant to. It is a 
method designed to challenge or question claims to truth in the world, not by using 
the rules and methods of the discourse in progress, but by establishing its historical 
nature, or contingency. 
 
This history or genealogy has been conducted almost entirely at the level of 
discourse – bodies of knowledge which organise academic, professional, legal and 
policy texts and their accompanying practices, in which the different versions of 
psychological harm are inscribed. The three basic versions that I have described, 
trauma, emotional abuse and attachment disorder, each have different discursive 
origins and histories. Although, as I have argued, the concept of trauma has 
migrated across many discursive sites and so links all three and they each support 
the same regimes of truth: the medical/clinical, the epidemiological/statistical and 
the administrative legal, I would not conclude that they have become part of one 
larger overarching discourse. While such grand epochal claims are tempting, one 
can recognise an important and undeniable cultural shift towards psychological 
individualism in the last quarter of the 20th century and yet see the discursive sites 
of these wound categories as still local and distinct 
 358 
 
What these categories of harm do have in common is that they are embodied in 
techniques and assessments that have real consequences for self and society. For, 
amidst all the variations, and the ambiguities and controversies caused by the 
wound’s subjectivity, these different versions are all items of knowledge which are 
also units of power in ‘the making up of people’ (Hacking, 1995). They are 
formulae which can change the lives of individuals to whom they are applied. In 
other words, what I have described here is the historical development of ways of 
knowing which have real, though variable, consequences for ways of being. 
Although this second half of a recursive loop is not something I have been able to 
pursue here, as stated in my Introductory Chapter, I have assumed, on the basis of 
an extensive literature in the social sciences, that socially constructed categories do 
have complex consequences for labeling and identity formation.  
 
Also assumed here is that these categories of knowledge play a part in the making 
of programmes and strategies of government, in its broadest sense. In my 
Introductory Chapter and in Chapters 5 and 7, I have given an account of the way 
that risk of psychological harm and its consequences has played a part in current 
governmental preoccupations in the UK. I saw this partly as setting out the political 
conditions of the emergence of these wound categories, partly as establishing its 
present cultural prevalence. Also, as stated in my Introductory Chapter, I have not 
speculated on the particular configurations of power, in the Foucauldian sense, that 
such versions of knowledge allow or will allow (this would be the subject matter of 
another thesis338). Nevertheless, as these categories figure in the making up of 
people and the creation of certain subjectivities rather than others, so they are 
undoubtedly elements in current formations of power; in the regulation and self 
regulation of souls in all social spheres and in both the coercive and non-coercive 
activities of the state.  
  
                                                 
338 See Brown, W. (1995) States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. This presents a critique of Foucault's categorisation of power in the light 
of modern politics. 
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The genealogy of these concepts is a story set in the dialectic between the body and 
soul as a location for invisible wounds, which was one of the main themes in my 
mind when I started this study. Initially, I was thinking of the movement from 
engagement with physical wounds to interest in psychical wounds as reflecting 
Freud’s move from the neurological to a psychoanalytic understanding of shock 
and trauma, which was achieved literally through the use of metaphor and 
associative thinking, though backed up by a complex theorisation of the internal 
wound as repressed memory. I was considering the major discursive shift from 
somatic threat to psychic threat, discussed in my Introductory Chapter, almost as a 
linguistic phenomenon, progressing as metaphor progresses from the concrete to 
the abstract. It then seemed to come full circle in the case of PTSD and nervous 
shock, as all the conceptual and practical problems involved with abstraction and 
invisiblity made themselves felt and a neurological version of this wound restored 
its visibility. The first half of this process, with variations, seemed to be repeated in 
the case of emotional abuse, only to come full circle again in the story of 
attachment theory. 
  
However, as I studied further the changing practices and the thought processes of 
those involved in these major shifts of discourse, it became clear to me that the real 
story was not about body and soul, and their various combinations, but about the 
dramatic way these discourses of the wound have contributed to, or been shaped by, 
how we construe what was traditionally called ‘the social’ – ‘the social’ that was 
posited and theorised in studies of ‘the socialisation process’. By this ‘social’ I 
mean a shared language, culture and moral imperatives and the organisation of 
production and reproduction with all its implications for group stratification and 
wealth distribution. A human way of being which, at birth, was written onto the 
tabula rasa of the new child, who was just a bundle of animal instincts, essentially 
savage. 
 
The story, as it emerges from this thesis, seems to run as follows: in Chapter 1, in 
which I lay out the implications of the invisible wound metaphor as a form of 
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defensive individualism, I describe, at some length, a critique of the discourse of 
wounds in which, it is claimed, ‘the social’ is reduced to the inter-psychic and 
national upheaval and change to the medical language of wounding and healing. In 
the straightforwardly medico/legal version of invisible wounds in the next two 
chapters on PTSD and nervous shock, ‘the social’ hardly makes an appearance, but 
then it re-emerges at a local level in the two chapters on emotional abuse. Here, the 
gradual shifting of the professional gaze from wounds on the body to wounds on 
the soul is facilitated by consideration of the psycho-social conditions of physical 
or sexual violence. But ‘social’ considerations like poverty and inequality were 
specifically eliminated from accounts of the causes and consequences of all forms 
of abuse, partly because of prevailing political conditions. This allowed the 
psychological its full range. Again, the interpersonal stands in for wider social 
considerations and this seems like a reductive process to which the critique in 
Chapter 1 could apply. 
 
Then we come to attachment theory, where the interpersonal or the socio-
psychological is embodied in the primal relationship between mother and child. 
This mutual relationship of complex interaction is said to be genetically 
programmed and therefore natural and exhibits a range of cross species features. It 
was Ainsworth who pointed out in her contribution to Martin Richard’s The 
Integration of a Child into a Social World (Ainsworth et al, 1974) that attachment 
theory turns the old version of ‘socialisation’ on its head339. For the child is not 
inducted into the social world. This world is there in the child already! And 
attachment problems are this potential for sociality cut off or spoiled. Furthermore, 
this version of invisible wounds as an essential feature of attachment theory is not 
undermined by the recent neurological version, as the psychic harm version of 
PTSD seems to be. On the contrary, the affective turn to neuroscience seems to 
provide a new holism. The narrative is expansive rather than reductive. The inner 
space of attachment spreads to inhabit the brain as well, where it can be seen and 
                                                 
339 See also Riley, D. (1983) War in the Nursery: Theories of the Child and Mother. London: Virago 
Press. Chapter 2 for an exposition. 
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read by new techniques. It strengthens attachment’s natural version of the social as 
the basis on which the human ‘social’ world is built. The nursing dyad, ventrum to 
ventrum, or right brain to right brain, is the prototype of human spirituality, ethics, 
communication and co-operative organisation as well as all the complex affective 
and cognitive capacities of the human mind. The basis of human society is a love 
relationship – the instinct for gift exchange rather than the rape and capture of 
women or the co-operative gaming of rational self interest. A truly Romantic theory 
and one in which, after centuries of cultivating his unique inner life, man can take 
his place in the animal kingdom once more. 
 
As I argued in Chapter 6, this natural idyll has a terrible downside – children cut off 
from all the potential of their conception and the extremes of disorder in young and 
old alike. It stands as a constant threat to mothers and a continual, never-ending 
source of work for our mother substitutes – those psy professionals in the 
therapeutic domain. For whether they are experts on body or soul, brain or mind, 
these growing numbers of technicians of psy and neuro-psy are what we need to 
service this way of being as (neuro) psychological individuals. We are continually 
learning new versions of our inner lives from new experts with new techniques, 
though I like to think that, as individuals, we are still ‘bricoleurs’340 who will call 
on different experts and different versions of the wound, whatever comes to mind, 
as it is useful to make a point or relieve distress. What is certain is that we will go 
on peering anxiously deep inside ourselves to appraise and improve our souls, 
much as we work on our bodies, through practice, exercise, regimes for shaping 
and strengthening and pharmacological and surgical enhancement. We will call on 
a host of trainers who will coach us in confidence and self sufficiency and lessen 
our vulnerability to external pressure and hostility. And, if the worst happens, there 
will be others there to bathe our wounds, sew them up and set us on the pathway to 
healing. 
                                                 
340See Levi-Strauss, C. (1968) The Savage Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ‘Bricoleur’ 
is French for ‘do-it-yourself man’. ‘Bricolage’ was a word used by Claude Levi Strauss in this book 
to describe the non-scientific building of imaginative worlds and world views with whatever bits 
and pieces come to hand.  
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What I have tried to do here is to present accounts of some of the language, the 
narratives and the practices that feed into our thinking about ourselves and our 
psychic vulnerability. I have done this to assert the contingency of this language, its 
historical nature or ontological subjectivity. Our explorers of the interior could have 
come back with different stories. We could have seen ourselves differently. It is 
only in that thought that our freedom lies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
